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
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THE

HISTORY OF GREECE.

BY

CONNOP THIRLWALL, D.D.

BISHOP OF ST. DAVID'S.

IN EIGHT VOLUMES.

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ANALYTICAL AND CHRONOLOGICAL

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
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ERRATUM.

A friendly reader has pointed out to me an error which has been allowed to remain in Vol. II. p. 256., where (in contradiction to Herodotus, vi. 90.) Nicodromus is said to have fallen into the hands of his adversaries. The passage should have run thus:

"—— the Athenian succours did not arrive in time. Nicodromus with some of his party escaped from the island, and at a later period sallying forth from Sunium, where a settlement was assigned to them by the Athenian government, made frequent descents for booty on Ægina. But seven hundred of his adherents fell into the hands of his adversaries."


Academy
Asomato
Road from the Metokhi of Sharamanga Archidale passing by the ruins of a fortified house
Hill with ancient foundations upon and near it
Road from Port Phanari and the ferry of Salamis
Perate or Northern long Wall
Phaleric or Southern long Wall
Halipedum
Bay of Phalerum
P. Aphrodisium
PIRAEUS
P. Zea
P. Phalerum
P. Munychia
Acropolis
Plan of the
WALLS AND PORTS
of
ATHENS
Scale of Yards

HISTORY OF GREECE.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE RUPTURE BETWEEN THE SPARTANS AND ALCIBIADES TO THE OVERTHROW OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AT ATHENS, AND THE RESTORATION OF ALCIBIADES.

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Quarrel between Agis and Alcibiades.—Alcibiades the counsellor of Tissaphernes. — Alcibiades negotiates with the Athenians at Samos. — Phrynichus. — Pisander's Intrigues at Athens. — Political Associations. — Conference between Pisander and Tissaphernes. — Third Treaty between Persia and Sparta. — Chios relieved. — Oligarchical Movements of Pisander: and of his Party at Athens. — Antiphon. — Theramenes. — The Four Hundred. — Expulsion of the Five Hundred. — The Four Hundred negotiate with Sparta. — Oligarchical Conspiracy defeated at Samos. — Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus. — Proceedings of Astyochus. — Alcibiades at Samos. — Tumult at Miletus. — Influence of Alcibiades at Samos. — Reaction against the Oligarchy at Athens. — Theramenes. — Fortifications at Eetionea. — Murder of Phrynichus. — Insurrection at Athens. — Destruction of Eetionea. — Revolt of Eubœa. — Revolution at Athens. — Fate of the leading Oligarchs. — Recall of Alcibiades.

In the interval between the battle of Miletus and the interview of Tissaphernes with the Spartan commissioners at Cnidus, some transactions had taken place, which were pregnant with very important changes, and gave a singular complexity to the affairs of the contending parties. Alcibiades, as we have seen, not only fought against his countrymen

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at Miletus, but exerted himself with great apparent earnestness and activity to deprive them of the fruits of their victory. Up to this moment there is no reason to doubt that he was seriously bent on serving the cause of the Peloponnesians, as that which was the sole foundation of his ambitious or vindictive hopes. But henceforth his conduct was entirely changed, and his views appear to have taken an opposite direction.

Quarrel between Agis and Alcibiades.

Though he had attracted great admiration at Sparta by his talents and address, and especially by the flexibility with which he adapted himself to the national character and habits, he does not seem to have gained any friends, and he made at least one implacable enemy, in king Agis. Thucydides only mentions the fact, without explaining the cause of his animosity. One quite adequate, and perfectly probable, is assigned by later writers[1], who relate that Agis suspected Alcibiades of having dishonoured his queen Timæa. The silence of Thucydides, on a point of this nature, cannot cast any doubt on the story, and since it is certain that Agis was convinced of his wife's infidelity, it would be an absurd stretch of incredulity to doubt that he believed Alcibiades to be her paramour. Whether his jealousy was well founded, is a different question; but the character of Alcibiades renders it very credible that he should have engaged in such an intrigue, less, perhaps, under the impulse of passion than of vanity[2], ambitious, as he is reported to have avowed, of giving a king to Sparta. Timæa's fondness for him is said to have been carried to such an excess, that, in her private apartments, among her female attendants, she called her infant son Leotychides by his name. Agis had

[1] Justin, v. 2. Plutarch, Alc. 23.

[2] So our Buckingham — whose character in many points resembled that of Alcibiades — during his embassy in France, as Clarendon says, *had the ambition to fix his eyes upon, and to dedicate his most violent affection to a lady of a very sublime quality.*

no difficulty in finding instruments for his revenge. The success and influence of Alcibiades among the Asiatic Greeks, though immediately subservient to the interest of Sparta, were of themselves sufficient to awaken the jealousy of the government, as well as the envy of many leading individuals. The suggestions of Agis probably contributed toward representing him as a dangerous person, whom it was necessary for the public safety to put out of the way. The great armament under Theramenes seemed to afford full security; and orders were sent either with it, or soon after, to Astyochus, to despatch Alcibiades. According to one account he was warned of his danger by Timæa; he at least received timely notice of it, and henceforth did not again put himself in the power of the Spartans, but attached himself wholly to the court of Tissaphernes.

The treachery of the Spartan government, if it did not strongly rouse his resentment, so altered his position as to compel him to adopt a new course. It was no longer with the aid of Sparta, but in spite of her hostility, that he could hope to overthrow his enemies, and to recover his station at Athens; and the safety of his country became indissolubly linked with his own. But though the same motive now induced him to thwart the Peloponnesians, which had hitherto engaged him in their service, he was also desirous that the Athenians, before they received his assistance, should feel their need of him, and should look up to him as a powerful benefactor. Both these objects he hoped to accomplish through the favour of Tissaphernes. He easily insinuated himself into the satrap's good graces, by those arts of flattery in which he was so consummate a master, as not to fear competition even with an oriental courtier. Tissaphernes was so much delighted with his society, that he is said to have given the name of Alcibiades to

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his favourite park. But for the purpose of gaining his patron's confidence, so as to make him the instrument of his own designs, Alcibiades well knew that something more was requisite than to minister to the amusements of his leisure hours. It was not a conformity of taste and habits, but of interests, that could effect a solid union between them. It was therefore his aim to draw Tissaphernes into the train of measures which he had planned for his own ends, by representing it as indispensable to his safety and prosperity.

Alcibiades the counsellor of Tissaphernes.

The first step was not difficult. He counselled Tissaphernes to contract the supplies which he had hitherto furnished for the maintenance of the Peloponnesian fleet; and this advice was too congenial to the satrap's avarice not to be readily adopted. It was at the instigation of Alcibiades that he reduced the pay of the seamen from a drachma a day, first to three fifths and then to one half of that amount, and became gradually less and less punctual in his disbursements.[1] His counsellor likewise prompted him with arguments to meet the remonstrances of the Peloponnesians, instructing him to plead the example of the Athenians, who from motives not of parsimony but of policy, for the preservation of temperance and discipline in their fleets, allowed their sailors only half a drachma a day: and he suggested to him that a small sum of money, judiciously distributed among the commanders of the allied forces, would silence their complaints; and in fact none but Hermocrates was able to withstand this bait. He himself under-

[1] Krueger (Comment. ad Dionys. p. 354.) seems to have quite bewildered himself in his account of these transactions. He has not observed that Thucydides, c. 45., clearly ascribes the first reduction of the pay to the influence of Alcibiades. He therefore resorts to conjectures equally unnecessary and improbable: that Tissaphernes made an addition out of his own coffers to the pay allowed by the king, so as to raise it to a drachma a day, which he then cut down to one half by the advice of Alcibiades; or that the words ἀντὶ δραχμῆς Ἀττικῆς are an interpolation.

took in the satrap's name to answer the applications which were made to him by the revolted cities for pecuniary aid. The Chians he dismissed with a sharp rebuke: *wealthy as they were, they ought to be ashamed of calling upon others, not only to risk their lives, but to spend their resources, for the defence of their liberty.* The others he admonished that it was only reasonable they should contribute as much at least, if not more, for the protection of their independence, as they had heretofore paid to the Athenians. For all, there was one specious pretext to cover the rejection of their demands. *Tissaphernes was obliged to use a strict economy, so long as he carried on the war with his private funds; he would be both just and liberal, whenever he received a sufficient supply of treasure from the King.*

But at the same time he endeavoured to impress Tissaphernes with a view of the war, and of his own relation to the belligerents, different from that which he had hitherto taken. Tissaphernes had hitherto been sincerely anxious to overthrow the power of Athens, which he had been used to consider as the only enemy that his master had to fear in the west, and he had been preparing to bring a great armament from Phœnicia to aid the Peloponnesians. Alcibiades now moderated his eagerness by pointing out to him a new and greater danger, with which the King would be threatened, if the same state should acquire the ascendancy in Greece both by sea and land. So long as Greece was divided between two rival powers, neither could ever be formidable to the King, who might always turn the arms of the one against the other. But if the empire of the sea should be united to that of the land, he might be brought into an immediate and hazardous struggle with the single mistress of Greece. It was both cheaper and safer to let the Greeks grind each other

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down in a protracted conflict. If however it was necessary to side with either party, the King's interests were less at variance with those of Athens than with her rival's. Her views were mainly directed to the establishment of her maritime dominion; and for the sake of securing it, she would probably be willing to resign the sovereignty of the Asiatic Greeks to the King; whereas the Spartans professed themselves the champions of Grecian liberty and independence, and therefore, if they were victorious in their contest with Athens, could not consistently suffer the Greek colonies in Asia to remain subject to the Persian empire. It should therefore be the object of Tissaphernes, first to extort what concessions he could from the Athenians, and then to rid himself of the Peloponnesians.

These suggestions sank deep in the mind of Tissaphernes, whose temper and capacity they exactly suited. He appears to have dismissed all intentions of bringing his Phœnician fleet into the Ægean, and to have resolved to use it only as a pretext for keeping the Peloponnesians inactive by the constant expectation of being soon joined by a force which would overwhelm the enemy, until the strength of their navy was wasted, whilst the most favourable opportunities were lost. He admitted Alcibiades to his most confidential intimacy, and Alcibiades, it may be supposed, did not fail to make the most public display of the footing which he had gained in the satrap's favour. The report of his potent influence, perhaps somewhat exaggerated, reached the Athenian camp at Samos, and produced such an effect there, that he now thought it time to intimate to some of the leading men that his resentment was not implacable, and that he would be no less willing than able to render the most important services to his country, if he might depend on returning to it with safety; but that he could not feel secure so long as the government was in the hands of the same vio-

lent democratical party which had driven him into exile. The persons to whom this message was sent eagerly caught at the prospect which it held out, that Alcibiades would lend his aid toward overthrowing the constitution, and establishing an oligarchy, in which they would be among the principal members. The burdens to which the wealthier citizens were subjected since the Sicilian disaster, added to their ordinary causes of discontent, had worn out the patience of many, and disposed them to desire a revolution at any cost, even at the risk of sacrificing the independence of the state. They were therefore delighted with overtures which promised to gratify their chief wish, and by means which at the same time might enable them to overcome their foreign enemies. Some of them crossed over to the continent, and had an interview with Alcibiades, which confirmed their hopes, and quickened their resolution. Let democracy be abolished at Athens, and he engaged to put them upon good terms first with Tissaphernes and then with the King, who would be more inclined to trust them under a different government. On their return to Samos, they mustered their friends and concerted their measures, which embraced not only Athens, but the subject states, in which they proposed to bring about a similar revolution; and they now ventured publicly to announce the offers of Alcibiades, with the condition annexed to them. The great body of the citizens in the fleet, startled by the sacrifice required from them, but attracted by the advantages of the Persian alliance, which would supply the deficiencies of their own exhausted treasury, remained in a state of suspense, which was interpreted by the authors of the project as acquiescence. Having made this first and most critical step, they again held a private meeting of their adherents, and took the proposals of Alcibiades into more mature consideration. No objection was offered

Alcibiades negotiates with the Athenians at Samos.

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Phrynichus.

by any one present, except by Phrynichus the general, an unprincipled but sharpsighted adventurer, who declared that he placed no confidence, either in the intentions of Alcibiades, or in his ability to fulfil his promises, and that their whole scheme appeared to him big with dangers which they had not sufficiently weighed. He could not believe that Alcibiades was at heart more friendly to oligarchy than to democracy, or that he desired any other revolution than one which would enable his partizans to bring him back in triumph; and they must be on their guard that he did not involve them in a civil war. On the other hand it seemed incredible that the King could ever be persuaded to expose himself to the enmity of the Peloponnesians, who were now formidable at sea and masters of several important cities in his dominions, for the sake of the Athenians, whom he could not trust. Their plan of establishing oligarchical government in the subject states, would, he was convinced, be attended with consequences which they did not expect. Instead of inducing the revolted towns to submit to their authority, it would encourage the others to rebel. What their subjects wanted was not a change in their constitution, but independence; and if they were forced to continue under Athenian sovereignty, they would prefer the rule of the Athenian people to that of an oligarchy, which they knew by experience to be far more oppressive. It was by the very persons who would take the lead in an oligarchical government that they were plundered and trampled on, and it was to the people alone that they looked for protection, when their property or their persons were threatened with violence. If the supreme power should fall into the hands of their oppressors, they would have no refuge left.

These reflections do indeed give us a still higher opinion of the sagacity and judgment of Phrynichus,

than the circumspection which he displayed on a former occasion in his military character. Thucydides adds the sanction of his own authority to the conjecture of Phrynichus as to the designs of Alcibiades; and there can be no doubt that he would have preferred any form of democracy to the kind of oligarchy which his new friends wished to establish. But he seems to have had two motives for professing himself hostile to the existing constitution. He might expect that the first attempt made to subvert it would involve the ruin of Androcles and other demagogues, his personal enemies, who, as long as they retained their influence, would stand in the way of his recall; and he might think that the condition which he attached to his offers, while it rendered them the more plausible, might serve as a colour for evasion and delay. Perhaps, as the final result, he anticipated a contest between two factions, in which he might be umpire, and might carry away the stake.

But the oligarchical party at Samos, making their wishes the measure of probability, slighted the warnings of Phrynichus, adhered to their first resolution, and sent a deputation to Athens headed by Pisander, one of the persons who had been most active in keeping up the public alarm in the affair of the Hermes-busts, to negotiate for the recall of Alcibiades, the abolition of democratical institutions, and alliance with Persia. Phrynichus now began to think his own position dangerous; he foresaw that, if Alcibiades should be restored, he should be exposed to his fiercest resentment, as the man who alone had endeavoured to thwart his views; he therefore determined to strike the first blow. He sent a letter to Astyochus, informing him of the injury Alcibiades was doing to the cause of the Peloponnesians, and of the attempts he was making to gain Tissaphernes for Athens, adding an excuse or explanation of his own treachery. But

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Astyochus had neither the means nor the will to serve the wishes of Phrynichus. Alcibiades, after the warning he had received, no longer put himself in the power of the Spartans, and Astyochus, as clearly appears from the sequel, had sold himself to Tissaphernes. He repaired to Magnesia, where the satrap was residing, and communicated the contents of the letter to him and Alcibiades. Alcibiades immediately wrote to the principal officers at Samos, complaining of the treason of Phrynichus, and demanding that he should be put to death. On this occasion Phrynichus, blinded perhaps by his fears, seems to have been deserted by his wonted sagacity; unless we should suppose his conduct the result of a very bold as well as subtle artifice. He again wrote to Astyochus, intimating no suspicion of his breach of secrecy, but only complaining of his want of caution, and offered to betray the Athenian armament into his hands, with the town of Samos, which like most of the others in Ionia was unfortified, minutely describing all the particulars of the plan. Astyochus betrayed this letter also to Alcibiades, who sent a fresh charge against Phrynichus to Samos. But before his despatch arrived there, Phrynichus—who had either discovered or foreseen the behaviour of Astyochus—announced that the enemy, as he had been informed on good authority, was preparing to take advantage of the weakness of the town and of the absence of a part of the fleet, and to surprise their encampment, and that no time should be lost in fortifying Samos, and taking other precautions; and he immediately gave his orders, as general, to the same effect. After this the letter of Alcibiades, which confirmed his information as to the enemy's designs, was not only harmless, but seemed to prove that both the charges were malicious fabrications. Alcibiades now laboured still more earnestly to con-

vince Tissaphernes of the policy of siding with Athens; and the conference at Cnidus, which showed that he had judged rightly of the temper and views of Sparta, added fresh weight to his arguments. The satrap's inclination now tended this way; and he was only restrained from yielding to it by his fear of the Peloponnesians, whose naval superiority made it dangerous to provoke them.[1]

Pisander's intrigues at Athens.

In the mean while, Pisander and his colleagues executed their commission at Athens with great success. In the popular assembly he exhibited the prospect which was now opened of overcoming the Peloponnesians with the aid of Persia, and stated the terms on which this benefit was to be purchased: that the decree against Alcibiades must first be repealed, and that some changes must be made in the constitution. Pisander had to encounter a vehement opposition both from the ardent friends of democracy, and from the personal enemies of Alcibiades. He probably had some in the great priestly families, the Eumolpids and Ceryces, which filled the most important offices in the Eleusinian mysteries. They endeavoured to alarm the superstition of the people, while others appealed to its pride, and exclaimed against the indignity of making a way for the return of Alcibiades on the ruin of the laws. But the main point had been already gained, when the public spirit was brought down to a state in which it could tolerate such a proposal, though cautiously worded, so as to leave it doubtful what parts of its institutions the people would be required to sacrifice. Pisander felt the strong ground on which he stood, and was not

[1] This appears to be the meaning of Thucydides, VIII. 52., and not to be improperly or harshly expressed according to the reading πεισθῆναι. According to the reading πιστευθῆναι, which Krueger prefers, the views attributed to Tissaphernes, whether it was the confidence of Alcibiades or that of the Athenians that he is supposed to desire to gain, would, even if in themselves probable, be much more obscurely intimated.

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moved either by the indignant protestations of the demagogues, or by the solemn adjurations of the priests, but calmly called on his opponents to answer a plain question. He successively interrogated each of them, whether he saw any hope of safety for the commonwealth, now that the Peloponnesians had raised a navy, at least as powerful as their own, which was maintained by Persian gold, and were masters of more cities than remained attached to the Athenian confederacy, unless the King could be brought over to their side. None ventured to reply in the affirmative, and Pisander triumphantly concluded: *The only way of gaining this ally is to temper our constitution, and to fill the chief offices of the state, in such a manner that he may be able to trust us; this is not a time to discuss forms of government, but to provide for the public safety. If the innovations that may be expedient for the present should not satisfy us, they may be hereafter revised. Alcibiades must be restored; for he is the only man who can accomplish the object for which these changes are to be made.* Urged by the apparent necessity of the case, and soothed by the hope of resuming its concessions, the people yielded, and passed a decree, by which Pisander and ten other commissioners were invested with full powers to negotiate with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades. Pisander at the same time, wishing to get rid of Phrynichus, imputed the fall of Iasus to his treachery. He and Scironides, one of his colleagues, were recalled, and Leon and Diomedon were sent to supply their place.

Political associations.

Pisander neither had fully disclosed the nature of the political changes which he had in view, nor did he mean to rely on the consent of the people for bringing them about. He had more convenient instruments at his command. In most of the Greek states the ambition of individuals, or the conflict of

parties, had given rise to a number of private associations, for purposes either wholly or mainly political, some attached to a single leader, others united by the common interests of the members. These clubs were of long standing at Athens. Cimon had formed one, which rallied round him as its centre, attracted not more perhaps by his fortune and abilities than by his principles, shared the reproach which he incurred by his partiality for Sparta, and proved its devotedness to his person at the battle of Tanagra. It seems to have been by means of a similar union that Thucydides, the rival of Pericles, endeavoured to collect and guide the strength of the aristocratical party. It was so perhaps that Nicias and Alcibiades had been enabled to defeat the attempt of Hyperbolus. It was on his command over such associations, that Alcibiades relied for the accomplishment of his ambitious designs. But there appear to have been many political clubs at Athens, which did not acknowledge any chief, but merely aimed at certain objects in which all the members were equally concerned. The defective administration of justice exposed unprotected individuals to vexation and wrong, but enabled a number, who combined their fortunes and credit, the more easily to shield each other, or to strike a common enemy. Another end for which such coalitions were formed, was to control the elections for offices of trust and power, either with a view to self-defence, or to the extension of their influence. In every case both the object and the means, if not positively illegal, were such as the law did not recognise; the mutual attachment of the associates was stronger than the ties by which they were bound to the state, and even than those of blood; and the law of honour which generally prevailed among them required that they should shrink from no sacrifice and from no crime, which the common interest might demand.

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These associations therefore were hotbeds of seditious and revolutionary projects; and Phrynichus found it easy to engage them on his side; and before he left Athens, he had organised an extensive conspiracy among them for the immediate subversion of the democratical government.

Leon and Diomedon arrived off the coast of Asia before him to take the command of the fleet, and soon after sailed to Rhodes to inspect the enemy's condition. They found the Peloponnesian fleet still laid up, but made a landing on the island and gained a victory over the troops which marched against them, and then stationed themselves at Chalce to watch the movements of the enemy, and to seize all occasions of annoying him. While they were here, Pedaritus sent to Rhodes to announce that the Athenians had completed their works, and that Chios could only be saved by the immediate succour of the whole Peloponnesian armament. But before it could move to his relief, collecting all his land forces, he made a sudden attack on the enemy's naval camp, and succeeded in storming it, and in taking some of their galleys which were hauled up there; but the Athenians soon brought up their main body, and an action ensued in which he was defeated and slain. The siege now became closer than before, both by sea and land, and the Chians began to suffer greatly from hunger.

Conference between Pisander and Tissaphernes.

About the same time Pisander and his colleagues arrived, and opened the negotiation with which they were entrusted, and which Alcibiades conducted on behalf of Tissaphernes. But affairs were no longer in the state in which Pisander had left them, when he was deputed by the oligarchical party at Samos to Athens. Tissaphernes was then, in appearance at least, wavering between the two belligerents, but inclined to espouse the cause of the Athenians. His however was a character, in which fear predominated

over every other impulse, and he had soon abandoned all thoughts of the more hazardous course which had been last suggested by Alcibiades, which would have involved him in a contest with the Peloponnesians, and recurred to the plan, which, when it was first proposed to him, he had adopted with entire approbation, of letting both powers waste themselves in a protracted conflict with each other. Alcibiades saw that he could not hope to lead the satrap beyond the line of neutrality, and had therefore to devise a scheme for saving his credit and extricating himself from his engagements. He determined to force the Athenians themselves to break off the negotiations, by making demands which it was impossible for them to grant; and Tissaphernes thought it prudent to mask his intentions, and to leave a door open for a future accommodation, and was therefore willing that they should seem to have rejected his overtures. The conferences were held in his presence, and Alcibiades, who spoke for him, advanced in his demands, as the Athenian commissioners gave way. He was hardly prepared for the full extent of their compliance. Even when he exacted the cession of all Ionia and of the adjacent islands, he found them still yielding. But when, in a third interview, he required that the King should be at liberty to keep as many ships as he would on the sea, and to send them in any direction along his own coasts, the patience of the commissioners was exhausted. This seemed equivalent to an abdication of the maritime sovereignty of Athens; and being now convinced that Alcibiades was trifling with them, they indignantly put an end to the negotiation, and returned to Samos.

Having thus broken with the Athenians, Tissaphernes made it his next care to sooth the Peloponnesians; and he immediately proceeded to Caunus, and invited their commanders to an interview. He saw

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that the policy he had adopted required that he should open his coffers to them; that without a supply of money they could not maintain their fleet, or would be compelled to hazard a battle on disadvantageous terms with the Athenians; in either case the balance which he wished to preserve would be lost. There was however beside a danger to apprehend, which still more nearly concerned him. Urged by their need, and irritated by his conduct, they might easily be tempted to seize by force what he withheld from them, and at once to satisfy their wants and their revenge, by plundering and ravaging his province. Yet, after the conference at Cnidus, they could not accept his subsidies until a new treaty had been concluded, on terms which would remove the objections of Lichas. All therefore he could attempt was to save his master's dignity as far as possible, and to elude the jealousy of Sparta by vague and ambiguous language.

Third treaty between Persia and Sparta.

These objects he seems to have accomplished in a third treaty, dated from the plain of the Mæander, but ratified, it would appear, by the governors of all the western maritime provinces of Persia. For, beside Tissaphernes, the sons of Pharnaces, the father of Pharnabazus, are mentioned as parties, with a personage named Hieramenes, probably the same who is elsewhere said to have married a sister of Darius. In this treaty the article which had before given offence was so limited, as to imply nothing inconsistent with the independence of the European Greeks, but yet so as not to renounce any claim that the Persian king had ever advanced, and distinctly enough, though in a singular form, to recognise his right to the sovereignty of the Asiatic colonies. It declared, that the King's country, so far as it lay in Asia, belonged to the King[1]: language which could have no meaning, unless it re-

[1] Χώραν τῆς βασιλέως, ὅση τῆς Ἀσίας ἐστι, βασιλέως εἶναι. Thuc. VIII. 58.

ferred to districts which had for a time ceased to be subject to him in fact: and in this sense it seems to have been understood by all parties. A more explicit stipulation than was contained in either of the preceding treaties as to the maintenance of the Peloponnesian fleet was introduced into this, though with reference to a previous compact the terms of which are not stated. Tissaphernes engages to furnish pay for the ships which had been sent from Peloponnesus, according to the original contract[1], until those which the King was fitting out should arrive. After that, the Peloponnesians must either maintain their own armament, or consider all the supplies which they receive for that purpose from Tissaphernes — though he bound himself to advance them — as a loan to be repaid at the end of the war, which was to be carried on in concert by the two allied fleets. As soon as this treaty was concluded, Tissaphernes executed one part of its conditions, by an immediate payment, and assumed the appearance of actively preparing to bring up the great Phœnician fleet, to which the two contending parties had long been looking forward with anxious expectation.

The Peloponnesians now determined to return, as Tissaphernes himself wished them to do, to Miletus. But before they had left Rhodes, they were invited by an embassy from Eretria to lend their aid toward effecting the revolt which had been long meditated in Eubœa. One of the main obstacles to the execution of that design had been recently removed. The town of Oropus, which, so long as it remained in the hands of the Athenians, afforded them the means of con-

[1] Κατὰ τὰ ξυγκείμενα. It is not clear whether this refers to the rate of pay, or only to the general undertaking mentioned VIII 5., ὑπισχνεῖτο τροφὴν παρέξειν. The rate of pay specified at Sparta appears, from VIII. 29., to have been a drachma a day. But it seems that after the third treaty with Tissaphernes the Peloponnesians contented themselves with the ordinary allowance; for Xenophon, Hell. 1. 5. 5., speaks of a contract by which the King had engaged to give half a drachma a day. Krueger, p. 356., supposes that this was the rate always implied when no particular sum was expressed.

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tinually annoying the island, and especially its opposite neighbour Eretria, had been betrayed to the Bœotians, notwithstanding the presence of an Athenian garrison, by a party of the citizens, aided by some Eretrians, who were now eager to shake off the authority of Athens. But the Peloponnesian commanders considered the relief of Chios as an object of superior importance, and toward the beginning of the spring of 411 set sail from Rhodes with their whole armament. In their passage, off the Triopian foreland, they saw the Athenian fleet, which had just left its station at Chalce. There was no disposition on either side to risk an immediate attack; but this movement of the Athenians, who arrived at Samos about the same time that the enemy reached Miletus, convinced the Peloponnesians that they should not be able to relieve Chios without a battle. But while they remained in suspense, the Chians, hard pressed by the siege, made a vigorous effort for their own deliverance. A Spartan named Leon, who accompanied Antisthenes to Miletus, had taken the command in the room of Pedaritus, and had brought a squadron of twelve galleys, which had been left to guard Miletus while the fleet lay at Rhodes. With this reinforcement the Chians were able to man thirty-six galleys[1]; the Athenians only numbered thirty-two. The besieged drew out their whole military force, and occupied a strong position, while their fleet advanced against the enemy. A warm engagement ensued, which lasted till late in the evening; and the Chians, if not victorious, were at least not worsted; and this, in an action with an Athenian fleet nearly equal in numbers, was still a triumph. This success was immediately followed by a happy change in the state of their affairs. Early in the spring

Chios relieved.

[1] Nothing, it might have been supposed, can be clearer than the statement of Thucydides, VIII. 61., that the Chians had received the reinforcement brought to them by Leon, *before* they went out to fight the Athenians, and did not *go out to meet him*. Perhaps some Latin translator has obscured the author's meaning.

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Dercyllidas, a Spartan, marched from Miletus with a small body of troops toward the Hellespont, to excite the cities in the satrapy of Pharnabazus to revolt from Athens. As soon as he arrived there Abydos opened her gates to him, and Lampsacus imitated the example two days after. On hearing of these events Strombichides sailed from Chios with twenty-four ships, including some transports, and took Lampsacus, an unwalled city, by storm, after defeating its troops; but contented himself with the pillage, and permitted the citizens to return to their dwellings. He then marched against Abydos, but could not succeed there either by force or persuasion, and therefore crossed over to Sestus, which he made his station for the protection of the Hellespont. After his departure the Chians became decidedly superior to the enemy by sea, and Astyochus ventured to sail along the coast with two galleys to Chios, and to bring away the squadron with which they had been last reinforced to Miletus.[1] The armament under his command now amounted to upwards of a hundred sail, and he soon after appeared with it before Samos to offer battle to the Athenians. But the state of affairs at Samos which he was probably acquainted with, did not permit them to accept his challenge, and he sailed back to Miletus.

Pisander and his colleagues were not disheartened by the issue of their negotiation with Tissaphernes; and on their return to Samos, they both strengthened the resolutions of the oligarchical faction in the fleet, and found means to form a new oligarchical party among the Samians, who had so lately overpowered and persecuted their own nobility. Their Athenian partizans, though sensible of their weakness and danger,

[1] VIII. 63. κομίζει αὐτόθεν τὰς ναῦς. Not certainly all the ships — which the Chians would not have parted with — and therefore it seems that Leon's squadron must be referred to. Yet the Chians might have added some of their own, so as to raise the number of the Peloponnesian fleet from 94 to 112. Krueger, p. 303., supposes that the galleys not accounted for may have been furnished by the Rhodians.

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came to the determination of renouncing all dependence on Alcibiades, who, they began to see, could never become a cordial adherent to such a cause as theirs, and prepared to meet the emergency by extraordinary efforts and sacrifices, to which they encouraged one another by the reflection, that they should no longer be labouring for any end but their own private advantage. With this purpose they sent Pisander home, with five of his colleagues, to prosecute the work which he had begun there, and instructed them to establish oligarchical government in all the subject cities at which they might stop in their voyage; and the remaining five were despatched on the like mission to other quarters. Diotrephes, who had been appointed to command on the coast of Thrace, was sent from Chios with instructions of the same kind. Accordingly on his arrival at Thasos he abolished the democratical constitution. But the result of this change was very different from that which its authors expected, though Phrynichus had predicted it. Within two months after, when Diotrephes had left the island, the Thasians began to fortify their city, and prepared to resume their independence; and a party of refugees who, from their places of exile in Peloponnesus, had long been concerting measures with their friends at home for this end, unexpectedly found the principal obstacle to the accomplishment of their designs—the opposition of the commonalty—removed by the Athenians themselves. And such, Thucydides observes, were the consequences of the revolution in most of the states where it was effected. Instead of reconciling them to the rule of Athens, it was viewed not as an equivalent for independence, but as a step toward it; and the sober, wary spirit of the oligarchical governments[1] rendered their success the more certain.

[1] Σωφροσύνη, VIII. 64. This quality seems to be mentioned here with reference not to the motives for desiring the change, but to the means of effecting it. But the expression σωφροσύνην λαβοῦσαι is very singular and obscure.

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Pisander, while he executed his commission, drew some reinforcements of armed followers from several of the cities where he established oligarchical ascendency on his voyage to Athens. On his arrival he found that during his absence great progress had been made there toward the completion of the work which he had set on foot. His associates, by the language which they openly held, had prepared the public mind for various changes in the laws and constitution, some of which were clearly desirable, and none very repugnant to the feelings of moderate men. They contended that no pay ought to be allowed for any but military service: a reform levelled against the abuses of the courts of justice, and the popular assembly, but which was also strongly recommended by grounds of economy. It was intimately connected with another measure, which they suggested at the same time as the basis of the new constitution for limiting the enjoyment of all political rights to a body of not more than five thousand citizens, who were to be chosen with regard both to property and to personal qualifications. Thucydides justly admires the ingenuity of this proposal. The number was large enough to conciliate those who had apprehended that the oligarchy to be prescribed to them was to be formed on a much narrower foundation, and who did not perceive the hollowness of this seeming liberality; and it secured the good-will of all who might hope to be included in the privileged class, and who were not aware that its privileges would be merely nominal, and that the authors of the revolution would reserve the substance of power to themselves.[1] But while the leaders of the party

Oligarchical movements of Pisander;

and of his party at Athens.

[1] Thuc. VIII. 66. ἐπεὶ ἔξειν γε τὴν τόλιν οἵπερ καὶ μεθίστασαν ἐμέλλον. The manner in which these words have sometimes been interpreted proves that a moderate acquaintance with the language of the Greek authors may be as useful a qualification for a historian of Greece, as the art of handling an oar or of shouldering a firelock.

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covered their designs with these specious professions, some of their younger associates were serving their cause in a different manner, by ridding themselves of their most obnoxious and formidable adversaries. Androcles was first marked out, both as a powerful demagogue, interested in upholding democracy, and as a victim the most agreeable to his enemy Alcibiades, on whom the hopes of the oligarchs at Athens still rested. He was removed by secret assassination, and some other persons who were deemed irreconcilably hostile to their plans shared his fate. These proofs of reckless daring and determined resolution struck all classes of the citizens with terror, and prepared them passively to submit to the will of the party which wielded such instruments. No formal change indeed was yet made in the mechanism of the constitution; the popular assembly and the council of Five Hundred still met, as usual, for the transaction of public business; but they deliberated under fear of the oligarchical dagger, which was sure to reach every one who thwarted the wishes of the conspirators. And thus by degrees they usurped the entire management of affairs, were the only speakers in every debate, and no proposition was brought forward either in the council or the assembly, which had not been previously discussed in their private meetings. Their boldness created an exaggerated persuasion of their strength. As the extent of the conspiracy could not be ascertained, none could know that any man he met, whether friend or stranger, was not privy to it; and some notorious cases, in which men who were believed most adverse to oligarchy were discovered to have taken a part in it, contributed to destroy all mutual confidence among the patriotic citizens, and to stifle every murmur of indignation, and all counsels of resistance.

Such was the state of affairs when Pisander arrived;

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and though he had totally failed in the principal object of his mission, the undertaking had advanced too far, and his associates were too deeply engaged in it, to be affected by this disappointment. The aid of Alcibiades was only important with a view to the foreign war; the domestic revolution now stood in no need of him, and in some respects even gained strength by his estrangement from it. Neither Pisander nor any of the principal conspirators were personally attached to him; most of them perhaps were secretly jealous of him, and their rupture with him procured one very useful accession to their party. Phrynichus, as soon as he perceived that the establishment of oligarchy, instead of furthering the restoration of Alcibiades, would be an effectual bar to it, became one of their warmest abettors. Among the rest there was probably a great diversity of views and motives. Antiphon, the man whom Thucydides represents as the soul of the plot, and whose character and abilities he describes with the affectionate admiration of a friend and a scholar [1], was a person qualified perhaps for filling a station like that of Pericles, but neither capable of reaching such an eminence, nor disposed to acquiesce in a lower sphere; and it seems to have been disappointed ambition that made him hostile to the democratical institutions under which he felt himself depressed below his proper level. Thucydides extols his eloquence, which he had cultivated with extraordinary care—undoubtedly as an instrument for acquiring reputation and power—and believes that he was only prevented from displaying it in the popular assembly by the jealousy which the

Antiphon.

[1] By this I do not mean that the testimony to the fact, that Thucydides was the disciple of Antiphon, is decisive, though I know of no reason for questioning its truth. But even if the manner in which Thucydides speaks of him was the sole ground of the tradition, it will be not the less true that from some cause or other the historian does use language which naturally suggests the thought of such a relation. See the dissertation De Antiphonte, in Ruhnkens Opuscula, pp. 9, 10.

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people conceived of his intellectual superiority, and that finding himself thus excluded from public life, he aided those who were unable to plead their own cause in the assembly or the courts of justice with his counsels. Antiphon indeed is said to have been the first orator who wrote speeches for his clients[1], as he was one of the first that opened a school of rhetoric. But that he was driven to this occupation by the cause which Thucydides mentions is a view of the matter which we can hardly adopt even on this authority. Athens had surely been too long inured to the presence of great men to be alarmed by the genius of Antiphon, even if he had had ampler means of displaying it, and though it may have been much more powerful than the literary remains attributed to him would have led us to suppose. But the eloquence which Thucydides admired, and which perhaps contributed to form his own, may not have been of the kind best adapted to sway the popular assembly, where, we venture to believe, even Thucydides himself would never have produced any great effect. But if by this or any other cause Antiphon was prevented from taking a part in public affairs, we could understand both why he was discontented with the existing order of things, and how he might incur the suspicion of disaffection, which naturally fell on a man of eminent talents, who kept aloof from all political pursuits. It seems that he had harboured the project of a revolution long before circumstances were ripe for carrying it into effect[2]; he had probably never ceased to direct his thoughts toward this object, since the failure of the Sicilian expedition opened a clearer prospect of success; and it would not be a groundless conjecture, if we ascribed the institution of the extraordinary council already mentioned[3] to

[1] See the dissertation de Antiph. p. 18.

[2] Ἐκ πλείστου ἐπιμεληθείς, VIII. 68.

[3] See Vol. III. p. 464.

his suggestion; it at least shows a close affinity to measures which were undoubtedly his. It was he who had concerted the whole plan which was now about to be put into immediate execution; and he had no doubt a very distinct conception of his own ultimate aims. But it is probable that these were still a secret to many of his associates, who may have been no less deceived by his professions, than those who were entirely strangers to his schemes. In the number of those who had thus been drawn into an undertaking the precise nature of which they did not understand, we may reckon Theramenes son of Hagnon, a person whose character will be more clearly unfolded in the progress of the history by his actions, than it would be by words. He is coupled by Thucydides with Antiphon, Phrynichus, and Pisander, as a prime leader in the conspiracy. But it seems evident that, though he was one of their most active instruments, he never was admitted to their inmost councils.

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Theramenes.

After the return of Pisander it only remained to give a legal form to that supreme authority which he and his associates had already in substance usurped. The first step was to hold an assembly of the people, in which ten commissioners were appointed, under the title of Compilers[1], with full powers to frame any measure which they might judge expedient for the better government of the commonwealth, to be laid before the people on a certain day. When the day came, the assembly was held, not at Athens, but in a celebrated sanctuary of Poseidon, at Colonus, a village a mile or two from the city: a precaution probably for the purpose of making it more select and subservient. The commissioners however only brought in a proposal for a decree, which made it lawful for every Athenian to propose any measure

[1] *Ξυγγραφέας αὐτοκράτορας.* Thuc. VIII. 67.

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he might think fit, without fear either of the prosecution to which the movers of illegal propositions were liable, or of any other ill consequence, and threatening all who should attempt to restrain this freedom with severe penalties. As soon as this decree was passed, the principal articles of the new constitution were openly brought forward. They included an entire change in the mode of filling public offices, the nature of which Thucydides does not explain. It may have related both to the term for which they were held, and to the process of appointment, which was probably no longer subjected to chance. The principle was laid down that no pay should be granted for any but military service. The limitation of the highest franchise to five thousand citizens, would seem only to have been declared in general terms, as a measure the details of which were reserved to another time. But the most important of the proposed institutions was a new council, which was to take the place of the Five Hundred. Five presidents[1] were to be first appointed, who were to elect a hundred persons, and each of these three others, so as to make up a body of Four Hundred, which was to be invested with unlimited power. What limit was assigned to the duration of their office, whether it depended in any way on the five original electors, and whether these had any further share in the government, are points on which Thucydides has not gratified our curiosity. The Four Hundred were to have the power of assembling the Five Thousand as often as they thought proper. Whether these assemblies were in theory to possess equal authority with those held under the old constitution, we do not learn. But the clause which left their meetings to depend on the pleasure of the Four Hundred seems to have

The Four Hundred.

[1] Πρόεδροι.

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Expulsion of the Five Hundred.

been so worded as to cherish the persuasion that the Five Thousand were to be a real and effective body.

All the articles were adopted without opposition, and the mock assembly was dismissed. The Four Hundred, as soon as they were elected, proceeded to assume the reins of government. But they did not feel sure that the Five Hundred would quietly resign their places, and apprehended that their resistance might rouse a general insurrection. Against this danger they throught it necessary to take extraordinary precautions. Ever since the enemy had occupied Decelea, all Athenians capable of military service had been kept on duty, with no intermission but for needful refreshment, either on the walls, or at their arms, which were piled in constant readiness for action in various parts of the city. On the day appointed for the expulsion of the old council, the adherents of the oligarchs were directed, when they withdrew with their comrades from their posts, to let the rest disperse, but themselves to remain at a short distance from the arms, to wait for the turn of events; and they were reinforced with some troops which were brought over for the purpose—perhaps the same which accompanied Pisander—from Andros, Tenos, Carystus, and Ægina. The Four Hundred then armed themselves each with a short sword, which they probably did not take great care to conceal, and, escorted by a hundred and twenty of the younger conspirators, whom they selected as a permanent guard, proceeded to the council-chamber, where the Five Hundred appear to have been all assembled. But as they were unarmed, a less formidable display of force might have been sufficient to overawe them. When they were commanded to leave the room they silently obeyed, and at the door each received his pay for the remainder of the year. The rest of the citizens were equally passive; and the

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Four Hundred quietly installed themselves with the religious ceremonies usual on such occasions, and drew lots for their presiding members under the constitutional title of Prytanes.

There were perhaps not wanting advocates of the oligarchy, who represented the erection of the new council as a return to Solon's institutions. But the spirit of a government, hostile to the great body of the people, which could only reign, as it had usurped its authority, by terror, soon made itself felt in every part of the administration. Obnoxious citizens were removed, a few by executions, others by imprisonment or exile. Only one of the measures which commonly accompanied a revolution in a Greek city was wanting on this occasion. The refugees, many of whom might have been useful auxiliaries, were not recalled, through fear of Alcibiades, whom it was probably deemed imprudent to provoke, by excepting him from a general act of indulgence. But still the government was aware that it had no chance of permanently keeping its ground without foreign support; and one of its first objects was to make peace with Sparta. It addressed its overtures to Agis, and urged its claims to the confidence of an oligarchical power. But the Spartan king, believing these proposals to be the effect of conscious weakness, and thinking it impossible that so great a revolution could have been quietly brought about, gave no encouragement to the envoys, but sent for a strong reinforcement from Peloponnesus, and, as soon as he had received it, marched down from Decelea toward Athens. He hoped either to find disorder prevailing within the city, or to create it by the approach of his army; and expected that, even if the gates were not thrown open to him on his own terms, he should at least be able to carry the Long Walls, which in a time of general confusion would be left unprotected, at the first

The Four Hundred negotiate with Sparta.

assault. But he was disappointed by the unanimity with which the Athenians were inspired by the presence of the invaders. All remained tranquil within, and as he came near to the city, the foremost of his troops were charged by a body of cavalry, supported by heavy and light infantry, who cut down some, and kept possession of the slain. This repulse convinced him of his error; he gave orders for retreat, and a few days after dismissed the newly arrived troops. He now listened more favourably to the Athenian oligarchs, who, not discouraged by their failure or by the recent display of his hostile designs, renewed their application to him, and by his advice sent an embassy to treat for peace at Sparta.

They had likewise, as soon as the revolution was accomplished, deputed ten of their number to Samos —where they foresaw that their proceedings would probably give great offence to the mass of the citizens in the fleet, and might provoke a dangerous opposition —to vindicate the purity of their intentions, and to exhibit the changes which had just taken place in the fairest light. The seamen were to be informed that the government was in the hands, not of the Four Hundred only, but of five thousand citizens, a greater number than the calls of foreign service in war-time had ever permitted to assemble at Athens for deliberation on any subject, however important.[1] The sound of this argument was probably designed to catch the unthinking, and to persuade them that the new institutions were really more popular than those which had been abolished.[2] In substance it seems to turn upon the fallacy, that a right which can be but

[1] This, Dr. Arnold observes, cannot have been literally true, since there were occasions which required the presence of six thousand citizens in the assembly. But the assertion is clearly limited to times of war; and it could hardly have been ventured upon, even by so impudent a faction, if it had not been at least generally well founded. The learned reader needs not to be informed that Thucydides does not make this assertion himself.

[2] This is a remark of the Greek scholiast on Thuc. VIII. 72.

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seldom exercised is therefore of little value. But the effect which it would have produced at this time on the minds of the hearers cannot be estimated. For the deputation was stopt on its way by intelligence of some untoward events, which had occurred at Samos during the time that the Four Hundred were establishing their dominion at Athens, and was induced to wait at Delos until it should find an opportunity of executing its commission with a fairer prospect of success.

Oligarchical conspiracy defeated at Samos.

Pisander, as we have seen, before his departure from Samos, had formed a new oligarchical faction there in the bosom of the commonalty itself, composed of persons who were averse not to the principles, but only to the power of the defeated party, or who had been forced to dissemble their sentiments. They soon grew into a band of about 300 conspirators, and thought themselves strong enough to overthrow the democratical government; a design in which they were warmly encouraged by their Athenian friends, whom, to prove their zeal, they abetted in several acts of violence, similar to those by which the partizans of oligarchy had silenced opposition at Athens. Hyperbolus was at this time living at Samos; whether he took any part in the late political transactions does not appear. It is probable that he had several enemies in the fleet; and among them Charminus, one of the generals. The Samian conspirators aided them in assassinating him, and it seems that their hatred was not satiated by his death, but that they put his body into a sack, and sank it in the sea.[1]

[1] Theopompus, quoted by the scholiast on Lucian, Timon, c. 30. and Schol. Arist. Pax. 680. It is only for the sake of readers who do not understand the language of Thucydides we need observe, that he does not mean that Charminus *was, with some others, unfortunately killed*, but that the Samians, in conjunction with Charminus and some other Athenians, killed Hyperbolus, and committed other like acts. But it required no common effrontery, first to omit all mention of Hyperbolus, and then to represent the death of Charminus as an *unfortunate* accident — because it was supposed to be an *oligarchical* murder.

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The impunity with which they perpetrated this and other like deeds animated the Samians to the greater enterprise which they were meditating; but it seems also to have rendered them so confident of success, that they did not take sufficient care to conceal their purpose. The commonalty, having discovered its danger, applied to some of the Athenian commanders and other leading men, who were known to be adverse to the plans of the oligarchs, for assistance to ward off the blow, the effect of which would be to alienate Samos, hitherto the main support of the shaken power of Athens, from the Athenian democracy. Among the generals, Leon and Diomedon were sincerely attached to the institutions under which they had risen to a station which satisfied their honourable ambition; and, among the persons of chief note in an inferior rank, Thrasybulus, son of Lycus, who commanded a galley, and Thrasyllus, who was serving in the army, shared their sentiments, and exerted their influence with the soldiers and seamen, to engage them to resist the threatened attack. The crew of the state-galley, the Paralus, which was entirely manned by Athenian citizens, were especially ready to comply with their call; and with their aid the conspirators, when they made their attempt, were repulsed and overpowered. Thirty were killed in the affray; but the survivors were treated with extraordinary lenity. Three only—the principal ringleaders—were punished with banishment; the rest received a free pardon and amnesty.

Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus.

This event decided the triumph of the democratical cause in the Athenian armament; and as the revolution which took place about the same time at Athens was not yet known at Samos, Chæreas, one of the persons who had taken the most active part in the late proceedings, was despatched on board the Paralus, to announce what it was supposed would be

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agreeable news to the government. But on its arrival the Four Hundred threw two or three of the most obnoxious among the ship's company into prison; and transferred the rest to another galley, which was ordered to a station on the coast of Eubœa. Chæreas himself made his escape, and, returning to Samos, spread an exaggerated report of the tyranny of the new government, charging it with wanton outrages on the persons and families of the citizens, and with the design of arresting the relatives of those who were serving at Samos, and of keeping them as hostages, to be put to death if the fleet should hold out against the oligarchy. These calumnies so irritated the multitude, that it was with difficulty they were restrained by the remonstrances of their more discreet friends, who pointed out the danger of a tumult in the camp while the enemy was so near at hand, from falling on the chief authors of the oligarchical conspiracy. But Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus took this opportunity to bind them by a solemn oath, which was exacted even from those who were known to entertain opposite sentiments, to maintain democratical government and mutual concord, and to persevere in the war with the Peloponnesians, and in implacable enmity toward the Four Hundred. All the Samians of ripe age took the same oath, and were henceforth indissolubly united with the Athenians of the fleet by a sense of common interests and dangers.

After this an assembly was held in the camp, in which the generals and some of the captains who were suspected of disaffection were removed, and their places filled with more trustworthy men; among the new generals were Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus. The speakers who came forward in this assembly animated their hearers boldly to maintain their rights against the oligarchical usurpers. The city, they observed, had revolted from them, who, as they were greatly superior in numbers and strength, might

properly regard themselves as representing the state. Their means of collecting supplies from their subjects, and of carrying on the war, were just the same as ever, though Samos—once a formidable rival of the Athenian power—was now to them what Athens had hitherto been. The navy had not only provided for its own subsistence, but had secured that of the city, which without the protection which they afforded to its commerce would soon be reduced to distress, and might thus be compelled to respect the claims of so numerous a body of citizens, whom the oligarchs had disfranchised. They might very well dispense with all the assistance they could hope to receive from Athens in their contest with the enemy. Its treasury was empty, and it could not even pretend to direct them with its counsels; for in upholding their hereditary constitution, they had shown as great a superiority in wisdom over those who abolished it, as they possessed in power to restore it. The name of Alcibiades was also held out as an encouragement. It was still assumed that he was able to transfer the alliance of Persia from the enemy to them, and that he would gladly purchase his own recall at this price. Should all other resources fail, with such a naval force as they possessed, they had their choice of many cities and territories, where they might find a new home. CHAP. XXVIII.

Before these disturbances had subsided, the rumour of them reached Miletus, and contributed to irritate the discontent which had for some time prevailed in the armament at the conduct of Astyochus and Tissaphernes. The satrap, after he had gained his point by the treaty concluded in the winter, had become as remiss as before in making the stipulated payments, and the Spartan admiral not only connived at this breach of faith, and omitted to second the remonstrances of Hermocrates and others who loudly Proceedings of Astyochus.

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complained of it, but, affecting to place entire confidence in the professions of Tissaphernes, under pretence of waiting for the Phœnician galleys, kept the fleet in a state of inaction in which its strength was continually wearing away. Even when the report of the intestine dissensions which were agitating the camp at Samos, while a considerable part of the Athenian forces was in the Hellespont, seemed to offer the most favourable opportunity for attacking the remainder, Astyochus showed no disposition to take advantage of it; till at length the murmurs of the men, especially of the Syracusans, grew so loud, that he no longer ventured to neglect them, but held a council of war, in which it was determined to make an attempt to draw the enemy into a decisive engagement. Accordingly the fleet, which had been raised by the reinforcements last received from Chios, to 112 galleys, moved toward Mycalé, while the Milesian troops were ordered to march in the same direction to support it. The Athenians with 82 galleys were at this time lying off Glaucé, a point on the coast at the foot of Mycalé divided by a narrow channel from Samos; and perceiving the Peloponnesians approaching with a force which they thought it imprudent to encounter, they sailed across to their own camp. No measures, it seems, had been preconcerted for the event, though it was one which might have been reasonably expected, of their declining a battle; and Astyochus did not desire one. He however formed an encampment, both for his naval and land forces, on the coast of Mycalé, and the next day prepared to sail up to Samos. But he was stopt by the intelligence that Strombichides had arrived with his squadron from the Hellespont. He had been sent for as soon as it was known that the Peloponnesians were meditating a hostile movement; and the ships which he brought with him raised the

numbers of the Athenians to 108. Astyochus immediately led his armament back to Miletus; and when the Athenians came up and challenged him in their turn, he kept within the harbour. CHAP. XXVIII.

His judgment in avoiding a battle with an enemy so little inferior in numerical strength, seems not to have been questioned; but as offensive movements were held to be no longer practicable in this quarter, and the difficulty of providing for the subsistence of the armament became more pressing, while the supplies of Tissaphernes grew every day scantier, it was thought expedient to embrace the offers of Pharnabazus, who had sent repeated invitations with the promise of furnishing pay for as many ships as should come to him, and to carry into effect that part of the original plan of operations which related to the Hellespont. Overtures which were received at the same time from Byzantium enforced these motives, and Clearchus was despatched with a squadron of forty galleys; it was, however, dispersed by a storm which overtook it on the open sea, into which he ventured out, to escape the notice of the Athenians, and only ten galleys, under the command of Helixus the Megarian, held on their course to the Hellespont. Their arrival however gave the Byzantians courage to revolt. Clearchus himself, with the rest of his squadron, after having put into Delos for shelter, returned to Miletus, and thence proceeded by land to the Hellespont. The Athenians also despatched a small force to the same quarter from Samos.

In the mean while Thrasybulus and his colleagues, who had always looked to Alcibiades as the chief hope of their cause, in the contest which they had to maintain against his and their common enemies, at length procured a decree from the camp-assembly, by which he was pardoned and recalled. Thrasybulus, who was the principal author of the measure, Alcibiades at Samos.

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himself sailed to fetch him from the court of Tissaphernes, and brought him to Samos, where an assembly was held to receive him. He addressed it in language fitted to move its sympathy with his personal misfortunes, and to cheer it with brighter prospects of public affairs. He magnified the influence which he pretended to possess over Tissaphernes to an extravagant degree; and his object, Thucydides observes, in this exaggeration, was not merely to dazzle and encourage his hearers: he knew that an account of his speech would find its way both to Athens and to the Peloponnesian camp; and he hoped that his assertions would inspire the oligarchical faction with terror, and the Peloponnesians with such distrust of Tissaphernes as might lead to an open rupture. He therefore did not scruple to pretend that the satrap had assured him, that, if he could only rely on the Athenians, they should not want pay for their seamen; no, not if he should be forced to turn the furniture of his palace into money for them; and that he would bring the Phœnician fleet, which had already come westward as far as Aspendus, to their aid, instead of the enemy's; but that he could rely upon them only when he saw Alcibiades recalled, and placed in a situation where he might engage for the steadiness of their conduct. The success of these boasts was greater perhaps than he hoped or even desired; for the assembly not only created him general, and entrusted him with the whole management of the negotiation with Tissaphernes, but, passing at once to an excess of confidence, as if there was no longer any thing to fear from the Peloponnesian armament, was eager to turn its arms against the Four Hundred; and a proposition was formally made, and found many warm supporters, for sailing forthwith to attack Piræus. Alcibiades however checked this temerity,

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and declared that the first duty which his new office imposed on him was to treat with Tissaphernes on the means of finishing the war. And accordingly, as soon as the assembly broke up, he set off for the satrap's court, at once to make a display of their intimacy, which would raise his own credit with the Athenians, and by the exhibition of his new dignity to exalt the importance of his friendship in the eyes of Tissaphernes.

Tumult at Miletus.

The recall of Alcibiades, and the means by which it was accomplished, were soon known in the Peloponesian camp; and the news produced much of the effect which he had expected. It strengthened the suspicions which had long prevailed against Tissaphernes, and revived the murmurs which had before broken out against Astyochus. Not only the common seamen, but persons of higher station in the fleet, charged the admiral with having sold the interests of the service to Tissaphernes; and his imprudence aggravated the popular discontent into an uproar, which threatened his life. The Syracusan and Thurianseamen, accompanied by their commander Dorieus, came in a body to him, and, with the plainness of men who were not used to restraints on their freedom of speech, demanded the arrears of their pay. Astyochus answered haughtily, threatened the claimants, and at last raised his staff, as if to strike Dorieus, who was foremost to plead the cause of his men. The insolent gesture kindled the indignation of the crowd; they rushed upon the admiral with a fierce outcry, and he only escaped their violence by flying to an altar, where he remained till the tumult was appeased. The temper thus displayed encouraged the people of Miletus to make an attack upon a fortress which Tissaphernes had built in their city, and to expel the garrison which he had placed there; and their proceedings were viewed with approbation

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by their allies, especially by the Syracusans. Lichas however condemned them, and laid it down as a general principle, that the Greeks within the province of Tissaphernes must submit to his authority, if moderately exercised; but at the same time he intimated, that their subjection was only to last until the war should have been happily terminated. Yet even this hint did not sooth the anger he excited by his resistance to the popular will on this and some similar occasions; and it showed itself even after his death, which happened at Miletus, when the Milesians interfered to deprive him of the honours which his countrymen wished to pay to his remains. Just at this juncture, by a seasonable coincidence, a new admiral, named Mindarus, arrived from Sparta to take the place of Astyochus, who sailed home. He was accompanied by an agent of Tissaphernes, a Carian, named Gaulites, who was equally familiar with the Greek as with his own tongue, and who was instructed to complain of the conduct of the Milesians, in the expulsion of the Persian garrison, and to vindicate his master from the charges with which he knew himself to be threatened; for Milesian envoys were on their way to Sparta with Hermocrates, to expose the satrap's duplicity, his connection with Alcibiades, and the injury which the cause of the Peloponesians had suffered from it.

Influence of Alcibiades at Samos.

In the mean while Alcibiades had returned to Samos. His presence seems to have encouraged the ministers of the Four Hundred, who, as we have seen, had stopt at Delos, to continue their voyage to the camp. There they were introduced into the military assembly, and executed their commission. It was some time before they could gain a hearing; they were interrupted by cries which threatened the subverters of the constitution with death. But when the tumult was hushed, they defended the conduct of the Four

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Hundred, and the changes which had taken place at Athens, and endeavoured to remove the impression which had been made by the exaggerations and fictions of Chæreas. They contended that if the government had ever harboured the design which had been imputed to it, of betraying the city to the enemy, it would have seized the opportunity afforded by the appearance of Agis before the walls. It had proved on that occasion, that it had no views inconsistent with the safety and honour of the commonwealth. The political privileges bestowed by the new order of things were not appropriated to a narrow oligarchy, but were to be shared by five thousand citizens. All that they had heard of the ill treatment of their relatives, was a groundless calumny; none were molested either in their persons or their property.—But the assembly either did not believe this assertion, or was not satisfied with their explanations, and seemed to be only irritated by the attempts made to conciliate it. Among various proposals suggested by its resentment, that of sailing to Piræus was renewed, and was recommended with great vehemence by many voices. But Alcibiades again interposed to prevent a step which would have left Ionia and the Hellespont in the enemy's power; and, manifest as the danger was, Thucydides believes that no other man possessed influence enough to have averted it. It was the first great service which he had rendered to his country. He silenced those who would have indulged in personal invectives against the envoys with a severe reproof, and dismissed them with a firm but mild answer, which however was designed to conciliate, not the Four Hundred, but the great mass of their partizans. As to the Five Thousand, he did not mean to deprive them of their franchise; but he required that the Four Hundred should be deposed, and the old council of Five

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Hundred reinstated in its legitimate authority. All measures of retrenchment by which a greater part of the public revenue was spared for the maintenance of the troops should have his hearty approbation. And he exhorted his countrymen at home to persevere in resisting the enemy. As long as they all continued to defend themselves against attacks from without, there was good hope that they would be able to compose their domestic quarrels; but the disposition for reconciliation would come too late, if any fatal blow should be struck either against Athens or against the armament at Samos. The assembly was likewise attended by an embassy which brought offers of assistance from Argos. The Argive envoys came along with the crew of the Paralus, whom the Athenian government had first degraded by transferring them to another vessel, and had then incautiously entrusted them with the charge of conveying three ambassadors to Sparta. But in their passage they stopt at Argos, where they left their oligarchical companions in custody, and sailed with the Argive ministers to Samos. Alcibiades in the name of the assembly thanked the Argives for their offers, and expressed his hope that the Athenians would find them equally prompt on future occasions when their aid might be needed.

Though Tissaphernes had adopted the policy suggested to him by Alcibiades toward the Peloponnesians, so far as to determine that he would never grant them any effectual succours, he was still as anxious as ever to avoid an open breach with them, into which it was the aim of his counsellor to draw him. He therefore thought it necessary, when the suspicions of his allies had been raised to their greatest height by the restoration of Alcibiades, to make some attempt to recover their confidence or at least to revive their hopes. For this purpose he

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proceeded in person to Aspendus with the avowed object of bringing the Phœnician fleet to join the Peloponnesians. He desired that Lichas might accompany him, and appointed Tamos to provide for the subsistence of the Peloponnesian armament in his absence. The forethought of Tissaphernes never went beyond an expedient for gaining time; and he trusted to his ingenuity for inventing a new one when that which served his immediate purpose was worn out. The journey to Aspendus, which seemed to offer a decisive test of his sincerity, appeased the allies, and probably persuaded many that he was at last in earnest. This belief was confirmed when, after his arrival there, he sent for a Lacedæmonian officer to take charge of the Phœnician fleet; and Philippus was despatched with two galleys for this purpose. But Alcibiades knew his mind better, and, when the news reached Samos, declared his intention of following him to Aspendus, and engaged either to return with the Phœnician fleet, or to prevent it from being employed in the enemy's service. He was probably aware that the Athenians had as little to hope as to fear from the satrap's journey; but he thought that his own might serve to embroil him the sooner with the Peloponnesians, and so to force him into alliance with Athens. He therefore set sail with a squadron of thirteen galleys for Aspendus.

Reaction against the oligarchy at Athens.

The answer which the deputies of the Four Hundred brought home from Samos produced an impression at Athens very unfavourable to the interest of the oligarchical leaders. It was however only the occasion which drew forth the expression of feelings that had for some time been secretly gaining ground among their subordinate associates. Most of them were already disappointed, or offended, or alarmed, by the course which affairs had taken. Many had

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engaged in the revolution with views of personal aggrandisement or distinction, and found that they were only the instruments of others. Some had sincerely desired the reformation of abuses, and had hoped to effect it by moderately contracting the popular basis on which the old constitution rested; but they found that they had lodged absolute power in the hands of a very small body of men, which was itself perhaps secretly governed by a still smaller number of unseen directors. Others had perhaps been chiefly impelled by the belief, that a change in the constitution, whether desirable or not for its own sake, was necessary to procure them the means of withstanding their foreign enemies; and they found that they had nearly involved themselves in a civil war with their own navy, which must either overpower them or leave them helpless. This last reflection not only operated powerfully with many, but served as a pretext for some who could not decently avow their real motives. Among the ambitious and disappointed men who covered their selfish ends under a show of zeal for the public good were Theramenes, who was one of the generals, and Aristocrates, who also held a high military office.[1] They took the lead among the discontented of their party, who began to cabal against the oligarchy, as before against the democracy. They professed indeed not to have changed their opinions, but only to desire that the Five Thousand should be no longer a mere name, but a real and active body. They affected to fear that the embassy which had been lately sent to Sparta had been secretly instructed to concert measures for betraying the city into the enemy's hands. They urged the necessity of coming to terms with Alcibiades and the fleet. But they

Theramenes.

[1] That of ταξίαρχος.

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ılly dissatisfied with the subordinate places
ıey occupied in the new system; they were
abandon a cause which they perceived to be
and to seize the foremost station in the
of the commonalty which appeared to be
ıand.

eading oligarchs however, the men, who, like
hus, dreaded above all the return of Alcibi-
who were implacably hostile to democratical
ıcy, as Antiphon and Aristarchus, one of
erals most congenial to him in his political
s, or who, like Pisander, were conscious of
taken too active a part in the revolution to
ven, or who thought the power they wielded
eeping at any risk and cost, could not be
by the arguments and motives which swayed
their adherents. They determined neither
ı nor to relax their authority, but sooner, if
to extremities, to sacrifice the independence
state. They had already begun to provide
· own security under the pretext of guarding
against the attack with which it was threat-
· the armament at Samos. With this view
l begun to fortify the mole called Eetionea,
ırmed one side of the outer entrance of Piræus,
ower at its extreme point by the harbour's
and a wall, which ran from this point along
e of the harbour. The tower connected this
ll with the old one, which protected Piræus
and side, and thus enabled a handful of men
mand the entrance of the port. The new
tion also took in a large building, which was
d into a public granary, where all the corn-
were compelled to deposit their stock of
nd the masters of the cornships which came
æus to house their cargoes. But when, on
ırn of their ministers from Samos, they saw

Fortifications of Eetionea.

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themselves not only exposed to the hostility of the fleet, but deserted by several of their most active partizans, and the tide of public opinion setting in fast against them, they began to look to an accommodation with Sparta as their only sure ground of hope; and the first embassy having miscarried, as we have seen, Antiphon and Phrynichus themselves, with ten colleagues, set out to negotiate a peace on the best terms they could procure. Thucydides expresses his conviction, that, though they would have wished to rule Athens as an independent and sovereign state, they would have consented if they could obtain no better conditions, to cede, not only her tributary cities, but her ships and her walls. It was therefore not without good ground, though perhaps without any certain evidence of the fact, that Theramenes and his party laboured to excite a suspicion in the public mind, that the works of Eetionea were designed not to exclude their political adversaries, but to enable them to admit the enemy into Piræus; and when Antiphon and his colleagues returned without having concluded any publicly acknowledged treaty, their seeming failure was interpreted as a sign of some secret agreement to betray the city into the enemy's hands.

These suspicions were greatly strengthened by the intelligence which was received about the same time, that a squadron of forty-two galleys, including some from Italy and Sicily, was collected on the coast of Laconia, under the command of the Spartan Hegesandridas, avowedly destined to act against Eubœa, where in truth the aid of the Peloponnesians had been solicited. But Theramenes represented it as much more probable that the real object of this expedition was connected with the works which were proceeding at Eetionea, and that the enemy was only waiting for their completion to enter Piræus

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unresisted. And the aspect of the fortifications themselves, which were provided with posterns and passages adapted for the clandestine admission of troops, seemed to attest the purpose for which they were constructed. Still these surmises had hitherto been confined to private circles; not a breath of opposition had yet been publicly vented against the authority of the government, and the first intimation which it received of an immediate danger was given not by words but by a deed of blood. Soon after his return from Sparta Phrynichus was assassinated, in broad day, in the agora while it was thronged with people, at a short distance from the council-chamber which he had just quitted. The person who struck the blow escaped through the crowd, and was not immediately discovered; he was known however to be one of the young citizens employed in the home service[1]; but his accomplice was arrested, and put to the torture. He proved to be an Argive; but no confession could be wrung from him as to the authors of the plot, except that he knew of sundry meetings which had been held, and numerously attended, in private houses, and among the rest in that of the commander of the home troops.[2] Though it seems probable, from the various accounts which have been left of this occurrence, that some other persons were thrown into prison on suspicion of having been privy to it, it appears that the government did not think it prudent to follow the clue which the disclosures of the Argive put into its hands. It might have led to discoveries which it was safest to suppress, as they

Murder of Phrynichus.

[1] *Ἀνδρὸς τῶν περιπόλων τινος.* One might be inclined to conjecture from this expression, that the body of the *περίπολοι* at this time included some citizens of maturer age than the youths of whom it was regularly composed. Indeed, if we would attempt to reconcile the accounts of Thucydides and Lysias, who (c. Agorat. p. 136.) states the person who struck the blow to have been a foreigner, we should be obliged to suppose that the residentaliens were admitted into it.

[2] *Τοῦ περιπολάρχου.* Is this the same person as the Hermon who is afterwards described as *Ἕρμων τις τῶν περιπόλων τῶν Μουνυχιάσι τεταγμένων ἄρχων*?

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might reveal the numbers and increase the confidence of the disaffected. No further steps therefore were taken to avenge the murder of Phrynichus. This was perhaps one of the results anticipated by those who planned the deed, in which they followed the example of his own party. It served to sound the disposition of the people, and to detect the weakness of the oligarchs, and encouraged Theramenes, and his partizans—though it is not certain that they had any share in it—to engage in a bolder and more important enterprise.

Their proceedings were quickened by the movements of the Peloponnesian squadron, which soon after appeared in the Saronic gulf, directly in face of Piræus, off Ægina. The troops were landed to ravage the island, and it then proceeded to anchor at Epidaurus. This Theramenes treated as a clear proof of a secret correspondence between the government and the enemy, who, if Eubœa had been his real destination, would not have turned so far aside out of his course; and he urged his friends no longer to remain passive. After long debate the plans of his party were settled and were promptly executed.

Insurrection at Athens.

A body of heavy infantry was employed in building at Eetionea; it included the corps commanded by Aristocrates, but Alexicles, one of the generals devoted to the oligarchical cause, superintended the work. The men were generally ill affected toward the government, and were now induced to break out into open mutiny: they seized Alexicles, and kept him in custody; and they were encouraged by the approbation, not only of Aristocrates, but of Hermon, the commander of the young militia on duty at Munychia. The Four Hundred were sitting in council when this news was brought to them, and Theramenes was present. As his colleagues were acquainted with his sentiments, they at once imputed the act of the troops

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to his instigation, and threatened him with their vengeance; and they were on the point of arming their followers immediately to quell the mutiny. Theramenes however asserted his innocence, and obtained leave to go with another general, one of his own partizans, to rescue Alexicles. Aristarchus also set out for the same purpose, accompanied by some of the younger citizens of the equestrian order. But their departure did not pacify the adherents of the oligarchy, who were alarmed by a report that Alexicles had been put to death, and that the insurgents had taken entire possession of Piræus; and it was with difficulty that by the persuasions of the elder citizens, and of Thucydides, a Thessalian of Pharsalus, proxenus of the city, who represented the fatal consequences which might ensue from a civil war while the enemy was so near at hand, they were restrained from taking up arms, and marching down to attack their adversaries. Theramenes found Piræus in a state of equal agitation, every moment expecting some hostile movement from the city. His presence raised the confidence of the troops, which was not checked by the language and tone in which he affected to condemn their conduct, and they as little regarded the sincere indignation of Aristarchus. They appealed to Theramenes to pronounce, whether the fortress was designed for the public good, and whether it was better it should stand or fall; and he then so far laid aside the mask, as to leave the question to their own judgment, and to give his consent if they thought it best to demolish their work. On this permission they immediately began to pull down the buildings at Eetionea, and they were aided by a great part of the population of Piræus. The cry however by which they invited the multitude to join them, was only a call upon those who preferred the rule of the Five Thousand

Destruction of Eetionea.

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to that of the Four Hundred. Yet those who used this language aimed at nothing short of the restoration of democracy. But as it was possible that the list of the Five Thousand had been formed, and communicated to all who were included in it, there was still room to apprehend that every citizen whose aid they sought might be a member of this invisible body, and interested in securing its privileges.

By the next day the destruction of the fortress was completed; Alexicles was now set at liberty, and the troops, after a public meeting in the theatre at Munychia, marched up to the city, and posted themselves in the Anaceum, the sanctuary of the Twins. The Four Hundred, who were assembled in great alarm, sent a deputation to sooth them with promises and entreaties. The deputies addressed themselves individually to those who discovered a spirit of moderation, assured them that the list of the Five Thousand would shortly be published, and that to this body the election of the Four Hundred would be committed according to such rules as it might think fit to adopt, and exhorted them to wait patiently for this satisfaction of their doubts, and in the mean while to exert their influence to prevent a tumult, which would endanger the public safety. The troops, calmed perhaps as much by the consciousness of their strength, as by the arguments addressed to them, but sincerely concerned for the commonwealth, declared themselves willing to accede to an amicable compromise, and a day was fixed for an assembly to be held for this purpose in the sanctuary of Dionysus. But when the day came, and just as the assembly was on the point of meeting, news was brought that the Peloponnesian squadron was advancing along the coast of Salamis. The suspicion which Theramenes had so often expressed now appeared to be fully confirmed; and his party congratulated themselves that the fortress, which was

so clearly the mark of the enemy's movements, had fallen in time. Thucydides himself, though he observes that the disturbed state of Athens might have been sufficient, without any invitation from within, to induce the Spartan admiral to shape his course this way, does not think it improbable that he acted in concert with the oligarchs. For the time however all reflections were absorbed by the care of defending the city. All the serviceable population of Athens rushed down with one accord to Piræus, to man the ships, guard the walls, and secure the mouth of the harbour.

The Peloponnesians however quietly pursued their course past the town, and did not stop until they had doubled Sunium, and, after a short stay on the eastern coast of Attica, proceeded to Oropus. The danger which now appeared to threaten Eubœa, created almost as great alarm at Athens as that which had been just felt for the city itself. A squadron, the largest that could be immediately fitted out, was manned with all the haste that the exigency demanded, and was sent under the command of Thymochares to Eretria, where it joined that which had before been stationed on the coast of Eubœa. But together they amounted to no more than thirty-six galleys, and these for the most part were but ill prepared for action; and they had scarcely reached Eretria before they were forced into a combat under the most unfavourable circumstances. The Eretrians, who were in correspondence with the Spartan admiral, took measures to prevent the Athenian seamen from finding provisions in the ordinary market, and compelled them to go in quest of them to the outskirts of the town, at a great distance from their ships. A signal was then made to the Peloponnesians, who immediately pushed across the channel from Oropus. The Athenians had time indeed to embark, but in disorder, and meeting with the enemy near the

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mouth of the harbour, before they had recovered from the confusion of the first alarm, and before all were collected and disposed in any order of battle, were soon put to flight. Those who took refuge in Eretria itself, trusting to the loyalty of their allies, were attacked by the Eretrians, and almost all slain. A part of the rest found shelter in a neighbouring fort, which was held by an Athenian garrison. Fourteen galleys escaped to Chalcis; but twenty-two fell into the hands of the Peloponnesians, and the crews were all either killed or made prisoners. This blow was very soon followed by the revolt of Eubœa, where Oreus alone remained attached to the parent state.

Revolt of Eubœa.

The consternation excited by this intelligence at Athens was even greater than that which followed the Sicilian disaster; and indeed the state had never before seemed so near the brink of ruin. The city, at enmity with its fleet, divided between two parties which had been very lately on the point of turning their arms against each other, deprived of almost all its remaining naval force, and of the island on which it chiefly depended for subsistence, had scarcely a glimpse of hope left, and had every reason to fear that the victorious enemy would shortly appear to attack or to blockade Piræus. The timidity of the Spartan commander, which prevented him from taking advantage of so fair an opportunity, when he might either have forced Athens to surrender, or, by drawing the armament from Samos to its relief, have deprived it of all its foreign possessions, provokes Thucydides himself to an unusually sarcastic remark: that it was not on this occasion only, but on many others, that the Lacedæmonians showed themselves most convenient enemies to the Athenians. The Athenians however merited the praise of exerting a degree of prudence and energy scarcely inferior to the imbecility and inertness of their antagonists. They were still able to man twenty

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galleys, with which they prepared to defend themselves as they could; and they immediately applied themselves to the no less important task of healing their civil discord. An assembly was called in the Pnyx, the old place of meeting, which had been used ever since the expulsion of the tyrants, and a decree was passed, by which the Four Hundred were deposed, and the supreme power was committed to Five Thousand citizens. All that was done on this occasion was to abolish the oligarchy, and to lay down the basis of a new constitution in very general terms. In subsequent assemblies legislative committees were appointed, which defined the particulars of the new institutions. Unfortunately Thucydides has left no more than a very short and slight description of them, in which there are only two or three points clearly discernible. There was a sovereign body of Five Thousand into which none were admissible but citizens who served in the heavy-armed infantry; but all who belonged to this class had a share of some kind in the privileges of the Five Thousand. How this participation was regulated, we are not informed; but it seems most probable that the members of the ruling body were changed from time to time, according to a fixed order of succession, so that none were excluded from the actual enjoyment of the highest franchise except the citizens whose means did not enable them to support the expense of serving in the regular infantry. The pay of all civil offices was abolished with a solemn imprecation against its revival; a measure, which, as it included the courts of justice and the popular assembly[1], would of itself have limited the exercise of political rights to a class not much larger than that which was formerly invested with them, and tended to recon-

Revolution at Athens.

[1] Thuc. VIII. 97. Μισθὸν μηδένα φέρειν μηδεμιᾷ ἀρχῇ, where ἀρχὴ must be interpreted by the observations of Aristotle, Pol. III. 1. on the definition of a citizen τῶν (ἀρχῶν) αἱ μέν εἰσι διηρημέναι κατὰ χρόνον — ὁ δ' ἀόριστος, οἷον ὁ δικαστὴς καὶ ἐκκλησιαστής.

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cile the poorer citizens to their loss of power; especially as no bar was fixed to prevent them from gaining a place in the privileged class, which might be considered as a reward held out to their industry, at a distance not so high as to discourage their ambition.

The Athenian constitution thus assumed the form to which Aristotle assigned the name of a *polity;* it differed but slightly in substance from that which existed before the time of Pericles; though the number of citizens belonging to the class now disfranchised was then probably much smaller. Thucydides expresses the highest approbation of the new constitution, as a happy mean between democracy and oligarchy, and the opening of a new era, which promised a return of prosperity to the commonwealth. Perhaps its most beneficial effect was, that it united the citizens of the middle class, the largest, the most powerful, and the most enlightened, more closely together, and took away most of the pretexts and motives by which the oligarchs had been able to divide, overpower, and oppress them. The great advantage which it immediately yielded, was that it afforded a basis for a reconciliation with the fleet. A decree was passed for recalling Alcibiades and other exiles—probably all those who had been involved in his sentence—and a deputation was sent to the camp, to announce the recent revolution, and to exhort the troops to prosecute the war with vigour. And though the limitation of the old democracy cannot have been equally acceptable to all the citizens who were serving in the fleet, it probably met the wishes of the greater number. The overthrow of the Four Hundred was universally agreeable; and the appearance at least of unanimity was at once completely restored.

Fate of the leading oligarchs.

The leaders of the oligarchical faction, as soon as they saw themselves deprived of power, secretly withdrew from the city, and sought shelter among their

friends at Decelea. Thucydides only names Pisander, Alexicles, and Aristarchus, among the fugitives. Aristarchus had the consolation of inflicting a considerable injury on his country while he abandoned it. When the cause of his party had become hopeless, he quitted the city with a few bowmen taken from among the rudest of the barbarians who were employed in the public service, and proceeded to the border fortress of Œnoe, which happened at this time to be besieged by a force consisting of Corinthians and of Bœotian volunteers. The Corinthians had come to revenge a blow which a body of their troops, on its way home from Decelea, had suffered from the Athenian garrison; and they had called in the aid of the Bœotians who were always desirous to get possession of the place. Aristarchus, in concert with the besiegers, deceived the garrison by a story for which his office gained credit, of an agreement lately concluded at Athens with the enemy, and induced it to surrender the fortress to the Bœotians. We do not know through what means he afterwards fell into the hands of justice; but we find that within four or five years he was put to death[1], and Alexicles appears to have suffered at the same time, though on a different charge.[2] Antiphon probably remained at Athens, either trusting to his eloquence and influence, or because he was prevented from escaping; for not long after he was brought to trial[3], with Archeptolemus and Onomacles, two of his colleagues in the embassy to Sparta, and Theramenes, lately his intimate friend, became his accuser.[4] The main charge was that they had gone on a treasonable

[1] Not later than 406. Xenophon Hell. i. 7. 29.

[2] Lycurgus c. Leocr. p. 164. It is remarkable that the orator should not mention the real offence of Aristarchus, though so much to his purpose, but represent him and Alexicles as suffering for their participation in the guilt of Phrynichus.

[3] That it was *soon* after the revolution, is implied in the expression of Thucydides, ὑστερῷ τὰ τῶν τετρακοσίων ἐκακοῦτο.

[4] Lysias c. Eratosth. p. 126.

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embassy, had sailed in an enemy's ship[1], and had passed through Decelea—perhaps on their return from Sparta, when they had no longer any pretext for visiting the enemy's camp—but the part they had taken in the establishment of the oligarchy was, as we learn from Thucydides, their real offence, though it might have seemed incredible that Theramenes should have impeached them on this ground, if his subsequent conduct did not prove that he was capable, if not of every crime, yet of any baseness. Antiphon's defence was considered by Thucydides as the ablest he had ever met with. But he and Archeptolemus—Onomacles seems to have escaped or to have died before sentence was passed—were condemned to death, their property confiscated, their houses rased to the ground, and the site marked with a memorial of their crimes, their bodies cast to the dogs beyond the borders of Attica, and their descendants doomed to perpetual infamy.

But it does not seem that a very rigorous investigation was instituted into the conduct of the Four Hundred; and those who had not taken a conspicuous part in their proceedings, and who might therefore be considered as reluctant instruments of the leading men, were permitted to remain unmolested at Athens. Among them were some who were perhaps not less implacably hostile to popular government than Antiphon himself, and who only waited for an opportunity of recovering their power. In the mean while they seem to have assumed the mask of patriotic zeal and indignation against the oligarchy. So not only Theramenes, but Andron, who proposed the rigorous ordinance for the impeachment of Antiphon and his two colleagues, was himself one of the Four Hundred.[2] And such un-

[1] Cæcilius in Plutarch, X. Orat. Vit. Antipho, where the ordinance of the council (which was perhaps empowered to direct the form of proceeding as in the case of the victorious generals, Xen. Hell. I. 7. 7.) and the judgment, are given at full length. But the words ἐκ τοῦ στρατοπέδου πλεῖν want explanation.

[2] Harpocratio, Ἀνδρών.

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doubtedly was the policy adopted by Critias son of Callæschrus, a man whom we shall hereafter find taking the lead among the enemies of liberty, but who now distinguished himself by the ardour with which he embraced the prevailing cause. It was he who proposed the recall of Alcibiades.[1] To this step he may have been led by personal friendship, or by the wish to conciliate a powerful political associate. But it was likewise at his motion that, after the ceremony of a judicial investigation, the remains of Phrynichus were disinterred, and carried, as those of a traitor, out of Attica, while Apollodorus, a Megarian, and Thrasybulus, an Ætolian of Calydon, who had been imprisoned as privy to his murder, were released, and rewarded with the freedom of the city.[2]

Recall of Alcibiades.

[1] Plutarch Alc. 32. quotes some lines of a poem addressed — how long after the event we do not know — by Critias to Alcibiades, in which he claims this merit. Γνώμη δ' ἡ σε κατήγαγ', ἐγὼ ταύτην ἐν ἅπασιν Εἶπον, καὶ γράψας τοὔργον ἔδρασα τόδε.

[2] Lysias c. Agorat, p. 136. where Thrasybulus is said to have struck the blow, and, agreeably to the statement of Thucydides, in a frequented part of the city. The singular variation as to the time and place in Lycurgus c. Leocr. p. 164. — where the murder is said to have been committed by night, and near a fountain among osiers, therefore, it might be supposed, outside the city — may have arisen from some confusion between this and some other event of the same kind. It is Lycurgus who informs us that Critias was the mover of the decree for the investigation which terminated as we have mentioned in the text. But to suppose that these proceedings took place before the overthrow of the Four Hundred was a somewhat gross mistake.

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FROM THE OVERTHROW OF THE FOUR HUNDRED TO THE BATTLE OF NOTIUM.

Operations of Mindarus in the Hellespont. — Battle of Cynossema. — Journey of Tissaphernes. — Beginning of Xenophon's History. — Loss of a Peloponnesian Fleet. — Fortification of Chalcis. — Actions in the Hellespont. — Alcibiades arrested by Tissaphernes. — Battle of Cyzicus. — Distress of the Peloponnesians. — Sparta makes Overtures for Peace. — Hermocrates. — Athenian Armament under Thrasyllus. — Battle of Ephesus. — Capitulation of Pylus. — Siege of Chalcedon. — Athenian Embassy to Persia. — The Athenians recover Byzantium. — Cyrus Satrap of the Maritime Provinces of Asia Minor. — Return of Alcibiades to Athens. — His expedition to Eleusis. Lysander — At the Court of Cyrus. — Battle of Notium. — Alcibiades deposed. — Conon and his nine Colleagues. — Foundation of Rhodes.

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WHILE the revolution just described was taking place, the operations of the hostile fleets, which had hitherto been opposed to each other on the south coast of Ionia, were transferred to a new theatre of war. The Peloponnesians found Tamos no more attentive to their wants than Tissaphernes had been; and at length even the scanty and irregular supplies which they at first received, wholly ceased. At the same time Mindarus was informed by despatches both from Philippus, and from another Spartan named Hippocrates, who had been sent to Phaselis, that it was now evident Tissaphernes had no intention of fulfilling his promise with regard to the Phœnician fleet. He therefore resolved to accept the invitation of Pharnabazus, who continued to urge him to bring up his whole force to the Helles-

Operations of Mindarus in the Hellespont.

pont, and effect the revolt of all the other towns which remained subject to Athens in the satrap's province. Having first despatched Dorieus with thirteen galleys to Rhodes[1], where some movements were apprehended from the party adverse to the Peloponnesian or aristocratical interest, he set sail from Miletus with seventy-three galleys. His orders for sailing were given so suddenly as to prevent any notice of his design from being conveyed to the enemy. But having, like Clearchus, put out into the open sea to escape observation, he was driven by a gale to the Isle of Icarus, and detained there five or six days, but at length arrived safe at Chios.

In the mean while Thrasyllus, who in the absence of Alcibiades had the supreme command of the Athenian fleet, on discovering the departure of the Peloponnesians, immediately set sail with fifty-five galleys in pursuit of them. Finding however that they were lying at Chios, he proceeded to Lesbos, both to take precautions for stopping their progress, and to recover Eresus, which had been recently induced to revolt by a body of exiled Methymnæans, who had crossed over with some political volunteers from Cuma, and after having been repulsed in an attempt on their own town, gained admission at Eresus. Thrasyllus prepared to assault the place with his whole force, which was raised to sixty-seven galleys by the addition of five, with which Thrasybulus had been sent forward on the first news of the danger, but arrived too late before Eresus, five belonging to Methymna, and two which happened to be returning from the Hellespont. It was the design of Thrasyllus, as soon as he had reduced Eresus, to advance against the Peloponnesians at Chios; and he had ordered a supply of provisions to be laid in at Methymna for this expedition. But in the mean while he stationed scouts both on the coast

[1] Diodorus, xiii. 38.

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of Lesbos and on that of the opposite continent, that the enemy might not pass unobserved through the channel while he was engaged in the siege on the western side of the island. Mindarus however, having staid only two days at Chios, where he victualled his fleet, and obtained a small subsidy from the Chians for the pay of his men, by dint of extraordinary speed, contrived to effect his passage between Lesbos and the main, and to reach the mouth of the Hellespont, before Thrasyllus received any advice of his movements. An Athenian squadron of eighteen galleys was at this time lying at Sestus, and sixteen which had been sent by the Peloponnesians after Clearchus, were at Abydus. They had received notice of the approach of their friends, and were charged to prevent the escape of the Athenian squadron; but though Mindarus arrived in the straits a little before midnight, the Athenians were soon apprised of his presence by the fires which they saw suddenly kindled on the hostile coast, as well as by fire signals, which were raised from their own, and they instantly set sail to gain the open sea. They were not observed by the squadron at Abydus; but at daybreak they found themselves in view of the Peloponnesian armament, which chased them as they made for Imbrus and Lemnos, and took or destroyed four galleys. Thrasyllus on this intelligence immediately raised the siege of Eresus, and proceeded toward the Hellespont with such rapidity, that he fell in with two of the Peloponnesian galleys, which had been carried out beyond the rest in the heat of the pursuit after the Athenian squadron. The next day he came to anchor at Elæus, and was joined by the fourteen fugitive galleys, which, the five Methymnæans having been left behind at Lesbos, raised his forces to seventy-six sail.

Battle of Cynossema.

The Peloponnesians numbered ten more; an advantage which made Mindarus, now no longer hampered

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by the intrigues of Tisssaphernes, willing to try the event of a battle. On the other hand the Athenian commanders were no less desirous of striking a blow which would raise the spirits of their men, and thought themselves not too unequally matched. Five days were spent in preparation, and the Athenians then moved in a single column along the shore toward Sestus, and were met by the Peloponnesians, who perceived their approach from Abydus. Their right was commanded by Thrasybulus; their left, which was parted from the centre by the headland of Cynossema, by Thrasyllus. The Peloponnesians had two main objects in view; to break the Athenian centre, and to outflank their right wing, so as to prevent them from issuing out of the straits. And accordingly Mindarus himself, with his fastest galleys, commanded the left of his line against Thrasybulus, while Thrasyllus was opposed to the Syracusans. The attack on the Athenian centre succeeded, it was overpowered by superior numbers, several galleys were driven aground, and the Peloponnesians landed to follow up their victory on shore. In the mean while Thrasyllus was engaged in a warm combat with the Syracusans, and was prevented by the intervening headland from seeing the distress of his centre; and Thrasybulus was employed in endeavouring to baffle the manœuvres of Mindarus. But, according to Thucydides, the partial success of the Peloponnesians threw them into confusion, which spread through their whole line, when Thrasybulus suddenly turned upon the enemy who were striving to outflank him, and having put them to flight, attacked their victorious but disordered centre. The Syracusans, who had hitherto maintained their station, though with difficulty, against Thrasyllus, were involved in the general defeat. The narrowness of the channel, as the vanquished found shelter near at hand, prevented the Athenians from making many

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captures. They took only one and twenty galleys, and lost fifteen of their own. But the value of their victory was not to be measured by these visible fruits. This was the first great battle they had fought since their disasters in Sicily; their success restored the confidence of their seamen, and the news, which was immediately carried to Athens, lightened the dark cloud which had hitherto hung over the prospects of the state, consoled the people for the recent losses in Eubœa, and animated it with the hope that it might still conquer, even without any other resources than those of its own energy and courage.

The victors, having left their prizes at Elæus, and having staid three days at Sestus to refit, sailed northward to reduce Cyzicus, which had lately revolted. In their way they fell in with eight galleys — part of the squadron with which Helixus the Megarian had taken possession of Byzantium — and after a battle on shore, captured them all. Cyzicus being unfortified made no resistance, and was forced to pay for its rebellion. But in the mean while the Peloponnesians sailed to Elæus, and recovered those of their galleys left there which were in serviceable condition: the rest had been burnt by the people of Elæus. They also despatched Hippocrates and Epicles to Eubœa, to bring away the squadron of Hegesandridas.

About the same time Alcibiades returned with his thirteen galleys to Samos, to claim the merit of having withheld Tissaphernes from sending the Phœnician fleet to assist the enemy, and of having biassed him in favour of the Athenians; and, having manned nine additional galleys, he proceeded to Halicarnassus where he levied large contributions, fortified Cos, and appointed a governor there. While he was thus employed, Tissaphernes also left Aspendus to return to Ionia. He had been startled by the intelligence

Journey of Tissaphernes.

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that the Peloponnesian armament had wholly withdrawn from his province, and was much displeased at seeing its services transferred to Pharnabazus. He was also alarmed by an occurence which took place soon after Mindarus arrived in the Hellespont, and which he considered as a sign of the animosity of the Peloponnesians toward himself. The Æolians of Antandrus, which was included in his satrapy, found themselves oppressed by Arsaces his lieutenant, and dreaded some deeper injury from his perfidy and cruelty, of which he had given a signal proof on a former occasion toward the Delians, during their sojourn at Adramyttium, when, without any apparent provocation, having drawn many of their best troops into his service, as auxiliaries in a pretended expedition, he had massacred them in cold blood. The Antandrians therefore availed themselves of the presence of the Peloponnesians at Abydus, and, with the aid of a body of heavy infantry which Mindarus sent over to them through the passes of Mount Ida, dislodged the Persian garrison from their citadel. Tissaphernes, coupling this transaction with the conduct of the Peloponnesians at Miletus and at Cnidus, where his garrison had likewise been expelled, began to apprehend further detriment from their hostility, and was again anxious to propitiate them. Notwithstanding the assurances which Alcibiades professed to have received from him—by which it is possible that the Athenian may have been himself deceived—he had neither authority from his master to declare himself in favour of Athens, nor any intention to serve her cause. He did not despair of being able to find excuses which would appease the Peloponnesians even with regard to the delay of the Phœnician fleet, and would give him a fair colour for expostulating with them on their proceedings at Antandrus. With this view he proceeded toward the Hellespont, and on his

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journey stopt at Ephesus to sacrifice to the great goddess of the Ephesians: a fact chiefly remarkable as the last which Thucydides records; for with it his history abruptly terminates; and we are left to conjecture in what point of view—whether as indicating a desire of conciliating the Ionians, or in any other way connected with the objects of the satrap's journey—it appeared to him worth mentioning.[1]

Beginning of Xenophon's History.

Xenophon's Greek History—in which he has related the events of the forty-eight years following the period described by Thucydides—opens as abruptly as that of Thucydides breaks off, and with a manifest reference to some occurrences which his predecessor had not mentioned. It seems clear that the beginning of his work has been lost, and it is at least certain, that an interval of five or six weeks must have intervened between the last event related by Thucydides, and that with which Xenophon's narrative at present opens. It is to Diodorus that we are indebted for all the means we have of filling up this blank; and as we know that he had Ephorus before him in this part of his compilation, we have reason to believe that no transactions of any great importance that occurred during this interval have been buried in oblivion. Still Diodorus has elsewhere given such flagrant proofs of his want of diligence and judgment, that we cannot be sure that even what he relates on the authority of Ephorus has been accurately reported. Unless however he has been more than usually negligent or bewildered, he cannot have misrepre-

[1] But assuredly Thucydides was not so ignorant or forgetful as to suppose that this act of Tissaphernes was inconsistent with the *Persian religious belief* which prevailed both at this and at an earlier period. *He* could not have forgotten the motive assigned by Datis for the honours which he paid to the Delians. (See Vol. II. p. 258.) *He* must have known that the Persians were commonly believed to have burnt the Greek temples in revenge for the conflagration of the temple of Cybebe (Vol. II. p. 240. See Herod. v. 102.), even if he was not aware that the many-sided divinity of Ephesus was much less a Greek than an Asiatic goddess, intimately allied with the leading personages of the Persian theology. See Creuzer, *Mythol.* II. p. 187. Baur, *Symbolik.* II. p. 221.

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sented the main facts contained in this part of his narrative, and as they are consistent enough with all that we find in Xenophon, there seems to be no reason for calling them in question. Mindarus, as we have seen, had sent Epicles and Hippocrates to Eubœa for the ships which were stationed there under Hegesandridas. It seems that Hegesandridas, after his victory, with the aid of his Eubœan allies, was able to send a squadron of fifty galleys to the aid of Mindarus, and yet to retain a considerable force on his own station. Hippocrates appears to have remained in Eubœa, waiting perhaps for fresh reinforcements, while Epicles sailed with the squadron toward the Hellespont. But off Mount Athos he was overtaken by a terrible storm, which destroyed every galley, and all their crews except twelve men. An inscription, dedicated by the twelve survivors in the temple of Athene Itonia at Coronea, was quoted and most probably seen by Ephorus[1]; and it affords incontrovertible evidence of the fact; nor is there sufficient ground for suspecting that Diodorus so grossly misunderstood his author, as to refer the event to a wrong epoch, especially as no other can be found for so memorable a disaster. There can therefore be little doubt that Epicles—for he is never again mentioned—really perished with his whole squadron.

Loss of a Peloponnesian fleet.

Yet the immediate consequences of this event do not appear in the narrative of Diodorus, and can only be collected from the state of affairs which Xenophon represents at the beginning of his history, where we find Hegesandridas still in command of a squadron, and Hippocrates again serving under Mindarus in the Hellespont. But hence it seems clear that, when the news of the shipwreck reached Eubœa, Hegesandridas sailed, with as many galleys as he could collect or as

[1] Diodor. xiii. 41.

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could be spared, accompanied by Hippocrates, towa the north. He would feel the less scruple in wi drawing his forces from Eubœa, as a work had bc lately begun which promised to secure the isla from the attacks of the Athenians.[1] For it was p bably before his departure, and with his sancti and assistance, that the Eubœans had set about undertaking which they had planned as soon as th revolted from Athens, though Diodorus places execution a little later. Their main object was connect their island with the main land by a brid over the Euripus, so as to insure the introducti of supplies and succours from Bœotia, and to preve the Athenians, even though masters of the sea, frc besieging them on that side. For this purpose mole was carried out from Chalcis, and another frc the opposite Bœotian town of Aulis, leaving a passa between them for only one ship. A tower was bu at the end of each mole, commanding the passag which was covered by a wooden, perhaps a moveab bridge. The Bœotians zealously co-operated in tl work, which tended to strengthen their influen in Eubœa, while it subjected the Athenians a great permanent inconvenience, as it barred tl channel against all vessels bound for Athens fro the north, and compelled them to make the dif cult and dangerous circuit of the eastern coas the dreaded scene of many calamitous shipwrecks After the departure of Hegesandridas, Theramen was sent from Athens with thirty galleys, to obstru the work; but he found too strong a force collected f the protection of the workmen, and probably tl work itself too far advanced, to offer any effectu interruption. But having no enemy to fear on tl

Fortification of Chalcis.

[1] Diodor. xiii. 47.

[2] See a memoir by Mr. Hawkins in Walpole i. p. 545., where, however, one c hardly help suspecting that he somewhat underrates the ancient productiveness Eubœa itself.

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sea, he proceeded on a cruise among the islands, to levy contributions both from friends and foes. Besides exacting heavy penalties from those who had incurred the charge of treasonable attempts or designs against the majesty of the commonwealth, he appears now to have undone some part of the political changes which had been effected by Pisander and his oligarchical associates among the subjects of Athens. In most cases perhaps the revolution at Athens was attended by a similar one in the states which had before followed her example. But at Paros Theramenes found oligarchy still established; and while he restored the democratical government, he forced the defeated party to pay dearly for its brief enjoyment of power.

Actions in the Hellespont.

Not long after Hegesandridas quitted Eubœa, Thymochares, whom he had defeated at Eretria, was sent with a small squadron in the same direction: and the first event related in Xenophon's History is an action which took place between the squadron commanded by Hegesandridas and a part of the Athenian navy reinforced by Thymochares. The battle appears to have been the second that was fought within the course of a few days; it was won by the Lacedæmonians; but as no further results are mentioned we may conclude that both this and the preceding one were of slight importance. Hegesandridas was perhaps on his way to the coast of Thrace, where not long after we find him stationed; and it seems not improbable that it was off this coast that the actions took place, and that the main squadron opposed to him on both occasions was that of Theramenes. The hostile fleets in the Hellespont were still watching each other's movements, waiting perhaps for supplies and reinforcements, toward the end of September, when Dorieus, having executed his commission at Rhodes, sailed in with fourteen galleys. Information was immediately given of his approach to the Athenian

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commanders, who were encamped at Madytus on the coast of the Chersonesus, and they put out with twenty galleys to attack him. But he ran his squadron aground near the headland of Rhœteum, and defended himself so vigorously, that his assailants were forced to retire, baffled, to their camp. This action was observed by Mindarus, who was sacrificing to Athene in the citadel of Ilium, which commanded a view of the coast, and he hastened to embark and join Dorieus with his whole fleet. The Athenians now came out from Madytus to meet them, and an engagement ensued near Abydus, which lasted with fluctuating success nearly the whole day. Toward evening Alcibiades was seen entering the straits with eighteen galleys, and on the appearance of this squadron the Peloponnesians took to flight, and were pursued and driven ashore, where however they maintained the combat in defence of their ships, and were supported by Pharnabazus, who came to their aid with a body of troops. He displayed the utmost zeal in their behalf, animated his men not only by his exhortations but by his example, pushing forward with his horse into the sea, and persevering as long as there was an enemy to oppose. The Athenians however succeeded in carrying off thirty of the Peloponnesian galleys, and in recovering those which they had themselves lost, with which they retired to Sestus.

Notwithstanding this victory, the want of money was so pressing, that while Thrasyllus sailed to Athens to bear the good tidings, and to procure reinforcements, other officers were despatched in various directions to collect pecuniary supplies; no more than forty galleys were left at Sestus. It was at this juncture that Tissaphernes, who perhaps had not only travelled slowly, after the fashion of an Eastern grandee, but had taken time to watch the turn of events, arrived in the neighbourhood of the

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Hellespont, bent perhaps the more on conciliating the Peloponnesians on account of their recent losses, which may have led him to fear lest the balance which he wished to preserve should be destroyed, and he himself might incur his master's displeasure as having contributed to the success of his old enemies the Athenians. When therefore Alcibiades went to greet him on his arrival with presents which were at once offerings of friendship and a tribute of homage, not perhaps without hope of obtaining some supplies for the necessities of the fleet, instead of the usual gracious reception he was arrested and sent prisoner to Sardis. Tissaphernes at the same time professed that he had orders from the King to treat the Athenians as enemies; and he seems to have taken this opportunity of opening a fresh correspondence with the Peloponnesian commanders, and of apologising for the breach of his promise with regard to the Phœnician fleet. At Aspendus it appears he had pleaded as a pretext for delay, that the numbers of the fleet fell so far short of the force which he had been commanded to raise, that he did not venture to run the risk of offending his master by sending such inadequate succours. Now, as we may collect from Diodorus[1], he offered a new excuse: alleging that news which had been received of certain designs formed by the king of the Arabians, and the ruler of the revolted Egyptians, which threatened the safety of Phœnicia, had prevented him from parting with a force which was needed to protect the King's dominions. But, as his character was now generally understood, his assertions appear to have gained little credit; and when, after a month's imprisonment,

Alcibiades arrested by Tissaphernes.

[1] Diodor. XIII. 46. Though Diodorus here and elsewhere, by a blunder which alone might serve to stamp his character as a historian, has confounded Tissaphernes with Pharnabazus, the apology which he puts into the mouth of Pharnabazus for the conduct of Tissaphernes is too characteristic of its real author not to be genuine.

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Alcibiades contrived to effect his escape from Sardis to Clazomenæ, he easily made it to be believed that he had been released by the satrap's orders.[1] In the mean while Mindarus, who had still sixty galleys left, or had received reinforcements which raised his fleet to that number[2], prepared to take advantage of the enemy's temporary weakness; and the Athenians, having been apprised of the attack which he meditated, withdrew under cover of night from Sestus to Cardia, on the isthmus of the peninsula. Here they were joined by Alcibiades, who brought with him five galleys and a smaller vessel, which he had found at Clazomenæ. But hearing that the Peloponnesians had left Abydus for Cyzicus, he crossed over by land to Sestus, and ordered the fleet to sail round and meet him there; for, notwithstanding his great inferiority in numbers, he was resolved to seek an engagement. But just as he was on the point of sailing, Thrasybulus and Theramenes arrived, each with a squadron of twenty galleys; for Theramenes had joined Thrasybulus on the coast of Thrace, and they had been engaged in levying contributions till they were called away by a despatch from the fleet at Cardia. The object of Alcibiades now was to overtake the enemy before this augmentation of his force should have been heard of. Making all speed he arrived in the forenoon of the next day at the island of Proconnesus, where he learnt that Mindarus was at Cyzicus with Pharnabazus and his troops. He remained the rest of the day at Proconnesus, taking the most rigorous precautions to prevent intelligence of his coming from reaching the enemy. Early the next morning he assembled the men, and told them that they must be prepared

[1] Plutarch Alc. 28.

[2] Diodorus, XIII. 49. speaks of great accessions from Peloponnesus and other quarters, as to which Xenophon is silent. Yet as Mindarus lost twenty-one galleys out of eighty-six at the battle of Cynossema, though he afterwards recovered a part of them, he must have been strongly reinforced either before or after his loss at Abydus. And it is probable that a part at least of these reinforcements came from Eubœa.

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B. C. 410.

Battle of Cyzicus.

to fight not only on the water but on land, and even against walled towns; for it was by their arms alone they could hope to provide themselves with those supplies which the enemy received in abundance from the Persian treasury. He then set sail in a heavy rain and a thick mist for Cyzicus. As he approached the harbour the weather suddenly cleared up, and, as the sun broke the mist, the Peloponnesian fleet was discovered exercising a great way off at sea. When the Peloponnesians saw the Athenians with so large a force between them and the harbour, they made for the nearest land, and laying their ships together in a compact mass defended themselves awhile from the decks. But at length Alcibiades, having sailed round with 20 galleys to another point of the coast, landed his men, and came up to attack them in the rear. Mindarus himself now landed to repel the assailants, but fell in the battle, and his men were put to flight. The whole fleet, except the galleys of the Syracusans, which they fired, fell into the hands of the Athenians, who carried them away to Proconnesus.

The next day they sailed to Cyzicus, which being abandoned by the enemy was forced to receive them, and was laid under heavy contributions by Alcibiades during a stay of twenty days which he made there. He then proceeded to the Bosporus; in his way he was admitted into Perinthus; and at Selymbria, though the gates were closed against him, he obtained money. On his arrival in the Bosporus he fortified the town of Chrysopolis on the eastern coast opposite Byzantium, and established a custom-house there, where he compelled all vessels which passed from the Euxine to pay a tithe on their cargoes. Then leaving thirty galleys under Theramenes and Eubulus to collect these duties, with general instructions to do whatever harm they could to the enemy, he returned with the rest of the fleet to the Hellespont. While he was

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Distress of the Peloponnesians.

reaping these fruits of the victory of Cyzicus. it had for a time reduced the Peloponnesians to great distress, which was described by Hippocrates, who took the command after the death of Mindarus, in a despatch—copied by Xenophon from the original which was intercepted and carried to Athens—consisting of four Laconic sentences. *The tide has turned; Mindarus has perished; the men are hungering; we are in a strait.*[1] But their embarrassment did not last long, for Pharnabazus, who was as true and generous as Tissaphernes was faithless and selfish, came forward of his own accord to their relief. He bade them take heart; for so long as their lives were saved, they would find timber enough in the King's forests to replace their lost ships. In the mean while he clothed and armed the men, gave them pay for two months, and stationed them to guard the coasts of his province. He then called the officers together, and bade them set about building new galleys at Antandrus, equal in number to those which they had lost; advanced the money required, and gave them leave to take the timber from the woods of Ida. While the ships were on the stocks, the Syracusans earned the gratitude of the Antandrians by helping them to fortify and guard their town, and were requited with the title of Benefactors and with the freedom of Antandrus.

Sparta makes overtures for peace.

Still the news of the loss of the whole fleet on which the Peloponnesians had hitherto relied for carrying on the war created so much alarm at Sparta, that an embassy was sent to Athens, with Endius at its head, to make overtures for peace. The fact, notwithstanding Xenophon's silence, cannot reasonably be doubted, and the account which Diodorus

[1] Ἔβρει τὰ καλά· Μίνδαρος ἀπέσσουα· πεινῶντι τὠνδρες· ἀπορεῦμες δ τι χρὴ δρᾶν. The strangest circumstance about this despatch is, that it runs so very nearly in two Hipponactean iambics. But the anxiety of some learned men to complete the first line by inserting a δὲ or a γε (see Valckenaer, Theoc. p. 264.)—as if the Spartans had consoled themselves under their misfortunes by putting them in verse—is a ludicrous example of misapplied erudition.

gives of the terms proposed by Endius is at least perfectly probable. Each party was to retain the places which it possessed, but to withdraw its troops from the other's territory, and the Lacedæmonian prisoners were to be exchanged against as many Athenians. But Cleophon, one of the upstart demagogues who from time to time pushed themselves forward into a disgraceful notoriety and a pernicious influence, now took the same course which Cleon had pursued on a similar occasion, and prevailed on the assembly to reject an offer which a few weeks before would probably have been hailed as an unexpected deliverance. Cleophon's sway over the public mind might lead us to conjecture that the polity which Thucydides applauded had already given way to the old democracy. But all classes were alike capable of being elated by sudden prosperity, and we do not know what may have been the demands of the Athenians on which the negotiation was broken off.

While the building of the new fleet was going on at Antandrus, news was brought to Hermocrates and his colleagues, that they had been condemned to banishment by the people at home, where an adverse faction was now predominant. They immediately assembled their men, and after protesting against the illegal proceedings by which they had been sentenced unheard and in a mass, they exhorted them not to relax their zeal or their discipline, and desired them to elect commanders in their room, until their successors should have arrived from Syracuse. This request was received with a general acclamation, especially from the officers and the soldiers, bidding them retain their office. But the generals deprecated all resistance to legal authority, however unjustly exercised, though at the same time they declared themselves ready to give an account of their administration, if any one present had aught to allege

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against them, and reminded their hearers of the victories they had gained and of the distinctions with which they had been honoured by their allies. This appeal was attended with an effect which they probably expected. Not a voice was raised except to renew the former acclamations, and they accordingly consented to remain in command until they were superseded by the new generals. Hermocrates had especially endeared himself to his inferior officers by the affability with which he had been used to communicate his plans, and to listen to their suggestions, collecting those of the captains, and masters, and even the soldiers whom he found the aptest learners, every morning and evening in his tent for consultation and discourse. When he took his leave, most of the captains pledged themselves by a solemn oath, as soon as they returned to Syracuse, to exert their utmost efforts for his recall. He appears to have proceeded to Sparta before the arrival of his successors, leaving his colleagues at Miletus with a newly built squadron of 20 galleys. His main object at Sparta was apparently to counteract the machinations of Tissaphernes, who was perhaps endeavouring by the intrigues of his emissaries to supplant Pharnabazus in the confidence of the Spartans. The satrap's agents were instructed to meet the charges of Hermocrates with a calumnious allegation, that he had applied to Tissaphernes for money, and that the refusal he met with was the motive of his resentment.[1] But this story was not believed, and the statements of Hermocrates were supported by Astyochus, who seems no longer to have had any thing to gain by falsehood. And the public opinion at Sparta turned so strongly against Tissaphernes, that

Hermocrates.

[1] Thucyd. VIII. 85. An intelligent reader of the original will not require a proof, that this is the epoch to which Thucydides refers, and consequently that Hermocrates had not been before superseded.

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he was suspected of having concerted a revolution which took place about this time at Thasos, in which the partisans of Sparta and the Spartan governor Eteonicus were expelled. Hermocrates, after thus defeating the artifices of Tissaphernes, returned to Asia, and was most cordially received by Pharnabazus, who supplied him liberally with money to fit out ships and engage mercenaries for his return to Syracuse. In the mean while the new Syracusan generals, Demarchus, Myscon, and Potamis, arrived at Miletus, and the troops, notwithstanding their regret for the loss of Hermocrates and his colleagues, quietly submitted to their command.

After the battle of Cyzicus, Pasippidas, a Spartan, had been collecting as many ships as he could from the allies of Sparta in the north. He was probably at Thasos when the revolution took place there; for he was accused of conspiring with Tissaphernes to bring it about, and was condemned to banishment, or remained in voluntary exile to escape a more rigorous sentence. Cratesippidas was sent out as admiral in the room of Mindarus, and found the galleys which had been collected by Pasippidas in Chios. While the Peloponnesians were thus forming a new navy, Thrasyllus was raising a powerful armament at Athens. A slight advantage which he gained over Agis, who had incautiously advanced in a marauding inroad too near the city walls, animated the people the more readily to entrust him with the forces he applied for, and they voted 1000 heavy infantry, 100 horse, and 50 galleys. While he was busied with his preparations, Agis was one day struck by the sight of the corn-ships which he observed from the heights of Decelea sailing into Piræus, and complained that he and his troops were only wasting their time in the occupation of Attica, so long as corn was permitted to be poured into Athens by sea; and he

Athenian armament under Thrasyllus.

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advised that Clearchus—who it seems had by this time returned from his first mission—should again be sent to the Bosporus to use all his influence at Byzantium and Chalcedon for the purpose of interrupting the Athenian commerce in that its most important quarter. This suggestion was adopted, and fifteen vessels were fitted out, from Megara, and some other of the confederate cities, and filled with troops. Three of these transports were intercepted at the mouth of the Hellespont by an Athenian squadron of nine galleys which was stationed there; the rest made their way to Byzantium, where Clearchus seems to have taken up his residence as governor.

B. C. 409. In the spring of 409 Thrasyllus, having completed his preparations during the winter, and having armed 5000 of the seamen to serve as targeteers, sailed to Samos, and after staying there three days, crossed over to the main land, and landed his troops near the small town of Pygela, which he attacked without success. But he ravaged the adjacent country, and almost entirely destroyed a body of troops which came from Miletus to its relief. The next day he sailed to Notium, and thence led his troops against Colophon, which immediately surrendered. He staid there but a few hours, and in the middle of the night resumed his march, and made an inroad into the interior of Lydia, where the corn was just ripe. Here he burnt several villages, and returned to the coast laden with plunder, having only experienced one very slight interruption from a troop of cavalry commanded by Stages, a Persian, who happened to be near the scene of his devastation. He now proceeded to attack Ephesus; but Tissaphernes had received intelligence of his design, and had made preparations for the defence of the place, which was of peculiar importance on account of its wealth and and of its numerous Persian residents. He had taken

Battle of Ephesus.

advantage of the reverence with which the temple was regarded by Greeks and barbarians, and had sent horsemen round to raise the population of the adjacent region *for the defence of the goddess.* Besides the auxiliaries thus collected, the Ephesians were succoured by the troops of the Syracusan squadron which had been reinforced by five others from Syracuse which brought two new generals, and by two from Selinus. Thrasyllus landed his forces during the night in two divisions, on opposite sides of Ephesus; the heavy infantry at the foot of Mount Coressus, the light troops and the cavalry on a marshy level to the north, and at daybreak began his march toward the city. But the Ephesians and their allies fell upon the two divisions separately and defeated them both, and the Athenians fled to their ships with the loss of about 400 lives. The Sicilian troops were acknowledged to have contributed most to the victory, and were rewarded by the Ephesians with public and private honours and immunities, and those of Selinus, who had just been deprived of their own city by the Carthaginian invasion, were admitted to the freedom of Ephesus. Thrasyllus, after burying his dead at Notium, sailed away to Lesbos. While he was at anchor at Methymne, seeing the Syracusan squadron, now twenty-five galleys, sailing by, he attacked them, captured four, and chased the rest back to Ephesus. The Syracusan prisoners were sent to Athens, where by way of retaliation they were confined in the quarries of Munychia, but contrived in the course of the next winter to dig through the rock, and escaped to Decelea and thence to Megara. In one of the prizes was a remarkable person, the cousin and namesake of Alcibiades, who had been involved in his kinsman's misfortune by the information—probably the calumny—of Dioclides. It would seem as if he had not been included in the decree which reversed his cousin's

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sentence; but that Thrasyllus notwithstanding ventured to set him at liberty.[1] He then pursued his voyage northward, and joined the squadron which was lying under the command of Alcibiades at Sestus, from whence the whole fleet soon after crossed over to Lampsacus, which they fortified, designing to make it their head-quarters for the winter. But the troops who had been serving with uninterrupted success under Alcibiades refused for some time to mingle in the same ranks with those of Thrasyllus, whom they looked upon as dishonoured by their defeat at Ephesus. In the course of the winter however Alcibiades made an expedition against Abydus, and routed a strong body of cavalry which Pharnabazus brought

[1] This has been the almost unanimous opinion of the commentators on Xenophon, I. 2. 13., who have therefore agreed in considering his text in this passage as corrupt, though they differ as to the mode of correcting it. The text actually expresses a very different fact: That Thrasyllus caused Alcibiades *to be stoned*: κατέλευσεν. The emendation κατέλυσεν is indeed very simple and easy, but unfortunately does not give the sense required. Wolf's conjecture ἀπέλυσεν would not be liable to this objection; but it is very difficult to conceive how this should have been corrupted into κατέλευσεν. Still if it was certain that Alcibiades the Phegusian was a friend, as well as a kinsman of the son of Clinias, it would be improbable that Thrasyllus should have made him suffer the death of a traitor. But it remains to be more attentively considered whether this ought to be assumed as indisputable. If there was any foundation for the charge of Dioclides (Vol. III. p. 392.), if Alcibiades the Phegusian was one of the persons who openly or secretly fostered the popular delusion in the proceedings against the Hermes-breakers, we should be led to suspect that he could not have been on good terms with his kinsman, who might have been gratified instead of being displeased with his punishment.

[Droysen (on the Hermokop. in Rh. Mus. IV. p. 32.) contends for the reading κατέλευσεν, observing, that if Thrasyllus set Alcibiades the Phegusian at liberty, this must clearly have been done on account of his relation to his celebrated namesake, and then it would follow that the Phegusian had suborned Dioclides with a view to serve his cousin. But this Droysen conceives to be impossible, for several reasons. In that case the Phegusian would have been already restored to his country, and would not have been found on board the enemy's fleet. Some of the persons denounced by Dioclides were friends of the elder Alcibiades; unless the Phegusian had been notoriously among his adversaries, he would have been an object of suspicion, and have been arrested as his friend. Büttner (*Geschichte der politischen Hetärien in Athen.* p. 68.) remarks that in the list of persons denounced by Dioclides, there is only one (Critias) who appears to have been a friend of Alcibiades, and that this depends on a mere surmise, that this Critias was the celebrated leader of the Thirty. He also observes, that if Thrasyllus put his prisoner to death, it might have been from some motive with which Alcibiades had nothing to do, and that the two cousins might have been good friends in 415, and yet enemies in 408. Both these writers assume that the statement of Dioclides as to the Phegusian was unquestionably true, and that his denunciations were principally directed against either the friends or the enemies of Alcibiades.]

up to protect it; and after this common victory the troops of Thrasyllus were greeted and recognised by their comrades. Several inroads were afterwards made from Lampsacus into the interior, to ravage the province of Pharnabazus.

Capitulation of Pylus.

During the same winter Sparta at length relieved herself from the thorn which Demosthenes had planted in her side. The garrison of Pylus, besieged by a great land force, and blockaded by a squadron of eleven galleys, was obliged to capitulate, and permitted to withdraw. The Athenians had sent thirty galleys to relieve it, under the command of Anytus, a name which afterwards became unhappily notorious. But he was prevented by contrary winds from doubling Malea, and returned, after a bootless voyage, to Athens. The people, indignant as usual at the disappointment, imputed it to the treachery of Anytus, and he was brought to trial. According to Diodorus he saved his life by bribing his judges, and this was the first case in which such corruption was practised at Athens. This last opinion is indeed confirmed by the authority of Aristotle[1], yet we do not know enough of the state of the Athenian tribunals at this period, to be sure that the verdict, which was apparently so just, was not honestly given. The success of the Spartans at Pylus was in some degree balanced by a disaster which they experienced about the same time in their ill-fated colony of Heraclea, where the Spartan harmost Labotas was slain with 700 men in a battle with the implacable Œtæans, through the treachery of their Achæan comrades, who seem to have been admitted—against the spirit of the original institutions—to the franchise.[2] On the other hand the Athenians

[1] Harpocratio Δεκάζων. But it is not clear that Aristotle alluded to this trial, nor even that he meant the same person. This Anytus was the son of Anthemio. He *may*, as Duker shows, Obs. Misc. v. p. 187. have been the accuser of Socrates.

[2] This is one way of accounting for their presence. Xenophon does not explain either how they came to be engaged in battle, or who they were. But perhaps

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suffered another loss this winter, which they perhaps felt not less keenly than that of Pylus. The Megarians, who were now reinforced by the Syracusan prisoners who had escaped from Munychia, made themselves masters of Nisæa. The Athenians sent Leotrophides and Timarchus with 1000 infantry and 400 cavalry, to revenge this blow. They were met near the border by the whole force of Megara, supported by the Syracusans[1] and a small body of Lacedæmonians, but completely defeated it, and pursued the Megarians with great slaughter to the town. But Nisæa was not recovered.

B. C. 408.

Early in the spring of 408 the Athenian fleet moved from Lampsacus toward the Bosporus, which now became the principal theatre of war, as it was generally felt, according to the observation of Agis, that the issue of the struggle mainly turned on the command of this great thoroughfare of Greek commerce. The generals began their operations with the siege of Chalcedon, where Hippocrates was harmost. On the approach of the Athenian armament, the Chalcedonians removed all their rural property of a moveable kind out of the country, and entrusted it to the care of their neighbours the Bithynian Thracians. Hearing this, Alcibiades advanced with a small body of troops to the Bithynian border while the fleet sailed along the coast, and demanded that the deposit should be given up to him. The Thracians were perhaps honest, but they were not prepared to sacrifice themselves for their Greek allies; they surrendered their charge, and gave pledges of submission. On his return to Chalcedon he began to invest it with an intrenchment surmounted with a palisade which he carried from sea to sea, inter-

Siege of Chalcedon.

we ought to connect this transaction with the proceedings of Agis mentioned by Thucydides, VIII. 16., and Vol. III. p. 466. These may have been Achæans of Phthia, who were engaged reluctantly as auxiliaries to the Heracleans.

[1] For it is most probably they who are signified by the words of Diodorus, XIII. 66. παραλαβόντες τινὰς τῶν ἐκ Συρακούσας.

rupted only by the bed of a river which flowed by the town. The works seem to have been nearly finished, when Pharnabazus came up with an army strong in cavalry, and encamped in the sanctuary of Hercules near the town. Hippocrates now made a sally, while Pharnabazus attempted to join him, by forcing his way through the opening with which the circumvallation was broken by the river. Thrasyllus, with the bulk of the Athenian infantry, sustained for a long time, without repelling, the charge of Hippocrates; but at length Alcibiades, who had probably been engaged in taking precautions against the movements of Pharnabazus, came up with the cavalry, and decided the fortune of the day. Hippocrates fell; his troops were driven back into the town, and Pharnabazus, unable to effect a passage, retreated to his encampment. The low state of the military chest forced Alcibiades, as soon as he had invested Chalcedon, to set off on an expedition to the Hellespont, to raise money. In his absence his colleagues entered into a negotiation with Pharnabazus, who, finding that the Peloponnesian allies were not able to protect his province from the hostility of the Athenians, and that their affairs were declining, was probably desirous of peace. It was now agreed that he should pay the Athenians twenty talents, and should give safe conduct to an embassy which they were to send to the Persian court; and that until these ambassadors returned they should suspend their operations against Chalcedon; in the mean while the Chalcedonians were to pay their ancient tribute and the arrears which had become due since they revolted from Athens.

Athenian embassy to Persia.

This convention was ratified by all the generals except Alcibiades, who, having collected all the forces of the Greek towns in the Chersonesus, together with a body of Thracians and about 300 horse, had taken Selymbria, and thence proceeded to reduce Byzantium.

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Pharnabazus required that he should ratify the treaty; and Alcibiades—as if he had been a distinct party—demanded that the like ceremony should be executed on the part of the satrap to himself. Accordingly two commissioners appointed by Pharnabazus received the oath of Alcibiades at Chrysopolis, while he took that which was tendered to him by two agents of Alcibiades at Chalcedon. And, as if to make the importance of Alcibiades more conspicuous, he and the satrap, beside the oath taken by all the generals, interchanged separate and personal pledges of faith. Pharnabazus then left Chalcedon, directing the Athenian ambassadors to repair to Cyzicus. They were accompanied by two Argives; but at the same time an embassy was appointed to guard the interests of Sparta and her allies; and it was headed—notwithstanding the charge under which he had been recently labouring—by Pasippidas. Hermocrates and his brother Proxenus—how authorised and for what purposes we are not informed—accompanied the Lacedæmonian envoys. Pharnabazus himself undertook to conduct them to court.

The Athenians recover Byzantium.

In the mean while Alcibiades prosecuted the siege of Byzantium, carried a circumvallation across the land side of the town, and made several attempts to take it by assault. These were all baffled; but the provisions of the besieged—whose supplies had perhaps been much straitened by the enemy before the siege was regularly formed—soon began to fail; and the evils of famine were aggravated among the inhabitants by the cruelty and insolence of Clearchus, who, when food grew scarce, reserved all that he found for the use of the garrison, while the Byzantians and their families were starving. Having thus, as he thought, provided for the immediate security of the place, reckless of the sufferings by which it was purchased, he crossed over to Asia for the purpose of obtaining a subsidy from

Pharnabazus, and of collecting an armament strong enough to draw off the Athenians from the siege, committing the defence of the town to the Megarian Helixus, and to Cœratadas, who commanded the Bœotian division of the garrison. But he had relied too much on the patience of the inhabitants, who had already entered into correspondence with the besiegers, and, as soon as he was gone, concerted a plan for admitting them within the walls. One night they opened the gates on the land side to Alcibiades and his troops, while the attention of the garrison was engaged by the movements of the Athenian fleet, which feigned a sudden attack on the harbour. The stratagem was completely successful; and Helixus and Cœratadas were obliged to surrender themselves prisoners with 300 of the garrison. As it was necessity, rather than good-will toward the Athenians, that urged the authors of the plot, they stipulated with Alcibiades that none of their fellow-citizens should be punished for their previous political offences; and this condition was observed. This was the only reward they asked for; and their conduct was so manifestly dictated by disinterested patriotism, that when they were afterwards brought to trial as traitors they were acquitted by the judgment of the Spartans themselves.

In the spring of 407, Pharnabazus and the rival ambassadors, who had stopt during the most inclement part of the winter at the Phrygian town of Gordium, were pursuing their journey, when they met another Lacedæmonian embassy headed by Bœotius, which was returning from the Persian court. They announced that they had been completely successful in their application to the King; and their assertions were confirmed by the presence of Cyrus, a younger son of Darius, who was sent down with instructions to aid the Lacedæmonians in carrying on the war, and with a commission which invested him with supreme

B.C. 407.

Cyrus satrap of the maritime provinces of Asia Minor.

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authority over the whole maritime region of Asia Minor, or, as the royal letter described it, over all who assembled in the plains of Castolus.[1] The Athenian envoys were nevertheless desirous of continuing their journey; if this was not permitted, they demanded leave to return home. But Cyrus, who entered with ardour on the duties assigned to him, desired Pharnabazus either to place them in his hands, or to detain them for a time, that the Athenians might not be warned of their danger; and Pharnabazus, to gratify the prince, kept them in custody, amusing them with promises, sometimes of conducting them to court, sometimes of sending them back to the coast; and it was not until they had been imprisoned three years, that he obtained leave from Cyrus to release them.

Alcibiades, having achieved so many brilliant and important conquests, having rescued the state from the dangers of intestine discord, made the name of Athens once more formidable to her revolted subjects, and enabled her to cope with the Peloponnesian confederacy supported by the power of Persia, now thought it time to show himself at home. Soon after the reduction of Byzantium he sailed to Samos with the greater part of the fleet, and thence proceeded with twenty galleys to levy contributions on the coast of Caria, where he collected 100 talents. Thrasybulus was sent with eighty galleys to the coast of Thrace, where he restored the Athenian sovereignty in most of the revolted cities, and among the rest in Thasos, which, since it threw off its obedience to Athens, had been reduced to great distress by war and civil broils and their attendant famine.

[1] Κάρανον τῶν ἐς Κασταλὸν ἀθροιζομένων. Castolus it appears from Steph. Byz. was in Lydia. Its connection with the Dorians which Stephanus there intimates is inexplicable. Nor do we know what were the provinces included in this description. The word Καρανὸς is also an enigma. But Xenophon does not give the slightest hint to warrant the fancy, that it was the intention of Darius to dismember his empire in favour of Cyrus, who on the contrary always speaks as his father's officer.

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Thrasyllus conducted the rest of the armament to Athens, where he found that Alcibiades had been elected one of the new generals with Thrasybulus and Conon. Alcibiades, having returned with his treasure to Samos, sailed first to Paros, and then made for Gythium, under pretext of observing the preparations of the Spartans, who were said to be fitting out a squadron of thirty galleys there, but really to gather information as to the state of public feeling toward himself; and—all his doubts having been removed by his recent appointment, and by private assurances from his friends—he at length sailed into Piræus.

Return of Alcibiades to Athens.

It seems to be sufficiently attested that he made his entry with the pomp of a naval triumph, though its circumstances are wholly omitted in Xenophon's dry narrative, and were probably much exaggerated by later writers. It is impossible to say how far he may have ventured to indulge his natural love of ostentation with the splendour which some of these writers described him to have displayed on this occasion.[1] But it appears that he reserved for himself the privilege of bringing home the prizes which had been taken in the late campaigns—which amounted according to Diodorus to no less than 200 vessels[2]—and that his squadron was both richly adorned with the most glittering spoils, and attended by transports laden with prisoners and booty. The crowd which flocked to the shores of Piræus to witness his landing was perhaps as great as that which saw him embark for Sicily, and now he was the exclusive object of

[1] As the Samian Duris, who prided himself on being a descendant of Alcibiades, Plut. Alc. 32., Athenæus XII. p. 535., and related that the galley of Alcibiades was adorned with purple sails, and that the rowers, as they entered the harbour, were kept to time by the flute of Chrysogonus, and the voice of Callippides, a tragic actor, both in sacred or theatrical attire.

[2] But Plutarch, Alc. 32., more judiciously supposes that this number included those which had been destroyed, and of which he carried away the ornaments of the prows.

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the public curiosity. The sentiments which he excited in the breasts of the spectators were various as the view they took of the events which had caused so great a change in the state of Athens since his last departure. The majority however regarded him as an injured man, the victim of the envy and animosity of his ambitious and turbulent rivals, who had first denied him an opportunity of vindicating his innocence, and then had misled the people to drive him into exile. *It was his misfortune rather than his fault, that he had been obliged to take refuge among the enemies of his country, who had shown by their treatment of him how little they believed his heart to be with them, how much they dreaded his unalterable attachment to Athens. Great as his abilities were, his fellow-citizens had nothing to fear, but much to hope from them. For minds like his the honours with which the people rewarded his services were sufficient to satisfy their ambition; his adversaries, who, conscious of no real merit, could only hope to rise upon the ruin of abler and better men, were much more dangerous to the commonwealth.* There were however others who considered him as the sole author of their past calamities, and of all the dangers which were still impending over Athens. And this party did not fail to notice that the day of his return was one of evil omen; for indeed it happened to be that on which the image of the tutelary goddess was annually stript of its ornaments for the sake of the needful reparations and ablutions[1], and was veiled from public view; and it was therefore marked in the Attic calendar as an unlucky day[2], and was one on which no religious

[1] Hence the holiday was called Πλυντήρια. The house of the Praxiargidæ enjoyed the exclusive privilege of performing these rites, which were derived from a very remote antiquity. The custom was the foundation of a whole class of legends, such as that which was the subject of the poem of Callimachus, *In Lavacra Palladis.*

[2] Ἐν ταῖς μάλιστα τῶν ἀποφράδων. Plut. Alc. 34.

Athenian would transact any business. But there were probably few in whose minds such reflections and forebodings were not at least for a time excluded by the thought, which the spectacle more immediately suggested, of the victories and conquests, by which Alcibiades had raised his country, from the depth of humiliation and despondency into which she had fallen when she had lost his support, to her present lofty and firm position.

He did not however wholly rely on the favour of the multitude, though he had neglected no means of ensuring it, and when his galley came alongside the quay he did not venture to leave the deck until he observed his cousin Euryptolemus and a strong body of kinsmen and friends ready to escort him to the city. He then landed, and was greeted by the crowd with all the tokens of that enthusiasm which the sight of an old favourite under such circumstances could not fail to kindle. Garlands were showered upon his head, the air rang with acclamations; the throng pressed upon the circle of friends that surrounded him, to gaze at him and salute him. Thus attended he went up to the city, and presented himself successively before the council and the assembly. He there asserted his innocence, bewailed his misfortunes, complained, but with delicate forbearance, of his wrongs, imputed his calamities to the malignity of fortune and the envy of a higher power, but dwelt at the greatest length on the fair prospects which were now open for Athens. His hearers, touched, flattered, and excited, by his address, testified their sympathy and delight by the extraordinary honours which they conferred on him, and none of his enemies ventured to raise a dissentient voice. The records of the proceedings against him were sunk in the sea[1]; his

[1] Diodorus, XIII. 69. *τὰς δίκας κατεπόντισαν.* Nepos Alc. 6. pilæ iliæ in quibus devotio fuerat scripta.

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property was restored to him; the priests were ordered to recant their curses[1]; a golden crown was decreed to him[2]; and he was appointed commander-in-chief of all the forces of the commonwealth both by land and by sea.

His expedition to Eleusis.

The first use which he made of his new authority was highly judicious. Since the enemy had been in possession of Decelea, the sacred procession in which certain objects of a mystic worship were transported from Athens to Eleusis, attended by a throng of devotees, had been discontinued through fear of hostile interruption; the mystic treasures had been carried by sea, the crowd of worshippers had consequently been greatly diminished, and many ancient observances and popular amusements, which were connected with certain stations on the sacred road, became impracticable. Alcibiades resolved at once to display his zeal for religion, and his contempt of the enemy, and thus to conciliate the superstitious prejudices which he had offended, and to raise the spirit of the troops, by conducting the mystic procession under a military escort to Eleusis. Having taken suitable precautions against surprise, by securing the passes and watching the enemy's movements, he led out the whole of the armed force which was not required for the defence of the city, and, placing the priests and their mystic train in the centre, marched to Eleusis. Agis either did not feel himself strong enough to offer any interruption, or was restrained from the attempt by religious scruples. But the success of this military pilgrimage did not the less sooth the pride as well as the piety of the Athenians, and heighten their confidence in their commander-in-

[1] The Hierophant Theodorus is said to have declined this recantation as unnecessary: for he had only cursed Alcibiades as the enemy of Athens. This ambiguous language seems to indicate a hostile spirit.

[2] Plutarch, Alc. 33., speaks in the plural number. But neither Xenophon nor Diodorus mentions any crown.

chief, to whom they voted an armament of 100 galleys, 1500 heavy infantry, and 150 horse, with leave, if we may trust Plutarch and Diodorus, to nominate his colleagues.[1] Within four months after his return[2] he had completed his preparations for a new expedition, and, with Aristocrates and Adimantus[3], sailed from Athens for the last time. He first bent his course to Andros, which was in a state of rebellion, and, having landed his troops, defeated those of the enemy, who met him in the field, and shut them up within their walls. But he could not reduce the town, or did not think it worth the time which a siege would have cost, and in a few days set sail again for Samos, leaving one of his colleagues with a small force to harass the enemy. CHAP. XXIX.

Lysander.

The Spartan government seems to have felt the necessity not only of making preparations for facing the Athenian armament, but of sending out a man capable of commanding against Alcibiades. And Sparta happened at this time to possess one better qualified for this purpose, and in all respects more suited to her present emergency, than any of her ancient worthies. This was Lysander, son of Aristoclitus. His father was a man of high birth; for, though not of the royal lineage, he belonged to a branch of the Heracleids. But his mother seems not to have been a citizen; and hence Lysander is sometimes described as of ignoble, if not of servile origin, and clearly appears not to have been entitled by birth to the full privileges of the Spartan franchise. But he shared the education of the noblest class of youths, and was not forbidden to aspire to some of the highest dignities

[1] The rhetoricians invented, as a topic for declamation, a law which Alcibiades was supposed to have recommended: that no general should be recalled from his command (to be put upon his trial). Meursius has carefully inserted this statute in his *Themis Attica*, I. 11., on the authority of the Scholiast of Aphthonius.

[2] See Mr. Clinton F. H. a. c. 407.

[3] Instead of Aristocrates, Diodorus, XIII. 69., names Thrasybulus, who appears not to have returned to Athens before the battle of Arginusæ.

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in the state. To these peculiar circumstances, which, while they stimulated his ambition, left him to depend on his industry for success, he probably owed much of that suppleness which distinguished his character beyond that of any of his countrymen, whose names we have hitherto had occasion to mention. And this was a quality so foreign to the Spartan nature, that it attracted more attention, and produced a greater effect, than it would have done in a Greek of any other city. A Spartan generally found it the hardest of all things to stoop, and frequently through the want of personal address lost the advantages which he gained by his policy or military talents. So we have seen that Gylippus and Clearchus had disgusted their allies by their arrogant demeanour, and even Brasidas, though his manners were generally prepossessing, had not been able to avoid a breach with Perdiccas, whom a little more pliancy would probably have conciliated without any sacrifice of the public interest. It seems to have been this quality, more than his general reputation for activity and abilities—though he had probably given proofs of both—that recommended Lysander as a successor of Cratesippidas in the office of Admiral, when his year expired.

At the court of Cyrus.

It was perhaps known at Sparta that a Persian prince was expected to take the supreme command in the maritime provinces, and that the talents of a dexterous negotiator might be required at his court to support the Spartan interests against the intrigues of Tissaphernes. Lysander, having strengthened the squadron with which he was sent out, with reinforcements from Rhodes, Cos, Miletus, and Chios, which raised its numbers to seventy galleys, sailed to Ephesus, and there waited, with the Lacedæmonian envoys who had just returned from the Persian court, till he heard that Cyrus had arrived at Sardis; and then,

accompanied by the envoys, proceeded thither in person. They found Cyrus well disposed to listen to their complaints against Tissaphernes, whom he looked upon as his enemy, and when they requested him to exert himself in their behalf, he assured them that he was prepared to carry the King's instructions into full effect: he had brought 500 talents with him; and, if this sum should prove insufficient, he would spend his private revenues in their cause, and sooner than let them want money, he would melt down the precious metals that adorned the throne on which he sat to give them audience. It was a figure of speech, like that which Tissaphernes was said to have used on a similar occasion, but more sincerely meant. These friendly professions encouraged Lysander to make a more specific request, and to represent to him, that if he would enable them to pay their seamen at the rate of a drachma a day, instead of the half-drachma which they now received, the crews of the Athenian galleys would soon desert, and he would save the expense of a protracted war. But Cyrus pleaded that he was bound by the King's orders, and by the terms of the treaty, which prescribed the amount of the subsidy to be paid for every galley which the Lacedæmonians wished to maintain. Lysander saw that this was not the time to urge his request, and in the course of the day he found a more favourable opportunity. Cyrus entertained the envoys, and before the banquet was over, Lysander had made such progress in his good graces, that as he placed the cup out of which he had been drinking, according to the Greek usage, in his guest's hands, he desired to know how he might oblige him. The Spartan took advantage of this offer to obtain an addition of an obolus to the daily wages of the seamen, and before he left Sardis received not only the arrears then due, but a month's pay in advance. The effect of this supply soon became visible in the

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spirits of the men and the strength of the fleet, which was raised to ninety galleys. But Alcibiades had likewise augmented his forces, and stationed himself at Notium, to watch the enemy's movements. The Peloponnesian fleet was both inferior in numbers, and needed repairs; and Lysander had it hauled on shore to refit, while he waited for an opportunity of action.

It came unexpectedly, through the imprudence of Alcibiades. He had endeavoured, without effect, to counteract the influence of Lysander at the court of Cyrus; for it was probably he who induced Tissaphernes to apply to the prince for leave to introduce an Athenian embassy there. Tissaphernes instructed Cyrus in the system of policy which he himself had learned from Alcibiades, and advised him to beware of making any of the Greek states too powerful, and to let them all waste their strength in their intestine quarrels. But Cyrus, beside his dislike of the counsellor, had good reasons for rejecting his advice. He had probably already formed views, of which Tissaphernes was ignorant, and which made it expedient for him to connect himself as closely as he could, not by hollow professions, but by real services, with one of the belligerents, and, as the Spartan alliance promised much greater advantages than he could derive from the friendship of Athens, he was sincerely desirous of establishing the ascendency of Sparta, and of crushing her rival; he therefore refused to receive the Athenian embassy. Alcibiades seems now to have been much embarrassed, and to have been driven to some violent methods of raising supplies, to prevent his men from yielding to the attraction of the Persian gold. An unprovoked attack which he is said to have made on the territory of Cuma[1], was apparently suggested by no other motive; and it was probably with a like object that,

[1] Diodor. xiii. 73. Nepos, Alc. 7., confounds Cuma and Notium.

hearing that Thrasybulus had left the Hellespont, and was fortifying Phocæa, he sailed thither to meet him. But he left the fleet at Notium, under the command of Antiochus, the master of his own galley, with strict injunctions to avoid an engagement, even if the enemy should offer battle during his absence. CHAP. XXIX.

Battle of Notium.

Antiochus is said to have been a skilful seaman, but he had not been recommended to the confidence of Alcibiades either by his talents or his virtues. Their intimacy it appears had arisen out of a childish occasion already mentioned[1], and had been cemented chiefly by their convivial intercourse, in which Alcibiades, who, as he was capable of the highest kinds of enjoyment, could also descend to the lowest, was pleased with his companion's boisterous spirits and nautical buffoonery. Antiochus, presuming on his familiarity with his commander, seems to have been totally heedless of the orders he had received. He appears to have attributed the inaction in which Lysander had kept his fleet, to timidity or the consciousness of weakness, and overlooking the difference between himself and Alcibiades, to have thought that, if he could only draw the enemy out, he should be certain of victory, and at least might enjoy the pleasure of insulting him with perfect safety. He therefore sailed from Notium, taking only one galley in company with his own, into the harbour of Ephesus, and as he passed close by the prows of the Peloponnesian fleet, offered every kind of contumely, by word and gesture, that could provoke an attack. Lysander at length ordered a few galleys to give him chase. But when he saw Antiochus supported by a detachment from the Athenian fleet, he advanced with the remainder of his own in order of battle. The Athenians now also brought out their whole force; but they came up in separate

[1] Vol. III. p. 318.

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groups, without order or plan, and were defeated in detail. The galley of Antiochus himself, which was among the foremost, was soon sunk, and his death probably hastened the flight of the rest. They took refuge in Samos, leaving fifteen destroyed or taken; but the greater part of the men were saved by the nearness of the shore. Alcibiades, on hearing of this disaster, came to Samos, and sailed out with his whole force toward Ephesus, to offer battle. But even after the recent loss, he was still superior in numbers, and Lysander would not risk the honour of his newly erected trophy. Alcibiades returned to Samos, rather shamed by the enemy's caution, than consoled by the display of his own strength.

The news of the battle of Notium was carried to Athens by some of his personal enemies, and among the rest by Thrasybulus, son of Thraso, who did not fail to add every circumstance which could place his conduct in the most unfavourable light. They found public opinion already turned against him, and suspicion and discontent generally prevailing, instead of the admiration and confidence which he had inspired a few months before. It was indeed scarcely possible that the expectations excited by his first successes should have been completely fulfilled, and they were perhaps purposely raised to the highest pitch by his adversaries, who knew that his reputation would suffer in proportion from the first reverse that might befall him. His unsuccessful attempt upon Andros was the first disappointment that chilled the popular enthusiasm. The eyes of the people had also been directed to Chios, with lively hopes that this important island and with it all the revolted Ionian towns would soon be restored to the dominion of Athens.[1] Not only was no step gained toward this end, but soon after

[1] Lysias Alcib. i. p. 143.

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the battle of Notium the Lacedæmonians took the fortress of Delphinium, which the Athenians had hitherto kept, and thus deprived them of their last footing in Chios.[1] About the same time news came that Eion had fallen into the enemy's hands. Alcibiades, as commander-in-chief, was held accountable for all these losses, which it was universally believed he only wanted the will to prevent. The people asked what he had done; and they heard from his enemies, that, while he abandoned the charge of the great armament which he commanded to unworthy favourites, the companions of his debaucheries, he was enriching himself, and supplying the demands of his luxurious habits, with the contributions which he extorted from the allies of the state. And this charge appears to have been not altogether unfounded; for though he may not have sacrificed the public service to his pleasures, it seems clear that he indulged without restraint in those which the wealthy and voluptuous cities of the Asiatic coast placed within his reach.[2] It was also discovered that he had built a strong-hold in the neighbourhood of Pactye in the Thracian Chersonesus[3]; and this provision for a refuge in distress was believed to indicate consciousness of guilt or of a treasonable design. The affair of Notium confirmed suspicions which had been before floating in the public mind, and excited its resentment to the utmost. Alcibiades was removed from his command; and Thrasybulus—though it does not appear that he had been guilty of any offence but that of receiving his colleague's unfortunate visit—was involved in the same disgrace. His attachment to Alcibiades was perhaps the motive

Alcibiades deposed.

[1] Diodorus attributes this conquest to Callicratidas, XIII. 76.

[2] Compare Plut. Alc. 36., Athenæus, XII. p. 535.

[3] Τὰ ἑαυτοῦ τείχη. Xenophon, Hell. I. 5. 17. They were near the coast of the Hellespont. Xenophon, Hell. II. 1. 25. Περὶ Βισάνθην. Plut. Alc. 36. Se Pactyen contulit (Diodorus XIII. 74.) ibique tria castella communivit, Bornos, Bisanthen, Neontichos. Nepos Alc. 7.

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which really swayed the authors of these measures; though they must have devised a different pretext to cover their attack. He however continued to serve in the fleet; but Alcibiades, who found that even there his conduct was generally condemned, sailed away to his fortified domain in the Chersonesus.

Conon and his nine colleagues.

Conon was permitted to remain in office. He was wealthy, and his family seems to have belonged to the higher class; he had probably taken no part in the late political convulsions, and might therefore be courted as a useful ally by every party. He had hitherto met with few opportunities of displaying his talents, though it may perhaps be collected from a narrative of Diodorus—which however is certainly much exaggerated, and perhaps full of fictitious incidents—that he had preserved Corcyra, when it was again threatened by its domestic factions, and had secured the Athenian interest without a renewal of the old scenes of bloodshed.[1] He had however probably been rising in reputation, and was now looked upon as the man who was most capable of filling the place of Alcibiades. Nine new colleagues were associated with him; and the list of their names possesses an unusual interest on account of its connection with some of the most important events of the ensuing history. They were Diomedon, Leon[2], Pericles, Erasinides, Aristocrates, Archestratus, Protomachus, Thrasyllus, Aristogenes. Conon was at this time at Andros, prosecuting the siege, with a squadron of

[1] Unless we suppose him to have done this, the whole account of the sedition in Diodorus, XIII. 48., must be rejected as a mere fiction. But the observation of Thucydides, IV. 48., proves that the description of Diodorus is at least greatly overcharged.

[2] Xenophon, H. I. 5. 16., names Leon, an officer already known to us, as one of the ten; but in the description of the battle of Arginusæ he omits his name and mentions Lysias instead. Schneider would therefore substitute the name of Lysias for that of Leon in the list, I. 5. 16., and would omit the name of Leon in the next passage where it occurs, I. 6. 16. It is however just possible that Leon was originally elected, and that he fell into the hands of Callicratidas in one of the galleys which Conon sent out from Mitylene, and that Lysias was appointed to fill his place.

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twenty galleys. He received orders to proceed with his squadron to Samos, and to take the command of the fleet; and Phanosthenes was sent with four galleys to Andros. On his way to Andros, Phanosthenes made a capture, which enabled the Athenians to exhibit a generous feeling, of which unhappily few instances occur in Greek history. Dorieus with two Thracian galleys fell in his way, and was taken and sent to Athens. He had been outlawed, with his whole family, both in Rhodes and at Athens, as a sworn foe to the Athenian interests; and the activity with which he had since served on the side of the Peloponnesians had rendered him an object of extraordinary resentment to the Athenians. Yet the people were softened by the presence of their inveterate enemy, when he was brought as a captive before the assembly; they rescinded his sentence, and restored him to liberty without a ransom.[1] His majestic aspect, and the many victories which he had won in the national games[2], pleaded no doubt powerfully for him, and detract something from the merit of the clemency which he experienced. Yet they did not, it seems, prove sufficient, though coupled with the recollection of many important services, to screen him from the resentment of the Spartans, who are said to have put him to death some years afterwards on a slight suspicion.[3] We do not know how far he may have contributed to an event which took place in the course of this year, and which is the most memorable in the history of his native island, and not without moment in the affairs of Greece. The three chief towns of the island, Ialysus, Lindus, and Camirus, were politically incorporated in a new capital, which took the name of Rhodes, and contributed each a share to its

Foundation of Rhodes.

[1] Xenophon Hell. i. 5. 19.
[2] Paus. vi. 7. 6., on the authority of Androtion.
[3] Paus. vi. 7. 4.

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population.[1] The unfailing tendency of such changes to promote democratical ascendency, must, we should think, have rendered Sparta averse to this union, though in the present state of her affairs she did not venture to oppose it. And if Dorieus, notwithstanding his aristocratical prejudices, was induced by patriotic motives to forward it, his conduct, on this occasion, may have secretly provoked that displeasure, which afterwards vented itself under the colour of a groundless charge.[2]

[1] Diodor. XIII. 75.

[2] Pausanias in his odd manner observes that, if what Androtion relates as to the death of Dorieus is true, the Spartans in this instance showed as much rashness (προπέτεια) as the Athenians in their treatment of the generals who conquered at Arginusæ. But rashness was never a Spartan failing.

CHAPTER XXX.

FROM THE BATTLE OF NOTIUM TO THE END OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

Proceedings of Lysander.— Callicratidas Admiral— Callicratidas at Sardis.— Conon driven into Mitylene.— Battle of Arginusæ.— Spartan Overtures for Peace.— Proceedings against the victorious Generals.— Archedemus.— Theramenes. — Callixenus.— Socrates.— Euryptolemus.— Condemnation of the Generals.— Motives of their Accusers.— State of the Athenian Constitution.— Plot to surprise Chios.— Lysander at Ephesus.— Journey of Cyrus to Court.— Movements of Lysander.— Philocles.— Ægos-potami.— Interference of Alcibiades.— Capture of the Athenian Fleet.— Massacre of the Prisoners.— Alleged Corruption of the Athenian Commanders — Lysander blockades Athens.— State of public Feeling at Athens.— Proposals of Capitulation.— Intrigues of the Oligarchical Faction.— Return of Critias.— Negotiation with Sparta.— Embassy of Theramenes.— Tumults in Athens.— Surrender of Athens.— Review of the War.

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WHEN Conon came to Samos, he found the fleet under his command superior in numbers to the enemy; but despondency was prevailing among the men; partly perhaps a consequence of the recent defeat; it was however probably still more owing to the want of full and regular pay, and to the contrast which they saw in this respect between their own prospects and those of the Peloponnesians, who were provided with an ample and unfailing supply from the inexhaustible riches of the Persian treasury. The Athenian crews appear to have been thinned, as Lysander predicted, by frequent desertions, and Conon deemed it expedient to reduce the numbers of his armament from above a hundred to seventy galleys, that each might

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have its proper complement. His next care was to provide for its immediate exigencies; and he was compelled, as Alcibiades had been, to employ it in expeditions which had no other object than the plunder to be collected in the descents which he made on the enemy's coasts. The autumn and winter passed without any more important operations; for Lysander did not stir from Ephesus. He probably did not feel himself strong enough to seek an engagement; but his attention was also deeply engaged by affairs of a different nature. His ambition was not such as commonly animated a Spartan general: the desire of glory earned in his country's service. His views were directed in the first place to his own aggrandisement, and he wished to make it as much as possible independent of her greatness. He was willing indeed to be useful; but it was in order that he might become necessary to her. On his arrival in Asia he found the Greek cities divided by the usual factions. The partisans of oligarchy, who had been kept down under the dominion of Athens, were beginning again to lift up their heads; but they still generally needed support from without. Here therefore Lysander perceived an opportunity of raising a host of adherents and satellites, bound to himself by the firmest ties of interest, and ready to forward any design for which he might employ them. For the interest of Sparta it would have been sufficient to establish oligarchical government in the room of democracy; but for Lysander's purpose something more was required. While he staid at Ephesus—where his naval preparations were perhaps rather the pretext than the motive for his protracted sojourn—he sent for some of the leading men from the principal Greek cities, the boldest and most aspiring spirits he could find, and held out to them the prospect of attaining to

Proceedings of Lysander.

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that absolute power which they coveted over their fellow-citizens. As long as the contest with Athens remained undecided, this end could not be fully accomplished. The downfall of Athens therefore was a necessary condition for the fulfilment of their wishes; but it was not the only one. They would still need the aid of a patron who could engage the authority of Sparta in their behalf, and they could only hope permanently to triumph over their enemies and rivals, if Lysander continued in a station which enabled him to befriend them. Having thus prepared them for future opportunities of action, he advised them in the mean while to collect their strength in clubs for mutual defence, and gradually to extend their influence by all the means which were already at their disposal; and he gave them an immediate earnest of his own good-will, by raising them to the highest offices which were subject to his nomination or control, and by abetting them in every aggression on the rights of others which his favour could enable them to commit with impunity.

B. C. 406.

He had thus placed himself at the head of a number of powerful, enterprising, and unscrupulous factions, which depended entirely on his support, when his year of office expired (406), and Callicratidas was sent to succeed him. The new admiral was a genuine Spartan of the best stamp, and directly opposite to Lysander in the leading points of his character: zealous for the public service without selfish ends, keenly alive both to his country's honour and his own, impatient of dissimulation and of servility. Lysander exerted his utmost efforts to thwart, discredit, and dishearten his successor. He sent all that was left of the Persian subsidy back to Cyrus; and he probably instructed his partisans in the allied cities to withhold all that they could of the supplies and succours required for the service. They no

Callicratidas admiral.

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doubt sincerely regretted his departure, and perhaps spontaneously vented their dissatisfaction in murmurs at the conduct of the Spartan government, *which so imprudently changed its admirals, and often sent out men who had none of the qualifications needed for the office: no naval experience, no knowledge of mankind, no acquaintance with the people among whom they came to command.* He himself, when he resigned the fleet to Callicratidas at Ephesus, bade him remember that it was victorious, and in possession of the sea. But Callicratidas, in answer to this boast, desired him to conduct it to Miletus, and to prove his assertion by keeping Samos, where the Athenian fleet was lying, on his left hand. Lysander however declined this test, on pretence that he did not choose to interfere with another's province. After his departure, Callicratidas drew reinforcements amounting to fifty galleys from Chios, Rhodes, and other quarters; and having thus collected 140 sail, prepared to seek the enemy. The want of money however interrupted his operations; and when he set about procuring supplies, he discovered the machinations of Lysander's adherents, and the murmurs by which they called his capacity in question. He was anxious in the first place to secure the active co-operation of his own countrymen who were serving under him, and for this purpose he assembled them at Ephesus in a council of war, in which with dignified plainness he noticed the complaints which had gone abroad. *He could have been content to have staid at home, and had no ambition to dispute the precedence of naval skill with Lysander, or any one else, who pretended to it; but he had been sent out to command the fleet, and it only remained for him to do his best. But finding himself thwarted as he was, he desired their advice: whether he should stay, or return home, to report the state of affairs to the Spartan government.*

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Callicratidas at Sardis.

To such an appeal only one answer could decently be given: all present exhorted him to persevere in the discharge of his duties. But the only expedient which seemed to present itself for the immediate supply of his necessities was to apply to Cyrus; and Callicratidas reluctantly repaired to Sardis. It is not clear whether Cyrus had been prepared by Lysander to mortify Callicratidas, or merely observed the common forms of the Persian court, without being conscious that he was wounding the Spartan's pride. Callicratidas, it seems, expected an immediate audience, and was ordered to wait till the day after the morrow; and then—either purposely or because he desired to be admitted at an inconvenient hour—he was still repeatedly put off. Plutarch represents him as standing at the prince's gate during the banquet, and, when he was informed by the attendants that Cyrus was drinking, replying that he would wait till he had finished his draught. His patience was at last worn out, and he quitted Sardis without having obtained an audience, deploring the wretched condition of the Greeks, who were reduced to cringe to barbarians for money, and declaring that if ever he returned safe home he would do his utmost to bring about a peace between his country and Athens. He then sailed to Miletus, and thence despatched some galleys to Sparta to procure supplies. Miletus was one of the cities in which Lysander had formed a party, which had hitherto thrown every impediment it could in the way of Callicratidas. He however called a general assembly, stated his wants, and urged the Milesians to relieve them. One of the arguments which Xenophon attributes to him implies that he considered the war as a struggle for the deliverance of the Asiatic Greeks from the yoke of the barbarians, no less than from that of the Athenians. He promised, as soon as he received the supplies which he expected

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from Sparta, to requite the Milesians for all that they advanced, and for all the services they rendered to him in the mean while; and he conjured them to let the barbarians see that, without paying court to them, Sparta and her allies were able to subdue their enemies.

It seems as if the partisans of Lysander, conscious of their own selfish aims, and knowing how much they depended on Spartan patronage, supposed that more was meant by this language than met the ear, and interpreted it not as an appeal to the generosity and patriotism of their fellow-citizens, but as a threat pointed against themselves. They were therefore among the foremost to propose a grant of money out of the public treasury, and even to offer private contributions. With the funds thus raised, and an additional sum furnished by the Chians, augmented, if we may trust Diodorus, by the plunder of Teos[1], Callicratidas was enabled to exert the force of his superior numbers. It is probable that he received an invitation from a party in Methymna, which induced him to shape his course first toward that quarter. For Diodorus relates, that the town was betrayed to him, and this may be consistent with Xenophon's statement that the presence of an Athenian garrison, and the predominance of Athenian influence, compelled him to take it by storm. The plunder was given up to the troops; the captives only were reserved as public property; but Callicratidas, though urged by his allies, refused to sell the Methymnæans, and declared that, so far as rested with him, no Greek should be made a slave. He was perhaps forced to limit the application of this generous sentiment, so as to except the Athenian

[1] XIII. 76. All that raises a doubt as to the fact, is, that in the same passage Diodorus attributes the reduction of Delphinium also to Callicratidas, seemingly contradicting Xenophon, H. I. 5. 15.

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prisoners, who were sold together with the slaves found in the place. But the Methymnæans were set at liberty, and left in possession of their pillaged town.

Conon, though he was probably aware of the strong reinforcements by which the enemy's numbers had been raised to the double of his own, made an attempt to save Methymna; but he arrived too late; and finding that Callicratidas was already master of the town, he anchored for the night off a group of small islands, lying between the coast of Lesbos and the main, called the Hundred Islands.[1] The Spartan admiral, when he heard that the Athenian fleet was in the neighbourhood, declared that he would put a stop to Conon's *dalliance with the sea*[2], and sailed early next morning in quest of him. He might indeed now claim an absolute mastery over the sea, for since his departure from Miletus, or during his stay there, he had increased his armament to 170 galleys. Conon was sensible of the danger of his position, and had already got under way to effect his retreat, when Callicratidas appeared, and immediately began a vigorous pursuit, to prevent him from reaching Samos. Mitylene was the nearest place of refuge, and Conon saw himself compelled to make for it. That he had any intention of combating an armament which surpassed his own by 100 galleys, is difficult to believe[3]; and Xenophon supposes him to have used his utmost speed. But he was overtaken near the mouth of the harbour, probably by a part of

Conon driven into Mitylene.

[1] Νήσῳ τῶν Ἑκατὸν καλουμένων, Diodorus, XIII. 77. Strabo, XIII. p. 618., derives the name Ἑκατόννησοι from Ἕκατος, a title of Apollo, the god whose worship prevailed on the adjacent coast. By a strange coincidence in a strange oversight, both Wesseling and Schneider describe these islands as near Samos.

[2] Xen. I. 6. 15. Κόνωνι εἶπεν, ὅτι παύσει αὐτὸν μοιχῶντα τὴν θάλατταν.

[3] Diodorus, XIII. 77, 78., represents Conon as drawing the enemy into a battle, in which, as at first he had only the foremost of his pursuers on his hands, he was victorious, until the rest came up and captured thirty of his galleys which had advanced too far in pursuit. Polyænus, I. 48. 2., tells half the story.

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the hostile fleet, and lost thirty galleys before he could make his way into the town, where he hau'ed the remaining forty on shore under shelter of the walls. Callicratidas was master of each entrance of the two harbours formed by the small island on which Old Mitylene was built, and which was parted by a narrow channel called the Euripus, from the main land of Lesbos.[1] He sent for all the forces of Methymna, brought a body of troops over from Chios, and blockaded the town by sea and land. A voluntary supply of money from Cyrus was the first fruits of his success. Mitylene was ill provided for a siege, especially after its population was increased by so many additional mouths; and Conon saw that, unless intelligence of his situation was speedily carried to Athens, he might be forced to surrender before any succours came to his relief. He therefore drew down two of his fastest-sailing galleys, and manned them with the best rowers in the fleet, who went on board before daybreak, and during the day were screened by an awning from the enemy's view, while the soldiers were kept below[2]; at night they went on shore again. This process was repeated four days to lull the enemy's suspicions. On the fifth, at noon, while the crews of the galleys stationed to guard the mouth of the harbour were taking their meal on shore, the two Athenian galleys suddenly pushed out, and issuing from the harbour made, the one for the south of the Ægæan, the other for the Hellespont. The former was overtaken after a day's chase, the latter outstripped its pursuers, and finally reached Athens.

[1] See Plehn Lesbiaca, pp. 14, 15. Schneider's note on Hell. I. 6. 15. is in his most confused style. But even without it there are great difficulties about the geography of Xenophon's narrative.

[2] Ἐς κοιλὴν ναῦν μεταβιβάσας. Xen. H. I. 6. 29. The object plainly was concealment; but the precise nature of the contrivance cannot be understood without a clearer notion than we now possess of the παραβύματα here mentioned by Xenophon, and of the purpose for which they were used on this occasion. Schneider's note on the text is less obscure than that in the Corrigenda. How Cæsar's account of Antony's stratagem throws any light on Conon's, which was so completely different both in the end and the means, we are unable to divine.

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Xenophon does not inform us how Conon's colleagues were employed while he was engaged in the operations just described. It appears that only two of them accompanied him in his flight to Mitylene.[1] Diomedon was elsewhere with a squadron of twelve galleys: perhaps in the Hellespont; and the galley which carried the news to Athens may have apprised him of Conon's danger. He hastened—apparently with more zeal than discretion—to share it; but was intercepted by Callicratidas, and narrowly escaped, leaving ten out of his twelve galleys in the enemy's hands. But the Athenians, as usual, were roused by the new emergency—for the loss of the armament at Mitylene would have been almost irreparable—to extraordinary efforts. They immediately put forth the whole remaining strength of the commonwealth, and by the end of thirty days they had manned a fleet of 110 sail. Every hand that could be spared from the defence of the city was employed in this service. Many citizens of the equestrian class, who were usually exempt from such duty, embarked with the common freemen, and as their number did not still suffice, slaves were invited by the promise of freedom to join the expedition. All Conon's colleagues, except Archestratus, who died at Mitylene, and Leon, for whom Lysias appears to have been substituted, took the command in person. They first sailed to Samos, and there strengthened themselves

[1] These, according to the present text of Xenophon, Hell. i. 6. 16., were Leon and Erasinides. Morus proposed to strike out both these names, and to substitute that of Archestratus, who, it appears from Lysias (ἀπολ. δωρ. p. 162.), died at Mitylene. Schneider observes that Erasinides, who was present at the battle of Arginusæ, cannot have been blockaded with Conon in Mitylene, unless it was he who commanded the galley which escaped to Athens. The like conjecture would, as we have already observed, explain all that is obscure about Leon; so that the text might stand without any alteration. Schneider's conjecture is confirmed by the facts mentioned by Lysias. His client's ship was reckoned the best sailer in the fleet; on this account, after the death of Archestratus, Erasinides went on board of it. This proves that, if Archestratus accompanied Conon to Mitylene, Erasinides was already there: so that the difficulty about his presence at Arginusæ would still remain. And if his galley was accounted the fastest sailer, it *must* have been one of the two selected by Conon.

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with ten Samian galleys, and with thirty more from other quarters; and now feeling themselves able to cope with the Peloponnesians they prepared to seek them. Callicratidas on his part did not shrink from a decisive conflict; but leaving Eteonicus with fifty galleys to maintain the blockade of Mitylene, he stationed the remainder of his fleet at Malea, the southernmost headland of Lesbos.[1] In the evening of the same day the Athenians arrived at the Arginusæ, three small islands, near the Æolian coast, over against Malea. Their camp-fires first announced their presence to Callicratidas, who, as soon as he had ascertained it, prepared to surprise them by a sudden attack. For this purpose he set sail at midnight; but a thunderstorm, accompanied by a heavy rain, induced him to abandon his design, and to wait for daylight before he advanced against them.

Battle of Arginusæ.

The Athenians were then ready to meet or receive him; and a battle ensued, which for the number of vessels engaged was the greatest that had yet been fought between two Greek navies. We are informed by Xenophon, that Callicratidas was dissuaded by Hermon, a Megarian, the master of his galley, from venturing on an action, against such greatly superior numbers as those of the enemy. The Spartan's answer became very celebrated. It was, as Xenophon reports it: *Sparta would suffer no hurt from his death, but he should be dishonoured by flight.* This however can scarcely have been said on the occasion to which Xenophon refers it, and is only applicable to the story told by Diodorus, who relates that the Lacedæmonian soothsayer interpreted an accident which happened before the battle as a presage of the admiral's death. His reply would in this

[1] Not the Malea mentioned by Thucydides, III. 4. (on which see the note in Vol. III. p. 141.), as was supposed by Schneider, whose note on this subject in his Addenda, p. 98., throws every thing into confusion.

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case be both rational and magnanimous. But, according to another report, he said that Sparta might repair the loss of a fleet, but he, if he fled, should not be able to retrieve his honour. In this language indeed there would be nothing absurd but the false pride which Cicero condemns.[1] But beside that the anecdote, in this form, is not supported by sufficient authority, it seems clear that Callicratidas entered into the action with fair hopes of a victory; and he might not unreasonably believe that this inferiority in numbers was compensated by the better condition of his vessels and his crews. The Athenian commanders were conscious of their own disadvantage in this respect, and it was on this point that the dispositions made on both sides were grounded. The accounts which Xenophon and Diodorus give of the order of battle differ from each other in most particulars[2], but they seem to agree as to the general design of both parties: that the aim of the Peloponesians was attack, that of the Athenians defence. But Diodorus describes the Athenian line as formed so as to take in one of the islands, which separated it into two divisions; to meet which Callicratidas disposed his fleet in two squadrons, parted from each other by a considerable interval. Xenophon represents the Athenians as advancing to a distance from the shore, but formed in a compact mass of two lines in each wing, and only a little weaker in the centre. Aristocrates commanded fifteen galleys in the extreme left; Diomedon was stationed by his side, and Pericles and Erasinides in their rear, each with an equal number. The centre was occupied by ten Samian galleys, under Hippeus, a Samian commander, and by

[1] Offic. i. 24.

[2] It is difficult to understand Schneider, when, in his note on Hell. i. 6. 31., he denies, that Xenophon and Diodorus differ on any point in their description of the battle, though, according to his own statement in the same note, there is hardly a single point on which they agree.

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as many under the ten Athenian taxiarchs[1], and they were supported in the rear by a smaller number of Athenian or allied galleys. On the right, Protomachus took the lead, with Thrasyllus by his side, and Lysias and Aristogenes behind, each having fifteen galleys under his command. The Peloponnesians Xenophon describes as drawn up in a single but unbroken line, to take advantage of their superiority in offensive manœuvres over the unpractised Athenian crews. According to Diodorus, Callicratidas himself commanded in the right of his line, and Thrasondas a Theban in the left. Neither author however gives any intimation as to the effect which these arrangements produced, nor as to the causes which decided the battle, except so far as its issue may have been connected with the fate of the Spartan admiral, who was killed in a conflict with one of the enemy's galleys, according to Diodorus after he had sunk that of Lysias—who however survived—and had struck and grappled with that of Pericles. After this event the Peloponnesians were completely routed, and fled some toward Chios some to Phocæa, leaving seventy galleys and upwards destroyed or taken. Among them were nine out of the ten which composed the Lacedæmonian contingent, and were therefore probably under the immediate orders and eye of Callicratidas.

The Athenians lost five and twenty galleys, and almost all at such a distance from the shore that the men who survived had no chance of safety but in clinging to the wrecks. They seem to have spent very little if any time in pursuit of the flying enemy, and the generals, having returned to their station at the Arginusæ, held a council on the course to be next adopted. Diomedon thought that their first

[1] Who however were properly military officers. But of the ναύαρχοι who are mentioned on this occasion as three in number, I can find no explanation.

care should be to save as many as they could of their own people and of their disabled vessels, and that the whole fleet ought for this purpose to sail immediately to the scene of the action. Erasinides contended that it was of greater importance to proceed directly with the utmost speed to Mitylene, that they might surprise and overpower the enemy's squadron, which was still blockading it. But Thrasyllus suggested, that both these objects might be accomplished, if they detached a squadron sufficient to take care of the wrecks, and sailed with the rest of their forces to Mitylene. This advice was adopted; and it was agreed that each of the generals should detach three of the galleys under his command to accompany twenty-three of those which occupied the centre in the battle, in all forty-seven, to the scene of action. This squadron was to be conducted by some of the inferior officers, among whom were Theramenes and Thrasybulus, while the generals led the rest to Mitylene. Both designs however were frustrated. A violent storm came on, which prevented Theramenes and Thrasybulus from executing the orders they had received, and the generals themselves from moving that day out of the Arginusæ. In the mean while Eteonicus received intelligence of the event of the battle by means of a boat which had been kept in readiness for the purpose. To deceive Conon, he directed the men who brought the news to sail out again in the most private manner, and presently to return to the camp with garlands on their heads, and shouts of joy, announcing that Callicratidas had conquered, and that the whole Athenian armament was destroyed. When it came back, he himself made a public sacrifice of thanksgiving for the victory; but he gave orders to the captains of the fleet to sail away as soon as possible to Chios, and advised the merchants who had been attracted

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to his camp to embark their property as secretly and speedily as they could, and accompany the retreating squadron. The wind favoured their flight. He himself, after setting fire to his camp, led the land-force across the island to Methymna. Conon, finding the harbour clear, as soon as the gale had abated, set sail toward the Arginusæ, and met the friendly armament, which after a short stay at Mitylene proceeded to Chios; but being unable to effect any thing there it took up the old station at Samos. Conon and two of his colleagues, Protomachus and Aristogenes, remained with it; but the other six, Pericles, Diomedon, Lysias, Aristocrates, Thrasyllus, and Erasinides, returned to Athens.

After a victory as complete and important as the Athenian arms had ever gained, which delivered the state from a most pressing danger, when defeat would manifestly have been attended with immediate and utter ruin of all its hopes, they might well have expected an honourable and grateful reception. But causes had been at work during their absence which led to a very different result, and turned their triumph into a calamity, fatal to themselves, and disgraceful to their country. The news of the victory had, as usual, elated the people, and disposed them to listen to the counsellors who most humoured their presumption. They however showed one indication of a right feeling, which was probably the first impression produced by the joyful tidings. They rewarded the slaves who had served in the battle with immunities similar to those which had been enjoyed by the Platæans, and which placed them very nearly on a level with the citizens. The dejection caused at Sparta by the blow which had deprived her of nearly half her navy, was proportioned to her rival's exultation, and contributed to raise it to an inordinate degree. The party there which viewed the war with

feelings like those expressed by Callicratidas, when he was repulsed at the gate of Cyrus, took advantage of the prevailing despondency, to propose another embassy to Athens, to renew the attempt which had failed after the battle of Cyzicus; and envoys were sent with overtures of peace. It seems that they offered no concession beyond the evacuation of Decelea[1] and the Attic territory, and required the Athenians to resign their claims upon their revolted colonies. Cleophon is said again to have come forward as the most active opponent of peaceful counsels; and we find him described, on the authority of Aristotle, as appearing in the assembly highly excited with wine, and in armour[2], protesting against the terms proposed, and declaring that he would accept nothing short of the restitution of all the cities which had been separated from the Athenian empire. But the particulars of this anecdote, notwithstanding the great name by which they appear to have been sanctioned, are somewhat suspicious, because similar indecency of demeanour and language, which is not likely to have been repeated in its most extravagant circumstances, is imputed to Cleophon on another occasion which will be hereafter mentioned. There is however no reason to doubt that the grounds on which Cleophon contended against the Spartan proposals have been correctly reported. But he probably only expressed the prevailing temper of the people, which nothing but extreme distress and alarm could ever have induced to renounce its dominion over the rebellious subjects whom it had now once more a prospect of reducing to obedience. It is at least certain that the envoys came—though Xenophon has passed over this as well as the preceding embassy in total silence—and that their overtures were rejected.

Spartan overtures for peace.

[1] Λακεδαιμονίων βουλομένων ἐκ Δεκελείας ἀπιέναι ἐφ' οἷς ἔχουσιν ἀμφότεροι. Schol. Aristoph. Ran. 1590.

[2] Μεθύων καὶ θώρακα ἐνδεδυκώς. Ibid.

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Proceedings against the victorious generals.

But in the midst of the general joy there was one ground of regret which affected the best feelings of the people, and was soon perverted into an occasion of unjust suspicion and vehement indignation. It was evident from the despatches of the generals themselves, that a great number of lives had been lost, which under ordinary circumstances of the same kind would have been preserved; and it did not clearly appear that the loss might not have been prevented by a little more activity or attention. The thought, that hundreds of the brave men who had contributed most to the victory had been suffered to perish through neglect by a miserable death, and had been even deprived of the rites of burial, while their comrades were near at hand, and might have gone to their relief, was of all the most fitted to rouse the popular resentment against the persons who were chargeable with such remissness; and if the generals did not very distinctly explain their own conduct, it was not unreasonable to presume that they were conscious it would not bear examination. They had, it seems, at first intended to state the whole case in the despatch which they sent home immediately after the action; but Pericles and Diomedon, to save Theramenes and Thrasybulus, and the other officers who had been appointed to visit the wrecks, from all danger of unmerited reproach, prevailed on their colleagues not to mention the commission they had given, but to take the whole responsibility of the unfortunate issue upon themselves. It is possible that this delicate forbearance may have given an appearance of indistinctness and equivocation to their account of the affair, which would minister food for suspicion; and they had enemies who spared no pains to prejudice the people against them. It seems to have been soon after their arrival at Samos, that they received advice of a decree by which all but

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Conon were removed from their office, and two new generals, Adimantus and Philocles, created in their stead. According to Diodorus this decree was passed as the first step toward bringing the deposed generals to trial, for which they were summoned to return to Athens. He also relates that before their recall they defended their own conduct in a letter to the people, in which they mentioned the commission with which they had intrusted Theramenes and Thrasybulus, whom they suspected of being their secret accusers, and that it was this imprudent provocation that made Theramenes their enemy, and led to the decree for their impeachment and recall.[1] But this account can scarcely be reconciled with Xenophon's narrative, which, meager and imperfect as it is, still claims a higher authority. It leads us to suppose that the decree which deposed them was not passed with a view to any specific criminal proceedings which were immediately instituted, but simply as a mark that they had forfeited the confidence of the people.

Protomachus and Aristogenes remained abroad, according to Diodorus, through fear; but it is probable that neither they nor their six colleagues who returned home were aware of their danger. They could not have foreseen the baseness of Theramenes, nor have suspected the plots which were laid for their destruction. Their enemies appear to have proceeded with great caution, carefully feeling their way before they disclosed their designs. The first step was taken by a man named Archedemus, of whom Xenophon in his history gives a very obscure description, which has perhaps come down to us in a mutilated state; but in another work he has left a fuller account of him[2],

Archedemus.

[1] XIII. 101.

[2] Mem. II. 9. It is not indeed perhaps absolutely demonstrable that this is the same person as the Archedemus of the Hellenics; but the two descriptions tally so well together that we may, with Schneider, assume their identity.

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which seems to throw some light on the transactions we have now to relate. Archedemus was at this time a popular leader of great influence; but he had risen to this eminence from a very low station, and was commonly believed to have usurped the franchise, to which his birth did not entitle him, by impudence or fraud.[1] His talents had attracted notice before he had found any profitable employment for them, and they recommended him to Crito, one of the wealthier citizens, and a friend of Socrates, for a service which unhappily was not unfrequently needed at Athens. Crito's opulence and quiet disposition made him a mark for the attacks of sycophants, who took advantage of his aversion for litigation, to extort a price for their silence. It was by the advice of Socrates that, to rid himself of this annoyance, he engaged the assistance of Archedemus, who intimidated his persecutors by turning their own weapons against themselves. He was induced to render the like service to several of Crito's friends; and thus, while he gradually extended his reputation, and rose in favour with the people, he formed an intimate connection with a circle of persons who were probably all more or less adverse to popular government.[2] It would seem therefore that Archedemus had two characters to sustain; and we shall perhaps see reason to believe that the one which he put forward on this occasion served only to disguise that in which he really acted.

Archedemus at this time filled some office, the precise nature of which Xenophon's brevity, or the mutilated state of his text, renders it impossible to ascertain.[3] But it was one which gave him some

[1] Aristoph. Ran. 419., and according to the Scholiast on this passage he had been before attacked on the same ground by Eupolis in the Baptæ: so that he must have become conspicuous before the Sicilian expedition. (Compare Vol. III. p. 319. note 6.)

[2] This we may observe is not at all inconsistent with what is said of Crito, Mem. I. 2. 48. Many of his friends might be active politicians.

[3] Τῆς Δεκελείας ἐπιμελούμενος. H. I. 7. 2. This Schneider and others inter-

control over the generals with reference to their administration of the public money, and it seems that one of them had afforded him a handle for the exercise of his authority. He first laid a fine — which some of the magistrates were able to impose at their discretion by virtue of their office[1] — on Erasinides, and then called him to account before a court of justice, on a charge of malversation with respect to some moneys due to the treasury, which had come into his hands while he was commanding in the Hellespont. In the course of this accusation he introduced — it would seem incidentally and by way of aggravation — some other charges, relative to the general's conduct in his office; and among these the cruel negligence which he and his colleagues were said to have displayed after the battle of Arginusæ, was no doubt the main topic. The immediate result of the trial was that Erasinides was committed to prison; whether by way of punishment, or only that he might be brought before another tribunal, and on what ground, Xenophon does not inform us. But it is clear that the success of Archedemus against him was the signal for a preconcerted attack on the rest, and that his impeachment had been purposely made to precede the regular account which they were to give of their administration before the Council of Five Hundred. It is not certain whether in this oral report they went beyond the contents of their first despatch, and mentioned the instructions which they had given to Theramenes and Thrasybulus. Their statement did not satisfy the council; and Timocrates, one of its

pret *demarch* of Decelea. The difficulty about this is not — as Schneider seems to think in his Addenda, p. 100. — how Archedemus could have held this office while the enemy was master of Decelea; but first why it is here mentioned, and then how it comes to be so described. Schneider's attempt to connect the charge brought by Archedemus against Erasinides with his office of demarch altogether misses the mark, as Wolf observes in the Addenda, p. 117. Dobree's conjectures (Adv. I. p. 125.) τῆς δεκάτης, or τῆς Λείας, or τῆς δεκάτης τῆς Λ., meet this difficulty, but are extremely uncertain.

[1] Ἐπιβολή. As demarch he could not have done this.

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Therame-nes.

members, moved that they should all be taken into custody, and subjected to the judgment of the people. An assembly was soon after held to consider their case; and Theramenes now appeared foremost among their accusers. He insisted chiefly on their own despatch, by which, as they did not pretend to charge any one else with neglect of duty, they had admitted that they alone were answerable for the fate of the wrecks. Yet he appears not to have denied the commission he received, or that the violence of the storm rendered its execution impracticable; what ground was left after this admission for his accusation is a point which it would have been desirable to understand, but on which the historian is silent.[1] The generals were present, and were allowed to speak; but it seems that they had not received notice of the charge which they were to meet[2], and came with no other preparation than the consciousness of their innocence, and the testimony which they were able to offer. Each made a short defence, which consisted chiefly in a simple narrative of all that had passed after the battle; and they now — perhaps for the first time — pleaded, that if there was any blame to be attached to any one, it could fall only on Theramenes himself, and the other commanders of the squadron which they had ordered to look after the wrecks, while they themselves went to seek the enemy. But at the same time they frankly acknowledged that they imputed no fault to any of their officers; since the state of the weather had prevented them, no less than themselves, from proceeding toward their destination; and in proof of this fact

[1] It is only from the language which Xenophon puts into the mouth of Theramenes just before his death, that we learn that he admitted the commission and pleaded his inability to execute it. It is difficult to believe that this account of his own statements was totally false; yet there seems to be a direct contradiction between the plea which he here attributes to the generals (II. 3. 35. *φάσκοντες οἷόν τε εἶναι σῶσαι τοὺς ἄνδρας*), and that which they really used according to Xenophon's own narrative, I. 7. 6. It looks as if Xenophon had purposely involved the transaction in the greatest possible obscurity.

[2] *Οὐ προυτέθη σφίσι λόγος κατὰ τὸν νόμον.*

they were ready to call a multitude of witnesses[1], masters of galleys, and other competent judges. This statement produced its natural effect on the majority of the audience, and they would probably have been at once finally acquitted, if the lateness of the hour had not rendered it impossible to take the votes of the assembly; for there was not light sufficient for counting the show of hands. But many rose to offer themselves as sureties for the prisoners; and a motion was made that the assembly should be adjourned, and that at its next sitting the council should bring in a proposition for regulating the form in which the generals should be tried. This seemingly innocent proposal was carried, apparently without any suspicion of its consequences, which clearly show the intention with which it was made.

In the interval between this and the next meeting of the assembly, Theramenes and the other enemies of the accused set all their engines at work to revive and inflame the popular prejudices which their manly and candid defence had nearly extinguished. The day appointed for the adjourned deliberation fell, through chance or design, in the festival of the Apaturia, which was chiefly consecrated to the maintenance of the ancient ties, by which the citizens of the purest blood were united as members of one family within the smaller circles, which, according to the spirit of the early Attic institutions, included all the children of the state. On the last of the three days of the festival[2], the members of the phratries and of the houses[3] met to register the children born within the year and the youths who were entitled to admission. This seems to have been the day on which the assembly was held; and Theramenes hired a great number of persons to attend it, dressed in black, and with their heads

[1] Μάρτυρας παρείχοντο. So Diodor. XIII. 101.
[2] The day called κουρεῶτις.
[3] Φράτορες καὶ ξυγγενεῖς.

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shaved, as mourning for kinsmen whom they had lost in the sea-fight. He no doubt expected that the impression produced by their appearance would be strengthened by the religious and domestic character of the festival, and that both would supply the orators of his party with topics for much moving declamation.

Callixenus.

In the council a man named Callixenus was induced to come forward as the accuser of the generals, and move a proposition for a decree, which was adopted by the council, and was brought into the assembly. It assumed, in its preamble, that the cause had already been fully heard in the previous assembly, and that nothing remained to be done but to pronounce the verdict, and to determine the sentence; and it directed that all Athenians should vote on the simple question, whether the generals had done wrong in not taking up their men who had been left in the water after the battle: two urns were to be set for each tribe, to receive the ballots of acquittal or condemnation—this was perhaps the most expeditious mode of collecting votes—if the defendants were found guilty, they were to be put to death, their property to be confiscated, and a tenth consecrated to the goddess of Athens.

This proposition was plainly contrary both to law and justice. The prisoners had not had a legal trial, or a fair hearing: it is probable that none of the witnesses whom they offered to produce on the former occasion had been examined. Their cases were also confounded together, though it was possible that, if some were guilty, others might be innocent. Their friends, among whom Euryptolemus, the cousin of Alcibiades, was the most zealous and active, protested against the proposition, and declared their intention of prosecuting Callixenus as its author.[1] They were

[1] Τὸν Καλλίξενον προεκαλέσαντο.

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applauded by a part of the assembly; but the majority was not in a mood to listen to what perhaps appeared rather technical objections, than pleas which touched the merits of the case. Their passions were heated by the appeals which were made to their feelings on behalf of the sufferers and their afflicted relatives. A man was brought forward who pretended he had been preserved by clinging to a meal-barrel, and that his comrades, whom he saw sinking near him, had charged him, if he survived, to tell the Athenians, that their generals had left the brave defenders of their country to perish. A loud outcry was raised against Euryptolemus: *it was strange if the people was to be prevented from doing as it would;* and one Lyciscus moved that the persons who now attempted to control the assembly, if they did not withdraw their opposition, should be subjected to the same process, which was to decide the fate of the generals. The clamour and threats of the multitude overpowered Euryptolemus, and he was constrained to renounce the design of prosecuting Callixenus.[1] But a new impediment arose on the part of the presiding Prytanes, who refused to put the illegal proposition to the votes; yet their courage also at length gave way before the invectives of Callixenus, seconded by the shouts of the people, who demanded that the magistrates who resisted their pleasure should be brought to trial.[2] One man only, the Epistates, remained unshaken, declaring that he would only act as the law permitted. That man was Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus.

Socrates.

All that Euryptolemus could now attempt was to divert the assembly, by argument and remonstrance, from adopting the proposed decree; and he made a speech which from Xenophon's report appears to have been very dexterously adapted to his purpose. He

Euryptolemus.

[1] Ἀφιέναι τὰς κλήσεις.

[2] Καλεῖν τοὺς οὐ φάσκοντας.

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came forward, he said, not merely to defend, but also in one particular to censure the two persons among the accused in whose behalf he was most deeply interested —his kinsman Pericles, and his friend Diomedon. But his chief object was to give such advice as he thought most important for the public good. He admitted that Pericles and Diomedon had been guilty of culpable imprudence, in preventing their colleagues from stating the whole truth in their first despatch, which would have convinced every one that, if blame rested any where, it could be only with Theramenes and the other persons who now accused them; and they had thus involved their colleagues and themselves in one common danger. Yet he trusted that their indiscretion would not throw them into the hands of the malignant and ungrateful men who were now conspiring to destroy them, or blind the people to the clearest principles of law and equity. The course which he had to propose would satisfy the claims of the most rigid justice, would enable them to detect the real culprits, and to punish these with all the severity they could desire, and would save them from the remorse which they would suffer if they should be hurried into an act of injustice, which would be equally injurious to themselves and offensive to the gods. All that he required for the accused was a fair hearing—he would be content if but a single day was allowed for that purpose—and he was willing that their trial should be conducted according to the most rigorous form of proceeding which any law prescribed. There was a decree, known by the name of its author Cannonus, which directed that any one charged with treason, under its most general description of *wrong done to the people*[1], should be tried by the popular assembly,

[1] Ἐάν τις τὸν δῆμον ἀδικῇ.

and held in fetters even while pleading his cause[1]; that, if convicted, he should be put to death, and deprived of burial, his property confiscated, and a tenth dedicated to the goddess. To this severe process he was ready to subject his friends, and Pericles the first. Or, if the people preferred it, he was willing that they should be tried by one of the ordinary tribunals under the law against the most heinous cases of treason and sacrilege[2], which also deprived the convicted criminal, after his execution, of the rites of burial in Attica, and gave all his property to the state. In either case he only asked that a day should be granted for the separate trial of each prisoner, to be divided into three equal portions, for the accusation, the defence, and the judgment. This was surely not too great a favour for men who had gained so glorious and important a victory; nor was there any room to fear that justice might be frustrated by the delay; for it would be as much in their power to condemn or acquit whom they would, if each was tried by himself, according to law, as if, according to the illegal proposition of Callixenus, one vote was to be passed upon all; but a precipitate sentence might prove a source of bitter and unavailing regret. He then entered into a discussion of the facts of the case, and observed that one of the generals —it was Lysias—who was now charged with neglecting his duty toward his sinking comrades, had been himself rescued from a watery grave. He finally conjured the people to avoid the reproach of ingratitude and impiety, which they would incur, if, instead of submitting to the calamity which had been sent by

[1] Δεδεμένον ἀποδικεῖν ἐν τ δήμῳ; and, according to the Scholiast of Aristoph. Eccles. 1089., κατεχόμενον ἐκατέρωθεν, which is ingeniously explained by Hudtwalcker Diæt. p. 96. Schneider seems entirely to have mistaken the object of the decree of Cannonus, on which the reader may find some remarks in the Appendix.

[2] Ἐάν τις ἢ τὴν πόλιν προδιδῷ, ἢ τὰ ἱερὰ κλέπτῃ.

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the gods, they imputed it as a crime to their victorious generals, and, instead of honouring and rewarding them, inflicted on them the severest punishment which they could have suffered if they had disgraced or betrayed their country.

It is much to be regretted that Xenophon did not think proper to give some specimen of the arguments which were used on the other side; particularly as the fact mentioned with respect to Lysias suggests a question, whether the generals were not really all in some degree culpable in having neglected to take the earliest opportunity, after the battle was decided, of saving as many lives as they could. For it does not appear from Xenophon's narrative that there was not time for this before the storm came on. We do not know whether this point was discussed, nor any of the grounds on which Callixenus defended his motion. Xenophon confines himself to the most naked abstract that could be given of the subsequent proceedings. Euryptolemus moved that the prisoners should be brought to trial under the decree of Cannonus, but each separately; and this motion was carried, probably by a very small majority. For immediately after, one Menecles having raised some legal objection to the decree proposed by Euryptolemus[1], the question between this and the proposition of the council was again put[2]; and now the majority proved in favour of the latter. After this it seems that the votes of the assembly were immediately collected, in the manner prescribed by the council, on the general issue. The eight victorious generals were all condemned to death, and the six who were present were executed.

Condemnation of the generals.

[1] Ὑπωμοσία. According to Hudtwalcker, p. 96, it was a protest upon oath which had the effect of suspending the force of the decree until the question of its legality had been decided.

[2] Πάλιν διαχειροτονίας γενομένης. Yet the connection between this proceeding and the ὑπωμοσία is not evident.

There is no passage in Xenophon's Greek History, where we have so much reason to lament that he did not write a little more in the spirit of Thucydides, and consult the interest of posterity, instead of making it his chief care to avoid giving offence to his contemporaries, especially to his Spartan patrons. That he could have thrown, if not the fullest, at least a much clearer light on these transactions, it is scarcely possible to doubt. He has left them for the most part mysterious and unintelligible, has neither pointed out the connection of the facts which he relates, nor given the slightest hint as to the motives of the parties. We cannot however pass over so remarkable an event without endeavouring to form a more distinct notion of its nature and causes; and there are a few important points on which, notwithstanding Xenophon's silence, it seems still in our power to arrive at least at a probable conclusion.

The first impression made by his narrative is one quite as much of surprise as of indignation. It looks as if the bulk of the people had been in a conspiracy to murder some of their most deserving fellow-citizens, who were entitled to their warmest gratitude, without either a decent pretext or an assignable motive. This however is too much at variance with human nature to be believed. A large part at least of the assembly which condemned the generals to death, must have been persuaded that the sentence was just; and it does not seem difficult to explain how they might be so far deceived. The accusation of Theramenes and his brother officers—for it seems that some of them joined in it—must have appeared of itself the strongest of all testimonies against their late commanders; and the only objection which could have diminished its weight was removed by the generals themselves. As they had said nothing to implicate Theramenes, until they found themselves in danger, and even then exculpated

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him no less than themselves, he could scarcely be suspected of calumniating them for the purpose of securing himself; and since no one could be better informed as to all the circumstances of the case, his judgment might seem to many completely decisive. It was perhaps the force of this evidence that reconciled the consciences of the majority in the last assembly to that breach of legal forms of which Euryptolemus complained. It was perhaps said by some, and thought by many, that the prisoners had enjoyed the benefit of a trial before the assembly, such as Euryptolemus desired for them: that the merits of the case were well understood, and that the defence they had set up was not sufficient. And indeed we do not find that Euryptolemus either suggested any new plea, or intimated any ground for distinguishing one case from another. The absent generals were probably thought to have incurred the penalty of contumacy. The excitement produced by the artifices of Theramenes will account for the eagerness with which those who believed the prisoners guilty of sacrificing a great number of valuable lives, exacted what they considered as no more than a just vengeance. We see however from the fluctuation of the majority that opinions were pretty evenly divided. Those who voted for the generals were perhaps more judicious, more circumspect, more scrupulous, but possibly not more honest or more humane than those who condemned them. Nor in this case was it a gross measure of popular credulity that Theramenes abused; he took advantage of the uncommon forbearance and candour of his victims, and of his own reputation which had never before been stained by any atrocious crime, to effect their destruction.

Motives of their accusers.

What were the motives which impelled Theramenes to such enormous wickedness, is a question on which we can only form conjectures; it is probable that he

was instigated by more passions than one. He himself, when he was reproached for his conduct in this affair on a subsequent occasion, is represented by Xenophon as alleging in excuse, that the generals were the aggressors, and by endeavouring to shift the blame upon him, compelled him to attack them in self-defence. But this apology, miserable as it is, is not consistent with Xenophon's narrative.[1] Nevertheless it is not improbable that regard for his own safety, which was most effectually secured when the popular resentment was directed against other persons, may have had a considerable share in determining his course; as, if he had any coadjutors among his brother officers, it must have been by a like motive that they were chiefly swayed. But on the other hand it seems evident that Theramenes had other, and probably more powerful inducements, of a different kind. We see that he acted in concert with a number of persons who had no such apprehensions to stimulate them. It can scarcely be doubted that the ruin of the generals had been planned, before he and they returned to Athens, and that the decree by which they were recalled was the first step taken toward this end; and Euryptolemus, in his speech, asserts the existence of a conspiracy, in which Theramenes took a part. Whether he was drawn into it by fear, or by other motives, must depend on its nature and objects, which, as we know nothing directly of his confederates, can only be inferred from the character of the persons against whom it was directed. Among the accused generals all, of whom we know any thing

[1] Lachman (*Geschichte Griechenlands*, I. p. 431.) conjectures that he may have taken offence at the commission he received from the generals, as having been employed on a hazardous service from which they themselves had shrunk. It is not quite clear whether L. alludes to the hazard of incurring popular resentment in case of failure, or to the danger arising from the storm. But in either case the conjecture seems inadmissible. After he had been distinctly exculpated by his commanders, he could no longer suspect them of a design to injure him in public estimation; and the danger from the storm was equally great on the service which they selected for themselves.

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—Pericles, Diomedon, Thrasyllus—were more or less intimately connected with Alcibiades. Aristocrates was at least the mortal enemy of the faction which hated and feared him. This defeated, but active, and implacable, faction had most probably procured the decree which removed him from office; and if it permitted so many of his friends to succeed him, it was perhaps in the hope of finding a like opportunity of getting rid of them also. Their victory, which would in the ordinary course of things have rendered them formidable opponents, roused it to exert its utmost efforts for their overthrow. Theramenes, though he had once deserted this party, was now capable of becoming a very useful auxiliary, and as its chiefs—with whom alone he had quarrelled—had been removed, he was not unwilling to coalesce with it again. His ambition had been as little satisfied since the last revolution, as it had been under the government of the Four Hundred. And in fact we find him henceforth constantly in league with the oligarchical faction. Farther than this we cannot safely go in determining either his motives or those of his associates, and must leave it doubtful whether they had already formed the design of depriving the commonwealth of its best commanders, in order the more easily to betray it into the enemy's hands. This was no doubt the ultimate object of many among them; but perhaps it had not yet entered the mind of Theramenes.

We have already seen that Archedemus, notwithstanding his apparent zeal for the popular interest, may have been in the pay of the oligarchical party. That Callixenus, and the other orators who took the lead in the proceedings against the generals, were its instruments, is rendered nearly certain by the sequel of their history. On the other hand Cleophon, who uniformly opposed it, and in the end became the

victim of its animosity, notwithstanding his popularity, does not appear to have taken any part in these transactions. It is also clear that it must have secured the ascendency in the council of this year, as we shall find it did in that of the next; and though it could not command a majority in the assembly, yet the noisiest advocates of the most violent measures were probably its retainers.

State of the Athenian constitution.

But here we are led to consider another interesting question: whether the scenes which have just been described took place under that form of government on which Thucydides pronounced a high eulogy, or the old democracy had been previously restored with all its abuses. It is certainly somewhat strange that, in a part of Athenian history on which we have so much information, there should still be room for doubt on a subject of such a nature; and yet it is one on which we cannot advance beyond a probable opinion. Thucydides, though he distinctly intimates that the state of things which he applauds was not of long duration, does not inform us whether it was terminated by a new change in the constitution, which took off the restrictions imposed on the exercise of the franchise, or by the operation of other causes. Xenophon is altogether silent as to any change either in the form or the spirit of the Athenian government in the interval between the overthrow of the Four Hundred and the end of the war. It is true that the silence of such a writer cannot disprove the existence of any fact which it would have been his duty, as a conscientious historian, to have mentioned; but still it raises a presumption which can only be repelled by positive evidence. It has been thought that the influence of Cleophon, through which the Athenians were led to reject the proposals of peace after the battle of Cyzicus, could not have been established, until a change had taken place in the constitution of 410.

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On the other hand, it may seem improbable that such a change should have been effected, or attempted, so long as Alcibiades, who had openly declared himself against the ancient form of the democracy, retained his ascendency. After his fall indeed we know of no external obstacle that opposed the restoration of the ancient state of things. But the condition of the finances must then have appeared a strong objection against resuming the payments for attendance in the assembly and the courts of justice, without which the enlargement of the franchise might not have been so much coveted, nor have produced very important results. The delusion under which the assembly was hurried on to the condemnation of the generals, was one, so far as we can collect its nature, which does not imply the predominance of the lower classes; and the decision of the council, which probably raised a strong prejudice against them, was likely to have greater weight with the citizens of the higher order. So far the arguments on the opposite sides of the question nearly balance each other. There are however some others, which incline us to believe that the old democracy had been completely restored before the return of Alcibiades.[1]

That well-tempered polity which Thucydides praises had been adopted only as a measure of precaution, when it was believed that the invisible Five Thousand really existed, and might resist the extinction of their exclusive privileges. But the natural tendency of events, after the overthrow of the Four Hundred, was toward the re-establishment of the constitution which they had subverted. If, according to the professed intentions of the oligarchs, a body of Five Thousand citizens had been invested with a permanent

[1] On this and other questions discussed in the preceding pages, see Sievers, *De Xenophontis Hellenicis.*

authority, it would probably have clung very tenaciously to the institutions from which it derived its power. But a franchise which was shared by all the citizens who were able to serve in the heavy infantry, though only to be exercised by 5000 of them at a time, might seem a distinction hardly worth contending for. On the other hand those who felt themselves deprived of their ancient rights for no offence but their poverty, were no doubt eager to recover them, and were probably encouraged to resume them, not only by demagogues like Cleophon, but by the secret adherents of the oligarchical faction, who in the good government which promised prosperity to the state, saw an insurmountable bar to their selfish hopes. The *polity* was perhaps already abolished before the epoch at which Xenophon's history begins. It does not follow that the imprecation, which prohibited the receiving of pay for any civil office, was so soon taken off. This was perhaps a later measure, adopted after the successes of Alcibiades had restored confidence, and recruited the public revenues. If we might rely on an assertion of Æschines [1], that Cleophon had corrupted the people by a distribution of money, we could scarcely doubt that it referred to this revival of the ancient abuses. Alcibiades, whatever may have been his wishes, would not have risked his popularity for the sake of enforcing economy; and he may have thought that his influence was likely to gain by the restoration of the democracy, which might be considered as his work. We hardly know whether any stress may be laid on the terms of the decree proposed by Callixenus, that *all* the Athenians should vote on the trial of the generals, as an indication that the franchise was no longer subject to any restriction.

[1] De F. L. p. 406. Bek.

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The issue of these proceedings is likewise involved in an obscurity which the contemporary historian did not wish to clear up. The truth soon after penetrated through the tissue of calumnies with which the enemies of the unfortunate generals had intercepted it; and the indignation of the people was roused against the men who had practised on its credulity. We would willingly believe that the detection of their villany was principally owing to Thrasybulus, who was one of the persons most capable of making known the real state of the case, and of gaining credit for the truth. But Xenophon has contrived to mention his name in such a manner, as to leave it doubtful, whether he did not abet the conspiracy against the generals. Diodorus indeed expressly charges him with having been the accomplice of Theramenes; but his afterlife renders it probable that he was at least clear of this guilt, even if he did not take the earliest opportunity of proclaiming the innocence of his commanders. When it was ascertained, a decree was passed directing proceedings to be instituted against those who had deceived the people, and that they should give sureties for their appearance at the trial; and among them Callixenus was expressly mentioned. He and four others were accordingly impeached, and were kept in custody by their sureties. But it seems that they had friends, who enabled them both to evade a trial, and finally to make their escape. Theramenes was still more fortunate or skilful. He not only avoided a legal prosecution, but retained his place in popular favour; though it might have been supposed that, as he had been foremost among the accusers of the innocent, he would have been the first mark for the public resentment.

While these scenes were passing at home the Athenian fleet rode the sea without a rival. The remains of the Peloponnesian navy—a shattered dismembered body without a head—were confined to the ports in

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which they had taken refuge. Not long after the battle of Arginusæ Eteonicus found means of rejoining the forces at Chios, where he stayed with them during the autumn and the following winter. Neither succours nor supplies came from Greece, and he had no funds for paying or maintaining the troops. Till the end of the vintage however they made a shift to subsist, partly on the wages which were to be earned by field labour, and partly on the hospitality of the islanders, who permitted them freely to enjoy the fruits of the season. But when the winter came on, and these resources failed, they found themselves not only without food but in want of new clothing, and they knew that their commander was unable to supply them with either. The expedient which occurred to them in this emergency was one which may have been suggested to them by numerous examples of less excusable treachery, some of which we have already had occasion to mention. They resolved to make themselves masters of Chios. The plot seems to have been first formed by a small number, which was gradually augmented by fresh conspirators until they became a formidable body; and it was agreed that for the purpose of mutual recognition each should carry a reed. But before their plans were matured Eteonicus discovered their design, and being at the same time apprised of the concerted symbol, was enabled to estimate the magnitude of the danger. It was a crisis which called for great energy and address. An attempt to suppress the conspiracy by violence would have been likely to alarm and irritate all the accomplices, and might have induced them immediately to fly to arms and to accomplish their purpose. But even if it was crushed by such means, this display of severity would not only cost many useful lives[1], but

Plot to surprise Chios.

[1] Τό τ' αὐ ἀπολλύναι ἀνθρώπους ξυμμάχους πολλοὺς δεινὸν ἐφαίνετο εἶναι. I should have thought it unnecessary to observe that those allies are *not the Chians*,

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would probably disgust the surviving comrades of the delinquents, and might deter the other Greeks from a service in which it might be said men were put to death because they would not be starved. Eteonicus devised a more politic course for attaining his end. He set out accompanied by a band of fifteen men armed with daggers, and as he passed through the town, killed the first man he met with carrying the reed, who happened to be suffering from ophthalmia and had just come out of a surgeon's house. This made the deed the more remarkable; and his followers were instructed to inform the curious, that the man had been killed for carrying a reed. This report had no sooner spread, than the conspirators all threw away their tokens. Eteonicus now assembled the Chians, acquainted them with the danger they had just escaped, and exhorted them to relieve the wants of his men, and secure their own lives and property by a voluntary subsidy. The Chians supplied him with a sum of money which enabled him to give a month's pay to the fleet; and he took the opportunity of cheering the men with language which made them believe that he was totally ignorant of the plot he had stifled.

This adventure served as a warning both to the Chians and to the other allies of Sparta on the Asiatic coast, and roused them to take precautions against the recurrence of such dangers and exactions. A congress was held at Ephesus, at which it was resolved to send envoys to Sparta, with a request that Lysander might be appointed to the command of the navy. Cyrus also sent an embassy to second this application, which, though it was probably suggested by Lysander's personal adherents, marks the confidence which he had inspired, chiefly, Xenophon conceives, by his success at Notium. The law of Sparta did not permit

but the conspirators, if this mistake had not been made the ground of a misplaced remark on Greek morality.

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B. C. 405.

the same person to hold the office of Admiral twice; but an expedient was devised for reconciling the law with the wishes of the allies. The title of Admiral was conferred on Aracus; but Lysander was sent out with him, in an inferior rank, but invested by the secret orders of the government with the substance of supreme authority.

Lysander at Ephesus.

In the spring, or early in the summer of 405, Lysander arrived at Ephesus with a squadron of thirty-five galleys which he had collected from the European allies, and immediately sent to assemble those which were lying at Chios and in other ports, and while these were refitting, he directed new ones to be built at Antandrus. To defray the expense he was obliged to resort to the treasury at Sardis. Cyrus complained that he had already spent more than the sum which his father had assigned for the purposes of the war, but he nevertheless furnished a fresh supply, which enabled Lysander, on his return to Ephesus, to put all his ships into good condition, and to pay the arrears due to the seamen. He was still busied with his preparations, when he was recalled to Sardis by a message from Cyrus, to receive an extraordinary mark of the prince's favour and confidence. In the course of the preceding year Cyrus had given a public indication of his aspiring temper; whether in the heat of passion or upon a deliberate calculation of the effects it would produce, we cannot determine. He had put to death two princes of the blood royal, named Autobæsaces and Mitræus, sons of the king's sister, merely because they did not in his presence observe a ceremony which by the Persian usage was due to none but the king. In the royal presence a custom, apparently founded on suspicion, compelled every one to show his hands through the long sleeves which formed part of the Persian dress. Cyrus, it appears, claimed the same kind of homage, and arrogated to himself

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the still higher prerogative of capitally punishing his cousins because they refused or neglected it. Their parents[1] complained to Darius, and endeavoured to awaken his jealousy against this arrogant encroachment on the majesty of the throne. The king, perhaps foreseeing the evils which might arise from the ambitious spirit of Cyrus, unless it was laid under timely restraint, determined to call him to court; and the state of his own health furnished him with a pretext, and suggested an additional motive.[2] On receiving this summons, Cyrus sent for Lysander; and having acquainted him with the cause which called him away from his government, desired him not to risk a battle unless his forces should be greatly superior to those of the enemy. But he bade him spare no expense to ensure this superiority; for either in the royal treasury, or in the prince's private coffers, he would find unfailing resources; and he not only placed a sum of ready money in his hands, but assigned the revenues which he drew for his private use from the cities under his government, for the prosecution of the war during his absence. It seems that he also held out hopes, that on his return from court he would bring with him a Phœnician armament, powerful enough to overwhelm the Athenians. Then, having endeavoured to impress Lysander with a due sense of the obligations he had conferred on him and his country, he dismissed him, and set out for the borders of Media, where Darius, who had made an expedition in person against a neighbouring tribe of independent barbarians, the Cadusians, was said to be lying sick. He took with him a bodyguard of 300 Greek mercenaries, and under colour of a distinguishing favour, forced Tissaphernes to accompany him, fearing perhaps to leave him

Journey of Cyrus to court.

[1] Probably the Hieramenes and his wife mentioned Xen. Hell. II. 1. 9.

[2] This seems to be the easiest method of reconciling the different accounts (Hell. II. 1. 9. 13. and Anab. I. 1. 1.), if, as is most probable, they refer to the same journey.

behind, and not aware that he might prove a dangerous companion.

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Movements of Lysander.

Lysander being thus left with the amplest means which Cyrus could furnish at his absolute disposal, and invested with a portion at least of viceregal authority over many cities and districts near the theatre of war, proceeded to act on the offensive, not however forgetting the patience and caution recommended by Cyrus, which were indeed among the prominent features of his character. He sailed—it would appear so as to avoid a collision with the Athenian fleet—to the south coast of Caria. On his passage he touched at Miletus, which was perhaps the principal object of his expedition. During his absence his oligarchical partisans had entered into a compromise with their political opponents, which some at least among them seem to have been willing to observe. But Lysander, though he outwardly affected to approve of their reconciliation, secretly endeavoured by remonstrance and encouragement to instigate his friends to break the truce, and fall upon their unsuspecting adversaries. His persuasions prevailed, and he appeared with his armament before the town in the critical juncture of the oligarchical insurrection. His presence inspired the assailed party with terror, it abandoned all thoughts of resistance, and prepared for flight. He however assumed the mask of a mediator, checked the violence of the aggressors with stern rebukes and threats, and cheered the weaker side with assurances of protection. Many were decoyed by this artifice and induced to remain in the power of their enemies, who, when dissimulation could no longer be of use, put them all to death, or according to another statement selected 300 of the chief men for a massacre. The more wary, who made their escape, found a hospitable asylum at the palace of Pharnabazus, who furnished them with money, and settled them in a town on the

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southern borders of his satrapy.[1] After having thus made Miletus his own, Lysander continued his voyage to the Ceramic gulf, where a town named Cedreæ, inhabited by a race mixed of Greeks and barbarians, maintained its alliance with Athens. This seems to have been the whole offence for which he exterminated the men, and consigned the women and children to slavery. Then, after touching at Rhodes, he shaped his course toward the Saronic gulf. His motive for this step seems to have been, not so much the hope of any substantial advantage, as partly the desire of avoiding the Athenians stationed at Samos, and partly that of raising his own reputation by the appearance of commanding the sea even within view of the enemy's shores. He made descents on Ægina and Salamis, and on the coast of Attica itself, where he received a visit from Agis which enabled him to exhibit his apparent triumph in the sight of the Peloponnesian garrison of Decelea. But this display only lasted until information of his movements reached the Athenian fleet at Samos, and when he learnt that it was in pursuit of him, he made with all speed for the Asiatic coast.[2]

We are not informed of the effect which this unexpected inroad produced at Athens; Xenophon indeed has not thought it worth noticing, but it seems not improbable that it may have been connected with the appointment of three new generals, Menander, Tydeus, and Cephisodotus, who were now associated in command with Conon, Philocles, and Adimantus, and

[1] Plutarch, Lys. 8., and Diodorus, XIII. 104., vary from each other in several circumstances of this transaction, which Xenophon omits altogether; a silence, the motives of which may be easily conceived. It is with the help of Diodorus that I have fixed the epoch to which I have assigned it.

[2] Here again I have not thought Xenophon's silence as to these movements of Lysander a sufficient ground for rejecting the accounts of Plutarch, Lys. 9., and Diodorus, XIII. 104., though I cannot altogether exclude a suspicion that they may have arisen from a mistake, by which the operations of Lysander, after the battle of Ægos-potami, were referred to a wrong time. Some of the difficulties connected with this question will be presently considered.

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Philocles.

with some other proceedings which indicate an unusual excitement of the public mind. For it was probably on this occasion that a decree was passed, according to Plutarch's authority, on the motion of Philocles — who may have landed for a short time at Athens when he found that the enemy had disappeared, and perhaps was anxious to make up for the want of vigilance which might be imputed to his colleagues and himself by an ostentation of extraordinary zeal — for mutilating the prisoners who should be taken in the sea-fight which it was now resolved should be given on the earliest opportunity. This barbarous policy seems to have been designed to counteract the attraction of the Persian gold among the Greeks who had once helped to man the Athenian fleets, and was perhaps regarded as a just punishment of their desertion; and it may have been copied from a similar measure which is said to have been adopted in earlier times against the Æginetans[1], though Xenophon describes the later decree as directing that the prisoners should lose their right hands, while the earlier one is reported to have been confined to the amputation of the right thumb.[2] Adimantus alone is said to have opposed the decree, which might seem to imply that it was passed at the same period that he and Philocles were appointed to their office, if Xenophon did not also state that it was proposed in

[1] Cicero Offic. III. 11. Ælian V. H. II. 9., where Perizonius confounds the archon Philocles of B. C. 459 with Conon's colleague. There is no reason whatever for referring the decree against the Æginetans to the archonship of Philocles. Plutarch describes the purpose of the later decree in nearly the same terms which Ælian uses with regard to the earlier one — *ὅπως δόρυ μὲν φέρειν μὴ δύνωνται, κώπην δ' ἐλαύνειν* — a purpose which it is equally difficult to understand in either case, whether with regard to the Peloponnesian seamen, or the Æginetans, of whom Cicero remarks: "Athenienses sciverunt, ut Æginetis, *qui classe valebant*, pollices præciderentur."

[2] Schneider proposes to reconcile Xenophon with Plutarch, who only mentions the amputation of the right thumb, by correcting Xenophon's text *τὴν δεξιὰν χεῖρα* to *τὸν δεξιὸν ἀντίχειρα*. But it would not be at all surprising that Plutarch should have confounded the later with the earlier decree, nor that the later measure should have been more inhuman in order to be more effectual. Schneider says nothing of the *χειρῶν* in § 32.

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contemplation of an approaching battle.[1] Philocles exercised his command in an equally merciless spirit. He ordered the crews of an Adrian and a Corinthian vessel which he captured to be thrown down a cliff. We may hope, notwithstanding Xenophon's ambiguous language, that Conon's character was not stained by even a tacit sanction of any of these atrocious proceedings.

Lysander eluded the pursuit of the Athenians, and got the start of them on his way toward the Hellespont[2], which he found quite unguarded, and, on his arrival at Abydus, he ordered all the troops he could collect there to march, under the command of Thorax, against Lampsacus, while he sailed to attack it on the sea-side. It was taken by storm, and given up to pillage; but Lysander set all the citizens at liberty. The fall of this opulent city had only just taken place, when the Athenians, who had been chasing Lysander at full speed, entered the Hellespont with 180 galleys, and anchored at Elæus, from whence, finding that Lampsacus was lost, they moved on to Sestus, and,

[1] Xenophon first mentions the preparations made by the Athenians for another sea-fight precisely at the epoch which suits the supposition, that they were the result of Lysander's appearance on the coast of Attica; that is, as falling in the interval between the storming of Cedreæ, and his voyage to the Hellespont. At the time of the election of Philocles there was no prospect of a fresh sea-fight. It seems therefore quite clear that the epoch assigned in the text for the decree about the mutilation is the earliest at which it can be fixed. But a question may arise, whether it does not belong to a later date, and whether the ἐκκλησία mentioned by Xenophon (Hell. II. 1. 31.), though he does not hint that it was an extraordinary one, or in the nature of a *council of war*, was not an assembly held at Ægos-potami just before the battle. Plutarch indeed supposes it to have been held at Athens, as appears from his expression, Lys. 9., πείσας τὸν δῆμον. But on such a point his authority is of no weight; and on the other hand it may be urged, that the reason given for sparing Adimantus (Xen. Hell. II. 1. 32.) would be inapplicable, unless it was known that all the other prisoners were present at the passing of the decree which he alone opposed. Perhaps the strongest ground for acquiescing in Plutarch's statement is, that if the decree was passed at Ægos-potami, Conon would seem to have sanctioned it — unless Xenophon's μόνος ἐκελάδετο was meant to be confined to the prisoners.

[2] This is perfectly intelligible, if the Athenian fleet be supposed to have followed Lysander to Attica, and then to the Hellespont. But in Xenophon's narrative we can hardly account for it; and it is difficult to reconcile the reason assigned for sailing towards Chios at a distance from the shore (πελάγιοι): that Asia was hostile to them; with the fact just before mentioned, that on their passage from Samos to Chios they ravaged the king's territory.

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Ægos-potami.

only stopping there for provisions, proceeded to a place nearly two miles farther to the north, called Ægos-potami, facing Lampsacus, where the Peloponnesian fleet was still lying, at about two miles' distance; for such was here the width of the channel. The next morning at daybreak Lysander ordered his men to embark, after having taken their first meal, and made all his dispositions for a sea-fight, but gave orders that no ship should stir from its place. The Athenians at sunrise sailed up toward the harbour of Lampsacus to offer battle, but did not venture to attack the enemy, whom they saw fully prepared to receive them, and sheltered under the town, and after waiting till the afternoon they returned to Ægos-potami. Lysander directed some of his fastest galleys to follow them, and observe their proceedings after their landing, and it was not until he had received the report of his officers that he allowed his own men to go ashore. The Athenians when they landed at Ægos-potami, which was a mere open beach, without any habitations, proceeded at their leisure—supposing their day's work at an end—to Sestus, the nearest market, or as chance might lead them in search of provisions.

The next day Lysander gave the same orders, made the same dispositions, and remained stationary as before, while the Athenians, seeing their challenge again declined, grew more careless of the enemy, and wandered farther up the country in quest of victuals. Their movements were not only watched by Lysander's scouts, but were observed by a friendly eye which could discern their danger. The fortified domain of Alcibiades was so near this part of the coast, that he could perceive all that took place there from the top of his towers. Struck with the perilous position and false security of his countrymen, he came down to the sea-side to point out to the generals

Interference of Alcibiades.

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the error they were committing, and to advise them to transfer their camp to Sestus, where they would enjoy the same advantages which the enemy, in his station at Lampsacus, derived from the shelter of the harbour and a friendly city. According to the authors followed by Diodorus and Plutarch, he accompanied his advice with an offer of engaging a body of Thracians in their service, from the dominions of the two princes who had now succeeded to the remains of the great Odrysian monarchy, and were his friends; but in return required to be admitted to a share of the command. But it is scarcely credible that he could have made such offers, and proposed such conditions, at the same time that even his advice was contemptuously rejected, especially by Tydeus and Menander, who bade him depart and remember that they were generals now, not he. The difference indeed soon became manifest. The operations of the first day were repeated during the three next, without any variation; but on the fifth Lysander ordered the galleys which followed the Athenians toward the opposite shore, as soon as they should have landed and be scattered over the country, to return, and in the middle of the channel to hoist a shield. When the signal was raised he ordered the whole fleet to push across at its utmost stretch of speed. Thorax and the land-forces had likewise embarked. Of the six Athenian generals Conon alone was on the watch, and observed the enemy's approach. His own galley and eight others, including the Paralus, were soon manned; but this only enabled them to make their escape. The crews of the rest were too far off to be recalled by the signal which he gave, and Lysander found the ships nearly empty, and took possession of them, while Thorax and his troops scoured the country, and made the greater part of the men prisoners. A few found refuge in the fort-

Capture of the Athenian fleet.

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ress of Alcibiades, or in some other fortified places in the neighbourhood. Conon, seeing all lost, sailed away with his eight galleys to seek an asylum in Cyprus, which was governed by his friend Evagoras.[1] As a last token of his zeal for a desperate cause he carried off with him the large sails of the enemy's fleet, which he found collected on a headland near Lampsacus. The Paralus, with a still more gallant spirit, made for Athens, to bear the tidings of utter, hopeless, irretrievable, ruin.

Thus the war, which had lasted nearly seven and twenty years, and had drawn forth the whole strength of Greece, was decided within the course of an hour, at a time when, notwithstanding the foreign succours to which the conquerors were indebted for their success, the belligerent powers were so evenly balanced, that no human foresight could have anticipated the issue of the struggle. Lysander sailed back in triumph to Lampsacus with his prizes and prisoners, who included all Conon's colleagues; and he forthwith despatched a Milesian privateer with the news to Sparta, where it arrived on the third day after the event. His first care was to call a council of the allies to deliberate on the fate of the prisoners. The indignation which had been excited by the inhumanity of Philocles toward the Andrians and Corinthians, and by the decree for the mutilation of the captives, was now exasperated by the recollection of other misdeeds of the vanquished, and vented itself in a general cry for vengeance; and Lysander was not reluctant to execute it. It was resolved to put all the Athenian prisoners to death, except Adimantus, who was spared on the ground that he alone had opposed the decree. The number thus condemned to execution amounted

Massacre of the prisoners.

[1] A client of Lysias, who was present, is made to say that twelve ships escaped (ἐπεὶ. δωρ. p. 162.) Scheibe *Die oligarchische Umwälzung zu Athen*, p. 23. n. 27.) thinks that from this passage and from Isocrates c. Callim. § 68, it may be inferred that three galleys escaped to Athens beside the Paralus.

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according to the lowest statement to 3000. Lysander, who was probably conscious that he was not urged by vindictive motives, was anxious to give an appearance of stern but calm justice to the massacre. When the prisoners were brought out, he first addressed Philocles, and asked what he deserved who had set the example of such cruelty, as he had shown in the case of the Andrians and Corinthians. Philocles, it is said, declined to answer an accuser who was also his judge. He might have observed, that the question implied an extraordinary degree either of forgetfulness or of assurance in a citizen of the state which in the early part of the war had given so many precedents of the same kind.[1] But Lysander, with all the composure of righteous severity—according to Theophrastus[2], having first bathed and dressed himself, as if for a sacrifice—gave the signal for slaughter, by despatching Philocles with his own hands.

Alleged corruption of the Athenian commanders.

The death of Philocles and his colleagues seems at least sufficient to clear them from the suspicion of having betrayed their country, to which their previous conduct might otherwise not unreasonably have exposed them. That such suspicions should nevertheless have been entertained by their contemporaries is not surprising; and the lenity shown to Adimantus naturally pointed them more especially against him. He was afterwards impeached by Conon[3]; but whether on the ground of treason, or only of misconduct, and whether on a charge peculiar to himself, or one which he incurred in common with the rest, does not appear. The suspicion of treachery has been transmitted to modern times; but we find no sufficient reason for adopting it. It seems impossible to separate the case of Adimantus from that of the rest. As it would be capricious to suppose that he alone was sagacious

[1] See Vol. III. pp. 129. 151.
[2] In Plutarch, Lys. 13.
[3] Demosth. de F. L. p. 401.

enough to perceive the danger, so it cannot be believed that Lysander would have endeavoured to corrupt one general only, with a view to ensure the success of his stratagem, even if it should be thought credible that he would have exposed it to such a risk of disclosure. If however all but Conon were traitors, it is difficult to account for the exception made in favour of Adimantus. The suspicion might indeed assume a different form. Considering the generals as creatures of the faction which procured the destruction of their predecessors, we might imagine that, without having entered into correspondence with Lysander, they wilfully abetted his designs. But there is no solid groundwork for any of these conjectures; and, with regard to Philocles, they are rendered peculiarly improbable by his conduct toward the Peloponnesian prisoners. The heedlessness of the commanders seems indeed extraordinary, especially after the warnings of Alcibiades; but it is not too great to be ascribed to presumption and incapacity; and only proves that they were no better qualified for their station than the common men.

Lysander, having first made himself master of Sestus, proceeded northward, for the purpose of dislodging the Athenians from their remaining posts in this quarter. Byzantium and Chalcedon opened their gates to him. He dismissed the Athenian garrisons, but upon condition that they should repair to Athens, and with threats of putting to death all whom he found elsewhere. The numbers collected there could no longer give strength, and were sure to hasten the surrender of the city. All Athenians therefore who fell in his way were permitted and enjoined to return home. Having left a Lacedæmonian governor at Byzantium he returned to Lampsacus, where he staid a short time to refit, and then sailed out of the Hellespont with an armament of

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200 galleys. His chief employment in his progress toward the south, was to settle the government of the cities, now entirely subject to his will, on an oligarchical model, which enabled him to place the whole authority in the hands of his own creatures. A council of ten, (a *decarchy*, as it was commonly called,) nominated by himself, was the ordinary substitute for all the ancient forms of polity. While he stopt to introduce such changes in Lesbos he despatched Eteonicus with ten galleys to the coast of Thrace, where every town subject to Athens immediately submitted. Indeed throughout Greece and the Ægean, as soon as the events of Ægos-potami were known, the friends of Athens dropt all thoughts of resistance, except in a single instance. At Samos the fear and hatred which the democratical party felt toward its adversaries overpowered the restraints of prudence, and instigated it to fall upon them, and to maintain itself in open defiance of the irresistible power which was ready every moment to crush it. Whether however this was an act of wanton aggression, or of indiscreet resistance, is a question which our ignorance of the circumstances does not permit us to decide. But Lysander, intent on greater things, took no notice for the present of this demonstration of impotent enmity. While he drove the Athenians before him into Athens, he invited the outcasts whom the cruel policy or the resentment of the Athenians had at various times deprived of their native soils, to return to their long-lost homes. So a feeble remnant of the ancient population was collected in Melos and in Ægina. He had sent to Agis and to Sparta to announce his approach, and all the land-forces of the confederacy had been summoned to take the field, and followed Pausanias, the colleague of Agis, into Attica, where they encamped in the groves of the Academy. And not long after he himself appeared with 150 galleys, before the mouth of Piræus.

Lysander blockades Athens.

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State of public feeling at Athens.

It was night when the Paralus arrived with its heavy tidings; but they soon spread from Piræus to the upper city, ushered in by a long wail of grief and despair, which swelled as they passed from mouth to mouth. The streets and public places were speedily filled with groups of anxious or mourning citizens, assembled to learn or to deplore the fate of their friends and of their country. It is probable that Xenophon does not much exaggerate, when he says that none went to rest that night. But when he adds that the prevailing impression was the fear of treatment similar to that which, in the wantonness of prosperity, they had inflicted on the Melians, the Histiæans, the Scionæans, the Toronæans, the Æginetans, and on the people of many other vanquished cities, we cannot help suspecting that he has been more eager to express his own sense of the retribution which he thought due for so many breaches of justice and mercy, than careful to represent the exact state of public feeling, even so far as it fell under his observation. His own narrative, as well as the statements of another contemporary author[1], leads us to conclude, that the evil most generally dreaded was of a different kind, though not much less formidable: that it was not extermination, but a political reaction, which might once more reduce Athens under the yoke of a faction, irritated by its former defeat, and by the punishment of its principal leaders, and released from all restraints by the countenance which it would not fail to receive from Sparta. This, as the event proved, was the real danger; and whether this might still be avoided, seems to have been the main question which agitated all patriotic spirits. Successful resistance indeed was known to be utterly hopeless: the last struggle for victory had exhausted

[1] Lysias c. Agorat. pp. 130. 141. Eratosth. p. 126.

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the last means of defence. But it was possible that the show of a desperate resolution, steadily maintained, might induce the conquerors to content themselves with such terms, as would leave the state, though shorn of all its power, and dependent on its rival, still in the enjoyment of internal freedom. An assembly was held the next day, in which it was determined to block up the entrance of all the harbours but one, and to take all the precautions required for the defence of a city pressed, as they were soon to be, by a rigorous siege. In this attitude they awaited the arrival of Lysander and of the Peloponnesian army.

We should have less reason to doubt that Xenophon has faithfully described the impression made on the Athenians by the news of their disaster, notwithstanding the tone of exultation with which he relates it, if he had not forfeited his claim to credit on this point, by representing the same impression as still prevailing, at a time when it is clear from his own narrative, as well as from the statements of Lysias, that no such alarm could have been generally felt, and that the people was much more inclined to an overweening confidence in its own resources. The Athenians, he says, when after the arrival of Lysander they found themselves blockaded both by sea and land, were reduced to despair, and considered it as their inevitable doom to suffer the same usage as they had wantonly dealt to the weaker states, which had committed no offence but that of siding with their now victorious enemy. But this at least must be regarded as a fiction, which perhaps the historian thought justified by its moral tendency; for he himself afterwards mentions a fact which it seems impossible to reconcile with the supposition that the besieged never ceased to dread the utmost rigour of vindictive

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Proposals of capitulation.

hostility.[1] Soon after the appearance of Lysander before Piræus, negotiations were opened with the besiegers, and they proposed terms of peace, which to many appeared very reasonable and moderate, but which were nevertheless rejected. It is probable that Lysander was eager to consummate his victory, and therefore at first offered liberal conditions.[2] The main demand of the conquerors was that the Long Walls should be pulled down to the length of above a mile on each side. Such overtures could scarcely have been refused by men who felt their situation so desperate as, according to Xenophon's description, his countrymen believed theirs to be from the beginning of the siege; and it may seem surprising that they were not gladly accepted. Cleophon, it appears, was again foremost to oppose

[1] Accordingly a writer who eagerly copies Xenophon's picture of the despondency which prevailed at Athens, found himself obliged to disguise this fact as well as he could. Xenophon himself says simply — though in a parenthesis, and in the wrong place, as if he wished to keep the fact as much as possible out of sight — *προσεκαλοῦντο τῶν μακρῶν τειχῶν ἐπὶ δέκα σταδίους καθελεῖν ἑκάτερον.* The modern historian informs his readers — "*It was understood* that the Lacedæmonians, among other things, required the demolition of the Long Walls for the space of ten furlongs." This is a merely arbitrary variation from Xenophon's statement, which so far perfectly agrees with that of Lysias, who relates that those terms were formally proposed by the Lacedæmonians, and communicated to the people in the first assembly held on the subject of peace after the arrival of Lysander. Agorat. p. 130. Nor does Xenophon, any more than Lysias, authorise the assertion that *in holding out the requisition to demolish the walls no assurance had been given that slavery should not be the common doom.* Such an assurance, as far as it could be given by words, was clearly conveyed by the offer to *make peace* on the conditions proposed. But after the second unsuccessful embassy it is possible that doubts may have arisen or have been studiously suggested as to the intentions of the Spartan government, which Theramenes undertook to clear up. — If any one should be inclined to contend, that, independently of Xenophon's testimony, the nature of the case compels us to suppose that the Athenians throughout the siege were afraid of the worst, we would refer to the language of the Athenian speaker in the Melian conference, Thuc. v. 91., Ἡμεῖς τῆς ἡμετέρας ἀρχῆς, ἣν καὶ παυθῇ, οὐκ ἀθυμοῦμεν τὴν τελευτήν· οὐ γὰρ οἱ ἄρχοντες ἄλλων, ὅσπερ καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, οὗτοι δεινοὶ τοῖς νικηθεῖσιν.

[2] But Æschines perhaps exaggerates as much as Xenophon, though in an opposite direction, when (De F. L. p 38.) he says that the Spartans offered to allow the Athenians to keep Lemnos, Imbrus, and Scyrus, and their democratical institutions. Scheibe (p. 39.) supposes that these terms were proposed by the ephors, through the Athenian envoys whom they sent back from Sellasia. But it seems incredible, that Xenophon, when he was reporting the answer of the ephors, should have omitted so important a part of their message, especially as it exhibited the conduct of the Spartan government in the most advantageous light.

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the demands of the enemy, and he is said by a later orator[1] to have threatened to stab any one who should make mention of peace. But it is evident both from Xenophon and Lysias, that such violence was on this occasion at least unnecessary, and that he only expressed the general feeling, when he resisted the proposal relating to the Long Walls. And this feeling can only be understood, if it is supposed that the Long Walls were regarded as the bulwark of democracy, and the concession required as nothing less than the sacrifice of the constitution. On the other hand it is not improbable that these terms, while they appeared to popular jealousy intolerably oppressive, as little satisfied the secret wishes of the oligarchical party, which desired to see its country reduced to a condition in which its own ascendency would be more effectually secured.

Intrigues of the oligarchical faction.

The hopes of this party had been revived by the public calamity, and it prosecuted its machinations with redoubled activity, and, it would seem, with unusual dexterity and dissimulation. It was adverse to any treaty which would not completely prostrate Athens under its rule, and probably assumed a show of concern for the national honour, as a ground for concurring on this occasion with Cleophon. Such a course of proceeding would raise its credit, while it led the people to throw away the last chance of domestic independence. The council of this year was chiefly filled with men subservient to its views[2]; and Archestratus one of its members, who declared himself in favour of the enemy's offers, was put in prison —it would seem by his colleagues—and a decree was passed forbidding any one to renew this proposal. At the same time the urgency of the public danger

[1] Æschines, l. c.

[2] Lysias Agorat. p. 131. Possibly this prevailing tendency of the council may have been connected with the change which deprived its members of pay.

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furnished a fair pretext for suggesting a measure, which was professedly designed to promote concord, and allay discontent, but which probably strengthened the oligarchical faction more than the state. A decree, moved by one Patroclides, reciting a similar measure which had been adopted on the eve of the Persian invasion, restored many citizens who had been wholly or partially disfranchised to the full enjoyment of their political rights.[1] No exiles however were recalled by this decree[2], which, if it was the work of the oligarchy, marks its caution no less than the jealousy of the people. But it seems probable that this measure led directly or indirectly to the return of Critias, who had been for some time—perhaps for several years—absent from Athens. Xenophon intimates that he was banished[3]; but it is possible that his exile may have been partly voluntary, the result of a sentence of disfranchisement, which rendered his residence at Athens insupportable to his haughty spirit. He was perhaps thus forced to go abroad not long after the polity of the Five Thousand was abolished. At the time of the battle of Arginusæ he was sojourning in Thessaly, and—if we may believe an assertion which Xenophon puts into the mouth of an adversary[4]—was engaged in an enterprise, which shows how lightly his political principles sat on him, or how careless he was in the choice of instruments

Return of Critias

[1] Andocides Myst. p. 10. Ἔδοξεν ὑμῖν τοὺς ἀτίμους ἐπιτίμους ποιῆσαι.

[2] Id. ibid. Lysias indeed — in a passage which has been most absurdly applied to the period preceding the siege — seems to assert that the exiles were restored before the peace, δημ. κατ. ἀπολ. p. 174. But this contradicts not only Andocides, but Xenophon (Hell. II. 2. 23.), as well as probability. The return of the exiles was one of the evils most dreaded. It is probable that Lysias had different epochs in his mind at once; that in which the decree of Patroclides was passed, and that of the capitulation, when the exiles returned. The oath of concord which he speaks of (τοὺς ἀτίμους ἐπιτίμους ἐποιήσατε, τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις περὶ ὁμονοίας ὅρκους ὄμνυτε), whatever may have been its nature — which the description, τοῖς ἄλλοις ὄμνυτε, leaves extremely obscure — clearly belongs to the same period (the early part of the siege), as the deliberation about concord mentioned by Andocides (ἐβουλεύσασθε περὶ ὁμονοίας).

[3] II. 3. 15. Φυγὼν ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου.

[4] II. 3. 36.

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for his ambitious ends. He is said to have conspired with one Prometheus to establish democracy, and to have attempted to arm the Penests against their lords. The undertaking seems to have failed, but it may have recommended him to the favour of the people at home, and have enabled his friends the more easily to effect his restoration. On his return to Athens he became the leader of the oligarchical faction, and gained the confidence of the clubs, which still, as in the time of the Four Hundred, formed its principal strength. By them, or through their interest, he was appointed to an office, which is so described by Lysias[1], that we are left in doubt whether it was public and legal, or merely the creature of the party, which in either case used it for its own ends. It was copied from the Spartan institutions, being filled by five persons who bore the name of Ephors.[2] Their nominal

[1] Eratosth. p. 124. πέντε ἄνδρες ἔφοροι κατέστησαν ὑπὸ τῶν καλουμένων ἑταίρων, συναγωγεῖς μὲν τῶν πολιτῶν, ἄρχοντες δὲ τῶν συνωμοτῶν. Büttner (*Gesch. der pol. Het.* p. 86. not.) observes, with reference to the question discussed in the following note, that if they had been invested with legal authority, they would have been also ἄρχοντες τῶν πολιτῶν. The force of this argument, perhaps, depends in a great measure on the meaning of the expression συναγωγεῖς τῶν πολιτῶν, with which the other is evidently contrasted. Bremi (ad loc. in *Bibliotheca Græca* of Jacobs and Rost) observes: "συναγωγεῖς τῶν πολιτῶν *vocantur, opinor, qui habent comitia parum, credo, frequenter, et nonnisi de rebus levibus, quippe cum graves sua auctoritate moderarentur, fortasse ne totum quidem convocabant populum, sed eos cives quos norant faciles se habituros assentatores.*" And so Sievers, note 253, "*cives ad conciliabula secreta convocasse.*" But how this can be signified by the term συναγωγεῖς does not appear. I am inclined to think it may refer not to the convoking of public assemblies, but to the gaining over of the citizens to the faction, the enlisting them in the conspiracy, in which sense it might be compared with a similar meaning of συνδεκάζειν, on which Büttner has a very good note, p. 78.

[2] This in itself appears to be an argument against the supposition (which however is adopted by Boeckh and C. F. Hermann) that it was a public office; and indeed there is only one feature in the description given by Lysias, which seems to imply a legitimate authority: that they assigned the stations of the phylarchs who guarded the city — φυλάρχους ἐπὶ τὰς φυλακὰς κατέστησαν. All the other circumstances tend to the opposite conclusion; and perhaps this may be explained as a particular example of the influence exercised in the appointment of the magistrates. And, as Sievers observes (*De Xenophontis Hellenicis*, p. 92.), it is scarcely possible that there should have been any room for doubting who the ephors were — as appears from Lysias to have been the case — if they had been publicly chosen. Scheibe indeed (p. 35. note 11.) meets this argument with the remark, that Eratosthenes' denial of the fact that he was one of the ephors (Lys. Er. § 47.) proves nothing but his *impudence*, which he also showed by remaining in the city, though he was not included in the amnesty. But to deny a fact of public notoriety is

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authority—if it was in any degree legal—seems to have been confined to objects connected with the defence of the city. But their chief employment was to collect new associates for the cause of oligarchy, and to wield all the means at their disposal, for the purpose of swaying public measures, and of filling the most important offices with their own adherents. Thus the faction, while it avoided as much as possible every step which might disclose its designs, gradually gained strength, and waited for an opportunity of striking a decisive blow.

It was conscious that without any effort of its own the mere lapse of time would bring it continually nearer to its object. The suddenness of the calamity which had deprived Athens of her navy had prevented the laying in a stock of provisions to meet a long siege; the measures of Lysander had increased the ordinary number of mouths, and scarcity soon began to be felt. We cannot indeed estimate the precise value of Xenophon's language, when he says that the food was entirely consumed[1], since the city

not merely impudence, but folly. To face a manifest danger, which might have been shunned, may be foolhardiness, but is not impudence. Scheibe also supposes the appointment of the ephors to have preceded the passing of the decree of Patroclides. But the only reason he assigns (p. 35. n. 10.) is the language of Lysias c. Eratosthen. § 44. *ἐπειδὴ ἡ ναυμαχία καὶ ἡ συμφορὰ τῇ πόλει ἐγένετο, δημοκρατίας ἔτι οὔσης — πέντε ἄνδρες ἔφοροι κατέστησαν.* This however cannot afford the slightest ground for such a conclusion, as the orator had no occasion to mention the decree of Patroclides, which Xenophon on the other hand describes as the first measure adopted at the beginning of the siege; taking no notice of the appointment of the ephors. Sievers (*Comm. Hist. de Xenophontis Hellenicis*, p. 431.) places the decree of Patroclides before the ephoralty, though he expresses no opinion as to the return of Critias, which Weber (*Die elegischen Dichter der Hellenen* p. 643.) refers to the amnesty. Ulrici also (*Gesch. der Hell. Dichtk.* II. p. 579.) believes that it was subsequent to the disaster at Ægos-potami, but fancies that the institution of the ephors followed the surrender of the city, which is clearly inconsistent with the statements of Lysias.

[1] II. 2. 11. *ἐπεὶ παντελῶς ἤδη ὁ σῖτος ἐπελελοίπει.* Yet he writes, only a few lines after, that Theramenes waited more than three months for the time when the Athenians would be willing to accept any terms, *διὰ τὸ ἐπιλελοιπέναι τὸν σῖτον ἅπαντα.* The occasional supplies introduced by private adventurers, who contrived to elude the blockade, as in the instance mentioned by Isocrates adv. Callim. p. 382., can scarcely be thought sufficient to reconcile Xenophon's expressions in these two passages. The extraordinary honours bestowed on the client of Isocrates prove that the case was a rare, if not a solitary, one; and if the city had for several months been kept from starvation by his exertions, the orator certainly would not have failed to dwell upon that fact.

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was able to hold out four or five months after this failure. But if we may depend on the fact that several persons had died of hunger, the distress must have been great before the people attempted to renew the negotiation with the enemy. At length ambassadors were sent to Agis, to propose alliance with Sparta—a softer term for subjection—without any condition but that of retaining the walls and Piræus. Agis however disclaimed the power of treating with them, and directed them to repair to Sparta. But on the borders of Laconia, near Sellasia, they were stopt by a message from the ephors, who called upon them to state the proposal which they brought, and on hearing it ordered them immediately to depart, and not to return until they should be better advised. This answer created general despondency at Athens; and it would have been credible enough, that now at least many began to apprehend the worst evils of war. Xenophon however informs us, that none yet ventured to propose that they should accede to the terms first offered by Sparta; and it would therefore seem that they had not yet given up all hopes of a more honourable capitulation.

Negotiation with Sparta.

Still it was necessary that some step should be taken without delay; even the time required for another embassy could be ill spared. In this emergency Theramenes came forward to relieve the public anxiety. He probably still enjoyed the reputation of a friend of freedom, who had no connection with the oligarchical party. He was therefore listened to with confidence, when he offered to go to Lysander, and ascertain the real intentions of Sparta, and the object for which she insisted on demolishing the Long Walls. Xenophon speaks as if the only doubt had been, or at least now was, whether the Spartans exacted this concession merely by way of security for themselves, or with a view to further hostile proceedings, and

Embassy of Theramenes.

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would be satisfied with nothing short of reducing the Athenians to personal slavery. But at least it seems clear that it was not this suspicion that at first deterred the people from accepting these conditions[1]; and even now, if we may believe an author as well informed as Xenophon, and not swayed by stronger prejudices[2], Theramenes encouraged it to hope, not merely that it might avoid the total extinction of its civil existence, but that it might obtain peace without the sacrifice either of its fortifications or of the remains of its navy, and even some further indulgence, the precise nature of which he affected to keep secret, as he did the method by which he expected to procure such favourable terms. What was eagerly desired was readily believed, notwithstanding the opposition which he had to encounter, we do not know on what grounds, from several speakers; and he set out, but without any intention of returning until the city should have been reduced to a state of weakness which would leave it no liberty of choice as to any conditions that might be offered, or his own partisans should have gained an undisputed ascendency, which would be attended with the same effect. With this view he stayed upwards of three months in the enemy's camp, and he no doubt made use of this opportunity to communicate the plans of his party to Lysander. Xenophon is totally silent as to the events which happened during this interval at Athens, and would lead us to suppose that the only change which took place there before the return of Theramenes consisted in the progress of the famine. But we learn from Lysias that during this period the oligarchical faction was actively employed in ex-

[1] If it had been so, instead of peremptorily rejecting the condition, they would surely have applied for some further assurance to relieve their apprehensions. If no verbal assurance could satisfy them, the undertaking of Theramenes was useless.

[2] Lysias c. Agorat. p. 130. Eratosth. p. 126.

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tending its influence, and removing or overawing its adversaries; and we gather from an allusion, which Xenophon elsewhere makes to the same transactions, that the city was at this time the scene of violent tumults.[1]

We have already observed that the council of the year was filled with partisans of oligarchy; and Cleophon had frequently inveighed against it as a band of conspirators.[2] We do not know whether any fresh causes occurred during the absence of Theramenes to exasperate their mutual animosity, or whether the council now for the first time felt itself strong enough to act on the offensive against him. He was a troublesome and perhaps a formidable adversary; for he was bold, vigilant, and in one respect apparently honest—he died poor, after having for many years filled stations which would have enabled him to enrich himself at the public expense[3]—and he possessed the confidence of the great mass of his fellow-citizens. Measures therefore were concerted for his overthrow; and the struggle for this object seems to have been regarded as one which would in a great degree determine the final success of the contending parties. It appears that he held some military office, which afforded a pretext for charging him with neglect of duty; and the council at the instance of Satyrus, one of its members, threw him into prison, to take his trial. According to the legal mode of proceeding he should have been brought before a court composed in the usual way of the common citizens. But such a tribunal would not have served the purpose of his enemies, who foresaw that in this case he would be

[1] Hell. i. 7. 40. *στάσεώς τινος γενομένης, ἐν ᾗ* Κλεοφῶν *ἀπέθανε.*

[2] Lysias c. Nicomach. p. 184. Κλ. *τὴν βουλὴν ἐλοιδόρει, φάσκων συνεστάναι, καὶ οὐ τὰ βέλτιστα βουλεύειν τῇ πόλει.*

[3] Lysias De Bonis Ar. p. 156. "As to Cleophon, you are all aware that for many years all the affairs of the city (or its finances) passed through his hands, and it was expected that he had amassed a very large fortune from his office (*ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς*). Yet after his death this supposed wealth was nowhere to be found, and his relatives, to whom he left all he had, are notoriously poor."

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acquitted. To ensure his destruction, they called in the aid of an associate who possessed extraordinary means of abetting their designs. After the overthrow of the Four Hundred a person named Nicomachus had been entrusted with the task of collecting and transcribing the laws of Solon. If we may rely on the account which Lysias gives of this man and his commission, we are surprised to see an individual, under the Athenian democracy, invested with such extensive power over the lives and property of his fellow-citizens. Nicomachus, it appears, had at first required no more than four months for the execution of his work; but he contrived to delay its completion for some years. And the laws which he had to compile were in such a state, and his operations were subject to so little control, that he was able to insert forgeries in the new code, to suit the interest of any parties who would pay him for the interpolation. To this man the oligarchical faction now applied for assistance against Cleophon; and Nicomachus drew out of his armoury a weapon made or pointed for their purpose. He fabricated a law which constituted the council itself the judges of Cleophon's case, and according to Lysias paid so little regard to decency, as to produce this law, which no one had ever heard of before, on the very day appointed for the trial. Cleophon was tried by his enemies, condemned, and put to death. But this mockery of justice seems not to have been carried through without violent opposition; for Xenophon speaks of a sedition in which Cleophon lost his life, and in which—probably through the contrivance of the same party—Callixenus, and the others who had been thrown into prison for their conduct in the prosecution of the generals after the battle of Arginusæ, made their escape. They found an asylum in Decelea.

Tumults in Athens.

Theramenes, it must be supposed, received inform-

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ation of all that was passing at Athens during his absence, and perhaps the triumph gained by his friends over Cleophon hastened his return; though if the city had already begun to suffer the miseries of famine when he left it, he might well have expected to find it by this time willing to submit to any terms which might be dictated to it. He now announced that he had been till then detained by Lysander, and at last had been directed to apply to the government at Sparta, which alone possessed authority to decide such questions. It was not a time for scrutinising the conduct of Theramenes; the people was impatient of further delay, and eagerly caught at the hopes which he still held out. He was sent with nine colleagues to Sparta, invested with full powers. The embassy was stopt at Sellasia as before by a message from the ephors, but was permitted to proceed on declaring itself authorised to conclude a definitive treaty. An assembly was then held to deliberate on the terms which should be granted to the vanquished enemy. It was attended by deputies from the allied states; and according to Xenophon many of them urged the Spartans to exercise the right of conquest to its utmost extent, and instead of negotiating, to exterminate Athens from the face of Greece. The Corinthians and Thebans contended most strenuously for the more rigorous measure; and there was a report, that on this or some other occasion a Theban orator[1] had proposed to raze Athens to the ground, and to turn Attica into a sheepwalk; while the Phocians generously remonstrated in behalf of fallen greatness.[2]

[1] Erianthus or Erianthes. Plut. Lys. 15. Paus. x. 9. 9. Xenophon Hell. III. 5. 8. εἷς ἀνὴρ εἶπεν ὃς ἔτυχε τότε ἐν τοῖς συμμάχοις καθήμενος.

[2] This appears, from a fragment preserved by Suidas v. Μηλόβοτος χώρα, to have been distinctly related by the orator Lycurgus. Plutarch (Lys. 15.) places the debate on the doom of Athens at a later period, when the articles of the capitulation were supposed to have been infringed, and he represents the allies as softened by a passage from the Electra of Euripides, which was recited at a banquet by a Phocian. Scheibe (p. 44.) somewhat arbitrarily transfers this scene to Sparta, and to the previous occasion. Philostratus, in his life of Critias (c. 1.) represents

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But the Spartans were, if not too generous, too prudent to gratify the resentment of their allies by a kind of revenge which would have been no less impolitic than inhuman. They looked more to the future than the past; and Lysander, who had sent an Athenian exile named Aristoteles to prepare them for the embassy of Theramenes, had probably pointed out the advantages which they might derive from Athens, if the government were placed in the hands of a party which would entirely depend on their protection. They therefore took a tone of magnanimous forbearance, and declared that they would not consent to extirpate a people which had once rendered great services to Greece in the most perilous emergencies: a noble sentiment, which had unhappily been dormant in the case of Platæa, when they stood in a different relation to Thebes. The conditions with which the embassy was sent back were, that not only the Long Walls, but the fortifications of Piræus, should be destroyed within a certain number of days, the ships, all but twelve, delivered up, the exiles restored, and that Athens should be annexed to the Peloponnesian confederacy, or as Xenophon mildly but plainly expresses it, should make the enemies and allies of Sparta her own, and should follow whithersoever Sparta might lead both by land and by sea.

With these terms Theramenes and his colleagues returned; and as they entered Athens, they were surrounded by an anxious crowd, which trembled lest their embassy might have proved fruitless; for famine was now extending its ravages with frightful rapidity. An assembly was appointed to be held the next day, to receive and deliberate on the report of the embassy. But in the mean while the terms were privately com-

Critias as co-operating with the Lacedæmonians for this end: *βουλεύματός τε ἀτόπου τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ξυνελάμβανεν, ὡς μηλόβοτος ἡ Ἀττικὴ ἀποφανθείη, τῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀγέλης ἐκκενωθεῖσα*: perhaps only a rhetorical exaggeration as to both parties.

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municated to many inquirers, and they excited great surprise and indignation. A number of persons, including some of the generals and other military officers[1], reproached Theramenes with the disappointment he had caused of hopes which he had excited, and declared their intention of persuading the people to reject the terms he had brought. His party therefore thought it expedient to get rid of these opponents before the meeting of the assembly. One Agoratus was suborned to lay an information against them before the council, charging them with a conspiracy to obstruct the peace; and they were all arrested. The next day the assembly was held in the theatre of Piræus[2], the ambassadors made their report, and Theramenes urged the necessity of accepting the treaty, which notwithstanding the plenitude of his powers seems not to have been thought binding on the people. Several voices were still raised against it; not however because any apprehensions were entertained that the Spartans would not observe it, and would use the power it gave them to treat the Athenians as slaves, but because it was seen that the restoration of the exiles was the first step toward the abolition of democracy. Theramenes himself was attacked, and his conduct is said to have been contrasted by one Cleomenes with that of Themistocles, who had outwitted the enemy for the security of Athens, as Theramenes had deceived his confiding countrymen to deprive them of their means of defence.[3] But Theramenes felt himself strong enough to disregard these taunts; *it was for the safety of the citizens that the walls had been erected by Themistocles, and it*

[1] τῶν τε στρατηγῶν τινες καὶ τῶν ταξιαρχῶν. Lysias c. Agorat. § 13.

[2] Μουνυχίασιν ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ. See Arnold on Thucydides VIII. 93. Schoemann, who in his earlier work *De Com.* p. 57. considered the theatre of Munychia as distinct from that in Piræus, afterwards (*Antiq. J. P. Græc.* p. 220. n. 8.) acknowledged himself convinced of their identity.

[3] Plut. Lys. 14. Lysias c. Eratosth. § 63. draws the same contrast, ὁ μὲν Λακεδαιμονίων ἀκόντων ψκοδόμησεν αὐτά, οὗτος δὲ τοὺς πολίτας ἑκουσίους καθεῖλε.

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was for the same end that he now proposed to demolish them; if walls were essential to the welfare of a city, Sparta, which had none, must be in the worst plight of all. The majority of the assembly was glad to purchase relief from the horrors of famine at any price; it adopted the treaty, and approved of the proceedings which had been instituted against the persons accused by Agoratus, who were committed to prison for trial.[1] Lysander then sailed into Piræus, and took possession of the ships and the walls.

Surrender of Athens.

Review of the war.

The close of a struggle so long and so momentous, which produced so great a change in the state of Greece, invites us to pause, and reflect on the series of causes and effects which led to this issue. We are aware that the instruction to be derived from the contemplation of these events is not confined to any particular view of their connection. But as it is equally certain that they can yield little either of instruction or entertainment, so long as they are considered merely as insulated facts, it may not be useless to review them for the purpose of showing the kind of necessity by which they appear to be linked together.

We must begin by repeating an observation which we have already made: that the war was inevitable, and though it might have been delayed could not have been prevented.[2] It arose not out of the accidental

[1] Such still appears to me the right explanation and chronological arrangement of the facts related by Lysias, c. Agor. §§ 13—34.; but a different view of them has been taken by Scheibe, whose arguments are examined in the Appendix *On the interval between the surrender of Athens, and the appointment of the Thirty.*

[2] That the war was inevitable, is also maintained by Droysen, in his Introduction to the Knights, in his translation of Aristophanes, II. p. 285.; but for a reason which I cannot adopt, and a purpose with which I cannot sympathise. It is a part of the case which he endeavours to make, in order to vindicate the character of Cleon from the misrepresentations of Aristophanes and Thucydides. On this point I may find occasion to say a word elsewhere. The cause which in his view rendered the war inevitable, he states as follows: — "The development of the Athenian democracy rendered the struggle with Sparta inevitable. As soon as the democratical principle had completely worked itself out (*sich durchgearbeitet*) in the internal relations of the state, and had spread so as to pervade every thing within the limits marked out by the peace which had been concluded with Sparta, it could not fail to overstep those limits; for democracy cannot rest, or stand still, it is like a fire that can exist only as long as it continues to devour, and it has no

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occasion which determined the time of its commencement, but out of the characters and relative position of the parties. The immediate motive was not ambition, but on the one hand jealousy, on the other fear. The nature of the Athenian empire, no less than the genius of the people, constantly tended to conquest and aggression, and some members of the Peloponnesian confederacy were exposed by their situation to frequent collision with the rival power, which sometimes encroached upon their rights, and if not by actual intrigues, by the influence of its reputation and example continually threatened the stability of their internal constitution. Thus Corinth, Thebes, and Megara, had become implacably hostile to Athens, and were eager for war, from which they expected security and revenge; and Sparta was at length con-

limit or goal short of its own destruction." And he then proceeds to observe, that all attempts at a pacification were necessarily futile, inasmuch as the continuance of the war was essential to the being of the democratical principle which it carried out into action, the principle in which the Athenian people lived and moved, and which could not be overpowered until the strength of the people was utterly exhausted.

These observations appear to me very questionable in themselves, and not at all needed for a satisfactory explanation of the Peloponnesian war. It may be admitted that along with the development of democracy, and in a great measure through it, Athens rose to that height of power which rendered her so formidable to Sparta, that war became inevitable. But how often have states under totally different forms of government been placed in a similar position, with a like result! It may further be granted that in the case of Athens and Sparta, the difference of political institutions was one of the main elements of their antagonism. But the effect of this difference cannot properly be attributed to the institutions on the one side more than to those on the other. Again, it may be true that the genius of the Athenians, which made them impatient of restraint, and of artificial distinctions, and thus favoured the development of democracy, was just that which inspired them with a restless ambition, and urged them to encroach on the liberty of others; but it does not follow because their institutions were congenial to their character, that the effects of their character may be correctly charged upon their institutions. So much for the historical explanation. As to the general proposition, it must be owned that democratical states are not more exempt than others from the lust of conquest, not less ready to embark in *just and necessary* wars, especially such as promise to aggrandise and enrich them at the cost of a weaker neighbour; if this could ever have been doubted, it would be abundantly proved by the recent history of the United States. But that there is in such states any peculiar propensity to military enterprise; that their activity can never find a sufficient range in any other direction, and that, consequently, that pacific tendency which is so visible in the progress of the civilised world, is essentially irreconcilable with democratical institutions, and will either find in them an insurmountable barrier to its development, or prevail only by sweeping them away from the face of the earth — this is a proposition of which experience affords no proof, and which cannot be affirmed on any *à priori* reasoning, without extreme temerity.

vinced that the honour of her station in the confederacy, and perhaps her safety, required that she should comply with the wishes of her allies. Beyond these objects her views do not seem to have been then carried. She was desirous of humbling Athens, but apparently without any design of stepping into her place. She was the aggressor, but under a conviction of the necessity of the measure, which gradually overcame the reluctance inspired by her habitual caution. CHAP. XXX.

In the Peloponnesian councils no doubt seems to have been entertained, except by king Archidamus, of a speedy triumph, while at Athens the eloquence of Pericles was needed to brace the courage of his countrymen for the contest; and they entered upon it not so much with a strong hope of victory, as with the feeling that it was better to run any risk than to hold their power on a precarious tenure by the sufferance of Sparta. But the events of the first four or five years of the war wrought a great change in the views and spirit of the belligerents. The Athenians at first suffered much more than they had feared. The devastation of their territory proved far more annoying in the reality than their imagination had pictured it. The calamities of war were aggravated by the ravages of the pestilence. The protracted siege of Potidæa drained the treasury, and the main source of their revenue was threatened by the revolt of Mitylene. Their spirit sank for a moment under the pressure of these evils; they regretted that they had listened to the counsels of Pericles, and sued for peace, which the enemy was too much elated to grant on reasonable terms. But when they found that they were not overwhelmed by such a series of violent and unexpected shocks, their temporary despondency was succeeded by increased confidence in their own energy and resources; for it now seemed that there was no danger or difficulty which they might not hope to surmount.

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Already in the fifth year of the war, when the plague had a little abated, they began to turn their thoughts to conquests in the remote West. Pericles indeed had cautioned them against attempting any enlargement of their empire during the war. But he had also taught them to neglect Attica, and to fix their views on the sea, as a boundless field for new acquisitions by which they might compensate their domestic losses.[1] They acted in his spirit, though against the letter of his advice, when they began to sound their way in Sicily. But while they were engaged in their enterprises there, they prosecuted the war with new vigour at home, and gave their operations a more decidedly offensive character. The genius of Demosthenes — superior perhaps in military affairs to that of Pericles — seized the right method of assailing the enemy's most vulnerable side, and Sparta, after having in her turn sued in vain for peace, saw herself reduced to a state of the most abject dismay and perplexity. If Athens had confined her attacks to Peloponnesus, she might at least have extorted terms most advantageous to herself and humiliating to her rival. But it was not to be expected that her ambition should be moderated by success: the overweening presumption it inspired displayed itself in the impatience with which she bore her temporary exclusion from Sicily.

The pacification effected by Hermocrates among the Sicilian states should have been both a useful check and a wholesome warning to the Athenians. It failed altogether of answering the latter purpose; but it may have contributed, together with the alarm excited by the enterprise of Brasidas and the disastrous campaign in Bœotia to incline them to peace; and personal motives induced the leading men in the two rival states to take advantage of this soberer mood. Yet

[1] Thuc. I. 143. II. 62.

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the peace of Nicias seems never to have been considered by either party, as any thing more than an interval for taking breath, and gaining strength to renew the conflict. The inertness exhibited during this period by the Spartan government, the discord which threatened the Peloponnesian confederacy with dissolution, the accession of Argos to the Athenian alliance, all tended to increase the security with which the Athenians looked forward to the issue of the struggle. Melos was sacrificed in the wantonness of prosperity and power. The ambition of Alcibiades seconded that of his fellow-citizens; in an island like Sicily pretexts for intervention could never long be wanting; and the new Sicilian expedition was undertaken on a scale suited to the growing vigour, and the aspiring temper of the people. The conquest of Sicily was perhaps considered as a step to that of Peloponnesus; but it was more attractive as a source of revenue than the dominion of the whole Peloponnesian confederacy.

A modern historian, whose subject led him to speculate on the causes which determined the issue of the Peloponnesian war, thinks that far too much weight has been assigned in this respect to the disastrous event of the Sicilian expedition, while on the other hand the Athenians have been unjustly charged with rashness in that undertaking.[1] He attributes its failure to the want of that support which the Athenians had expected to receive from the Sicilian states, without which no foreign armament, however powerful, could have succeeded in such an enterprise; but he does not perceive any necessary connection between the Sicilian disaster and the final overthrow of the Athenian power. We cannot entirely assent to either of these views, though the one appears to us

[1] Manso. *Sparta*, II. p. 359.

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to come much nearer to the truth than the other. Without stopping to inquire how far the Athenians miscalculated the obstacles they had to encounter, or the aid which they were to receive, we think it clear that their first armament was adequate to the immediate object of the expedition, the reduction of Syracuse, which it so nearly accomplished that, if the siege had been begun a little sooner, all the succours that could have been sent from the other parts of the island and from Greece could not have saved the place. Whether the fall of Syracuse would have been attended with the subjugation of Sicily, is a different question. It might have involved the Athenians in a war with the other Sicilian states as calamitous as their defeat. But even should this not have been the immediate result, it seems certain that their ambition would only have been inflamed by such a conquest, and that they would have embarked in still bolder or wilder undertakings, which their unbending pertinacity would have rendered no less disastrous than the siege of Syracuse. Syracuse was their Moscow; but if it had not been so, they would have found one elsewhere.

In this point of view we might be disposed to maintain that a total failure, which put an end to all those projects of conquest in the West which had been so long harboured at Athens, was less to be dreaded than partial success. Nevertheless we cannot agree with the writer whose opinions we have noticed, that the defeat of the Sicilian expedition was an event of little or no moment with regard to the issue of the war, and that this is wholly to be ascribed to the Persian subsidies, which enabled Sparta, though repeatedly vanquished, as often to renew the struggle, until she had exhausted and overpowered her adversary. It is true that the wonderful efforts which Athens made during this period, prove

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that, but for the singular combination of circumstances which rendered the ambition of Cyrus subservient to the interests of Sparta, the war, notwithstanding the losses of the Athenians in Sicily, might have lasted many years longer, or might even have been brought to a different issue. But it seems equally clear, that Athens might have held out both against the Spartan arms and the Persian gold, until their union had been dissolved by the death of Cyrus, if she had not been weakened by domestic discord; and that, even if the Persian court had remained neutral, the intrigues of the oligarchical faction might have rendered all her victories fruitless. The failure of the Sicilian expedition both emboldened the leaders of that faction, and, by the increased pressure which it threw on the wealthier citizens, swelled its numbers, and embittered its spirit. Though defeated in its first attempt to betray the city, it never dropt its purpose. We cannot indeed pronounce with certainty that it deprived the people of the services of Alcibiades, though this is rendered highly probable by the sequel; but it seems clear that it contrived the scene through which the last resources of the state were intrusted to the weak or faithless hands which lost or betrayed them. In this way the Sicilian expedition appears to have contributed more than any other cause to the termination of the Peloponnesian war.

CHAPTER XXXI.

FROM THE END OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR TO THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF DEMOCRACY AT ATHENS.

Establishment of the Thirty. — Lysander's Return to Sparta. — Policy of the Thirty. — Punishment of the Sycophants. — A Spartan Harmost at Athens. — Dissensions among the Thirty. — Theramenes in Opposition. — He is impeached by Critias. — His Defence and Execution. — Increased Violence of the Thirty. — Death of Alcibiades. — Thrasybulus occupies Phyle. — Defeats the Troops of the Thirty. — Bloody Executions. — Thrasybulus in Piræus. — Battle of Munychia. — The Council of Ten. — Interference of Lysander. — Expedition of Pausanias. — Negotiations with Sparta. — Peace and Amnesty.

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In the capitulation on which Athens surrendered, so far as its terms are reported by Xenophon, no mention appears to have been made of any change which was to take place in its form of government; and, if we might believe Diodorus, one article expressly provided, that the Athenians should enjoy their hereditary constitution.[1] This is probably an error; but if such language was used in the treaty it was apparently designed rather to insult than to deceive the people; and the framers of the article, who were also to be its expounders, had in their view not the free constitution under which the city had flourished since the time of Solon, but some ancient form of misrule, which had been long forgotten, but might still be recovered from oblivion by the industry of such antiquarians as Nicomachus.

[1] XIV. 4. τῇ πατρίῳ πολιτείᾳ χρῆσθαι.

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Lysias indeed asserts that the abolition of the constitution was included among the offers which Theramenes made of his own accord to the enemy.[1] It is at least not to be doubted that the Spartan government, if it did not stipulate for the subversion of the democracy, looked forward to such a revolution as one of the most certain and important results of its victory. But it may have believed that its Athenian partisans would be strong enough to effect it without its interference. And we gather from a statement of Lysias, which Xenophon does not contradict[2], that Lysander, perhaps after he had seen the demolition of the walls begun, leaving his friends to complete their work, sailed away to Samos, now the only place in the Ægean where the authority of Sparta was not acknowledged.

Establishment of the Thirty.

If this was the case, he had scarcely laid siege to Samos before his presence was required at Athens. Theramenes, Critias, and their associates, wished to give a legitimate aspect to the power which they meant to usurp, and to overthrow the constitution in the name of the people. But they did not think it safe to trust to their own influence for the first step; and though Agis was still at hand, he might not enter so cordially into their views, and did not pos-

[1] c. Eratosth. § 70. *αὐτὸς ἐκείνοις ἐπαγγελλόμενος τοῦ τε Πειραίως τὰ τείχη περιελεῖν καὶ τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν πολιτείαν καταλῦσαι.*

[2] Eratosth. p. 126. *μετεπέμψατο τὰς μετὰ Λυσάνδρου ναῦς ἐκ Σάμου.* Xenophon indeed would lead us to suppose that Lysander did not leave Athens until he had settled the government of the Thirty. But the extreme brevity with which Xenophon touches upon the events which he here professes to relate, renders it unsafe to draw an inference from his silence against the positive testimony of another contemporary author. It would be quite consistent with the character of Lysander that he should have withdrawn from Athens before the walls were destroyed, for the very purpose of entrapping the Athenians into a breach of the treaty, which would give a pretext for exacting unreserved obedience to all his commands. Lysias seems to intimate that Lysander directed his Athenian friends to take no steps with regard to the constitution before a certain time: that is, probably, until the time allowed for pulling down the walls — which it was pretty certain would either not have been done or not done with the requisite exactness — should have expired. Theramenes, it is said, prevented an assembly from being held, *ἕως ὁ λεγόμενος ὑπ' ἐκείνου καιρὸς ἐτιμελῶς ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἐτηρήθη.* If such was the state of the case we can easily understand why Xenophon passed it over in silence.

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sess so much weight as Lysander. When therefore a day had been fixed for an assembly to consider the question of reforming the constitution[1], Lysander was sent for to attend the discussion. It seems that on his arrival he found the fortifications which should by this time have been rased still standing, or but partially destroyed, and that he affected vehement indignation at this breach of the conditions on which the city had been spared, and threw out threats of proceeding to extremities, if he did not actually re-open the question of the doom of Athens in his military council. For the present however he set about the work of destruction with the greatest pomp and solemnity. He assembled a band of flute-players from his fleet and from the city, and caused a part of the ships to be committed to the flames, and the walls to be thrown down to the sound of their instruments, which the allied troops, crowned with chaplets, accompanied with pæans.[2] The principal part in the management of the business in the assembly, was undertaken by Theramenes. He proposed that the supreme power should for the present be lodged with thirty persons, who should be authorised to draw up a new code of laws[3], which however was to be conformable to the ancient institutions, according to a model framed by Dracontides.[4] The presence

[1] Lysias, l. c. *περὶ πολιτείας τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ἐποίουν.*

[2] Plut. Lys. 15. But Plutarch's account does not exactly harmonise with that of Lysias (Eratosth. § 74.) According to Plutarch, Lysander first threatened the Athenians with destruction, and when he had thus brought them to complete submission (*ἐνδόντων πρὸς ἅπαντα*) caused the walls to be demolished, and the galleys to be burnt, and then proceeded to change the constitution by the appointment of the Thirty. According to Lysias the threats by which the opposition was silenced were uttered in the assembly when the change of the constitution was discussed.

[3] This appears to be the meaning of Xenophon's concise expression, Hell. II. 3. 2. *οἵ τοὺς πατρίους νόμους ξυγγράψουσι, καθ' οὓς πολιτεύσουσι.* They were to revise the old laws, but with unlimited power of altering them, and of adding new ones.

[4] Lysias, Eratosth. p. 126. *τῇ πολιτείᾳ χρῆσθαι ἣν Δρακοντίδης ἀπέφαινεν.* But the precise meaning of these words is very doubtful. There is almost equal difficulty, whether we suppose that they refer to a proposition then made, or to one which was to be made, by Dracontides.

of Lysander, and the neighbourhood of the Peloponnesian troops, deterred the friends of liberty, who had not been involved in the charge of conspiracy by Agoratus, from coming forward to express their sentiments on this proposition. But its nature and tendency were sufficiently clear, and a murmur of disapprobation ran through the assembly. Theramenes treated it with contemptuous defiance[1]; but Lysander silenced it by a graver argument. He bad the malcontents take notice, that they were at his mercy, and were no longer protected by the treaty. The fortifications had not been demolished within the time prescribed[2], and therefore in strictness of right the treaty was void. Their lives were forfeited and might be in jeopardy, if they should reject the proposition of Theramenes. It was adopted without further hesitation; and a list of the Thirty, of whom ten were named by Theramenes, ten by the Athenian ephors, and ten were nominally left to the choice of the assembly[3], was received with equal unanimity. The names which it comprised, some of which soon became infamously notorious, were: Polyarches, Critias, Melobius, Hippolochus, Euclidas, Hiero, Mnesilochus, Chremo, Theramenes, Aresias, Diocles, Phædrias, Chærilaus, Anætius, Piso, Sophocles, (not the poet, who was now dead,) Eratosthenes, Charicles,

[1] This account, which is that of Lysias, Eratosth. p. 126., is directly contrary to that of Diodorus, XIV. 4., who everywhere chooses to give Theramenes credit for the purest virtue and the warmest patriotism, and on this occasion represents him as protesting against the establishment of the oligarchy, until he was put to silence by Lysander's threats. No mistake is too gross for Diodorus; but one can hardly understand Schneider's meaning in his note on Xenophon, Hell. II. 2. 22., where he talks of reconciling Diodorus with Lysias by supposing the exact reverse of what Lysias distinctly asserts. Xenophon despatches the whole scene in three words: *ἔδοξε τῷ δήμῳ*.

[2] So Diodorus XIV. 4., and Plutarch, Lys. 15., who supply and explain Lysias, Eratosth. p. 127.

[3] *Δέκα ἐκ τῶν παρόντων*, Lysias, l. c. The whole list had no doubt been made out beforehand; and it does not seem probable that Theramenes really chose ten out of the Thirty. In that case his party would have been stronger than it appears to have been; and at least he could not have stood alone in his opposition to the measures afterwards adopted.

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Onomacles, Theognis, Æschines, Theogenes, Cleomedes, Erasistratus, Phido, Dracontides, Eumathes, Aristoteles, Hippomachus, Mnesithides. Besides these a board of Ten was appointed—perhaps by Lysander himself—to govern Piræus.[1] As soon as this affair was despatched, Lysander departed with his fleet to Samos, and the Peloponnesian army evacuated Attica.

The Samians, blockaded by land and by sea, were forced to capitulate before the end of the summer: they were permitted to leave the city, but not to carry away any part of their property, except the clothes they wore. These terms might be thought lenient, if they had been guilty of any ferocious outrage; but perhaps Lysander did not view their conduct in that light. He was however probably anxious to return home and to exhibit the fruits of his victory to his admiring countrymen, and may have been therefore the more willing to treat with the besieged. When they had withdrawn, he supplied their place with the exiles who had been expelled at various times in the civil feuds of the island, put them in possession of all the property of the vanquished party, and appointed a Council of Ten, to govern them, and secure their obedience. He then dismissed the allies to their homes, and himself with the Lacedæmonian squadron returned to Laconia. He brought with him the Athenian galleys surrendered in Piræus—the last fragments of that

Lysander's return to Sparta.

[1] Scheibe (p. 67.) thinks it probable that their functions were confined to matters of police. They were no doubt completely subordinate to the Thirty. In Plato Epist. VII. τῆς μεταβολῆς εἷς καὶ πεντήκοντά τινες ἄνδρες προὔστησαν ἄρχοντες, ἕνδεκα μὲν ἐν ἄστει, δέκα δ' ἐν Πειραιεῖ, περί τε ἀγορὰν ἑκάτεροι τούτων ὅσα τ' ἐν τοῖς ἄστεσι διοικεῖν ἔδει, τριάκοντα δὲ πάντων ἄρχοντες κατέστησαν αὐτοκράτορες, Scheibe (p. 68.) suggests an emendation: περὶ τὴν ἀγορὰν and ὅσα δ' ἐν τῷ ἄστει: but this would imply that the Thirty did not exercise equal authority in Piræus. It seems more probable that the writer intended to signify the functions of the ἀγορανόμοι and ἀστυνόμοι. But there is certainly a difficulty in the construction, for the style of the letter. In Thucydides it might perhaps be explained as an instance of the blending of the general with the particular: ὅσα τ' ἐν τοῖς ἄστεσι διοικεῖν δεῖ with ὅσα τ' ἐν τῷ ἄστει διοικεῖν ἔδει. Yet I should not venture to propose the substitution of the present for the imperfect.

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maritime power which he had broken[1]—trophies from the prizes taken at Ægos-potami, and 470 talents, the remainder of the tribute which he had collected from the Asiatic cities during the absence of Cyrus. But we are inclined to conclude from a story which, though it is not mentioned by Xenophon, is related by several later writers, with circumstances too minute and probable to be rejected, that he had previously sent a larger sum—perhaps not much less than 1000 talents—which he is said to have intrusted to the care of Gylippus, the hero of Syracuse.[2] Gylippus was subject to the same infirmity which had occasioned the disgrace of his father Cleandridas. He could not resist the temptation of embezzling a part of the treasure, was detected, and banished, and put an end to his own life by fasting.[3] But even the sum mentioned by Xenophon was probably the largest that had ever been carried at one time to Sparta. To this were added crowns, and various other presents, which had been bestowed upon Lysander by many cities, which

[1] Xenophon (Hell. II. 3. 8.) says, that he carried away all but the twelve, which by the treaty were to be left to the Athenians, and seems to know nothing of any having been burnt; while Plutarch, on the other hand, speaks (Lys. 15.) as if all were committed to the flames. This of course is absurd. But it is very probable that there were many which were not thought worth carrying away.

[2] Xenophon clearly states the 470 talents to have been carried to Sparta by Lysander himself. Diodorus, XIII. 106., relates, that he sent Gylippus to Sparta with 1500 talents immediately after his victory at Ægos-potami — at least before he came to Athens. Plutarch, Lys. 16., supposes the money to have been sent after the surrender of Athens; and in Nic. 28., citing Timæus, he mentions 1000 talents as the sum. It is remarkable that this, added to that mentioned by Xenophon, should come so near to the amount stated by Diodorus. Hence we are led to conjecture that the two larger numbers are not owing to exaggeration, but that Gylippus was sent home with 1000 talents — probably after the surrender of Athens — and that the 470 talents were the surplus left by the siege of Samos. Diodorus seems to have thrown the two sums together, and to have given the amount in round numbers. Schelbe (p. 61. n. 5.) rejects Xenophon's statement, because it is apparently at variance with those of Plutarch, Diodorus, and Posidonius in Athenæus, VI. 233. (who however says nothing as to the time, and therefore does not contradict Xenophon.) One should have thought that on such a point Xenophon was rather the better authority, even if it was not in itself more probable, that Lysander, when he was on the point of returning home, should have preferred bringing the treasure himself.

[3] Posidonius in Athenæus VI. p. 234. A. Schelbe (p. 62. n. 9.) finds an inconsistency, which I cannot perceive, between this account of the manner of his death, and the fact of his banishment reported by Plutarch and Diodorus.

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were eager to testify their gratitude and admiration, or to gain the favour of the conqueror. This influx of wealth was viewed with jealousy by several Spartans, who perhaps dreaded the effect it might produce both on their foreign policy, and their domestic institutions; the example of Gylippus, though by no means an extraordinary case, might seem to confirm their views; and it appears that a proposal was made to dedicate the whole to the Delphic god.[1] But Lysander and his friends strenuously resisted this measure, and prevailed on the ephors or the people to let the treasure remain in the public coffers. A part was employed to commemorate the triumph of Sparta, and the merits of the individuals who had principally helped to achieve it. Lysander himself adorned one of the Spartan temples with memorials of his two victories, of Notium and Ægos-potami[2]; and the first might indeed justly be considered as having opened the way for the last. Tripods of extraordinary size were dedicated at Amyclæ[3]; and at Delphi the statues of the tutelary Twins, Zeus, Apollo, Artemis, and Posidon, forming part of a great group, which comprised those of Lysander—who was represented receiving a crown from Posidon—his soothsayer Abas, Hermon, the Megarian, the master of his galley, and upwards of twenty-nine other persons, Spartans or natives of other cities, who had distinguished themselves at Ægos-potami, long attested the gratitude of Sparta toward gods and men.[4]

[1] Plutarch, Lys. 17., who cites Theopompus and Ephorus for the main fact, compared with Athenæus VI. p. 233., who says that, according to some authors, before Lysander's victory the Spartans used to consecrate all their gold and silver to Apollo in Delphi.

[2] Paus. III. 17. 4. [3] Id. III. 18. 8.

[4] Paus. X. 9. 7. The reader may have observed that this passage of Pausanias is referred to by a modern historian in support of the assertion, *that the policy of the Lacedæmonian government seems to have met the vanity of Lysander in the endeavour to give more than its due splendour to the victory of Notium. Nine statues were dedicated on the occasion*, &c. The statues dedicated were above twenty-nine; for there is a chasm in the text of Pausanias through which a name or names have dropt. But

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Policy of the Thirty.

In the mean while the party which had usurped the supreme authority at Athens, had been unfolding the real character of its domination. The first care of the Thirty was to provide themselves with instruments suited to their purposes; they filled all important posts with their creatures. The Archon, Pythodorus, had been one of the Four Hundred. The ephoralty seems to have merged in their own office. The council was already for the most part composed of their partisans, and needed but few purifying changes; it was now to become the sole tribunal for state trials. It might have been inferred from the language of Xenophon in his History, that the legislative functions which they professed to assume were merely nominal; but we collect from a hint which he drops elsewhere[1], that they availed themselves from time to time of this branch of their authority, to promulgate laws, or regulations of police, either by way of precaution or of pretext, and that they exercised a censorial control over the occupations and conduct of their subjects. But it is probable that they never intended to publish any code, much less any constitution which might limit their power. Their main object, in which they seem to have been unanimous, was to reverse the policy of Themistocles and Pericles: to reduce Athens to the rank of a petty town, cut off from the sea, without colonies or commerce, incapable of resisting the will of Sparta, or of exciting her jealousy. It must have been with the design of signifying this leading maxim of their administration in a sensible manner, that

there is no allusion in the whole passage to the battle of Notium, or to any victory but that of Ægos-potami. It seems to be to this group that Plutarch alludes, Lys. 18., where he says, that Lysander set up his own statue at Delphi in bronze, and that of each of the admirals (τῶν ναυάρχων ἑκάστου). — Some remarkable discrepancies between Xenophon and Plutarch in their accounts of the proceedings of Lysander subsequent to the battle of Ægos-potami, will be noticed in the Appendix.

[1] Mem. I. 2. 31.

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they altered the position of the bema from which the orators addressed the assembly in the Pnyx, so that it might no longer command a view of the sea and of Salamis, if any reliance can be placed on the fact.[1] They still more distinctly intimated their intention, while they took a step toward carrying it into effect, by selling the materials of the magnificent arsenal, which it had cost 1000 talents to build, for three, to a contractor who undertook to demolish and clear it away.[2] It was perhaps at a later period, and for their own security, that they destroyed the fortresses on the borders of Attica.[3] If they had succeeded in their aims, the history of Athens might now have been said to have closed; for it would have ceased materially to affect the course of events in the rest of Greece, and could have possessed no interest but such as might belong to the internal changes or quarrels of the oligarchy.

Happily for their country the diversity of their characters was too great to be reconciled even by the sense of their common interest, and proved a source of dissension which became fatal to their

[1] Plutarch Them. 19. The nature of this change remains as obscure as ever, and the fact itself begins to appear very doubtful. An explanation, seemingly satisfactory, had been proposed by Dr. C. Wordsworth, in his elegant and interesting little work, *Athens and Attica*, p. 73., where he observes that *there are very distinct remains of another bema, which has evidently been mutilated by design, at a distance of about twenty-five yards immediately behind the existing one. From the former the sea is distinctly visible, from the latter it is not.* But subsequent observations have raised apparently insurmountable objections to this hypothesis. See Mr. Stanley, *On Greek Topography*, in the Classical Museum, I. p. 56., where he comes to the conclusion — *What therefore is the explanation of the story in Plutarch yet remains to be determined, unless we adopt the ingenious conjecture that it arose from the transference of the assemblies from the Dionysian theatre which looks out on the sea to the Pnyx.* As to the Thirty, it is far from certain that they ever held an assembly in the Pnyx. The only one we shall hear of during their reign was held in the Odeum.

[2] The destruction of the *νεώρια* is distinctly imputed to the Thirty as their voluntary act, both by Isocrates Areop. p. 201. Tauchnitz, where the contract is specified, and by Lysias Eratosth. § 101., though in another passage, Agorat. p. 134., he couples it with the demolition of the walls and the surrender of the ships. But from another passage (Nicom. p. 185.) it would appear that the destruction was not completed, for he mentions *τοὺς νέως οἴκους καὶ τὰ τείχη περικαταῤῥέοντα.*

[3] Lysias Eratosth. p. 124.

power. The men whose ability and energy gave them the predominance over the rest were hurried by the violence of their passions into excesses from which their more prudent and moderate associates recoiled, but which they were unable to prevent. For some time they preserved a show of decency in their proceedings, and some of their acts were so generally acceptable, that the means, though contrary to law and justice, might to many seem to be sanctified by the end. The first prosecutions were directed chiefly against a class of men who were universally odious, and had contributed more than any others to involve the state in the evils from which they themselves now justly suffered, the informers, or sycophants as they were called at Athens, who had perverted the laws, corrupted the tribunals, and had gained an infamous livelihood by the extortion which they were thus enabled to practise on wealthy and timid citizens, but more especially on foreigners subject to Athenian jurisdiction, who were thus more than by any other grievance alienated from the sovereign state. The most notorious of these pests of the commonwealth were eagerly condemned by the council; and their punishment was viewed with pleasure by all honest men. Yet the satisfaction it caused must have been a little allayed in some minds by the reflection, that the form of proceeding by which they were condemned was one under which the most innocent might always be exposed to the same fate. According to the new regulation the Thirty presided in person over the trials held by the council: two tables were placed in front of the benches which they occupied, to receive the balls, or tokens, by which the councillors declared their verdict, and which instead of being dropt secretly into a box, were now to be openly deposited on the board, so that the Thirty might see which way every man

Punishment of the sycophants.

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voted.[1] These however were not the only cases which they brought before the council, even in the early part of their reign. The persons who before the surrender of the city had been arrested on information, partly procured by bribery[2], and partly extorted by fear, or by the rack, charging them with a conspiracy against the state, but who had really been guilty of no offence but that of expressing their attachment to the constitution which was now abolished, were soon after brought to a mock trial[3], and judicially murdered. Among them was Eucrates the brother of Nicias, who had been elected general after the battle of Ægos-potami, and had been strongly solicited by the oligarchical faction to join them and to share the power which they were preparing to seize, but believing it still possible to preserve the internal freedom of the commonwealth, had declined their offers and resisted their intrigues[4], Strombichides, whom we have seen commanding on the Asiatic coast[5], and many other citizens of like quality and merit.[6] And it can hardly be supposed that these were the only political adversaries sacrificed by the Thirty during the period in which they exer-

[1] Lysias Agorat. p. 133.

[2] Such appears to have been the case with Agoratus himself. One of the persons whom he named turned informer to save his life; Xenophon, a native of Icaria, was racked, and afterwards put to death, without making any disclosure. Lysias Agorat. p. 135.

[3] Lysias, p. 133. Ἐπειδὴ οἱ Τριάκοντα κατεστάθησαν, εὐθέως κρίσιν τοῖς ἀνδράσι τούτοις ἐποίουν ἐν τῇ βουλῇ.

[4] Lysias De public. bo. Nic. fr. p. 150. μᾶλλον εἵλετο πράττων ὑπὲρ τῆς ὑμετέρας σωτηρίας ἀπολέσθαι ἢ ἐπιδεῖν τείχη καθαιρούμενα, καὶ τὰς ναῦς τοῖς πολεμίοις παραδιδομένας, καὶ τὸ ὑμέτερον πλῆθος καταδουλούμενον. Scheibe (p. 52. n. 19.) thinks that it might be inferred from these words, that Eucrates was put to death before the Thirty came into office. But this seems to be pressing the orator's language with unnecessary preciseness. Lysias probably only means to say, that Eucrates was willing to die rather than consent to measures which involved the consequences here enumerated. It would not follow that he was actually put to death before the surrender of the city; and it is much more likely that he shared the fate of the other leading men, who were named in the list of the conspirators.

[5] Lysias Agorat. p. 130.

[6] Lysias Agorat. p. 135. Though it may be doubted whether the orator here confines himself to the persons who suffered immediately in consequence of the information given by Agoratus, or considers him as chargeable with all the bloodshed by the Thirty.

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cised their power with the greatest moderation. Nor was the race of the sycophants exterminated. Some purchased the patronage of the new government by the same arts as they had practised under the democracy.[1]

Even such executions might be considered as among the temporary evils incident to every political revolution; and there were some of the Thirty who did not wish to multiply them more than was necessary to their safety. But the greater number, and above all Critias, did not mean to stop here; and perhaps some signs of discontent soon became visible, which gave them a pretext for insisting on the need of stronger measures, and of additional safeguards. Two of their number, Æschines and Aristoteles, were deputed by common consent to Sparta, to obtain a body of troops to garrison the citadel. The ground alleged was, that there were turbulent men whom it was necessary to remove before their government could be settled on a firm basis; and they undertook to maintain the garrison as long as its presence should be required. Xenophon's language seems to imply that Lysander was at this time at Sparta[2]; whether present or absent, he exerted his influence in behalf of his friends, and induced the ephors to send the force which they desired,

[1] Lysias Eratosth. § 48. Andocides De Myst. § 99. ὃς ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ μὲν συκοφαντῶν ἔζης, ἐν ὀλιγαρχίᾳ δὲ, ὡς μὴ ἀναγκασθείης τὰ χρήματα ἀποδοῦναι ὅσα συκοφαντῶν ἔλαβες, ἐδούλευες τοῖς τριάκοντα. I owe these references to Scheibe, p. 70.

[2] Hell. II. 3. 13. πέμψαντες ἐς Λακεδαίμονα ἔπεισαν Λύσανδρον φρουροὺς σφίσι ξυμπρᾶξαι ἐλθεῖν, Scheibe, p. 166., considers this as unequivocal and indisputable evidence of the fact; but he justly observes that Lysander during the short stay which he made at Sparta on the occasion mentioned by Plutarch Lys. 20. when he was charged with grave offences by Pharnabazus, was not in a condition to exert influence in behalf of his Athenian friends. He must therefore, Scheibe thinks, have returned home on some previous occasion, which has not been recorded: *soon after the taking of Athens, when his influence was still powerful.* There would indeed be no objection to this conjecture, according to that view of the chronology of this period which I have endeavoured to establish in the Appendix *On the interval between the surrender of Athens and the appointment of the Thirty*; but it is quite inconsistent with Scheibe's, according to which several months elapsed after the surrender, before the Thirty were appointed; so that their deputation could not have been sent to Sparta long before the time when Lysander is known to have returned, but shorn of his influence.

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A Spartan harmost at Athens.

under the command of Callibius, who was invested with the authority of harmost. His arrival released Critias and his colleagues from all the restraints hitherto imposed on them by their fears of their fellow-citizens. They courted him with an obsequiousness proportioned to the wantonness of the tyranny which they hoped to be able to exercise with his sanction and aid. The footing on which they stood with him is sufficiently illustrated by a single fact. An Athenian named Autolycus, of good family and condition, who in his youth had distinguished himself by a gymnastic victory, had in some way or other offended Callibius, who, according to the Spartan usage, raised his truncheon to strike him. But Autolycus, not yet inured to such discipline, prevented the blow by bringing him to the ground. Lysander, it is said, when Callibius complained of this affront, observed that he did not know how to govern freemen. He however understood the men with whom he had principally to deal; for the Thirty soon after gratified him by putting Autolycus to death.

In return for such deference he placed his troops at their disposal, to lead whom they would to prison; and now the catalogue of political offences was on a sudden terribly enlarged. The persons who were now singled out for destruction, were no longer such only as had made themselves odious by their crimes, or had distinguished themselves on former occasions by their opposition to the ruling party, but men of unblemished character, without any strong political bias, who had gained the confidence of the people by their merits or services, and might be suspected of preferring a popular government to the oligarchy under which they were living. Xenophon seems to believe that Critias was inflamed with an insatiable thirst for blood by the remembrance of his exile. But it would appear that ambition and cupidity, rather than resentment, were

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the main springs of his conduct, and that he calculated with great coolness the fruits of his nefarious deeds. Nor was it merely political jealousy that determined his choice of his victims; the immediate profit to be derived from the confiscation of their property was at least an equally powerful inducement. It is uncertain to which of these motives we should refer the execution of Niceratus the son of Nicias, who shared his uncle's fate, but may have been involved in it more by his wealth than by his relation to Eucrates. It was perhaps on the like account, rather than because of the services which he had rendered to the people, that Antiphon, who during the war had equipt two galleys at his own expense, was now condemned to death.[1] And it was most probably with no other object that Leon, an inhabitant of Salamis, who seems to have been universally respected, and a great number of his townsmen, were dragged from their homes and consigned to the executioner. The case of Leon is particularly remarkable for the light it throws on the policy of the oligarchs. After the arrival of the Lacedæmonian garrison they had begun to dispense with the assistance of the council; and Leon was put to death without any form of trial. But they did not think it expedient always to employ the foreign troops on their murderous errands; they often used Athenians as their ministers on such occasions, and men who did not belong to their party, for the purpose of implicating them in the guilt and odium of their proceedings. When they had resolved on the destruction of Leon, they sent for Socrates and four other persons,

[1] This Antiphon has been confounded with the celebrated orator! One might have thought that, even if the manner in which he is described by Xenophon, II. 3. 40. had not been sufficient to guard any one possessing moderate powers of historical combination from so gross a mistake, it should have been prevented by the language of Thucydides, VIII. 68., who says that Antiphon was brought to trial for the part he had taken in establishing the oligarchy of the Four Hundred. Could this have been a crime in the eyes of the Thirty?

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and ordered them to go and fetch him from Salamis.[1] As his innocence was no less notorious than the fate which awaited him, Socrates, on leaving the presence of the Thirty, instead of obeying their commaads, returned home. The rest executed their commission.

Dissensions among the Thirty

These atrocities soon began to spread general alarm; for no one could perceive any principle or maxim by which they were to be limited for the future; there was on the contrary reason to apprehend that they would be continually multiplied and aggravated. Theramenes, who was endowed with a keen tact which enabled him readily to observe the bent of public opinion, was early aware of the danger into which his colleagues were rushing; and he remonstrated with Critias on the imprudence of creating themselves enemies by putting men to death for no other reason than because they had filled eminent stations, or performed signal services, under the democracy; for it did not follow that they might not become peaceful and useful subjects of the oligarchy, since there had been a time when both Critias and himself had courted popular favour. But Critias contended that they were now in a position which they could only maintain by force and terror, and that every man who had the means of thwarting their plans, and who was not devoted to their interest, must be treated as an enemy. This argument seems for the time to have satisfied Theramenes. But as the deeds of blood followed each other with increasing rapidity, and the murmurs of all honest citizens, though stifled in public, began to find vent in private circles, Theramenes again warned his colleagues, that it would be impossible for the oligarchy to subsist long on its present narrow basis. He wished that they might be able to dispense with the foreign

[1] Plato Epist. VII. Τὰ τε ἄλλα καὶ ... Σωκράτη ... ἐπί τινα τῶν πολιτῶν μεθ' ἑτέρων ἔπεμπον βίᾳ ἄξοντα ὡς ἀποθανούμενον, ἵνα δὴ μετέχοι τῶν πραγμάτων αὐτοῖς, εἴτε βούλοιτο εἴτε μή.

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garrison, and foresaw that, if they persisted in their present course, they could never safely dismiss it. His advice now produced some effect on them; but they seem to have been alarmed not so much by the danger which he pointed out as by the warning itself. They knew that he was a man who had never adhered to any party which he believed to be sinking, and suspected that he might be meditating to put himself at the head of a new revolution, as in the time of the Four Hundred. And though his character was so generally understood that he had acquired a homely nickname [1], which expressed the readiness with which he shifted his side, and the dexterity with which he adapted himself to every change of circumstances, still he might again become a rallying-point for the disaffected. To guard against this danger they determined to strengthen themselves by an expedient similar to that which had been adopted by the former oligarchy. They made out a list of 3000 citizens, who were to enjoy a kind of franchise which perhaps was never exactly defined; but one of its most important privileges was, that none of them should be put to death without a trial before the council. All other Athenians were outlawed, and left to the mercy of the Thirty, who might deal as they thought fit with their lives and property. [2]

Theramenes in opposition.

Theramenes objected to the new constitution, both on account of the small number of the privileged body, and its arbitrary limitation, which would show that the selection did not proceed upon any ground of merit. Since they meant to govern by force, it was

[1] Κόθορνος — a shoe which fitted either foot. Aristoph. Ran. 530. τὸ μεταστρέφειν πρὸς τὸ μαλθακώτερον δεξιοῦ πρὸς ἀνδρός ἐστι, καὶ φύσει θηραμένους, cf. II. 968. The allusion in Aristophanes seems directly to contradict Hinrichs, *De Theramenis, Criticæ, et Thrasybuli Rebus*, who says, p. 31., of Theramenes: "ubi factionem aliquam in civitate *nimis crescere* animadvertebat sententiam mutasse videri volebat."

[2] If Dracontides was the author of this proposition, the language of Lysias, cited above, p. 167., might admit of explanation.

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impolitic, he said, to establish such a disproportion between their strength and that of the governed. His objections were overruled, but not wholly neglected. They perhaps suggested the precaution which was immediately afterwards adopted. Under pretext of a review all the citizens were deprived of their arms, except the Knights, and the Three Thousand, who were thus enabled to cope with the rest. The Thirty now believed themselves completely secure, and grew more and more reckless in the indulgence of their rapacity and cruelty. In the low state to which the Athenian finances were reduced the maintenance of the garrison was a burden which they found it difficult to support; and, among other extraordinary means of raising supplies, it appears that they resorted to the spoliation of the temples.[1] But this was an expedient which probably required some caution and secrecy, and which could not be carried beyond certain limits. One which perhaps appeared both safer and more productive was suggested by Piso and Theognis, two of their number, who observed that several of the resident aliens were known to be ill affected to the oligarchy, and thus afforded an excellent pretext for plundering the whole class. They therefore proposed that each of the Thirty should have one of the wealthy aliens assigned to him, should put him to death, and take possession of his property. Theramenes very truly remarked, that the sycophants who had rendered the democracy odious to many, had never done any thing so iniquitous as what was now contemplated by the persons who were used to style themselves the best

[1] Lysias c. Eratosth. p. 129. *ὑπὲρ τῶν ἱερῶν, ἃ οὗτοι τὰ μὲν ἀπέδοντο, τὰ δ' εἰσόντες ἐμίαινον.* Isocrates Areopagit. 27. *τὴν δημοκρατίαν οὕτω κοσμήσασαν τὴν πόλιν καὶ τοῖς ἱεροῖς καὶ τοῖς ὁσίοις . . . τοὺς δὲ τριάκοντα τῶν μὲν ἀμελήσαντας, τὰ δὲ συλήσαντας.* This is most probably what Philostratus alluded to in the words *προὐδίδου δὲ τὰ ἱερὰ* (v. Crit. init.) which, as I learn from Bach, *Fragm. Critiæ*, p. 6., have suggested the conjecture, that he had been forced to quit Athens by a charge of impiety. But Philostratus appears to be speaking of his conduct during the government of the Thirty.

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sort of people[1]; for they had never taken away both money and life; and he apprehended with good reason that this measure would render the aliens generally hostile to the government. But his colleagues, after what they had already done, were not disposed to view this question on the moral side; and, having braved the hatred of their fellow-citizens, they were not afraid of provoking the aliens. The proposition was adopted, and Theramenes was invited to single out his prey with the rest; but he refused to stain his hands with this innocent blood. It was however resolved to begin by taking ten lives; and, for the sake of covering the real motive, two of the victims were to be poor men, who would therefore be supposed to have suffered for some political offence.

It is to one of the persons whose life was threatened by this nefarious scheme, that we owe a minute and lively description of one scene from the Athenian Reign of Terror. Cephalus, a Syracusan, had been induced by the persuasions of Pericles, and perhaps in part by the state of affairs in his native city, to migrate to Athens. Two of his sons, Polemarchus and Lysias, had afterwards joined the colonists sent out to Thurii, where Lysias, then a boy of fourteen, found an opportunity of cultivating his talent for oratory, under the guidance of eminent masters. When the disasters of the Athenians in Sicily had ruined their interest in all the Italiot cities, Lysias and his brother were compelled to quit Thurii on the charge of *Atticism* (of taking the Athenian side in political questions), and they returned to Athens, which was then under the government of the Four Hundred, and continued to reside there to the time which our narrative has now reached. They carried on a flourishing manufacture of shields, in which they employed 120 slaves as workmen, and their opulence enabled them to contri-

[1] Φάσκοντας βελτίστους εἶναι.

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bute largely to the service of their adopted country; but it excited the cupidity of the Thirty, and their attachment to the Athenian interest, which had driven them from Thurii, was now no less accounted a crime at Athens. They were therefore selected among the first victims devoted to destruction, on the motion of Piso and Theognis.

Piso himself, with Melobius and Mnesithides, undertook the seizing of Lysias and his property. They found him at table with some guests, who were dismissed, and he was arrested by Piso, while the two others proceeded to the manufactory, to take possession of all that they found there. In their absence Lysias prevailed on Piso by a bribe to promise to save his life. But Piso, notwithstanding the most solemn oaths, first seized all the gold in his coffers, of which he refused to let him keep a single piece for his journey, and then gave him up to the custody of Melobius and Mnesithides, who led him to the house of one Damnippus, where Theognis was guarding some other prisoners. Lysias was now consigned to the charge of Theognis; but while Damnippus, who happened to be his friend, was endeavouring to bribe Theognis, who was known to be no less ready than Piso to sacrifice the interests of his associates to his private gain, he made his escape, and took shelter in the house of a friend in Piræus. Here he learnt that Polemarchus had been arrested and dragged to prison by Eratosthenes; and in the course of the following night he embarked for Megara. But Polemarchus without being so much as informed of any charge — and indeed it does not appear that any was laid against him — was compelled to swallow the hemlock draught — the ordinary mode of capital punishment — and so rigorously was the confiscation of his property executed, that even his wife was stript of her earrings, and his friends were obliged to furnish the means of performing his exequies with decency.

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He is impeached by Critias.

Men who were capable of perpetrating such actions could not long endure the presence of an associate who refused to take his full share of their guilt and odium. The colleagues of Theramenes resolved to rid themselves of a troublesome monitor who might soon prove a dangerous opponent. They first endeavoured to communicate their distrust of his designs to the members of the council in private conversation, and then concerted a plan for an open attack on him. But to insure its success they surrounded the council-chamber with a band of the most daring of their younger followers, armed with daggers, which they did not take much pains to conceal. Critias then came forward to accuse Theramenes, who was present. He vindicated the frequency of the late executions which some of the councillors considered as excessive, and observed that in all revolutions such measures were necessary, but more than in any other when a populous city, which had been long used to democratical government, was brought under an oligarchy. The constitution which he and his colleagues had established was the only one that could gain the confidence of their benefactors, the Spartans, and that suited the interest of the best class, that to which they and the council belonged. Their policy therefore was to get rid of every one whom they perceived to be adverse to oligarchy; and they had the strongest of all reasons for so dealing with one of their own number who betrayed such sentiments; as was now the case with Theramenes. He had given the clearest proofs of his hostile disposition, by censuring their proceedings, and by thwarting every step which they took toward removing their adversaries. And he was not merely an enemy, but a traitor. For it was he who had drawn them into the engagements which they had contracted with Sparta; he was the author of the revolution by which the democracy had been over-

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thrown. It was he who had instigated them to the first acts of just severity by which they had incurred the popular resentment. And now, thinking them in danger, he wished to secede from them, that he might provide for his own safety. This however was only a new instance of his old treachery. He had begun by betraying the people, which honoured and trusted him for his father's sake[1], into the hands of the Four Hundred, among whom he filled a conspicuous station. But he no sooner perceived symptoms of weakness in the oligarchy, than he deserted it, and placed himself at the head of the popular party. His fickleness indeed had become proverbial; and the ease with which he shifted his side had proved fatal to numbers, whom he had first seduced into revolutions, and had afterwards abandoned. It was this same man, who having failed to execute the orders of his commanders after the battle of Arginusæ, caused them to be put to death for omitting what it was his own duty to have done. A man so uniformly selfish and regardless of honour and friendship, was a fit object for the most rigorous justice; and the punishment due to his offences was now indispensably necessary for the common safety. In the name therefore of the Thirty, Critias impeached him as a traitor, and an enemy to the constitution.

His defence.

Theramenes made a defence, which, with respect to the charges of Critias, was in most points a satisfactory vindication of his conduct. As to the prosecution of the generals indeed, his statements, compared with Xenophon's narrative, seem to be made up of gross falsehoods. But he maintained his political consist-

[1] Κατὰ τὸν πατέρα Ἄγνωνα. Agnon however was only his father by adoption. Schol. Aristoph. Ran. 548. He was a native of Ceos. Hence one of the allusions to his political versatility in Aristoph. Ran. 968. — ὃς ἦν κακοῖς που περιπέσῃ, καὶ πλησίον παραστῇ, πέπτωκεν ἔξω τῶν κακῶν, οὐ Χῖος, ἀλλὰ Κῖος· ὅτι δοκεῖ προσγεγράφθαι τῇ πολιτείᾳ, Ἀγνωνος αὐτὸν ποιησαμένου, ὡς Εὔπολις Πόλεσιν. Schol. Compare Plut. Nic. 2.

ency with a much fairer show of truth. He contended that he had proved himself to be a sincere friend to the existing oligarchy; for the measures which he had opposed were such as tended to its destruction. He had approved of the punishment of the sycophants; and on the same ground he had condemned the execution of innocent and respectable citizens, such as Leon, and Niceratus, and Antiphon, and the seizure of the aliens: acts, which could only alienate honest men of all classes from the oligarchical government. He had remonstrated against depriving the bulk of the citizens of their arms, because he did not wish to see the city reduced to a state of weakness, in which it could not serve the purposes for which the Lacedæmonians had spared it. He had not agreed to the proposal for introducing the foreign garrison, because he thought that the government might have been better guarded by its own subjects. He had objected to the strengthening of their exiled enemies, as they had done, by passing sentence of banishment against men who, like Anytus, and Thrasybulus, and Alcibiades, were the most capable of conducting the other outlaws. The policy which he had recommended was that which their adversaries would view with the greatest alarm, as fatal to their hopes. Nor had he ever departed from these principles. He had adhered to the government of the Four Hundred—which was established with the consent of the people, in order to incline the Spartans to peace—until he saw an attempt made by its leaders to betray the city to the enemy. In a word he was opposed alike to the abuses of an unlimited democracy, and to oligarchical oppression, and challenged Critias to show that he had ever favoured either. But he wished no less that the citizens who were most capable of serving the state should be united in its defence, than that others, whose indigence exposed their integrity to perpetual temptations, should

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be excluded from offices which afforded them opportunities of betraying their country.[1]

These sentiments produced a very favourable impression on a majority of the council, who, as they did not share the spoil collected by the Thirty, would willingly have put a stop to their robberies and murders. A murmur of approbation, which ran through the assembly, warned Critias that he could not safely rely on its subserviency for the condemnation of Theramenes; and, after having conferred a few moments with his colleagues, he called in his armed auxiliaries, and stationed them round the railing within which the council sat. He then told the councillors, that he thought he should be wanting in the duty of his station, if he suffered his friends to be misled; and that the persons whom they now saw round them, also declared that they would not permit a man who was manifestly aiming at the ruin of the oligarchy to escape with impunity. Now by virtue of the new constitution none of the Three Thousand could be put to death except by a sentence of the council; but all who were not included in that list might be sent to execution without any form of trial by the Thirty. He therefore declared that, with the unanimous consent of his colleagues, he struck out the name of Theramenes from the list, and condemned him to death. Theramenes immediately rushed to the altar of Hestia, which stood in the middle of the room, and conjured the council not to allow Critias the right thus to dispose of his life and theirs, but to claim the benefit of a legal trial both for him and for themselves. *He was aware that the altar would not protect him, and had only fled to it, that the impiety of his enemies might*

[1] Xenophon makes him say: *I have been always opposed to those who are content with no democracy, but one in which both slaves, and persons who are ready on account of their indigence to sell the city for a drachma, have a drachma to their share.* A drachma was the daily pay of a member of the Council of Five Hundred.

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be as manifest as their injustice; but he wondered that they who knew that their own names might just as easily be erased, should abandon him to the pleasure of Critias. The herald of the Thirty now summoned in the Eleven —the ministers of penal justice[1];—they entered with their attendants, headed by Satyrus, the most reckless and shameless among the satellites of the oligarchy. Critias bade them apprehend Theramenes, who had been lawfully condemned, and lead him away to punishment; and Satyrus and his followers proceeded to drag him from the altar notwithstanding his vehement obtestations, and, according to a confused and doubtful report, the courageous interference of his pupil Isocrates.[2] The councillors, who saw themselves surrounded by armed assassins, and even the outer door beset with troops, remained passive; and Theramenes was hurried across the agora, still loudly exclaiming against the treatment he suffered. Satyrus, it is said, would have stopped his outcries by a threat: *it should be the worse for him, if he did not hold his peace. Will it be the better for me,* Theramenes asked, *if I do?* When he had drunk the hemlock, he dashed the last drops on the ground, in imitation of a sportive

And execution.

[1] Meier *De Bonis Damnat.* p. 188., conceives that these eleven were a distinct board from that which existed under the same name in the democratical constitution. But there is no evidence that there were two bodies so called existing at the same time, which indeed would be hardly credible; and the office in each case, as Scheibe observes, p. 68., appears to have been precisely similar. That they were excluded from the amnesty cannot prove that their proper functions were not simply ministerial. They were no doubt selected for their entire devotion to the pleasure of the Thirty, and probably executed their orders with much wanton violence, and frequently made them a pretext for extortion.

[2] That the credit of the action, if real, belongs to Isocrates, as related by Plut. Vit. x. Or. Isocr. and the author of the Βίος Ἰσ. (Westermann Βιογράφοι, p. 254.) and not to Socrates, to whom, with two other friends, it is assigned by Diodorus, xiv. 5., can hardly be doubted: nor would one raise an objection on account of the constitutional timidity of Isocrates. But Diodorus and the Vit. x. Or. agree in representing the scene as taking place in the council-room: and it is not easy to conceive how Isocrates happened to be present there. The Βίος Ἰσ. indeed seems to transfer the scene to the street, but it also reduces the interference to a simple expression of sympathy: ἀκούσας τούτου πρὸς θάνατον συνηκολούθει ὁ Ἰσ. μεταστῆσαι βουλόμενος τοῦ θανάτου. Theramenes persuades him to survive, that his art might not perish with him.

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convivial usage[1]; *to the health*, as he said, *of his beloved Critias.*[2]

Xenophon admires the serenity and cheerfulness indicated by these sallies in the hour of death; but our admiration of such a deportment must mainly depend on our opinion of the sufferer's previous conduct and character. In Theramenes we find much to condemn, and nothing to approve, except that he shrank from following his profligate associates in their career of wickedness. We should not have been inclined to question that this abstinence was the effect of his justice and humanity, if his conduct in the impeachment of the generals had not proved how capable he was of sacrificing both to his selfish interest. But even if he had not been guilty of baseness which deserves abhorrence, his imprudence would have forfeited his claims to our pity; for such blindness as his, in a statesman, becomes a crime. To correct the abuses of democracy he agreed to invest a small number of men — of whom he either knew nothing or knew that they were among the most unprincipled of mankind — with absolute power. He wished that they should use it with prudence and moderation, but had provided no means of regulating and restraining them, except a view of their own interest, in which they happened to differ from him. They preferred the indulgence of their passions to the security of their power; it was he who had enabled them to make the choice which he vainly censured. If he had reason to complain that they did not spare the author of their elevation[3],

[1] The game of the *cottabus*, in which the player accompanied the sound of the falling liquor, which he threw into another vessel or on the ground, with the name of the object of his affections. See Schol. Arist. Pax, 1243.

[2] Κριτίᾳ τῷ καλῷ.

[3] Lysias, Eratosth. p. 127., represents him as claiming this merit in his speech before the council — *ὀνειδίζων ὅτι πάντων τῶν πεπραγμένων αὐτὸς αἴτιος.* There are however no expressions to this effect in Xenophon's report. But Critias, as we have seen, used this as a topic for heightening the guilt of his apostasy — *αὐτὸς ἄρξας τῆς πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους φιλίας, αὐτὸς δὲ τῆς τοῦ δήμου καταλύσεως.* Xen. Hell. II. 3. 28.

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the other victims of their tyranny had much more cause to rejoice in his fate. He seems to have died unpitied by either of the parties whom he had alternately courted and abandoned.

Increased violence of the Thirty.

His death released the Thirty[1] from the last restraints of fear or shame which had kept them within any bounds of decency; and they now proceeded to bolder and more thorough-going measures. They emulated the ancient tyrants, who had often removed the lowest class of the commonalty, for whom it was difficult to find employment, from the capital into the country, and prohibited all Athenians who were not on the list of the Three Thousand from entering the city.[2] But by the oligarchs this step seems not to have been adopted so much with a view to their safety, as to increase the facility of rapine and murder. They continued to send out their emissaries to seize the persons and confiscate the property of the citizens, who were now scattered by their decree over Attica. The greater part of the outcasts took refuge in Piræus; but when it was found that neither the populous town, nor their rural retreats, could shelter them from the inquisition of their oppressors, numbers began to seek an asylum in foreign cities; and Argos, Megara, and Thebes, were soon crowded with Athenian emigrants.

The oligarchs, notwithstanding their Lacedæmonian garrison, and their reliance on Spartan protection, began to be alarmed at the state to which they had reduced themselves, and to dread the vengeance of their exiled enemies, who were waiting so near at

[1] Schneider on Xen. Hell. II. 3. 54. conjectures that Satyrus was chosen to fill his place; according to Diodorus however it was still vacant after the occupation of Phyle, XIV. 32.

[2] Xenophon Hell. II. 4. 1. Justin. V. 9. places this decree after the occupation of Phyle, and perhaps confounds it with a different measure: *Deinde cum omnes Athenienses, proditionis suspectos haberent, demigrare eos ex urbe jubent, et in brachiis muri quæ diruta fuerant habitare, extraneis militibus imperium tuentes.* So Diodorus XIV. 32. μετῴκισαν αὐτοὺς εἰς τὸν Πειραιᾶ, καὶ τοῖς ξενικοῖς ὅπλοις διακατεῖχον τὴν πόλιν.

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hand for an opportunity of attacking them; and they applied to the Spartan government to interpose for the purpose of averting the danger. The Spartans, instigated perhaps by Lysander, issued an edict, which showed to what a degree they were intoxicated by prosperity. It empowered the Athenian rulers to arrest the exiles in every Greek city, and under a heavy penalty, forbad any one to interfere in their behalf.[1] But this decree was no less impolitic than inhuman; it disclosed a domineering spirit, which could not but produce general alarm and disgust; but its object was beyond the reach of the Spartan power. At Argos and Thebes, and probably in other cities, the injunction and threat were disregarded; the exiles continued to find hospitable shelter. At Argos the Lacedæmonian ministers who came to demand the Athenian refugees were ordered to quit the city before sunset.[2] The Thebans more particularly took pains to manifest their contempt for the Spartan proclamation by a counter-decree, directing that the persecuted Athenians should be received in all the Bœotian towns; that if any attempt should be made to force them away, every Bœotian should under pain of a fine[3] lend his aid to rescue them; and that they should not be obstructed in any expedition which they might undertake against the party now in possession of Athens: *no one*—so the decree seems to have run—*was to see or hear.*[4] This measure, though the spirit it breathes is so different from that in which the Theban commander had voted for the extirpation of the Athenian people, was not dictated either by justice or compassion toward Athens, but by jealousy and

[1] Diodor. xiv. 6. five talents. According to Plutarch (Lys. 27.) the penalty consisted in outlawry, ἐκσπόνδους τοὺς ἐνισταμένους τοῖς ἄγουσι.

[2] Demosth. De Rhod. Lib. § 27. Bekk.

[3] Diodor. xiv. 6. πρόστιμον, Plut. Lys. 27. ζημίαν τάλαντον.

[4] Plut. Lys. 27. μήτε ὁρᾷν τινα Θηβαίων, μήτ' ἀκούειν. Pelop. 6. μηδένα Βοιωτὸν ἀκούειν, μηδὲ ὁρᾷν.

resentment toward Sparta. Very soon after the close of the war causes had arisen to alienate the Thebans from their old ally. They were always disposed to set a high value on the services which they had rendered to the Peloponnesian cause, and now conceived that they had not been properly requited. They put forward some claims relating to the spoil collected at Decelea[1], and likewise to the treasure carried to Sparta by Lysander[2], which, chiefly it seems at his instance, had been resisted or neglected. Hence they could not without great dissatisfaction see Athens in the hands of Lysander's creatures. This feeling was, it must be supposed, encouraged by the democratical party at Thebes, which, though it had been kept under during the war, still subsisted, not without strength and hopes, and, in the turn which the public mind had now taken against Sparta, saw a prospect of recovering its ascendency. And there is reason to believe, as we shall see more clearly in the sequel, that like causes now began to affect the state of parties at Corinth in a similar manner.

One of the men whom the Thirty had most cause to fear, and toward whom, in an early period of their reign, many eyes appear to have been turned at Athens in anxious expectation, was removed either before or soon after the death of Theramenes. Alcibiades, according to the prevailing opinion, was sacrificed to the suspicions of the oligarchs. They had first, against the advice of Theramenes, condemned him to banishment, and then seem to have apprehended that he might place himself at the head of the malcontents. After the day of Ægos-potami he thought himself no longer safe in Europe, and, crossing over to Asia, took refuge at the court of Pharnabazus, insinuated himself with his wonted address into the

[1] Xen. Hell. III. 5. Justin. v. 11.

[2] Plut. Lys. 27.

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satrap's favour, and received the revenues of a Phrygian town for his maintenance.[1] But Alcibiades, it is said, determined to go up to the royal residence, having made some discoveries as to the designs of Cyrus, which he believed would be acceptable to his brother Artaxerxes who was now on the throne, and it seems to have been at the outset of his journey that he was cut off by a violent death. A house in the Phrygian village of Melissa[2], where he slept, was set on fire in the night; and when he rushed out, he found himself surrounded by a band of barbarians, who despatched him with their missiles. But as to the immediate occasion of this event there was a great variety of contradictory reports among the ancients, from which it is now impossible to disentangle the truth. It was generally believed that the assassins were emissaries of Pharnabazus, under the command of his brother Magæus, and his uncle Susamithres. But the satrap's motives were variously explained. Some attributed his conduct to his own jealousy of Alcibiades, others to the imperious demands of the Spartan government, which required the exile's life, either to secure itself and its Athenian friends or to gratify the animosity of Agis. Alcibiades was undoubtedly formidable and obnoxious enough to be the object of such a proceeding on the part of Sparta; but the compliance of Pharnabazus is not so easily reconciled with all that we know of his manly and open character. The other explanation however is still less probable. So that, unless we should suppose that the murderers were in the pay of Sparta, we might be rather inclined to adopt another story mentioned by Plutarch, which attributed the death of Alcibiades to the revenge of some private persons whose sister he had dishonoured. He left a

Death of Alcibiades.

[1] *Ei Grunium* (perhaps Gryneum) *dederat in Phrygia castrum, ex quo quinquagena talenta vectigalis capiebat.* Nepos Alc. IX. 3.

[2] Athenæus, XIII. 34. Between Synnada and Metropolis (Kara-hissar? Leuke, Asia Minor, p. 56.).

son of the same name, but of very inferior talents, and a fortune, which, notwithstanding the opportunities he had of enriching himself during the years in which he commanded with uninterrupted success on the coast of Asia, proved, contrary to the public expectation, smaller than the patrimony he received from his guardians.[1] As misfortune and difficulty commonly drew forth the highest powers of his mind, and the best features of his character, it is probable enough that the abrupt termination of his chequered career may have prevented the execution of designs more honourable to himself, and more useful to his country, than any plans of his early ambition. His tomb at Melissa was honoured by the emperor Adrian with a statue and a yearly sacrifice.[2]

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Thrasybulus, like Alcibiades, had been formally banished by the Thirty; though it is not certain that he was at Athens when their government was established. He was however at Thebes when their furious tyranny began to drive the citizens by hundreds into exile; and the temper now prevailing at Thebes encouraged him to undertake the deliverance of his country. Having obtained a small supply of arms and money from his Theban friends, he crossed the border with a band of about seventy refugees[3], and seized the fortress of Phyle, which stood on an eminence projecting from the side of mount Parnes, —with which it was connected by a narrow ridge with precipitous sides—twelve or thirteen miles from Athens. The fortifications had either escaped when the other Attic strongholds were demolished by the

Thrasybulus occupies Phyle.

[1] Lysias, De Aristoph. Bon. p. 156.

[2] Athenæus u. s. εἴδομεν δὲ καὶ ἡμεῖς τὸ ἐν Μελίσσῃ τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου μνῆμα ἐκ Σπνδῶν εἰς Μητρόπολιν ἀφικνούμενοι· ἐν ᾧ καὶ κατ' ἔτος δύεται βοῦς, διακελευσαμένου τοῦτο τοῦ πάντ' ἀρίστου Ἀδριανοῦ βασιλέως· ὃς καὶ ἀνέστησεν ἐπὶ τῷ μνήματι Παρίου λίθου εἰκόνα τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην.

[3] So Xenophon. Scheibe (p. 108.), not perhaps without a secret bias from his hypothesis, which requires that the progress of Thrasybulus should be represented as very slow, prefers the number 30, which is given by Nepos, scarcely a superior authority to Xenophon.

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Thirty, or were soon restored to a defensible state.[1] The oligarchs, confident that they should soon be able to crush so feeble an enemy, marched against them with the Three Thousand and their equestrian partisans, and as soon as they arrived at the foot of the hill of Phyle, ordered or permitted some of their younger troops, who were eager for the service, to attack the fortress. This assault however was repulsed, and they saw that it would be necessary to reduce the place by blockade. But a heavy fall of snow compelled them to abandon their design, and to return to the city. Their retreat, if it was not, as Diodorus describes it, accompanied with a panic, seems to have been ill conducted. Thrasybulus and his little band fell upon their rear, and cut off a number of the camp-followers, and probably made themselves masters of part of the baggage. Though however the state of the weather rendered a siege for the present impracticable, the Thirty deemed it expedient to check the excursions which the garrison might be emboldened to make into the interior, and sent out the Lacedæmonian auxiliaries, with two squadrons of horse, to encamp about two miles from Phyle. Thrasybulus had by this time been reinforced by so many other exiles that he found himself at the head of 700 men. With this force he came down from Phyle in the night, and halted unobserved about half a mile from the enemy. The ground which they had chosen for their encampment was covered with wood or bushes, which perhaps favoured his design of surprising them. At daybreak, at the most unguarded hour, just after the men had risen, and were for the most part dispersed, at a distance from their arms[2], he fell upon them, killed 120 of the infantry, and put the rest to flight,

Defeats the troops of the Thirty.

[1] Sievers (p. 54.) conjectures that they were preserved by order of the Spartan government, to secure the frontier against the Bœotians.

[2] Ὅποι ἕδοιτο ἕκαστος, Schneider's alteration of the text, both in this passage and in VII. 1 16. (except that in the latter ὅποι is required) seems entirely to pervert Xenophon's meaning.

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and pursued them for a mile. Then, after erecting a trophy and collecting all the arms he could find on the scene of his victory, he returned to Phyle, before a fresh body of horse, which was sent from the city, as soon as his exploit was known there, had arrived.

Bloody execution.

The Thirty now began to be alarmed at the boldness and success of Thrasybulus, and, if we may trust Diodorus and Justin[1] for a fact of such a nature, notwithstanding Xenophon's silence, they made secret overtures to him, under pretence of a negotiation about some prisoners, offering to admit him to a share of their power in the place of Theramenes, and to let him bring ten of his fellow-exiles along with him. What security they could propose which a man of common understanding might accept, for his personal safety, does not appear. Prudence no less than honour would have led Thrasybulus to reject the bait. He insisted, it is said, on the restoration of democracy, and they sent for a reinforcement to Sparta; but in the mean while they thought it advisable to take precautions for securing themselves against the consequences of any further reverses. They saw that they might possibly be dislodged from Athens, and determined to provide themselves with another place of refuge. Perhaps Critias already perceived that he could not depend on all his colleagues, and he seems to have been the principal contriver of the atrocious plan which was now adopted. He and his colleagues, attended by their cavalry, proceeded to Eleusis, with the professed intention of inspecting and registering the military force of the place, under the pretext of providing for its defence. Their followers were posted by the seaside, near a postern through which the devoted Eleusinians—who were citizens of the best condition—were ordered to pass, and were all arrested as they came

[1] v. 9. 13. *Post hæc Thrasybulum corrumpere, imperii societatem pollicentes, conantur.* Diodorus xiv. 32. inverts Xenophon's order, and places the negotiation after the scenes at Eleusis and Salamis, and before the surprise of the camp.

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out of the town. When they were secured, Critias and his band crossed over to Salamis, and there acted a similar scene. The prisoners taken in both places amounted together to about 300.[1] They were all carried to Athens, and committed to the custody of the Eleven. The next day the citizens both of the infantry and the cavalry were summoned to meet in the Odeum, which was partly occupied by the Lacedæmonian garrison. Critias addressed them in a short speech, reminding them that they were no less concerned in the preservation of the constitution they enjoyed than himself and his colleagues, and that, as they partook of the privileges it conferred, they must not shrink from their share in the risk of defending it. He therefore called upon them to show their devotion to the common cause, by condemning the prisoners to death; and pointed out a place where they were openly to declare their sentence. It was passed unanimously against the prisoners, though with reluctance by all but the most abandoned ministers of the tyranny; and they were all executed.

Thrasybulus in Piræus.

Such proceedings must have strengthened the cause of Thrasybulus, and he was now encouraged by his successes and his growing numbers to a bolder attempt. Four days after his victory[2] he descended from Phyle with 1000 men, and marched by night into Piræus, where he found the whole population of the place ready to aid him. The oligarchs immediately assembled their forces, horse and foot, and issued from the city. Thrasybulus, seeing the circuit of Piræus too large to be defended by his troops, did not attempt to repel the enemy, but awaited his approach on a road which led up the hill of Munychia. The army of the Thirty advanced unresisted through the heart of Piræus till it reached the foot of this hill, where it

[1] Lysias, Eratosth. p. 125. Agorat. p. 133.

[2] Xen. II. 4. 13. *οὓς ὑμεῖς ἡμέραν πέμπτην τραφόμενοι ἐδιώξατε.* Diodor. XIV. 33. *μετὰ τὴν μάχην εὐθύς.*

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was compressed by the nature of the ground into a phalanx of fifty deep. In front of it, the heavy infantry of Thrasybulus filled up the breadth of the road, but only stood ten deep. Behind them however, on the upper part of the declivity, were stationed the light troops, dartmen and slingers, in great numbers; for as the population of Piræus was all friendly, few perhaps who could find missiles of any kind were absent. As the enemy approached Thrasybulus came forward, and animated his men by the recollection of their recent success and the prospect of a just vengeance, pointing to the ranks which they had routed but a few days before, and to the tyrants by whom they had been deprived of property, homes, friends, kinsmen, and all things included in the name of country. *These merciless oppressors the divine justice had at length delivered into their hands, crowded together in a position where they would be a butt for the missiles showered on them from above, and would be unable to return one with effect. He exhorted them to seize the propitious moment, in which victory was certain, and death glorious.*

Battle of Munychia.

He was attended by a soothsayer who showed a spirit worthy of a descendant of Codrus. He enjoined his friends not to begin the onset till one of their side should be slain or wounded, and assured them that the result would be happy for them, though fatal to himself. To fulfil his own prediction he rushed forward, and fell, charging the advancing foe. The battle then began. The troops of the Thirty could not long sustain the shower of missiles, and the pressure from the higher ground, and were put to flight and pursued into the plain. The slaughter was much less than might have been expected under such circumstances, and is said to have been restrained by the humanity of Thrasybulus.[1] Only seventy of the com-

[1] Nepos, Thras. II. 6. Cedentes violari vetuit. *Cives* enim *civibus parcere æquum* censebat. Neque quisquam est vulneratus nisi qui prior impugnare voluit.

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mon men in the defeated army were killed; but the day was rendered memorable by the death of Critias, his colleague Hippomachus and his kinsman Charmides, one of the Ten of Piræus. The conquerors, with a noble tenderness, abstained from stripping their slain countrymen except of the arms which they themselves so much needed.[1] The restitution of the bodies led to an interchange of words between the adverse ranks; and Cleocritus, the herald of the Mysteries, who was gifted with a voice of extraordinary power, took the opportunity of proclaiming silence, and then of addressing an affecting remonstrance, on the part of his friends the exiles, to their adversaries. *Why*, he asked, *do you drive us from our homes? why seek the blood of your fellow-citizens, of men who have never wronged you, who have shared with you your holiest sanctuaries and sacrifices, your most cheerful festivals, the pleasures and pursuits of peace, the dangers of war? In the name of every tie, of religion, kindred, friendship, which binds us together, no longer neglect your duty to our common country for the sake of serving miscreants who have shed more Athenian blood in the course of eight months than the Peloponnesians in ten years of war: who, when we might have lived together in peace, have forced us into an impious and unnatural combat, which has cost lives, over which we who took them have wept perhaps not less than you who have lost them.* There was so much of reason as well as of feeling in this expostulation, that the commanders on the opposite side dreaded its effect on their troops, and led them back to the city.[2]

The death of Critias offers an occasion for a few

[1] Xenophon, II. 4. 19. and Nepos, Thrasyb. u. s. Neminem jacentem veste spoliavit, nil adtigit nisi arma quorum indigebat, et quæ ad victum pertinebant.

[2] Diodorus XIV. 33. represents the final retreat of the oligarchical forces as produced by a renewed attack of Thrasybulus, who in the interval was joined by a number of deserters from the enemy's ranks. So Nepos, Thrasyb. II. 5. talks of two engagements: *bis tyranni obpugnare sunt adorsi.* Justin, v. 10. follows Xenophon, only ascribing the speech of Cleocritus to Thrasybulus.

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reflexions on this remarkable man, which may justify a short interruption of the narrative; the rather as attempts have been made of late to palliate the atrocity of his conduct, by pleas which a review of his career, so far as it is known to us, does not seem to bear out.[1] His cruelty, it has been said, sprang not from wantonness or passion, but from political fanaticism; it was the result of a philosophical idea of government, which he fancied himself called to realise at any cost. It is the excuse which may be and has been set up for Robespierre and Marat. How far, if admitted, it should mitigate our abhorrence of his wickedness, may be doubted; but it has not been shown to rest on a historical foundation. Undoubtedly whatever extenuation of his guilt can arise from the influence of a strong, natural, and almost unavoidable antipathy to democratical institutions, of this Critias is entitled to the full benefit. He belonged to the most illustrious family in Athens: the race which numbered Solon and Pisistratus among its members. The blood of the ancient kings of Attica flowed in his veins; and if he had believed in any superior being, he might have traced his lineage to the gods. It is probable however that his incredulity did not prevent him from setting a high value on this imaginary descent. But he had at least as much reason to pride himself on his personal advantages, which separated him from the mass of his fellow-citizens no less than his heroic ancestry. That his intellect was of a high order, we have no ground to affirm; but he certainly possessed brilliant talents, which were cultivated by study under the best masters of his time. As a poet, as a musician[2], and as an orator, he was ranked in

[1] Scheibe p. 86.

[2] The instrument on which he excelled was the Dorian flute. Athenæus, IV. p. 184. D., where however Bach (Critias, p. 19.) seems to have mistaken the meaning of the epithet ἐπιφανεστάτους, which is applied to him and Callias, as if it referred to their eminence in the art, *præstantissimos Atheniensium tibicines*; it is clearly of

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after ages, notwithstanding the odium which clung to his name, as among the best in each art. Some fragments of his poetry, which are still extant, hardly permit us to recognise any higher merit that that of an easy and vigorous versification. But one of these, probably a part of a drama, was also—beyond doubt erroneously—ascribed to Euripides[1]; and the Greek critics could not decide which of the two was the author of another tragedy, now lost.[2] Though we do not know how this confusion arose, it must be allowed to prove that Critias had attained no mean degree of poetical excellence. His eloquence, which had been formed in part by the precepts of Gorgias, was remarkable for its pure and racy diction, its simple and nervous style.[3] It was probably rhetoric rather than philosophy that he studied in the school of Gorgias; as he appears to have been attracted to the society of Socrates much more by the exercises of dialectic subtilty which it afforded, than by any thing congenial to his own sentiments or disposition, either in the principles or the character of the sage. He was perhaps incapable of either liking or appreciating what was best in Socrates and his philosophy. Indeed he

their distinguished rank and celebrity that the writer is speaking. At Sparta and Thebes, and the Pontic Heraclea, all the citizens, as Chamæleon related, learned to play on the flute. At Athens it was, for that very reason, an aristocratical accomplishment.

[1] By Pseudo-Plutarch, Placit. Philos. 1. 7. as belonging to the Sisyphus. See Matthiæ Fragm. Eur. Σισυφος. It is cited from Critias, by Sextus Empiricus adv. Physicos (p. 402. ed. Bekker.). Welcker (*Die Griechischen Tragœdien*, 3. *abtheil.* p. 1009.) refers it to a tragedy of Critias.

[2] Athenæus, x. p. 496. B. Ὁ τὸν Πειρίθουν γράψας, εἴτε Κριτίας ἐστὶν ὁ τύραννος, ἢ Εὐριπίδης. See Welcker n. s. p. 1008., who thinks the uncertainty sufficiently explained by affinity of genius and style.

[3] He is classed by Phrynichus (Phot. Bibl. p. 1016. Bekker) with Plato, Demosthenes, Thucydides, and Xenophon, as a standard εἰλικρινοῦς καὶ καθαροῦ καὶ Ἀττικοῦ λόγου; by Cicero de Orat. II. 22. among those who kept close to the orators of the old school, *subtiles, acuti, breves, sententiis magis quam verbis abundantes.* Of him, Theramenes, and Lysias, it is said: *retinebant illum Pericli succum sed erant paullo uberiore filo.* Welcker (u. s. p. 1010.) remarks that the judgment of Philostratus on the style of Critias — τὴν ἰδέαν τοῦ λόγου δογματίας καὶ πολυγνώμων, σεμνολογῆσαί τε ἱκανώτατος οὐ τὴν διθυραμβώδη σεμνολογίαν, οὐδὲ καταφεύγουσαν ἐς τὰ ἐκ ποιητικῆς ὀνόματα, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν κυριωτάτων συγκειμένην καὶ κατὰ φύσιν ἐχόντων — is applicable to his tragedies also.

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ofessed to regard him as a mere teacher of the
t of disputation, and as such endeavoured to
ence him.[1] And it avails nothing in defence of
itias to represent this measure as simply a part
his antidemocratical policy.[2] It seems clear that
was aimed chiefly, if not exclusively, against
crates, who had provoked his resentment, not by
litical opinions, but by the freedom with which he
d reproved the tyrant's profligate sensuality. And
rhaps among all the acts of Critias there is none
hich so clearly marks the depth of his depravity,
his attempt to make Socrates the instrument of
s tyranny in the murder of Leon. That on this
casion he spared the life of Socrates, has been
eated as a proof that he regarded the philosopher
a stanch partisan of the oligarchy.[3] But it seems
least as allowable to view it as an instance of the
cendency which eminent virtue may exert over the
ost abandoned of men. And when we consider
e relation in which he had stood to Socrates, we
nnot attribute any high merit to this forbearance.
We also find some peculiar philosophical tenets
cribed to Critias, which, unless he has in this
stance been confounded with some other writer of
e same name, would imply that he had turned his
tention to physical speculations.[4] But however this
ay be, it is certain that he was not more separated
om the vulgar by his birth, abilities, and attain-
ents, than by his opinions on religion. In the prin-
pal passage preserved of his works he maintains, in
rse not unworthy of Euripides, that the belief, so
rnestly inculcated by Socrates, of an omniscient

[1] Xen. Mem. i. 2. 31. [2] Scheibe, p. 76. [3] Scheibe, p. 84.
[4] He taught that the blood was the seat or the essence of the soul. Aristotle, De
. i. 2. and others cited by Bach, p. 67. The same doctrine is ascribed to Em-
ocles, and one of the lines in which it was expounded by Empedocles — αἷμα γὰρ
ράσεως περικάρδιον ἐστὶ νόημα — is attributed by a commentator on Aristotle to
itias.

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and retributive Deity, was a mere invention of statecraft.[1] In such a man this theory was surely not the result of a disinterested inquiry, nor without its efficacy in supporting his courage and stifling uneasy misgivings. Xenophon conceived that he was corrupted by the example of his companions in Thessaly.[2] This however implies that the men with whom he there associated were among the most licentious and unprincipled he could find, and that he shared their excesses. But there seems to be no more reason for supposing that his morals were perverted by his intercourse with them, than that he was ever the more virtuous for the temporary restraint which was imposed on him by the society of Socrates.

That in such a man democratical institutions, especially when abused as they had been at Athens since the death of Pericles, might excite feelings of the bitterest disgust and the most decided hostility, may easily be imagined. And it followed as a matter of course, that he felt a strong partiality for Sparta, and preferred the policy of Cimon, more particularly as the advocate of the Spartan alliance, to that of Pericles.[3] But it is not even certain that he had any well-defined political principles. One of his works indeed was a metrical description of the principal Greek states, and he appears also to have treated the same subject in prose. But nothing that we know of

[1] The inference as to the opinions of Critias would no doubt be more conclusive, if, as Brandis believed (*Gesch. der Gr. Philosophie*, I. p. 545.), it was a fragment of the ἔμμετροι πολιτεῖαι, which however appear to have been composed in elegiac verse. Welcker (u. s.) has no doubt that it was a speech of Sisyphus in the play, and observes that it is perfectly in accordance with his character. But however this may be, it is quoted by Sextus Empiricus as evidence that Critias himself was ἐκ τοῦ τάγματος τῶν ἀθέων.

[2] Xen. Mem. I. 2. 24. Κριτίας, φυγὼν εἰς Θετταλίαν, ἐκεῖ συνῆν ἀνθρώποις ἀνομίᾳ μᾶλλον ἢ δικαιοσύνῃ χρωμένοις. Philostratus (vit. Crit.) justly rejects this plea, as inadmissible in behalf of a man like Critias, who might have given a tone to Thessalian society, instead of imitating those παρ' οἷς ἀγεροχία καὶ ἀκρατος καὶ τὰ τυραννικὰ ἐν οἴνῳ σπουδάζεται. And 10. Κριτίας ἐν τοῖς ἐλεγείοις εὔχεται πλοῦτον μὲν Σκοπαδῶν μεγαλοφροσύνην δε Κίμωνος.

[3] Plut. Cim. 16. Scheibe, p. 88., very arbitrarily treats this as a proof that Critias *emulated the lofty spirit of Cimon*; in what manner, he omits to show.

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either work would lead us to believe that he entered very deeply into it.[1] In the longest among the fragments remaining of the poem, he eulogises Sparta, not however on the score of her political wisdom, but of the temperance prescribed by the Spartan usages. Elsewhere, in verses which happen likewise to have been preserved, with an appearance of at least equal warmth and earnestness, he celebrates the memory of Anacreon, expressly as the bard of long-protracted banquets and midnight orgies.[2] The insurrection which he endeavoured to excite among the Thessalian serfs cannot have been designed to realise any oligarchical theory, but most likely to establish a tyranny for himself, as, if he had not been restrained by the competition of his colleagues and the jealousy of Sparta, he assuredly would have attempted to do at Athens. Neither in his writings nor in his history is there any thing to indicate that he was misled into the enormities which rendered his name a by-word by the ardour with which he pursued a philosophical abstraction. It was apparently a different motive that urged him to select the wealthy aliens and inoffensive landowners as his victims. Nothing more seems required to explain every part of his conduct, than the cause which Xenophon assigns for it: a restless ambition[3], stimulated by revenge[4],

[1] The exact nature of the relation between the ἔμμετροι πολιτεῖαι and the prose work on the same subject cannot now be determined; and it is not easy to form a satisfactory conjecture on it. According to Bach (p. 25.) the former was one *quod per lusum otiumque aggressus esse videtur, idemque ita comparatum, ut librorum quos de singulis civitatibus soluta oratione conscripsisse dicitur, succum tanquam subtilissimum versibus impariter junctis inclusisse statuendus sit*, and he cites the example of Hellanicus, who is said to have recorded the conquerors in the Carnea both in verse and prose: (*οἱ ἔμμετροι Καρνεονῖκαι* and *οἱ καταλογάδην*, Athenæus, XIV. p. 635. F.) But this analogy seems questionable, and I have sometimes been inclined to suspect that the ἔμμετροι πολιτεῖαι were resolved into prose by another hand.

[2] Athenæus, XIII. p. 600. E.

[3] Mem. I. 2. 14. Ἐγενέσθην (Critias and Alcibiades) φύσει φιλοτιμοτάτω πάντων Ἀθηναίων. 25. ἀγκωμένω μὲν ἐπὶ γένει, ἐπηρμένω δ' ἐπὶ πλούτῳ.

[4] Hell. II. 3. 15. προπετὴς ἦν ἐπὶ τὸ πολλοὺς ἀποκτεῖναι, ἅτε καὶ φυγὼν ἀπὸ τοῦ δήμου.

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restrained by no principle, and directed to no higher end than the indulgence of his selfish passions. It need not be supposed that he was naturally inclined to cruelty, or that he shed blood in pure wantonness. His character is dark enough without that stain. And unhappily such an abuse of the most splendid talents, and even the finest genius, is not so rare that we should be willing rather to do violence to history than admit it in the case of Critias.[1]

The events of the day, especially the death of Critias, unfolded the germs of discord among the Thirty and their adherents. There were some of the Thirty who were not quite so violent as their colleagues, and among the Three Thousand the majority, having kept clear of a direct participation in the rapine and bloodshed of the preceding period, though desirous of preserving their power and privileges, were willing to change the men and measures which had rendered them odious. Accordingly an assembly was held, in which the Thirty were deposed, and a new College of Ten — one from each tribe — appointed in their stead. Two of the Thirty, Phido and Eratosthenes were members of the new college; the rest retired with their most devoted partisans to Eleusis.

The council of Ten.

The men who were thus raised to power were known, according to Lysias, to have been bitter

[1] This remark would have appeared too commonplace, but that Scheibe, p. 87., talks of the impossibility that a man of such manifold accomplishments, as a philosopher, a poet, and an orator, should abandon himself to a stupid, capricious, unreflecting thirst of blood (*einem dumpfen, launenhaften und bewusstlosen Blutdurst*). In this argument there is a double fallacy. A very high degree of intellectual culture is notoriously quite consistent with gross moral depravity. And, if it be admitted that Critias was not animated by a wanton and brutal blood-thirstiness, it will not at all follow that he was impelled by no worse motives than political fanaticism. Scheibe adds, oddly enough, that *Philostratus alone does justice to Critias, when he says that Critias ought not to be termed a wicked man, because he subverted the Athenian democracy*; as if Philostratus had not subjoined other reasons for terming him so; among the rest, that *he surpassed all his colleagues in cruelty and bloodthirstiness* (ὠμότητί τε καὶ μιαιφονίᾳ τοὺς τριάκοντα ὑπερεβάλλετο), and had not concluded his character with the words: *to me he appears, of all men that have been noted for wickedness, the most wicked* (πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἐμοὶ γε φαίνεται ξυμπάντων, ὃν ἐπὶ κακίᾳ ὄνομα).

enemies of Critias; and it was therefore expected that this revolution would have been attended by an accommodation with the exiles; and Phido in particular is said to have been chosen for the express purpose of bringing about such an agreement. But it was soon discovered that these hopes were groundless, and that the new rulers were not less bent on overpowering the exiles in Piræus, than on excluding the faction of Eleusis. Thrasybulus therefore continued to make preparations for prosecuting his success. His followers were now more numerous than the enemy; but they wanted arms. The deficiency however was gradually supplied by the liberal contributions of the wealthier citizens, and by the active ingenuity of the rest. Aliens were invited into their service by offers of civil immunities. Among others Lysias, out of the wreck of his fortune, with the help perhaps of foreigners who wished well to the cause—Thrasydæus, the leader of the democratical party at Elis, is said to have advanced him two talents—supplied his friends with 200 shields, and with 2000 drachmas, and as we are informed on the same authority even hired 300 mercenaries.[1] Shields of wood or wicker, whitened over, were substituted by some for metal armour; and by such expedients, in the course of ten days, a numerous body both of heavy and light infantry was ready to take the field, and was supported by a squadron of seventy horse. They now began to make foraging excursions every day from Piræus. On the other hand the party in the city was stronger in cavalry, which it employed to check and annoy the exiles, but did not any longer venture—perhaps through fear of desertion rather than of the enemy's numbers—to lead out its infantry. Lysimachus, the commander of the city cavalry, who

[1] Pseudo-Plut. Vit. X. Orator. According to Justin, v. 9. Lysias Syracusanus orator, exsul tunc, quingentos milites stipendio suo instructos, in auxilium patriæ communis eloquentiæ misit.

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had been employed by the Thirty in their expedition to Eleusis, and remained in office under the new government, provoked the resentment of the exiles, and even disgusted many of his own followers, by a wanton massacre of some countrymen whom he found on their way from Piræus to their own farms in quest of provisions; but the incensed party seems to have confined itself to a single act of retaliation on the person of Callistratus, one of the knights.[1] It was however every day gaining new strength and spirit, and even ventured to bring engines against the walls; and, to retard its approaches, the engineer of the besieged barricaded the road leading to the city from the Lyceum with great blocks of stone.

The danger now appeared so pressing, that the Ten resolved to apply for protection to Sparta, and Phido was deputed to solicit assistance there.[2] It would seem as if the fear of their common enemy had induced the Athenian oligarchs to compose their differences with those of Eleusis; for envoys were sent, at the same time, and with the like objects, to Sparta, by the Eleusinian faction.[3] Phido endeavoured to interest the jealousy of the Spartan government on behalf of his associates, by suggesting that the success of Thrasybulus would subject Athens to the Bœotians, and he requested a fresh body of Lacedæmonian auxiliaries. Lysander, who was at this time at Sparta, supported the application with all his credit; and though the government declined to send out an army, he succeeded in procuring himself to be appointed harmost, and empowered to raise troops for the purpose of suppressing the insurrection, while his brother Libys was created admiral, and was ordered to blockade Piræus; and he obtained a loan from the Spartan treasury of 100 talents for Phido's colleagues. He

Interference of Lysander.

[1] It would be a remarkable and significant circumstance, if this was the Callistratus who is said to have introduced the payment of an obolus for attendance in the popular assembly. See Bœckh, Public Econ. of Athens, II. 14.

[2] Lysias, Eratosth. § 58. [3] Xenophon, II. 4. 28.

himself repaired to Eleusis, and soon attracted a large body of Peloponnesian troops into his service; for the military adventurers, who made war their profession, now began to abound in all parts of Greece. He was thus enabled to confine the exiles within Piræus, while his brother, with his squadron, prevented them from receiving supplies by sea. They now saw no prospect before them but a repetition of the miseries which had preceded the capitulation of Athens, terminated in like manner by a surrender, which would expose them utterly unprotected to the vindictive cruelty of their exasperated adversaries. CHAP. XXXI.

Their deliverance came from a quarter to which they could least have looked for it. The success, fame, honours, and influence, of Lysander had excited jealousy, and perhaps alarm, in several of the leading men at Sparta. Even the kings and ephors felt themselves reduced to comparative insignificance by his side. His new expedition against the Athenian exiles appeared to his rivals an enterprise in which the state had no interest, and which could only serve his private ends, by showing the importance of his patronage to the faction now ruling at Athens. Though therefore he had carried his point at Sparta so far as to obtain the permission he desired, his opponents were still bent on thwarting his designs, and the more eagerly the nearer he seemed to the accomplishment of his object. Pausanias, the colleague of Agis, was foremost among them, and after Lysander's departure concerted measures with three of the ephors for baffling his enterprise. They did not think it prudent openly to announce any change in the policy of Sparta toward the Athenian parties, but agreed to send Pausanias at the head of an army into Attica, avowedly for the purpose of co-operating with Lysander, but with the secret intention of defeating his work. The king accordingly summoned all the forces of the con- Expedition of Pausanias.

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federacy to follow him into the field, and collected a large army; but his real object was so well concealed, that Corinth and the Bœotian states refused to join him with their forces, alleging that they thought the invasion of Attica an act of unprovoked aggression, and contrary to the treaty which they had ratified. Pausanias however, accompanied by two of the ephors, marched into Attica, and encamped near Piræus, as if to carry on the siege in conjunction with Lysander. His first step was to send a message to the chiefs of the exiles, bidding them disband their forces; but as he did not think fit at once to disclose his friendly intentions, they refused so to put themselves in his power. He then made a feint of attempting to storm the town, but retired at the first show of resistance, and the next day advanced, with two brigades of the Lacedæmonian infantry, and three squadrons of the Athenian horse, toward what was called the Still Harbour[1], with the professed design of reconnoitring the ground with a view to circumvallation. But as he was retiring, after having inspected this side of the town, he was attacked by a party of the besieged, who gave him so much annoyance, that he was obliged to send his cavalry and a detachment of the heavy-armed foot, to drive them in, while he himself followed with the rest of his troops. His men killed about thirty of the enemy, and pursued them into the town as far as the theatre of Piræus, where the main body of the refugee forces was assembled. Their targeteers immediately began a brisk attack on the Lacedæmonians, who were forced to retreat, received many wounds, and lost some of their officers. Observing this success of his light troops, Thrasybulus advanced to the charge with his heavy infantry, and compelled Pausanias to fall back for about half a mile on a rising ground,

[1] ἐπὶ τὸν κωφὸν λιμένα.

where he halted, and ordered the other divisions of his army to join him. Thus reinforced, and having formed a phalanx of unusual depth, he led it against the Athenians, who barely sustained his onset, and were routed with the loss of 150 men. Pausanias raised a trophy, but had no intention of following up his victory. He secretly sent another message to the exiles, directing them to depute some of their number to himself and the ephors who accompanied him, and suggested the language which it would be expedient for their envoys to use. At the same time knowing that there was in the city a party desirous of peace, he encouraged them to meet in the largest number they could collect, and to address him with a public declaration of their pacific sentiments.

It was probably on the same occasion that Diognetus, a kinsman of Nicias, appeared in the Lacedæmonian camp, with the orphan children of Niceratus, and of Eucrates, and placing the infant son of Niceratus on the king's knees, and the others by his side, implored his protection against the oligarchs who had bereaved them of their natural guardians.[1] This scene was perhaps contrived by Pausanias for the purpose of exciting the indignation of the allies against Lysander's friends, who, while they pretended to purge the city of the vile informers and extortioners, who had afflicted and disgraced it, had not even spared a family so eminent for rank, wealth, its services to Athens, and its merits toward Sparta, as that of Nicias. The spectacle at least produced a powerful impression on the by-standers, and enforced the arguments and petitions of the envoys; and Pausanias, with the approbation of the ephors who accompanied him, and perhaps of the whole army, except Lysander and his partisans, concluded an

[1] Lysias, Pro Niciæ Fr. p. 150.

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armistice with the exiles, and sent their deputies, as well as those of the party opposed to the measures of the government in the city, to plead their cause at Sparta. The Ten, when they heard of this embassy, sent ministers of their own to counteract it, who were instructed to declare, that they resigned themselves and the city to the absolute disposal of the Spartans; and to urge that, if their adversaries professed to be equally loyal to Sparta, they ought to be called upon to surrender Piræus and Munychia. But this suggestion was disregarded; and the representations of Pausanias had now more weight in the Spartan councils than the wishes of Lysander. After all the envoys had been heard by the ephors in the ordinary assembly, fifteen commissioners were appointed with full authority, in conjunction with Pausanias, to compose the differences of the Athenian parties. The terms which they prescribed were liberal and wise. They published a general reconciliation, secured by a complete amnesty, from which none were excluded but the Thirty, the Eleven, and the Ten who had been governors of Piræus. It even comprehended the Ten, who succeeded to the Thirty in the city, without excepting those among them who had belonged to the number of the Thirty. The persons excluded from it, and all other citizens who might fear to return to Athens, were to be allowed to live unmolested at Eleusis. The Spartans perhaps thought that they might there be still useful instruments for curbing the independence of Athens. The treaty was ratified both between the antagonist parties, and as an engagement contracted by them with Sparta, which thus guaranteed its execution. When it was concluded, Pausanias disbanded his forces; and the exiles entered the city in triumph, and marched up under arms to the citadel, to render a thanksgiving sacrifice to the tutelary goddess. An

Negotiations with Sparta.

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assembly was then held, in which the citizens once more met as in former days—not indeed with the feelings or prospects of past times, but still again united as one people, freed from domestic tyranny, with some new titles to glory, of a purer kind than they had earned by most of their ancient victories, and not without hopes that, when the wounds inflicted by war and civil discord should be healed, their country might recover some portion of her pristine vigour. The little piece of stiff and meagre rhetoric, which Xenophon puts into the mouth of Thrasybulus on this occasion, seems indeed miserably unworthy both of it and of him.[1] But it probably embraces two of the leading topics on which he dwelt; for, as he would not forbear from expressing the exultation belonging to such a triumph of the righteous cause, he assuredly took this opportunity of inculcating a strict observance of the conditions which provided for the safety of the vanquished party, and for the tranquillity of the state.

Still peace could not be said to be completely restored, so long as a remnant of the most violent oligarchical faction continued to occupy Eleusis, harbouring implacable animosity, and restless hopes of recovering their power; and for several months after the return of the exiles they were thus threatened by the survivors of the Thirty, and the stanchest of their adherents. It is not very easy to reconcile the statements of Lysias and Xenophon on this subject. But perhaps we may collect from the orator[2], that the oligarchs, seeing that they could no

[1] He insists on the superiority of the democrats in the four cardinal virtues. This may be pedantic enough: but I am not sure that I understand what Scheibe means when he says (p. 135.) that *the speech expresses the very same tendency to philosophical abstraction by which the oligarchs had been misled to realise their new political theories.* The theories of Critias and his colleagues—if they had any—appear to have been any thing but new, and their object was something more solid than a philosophical abstraction.

[2] Eratosth. p. 123. *μισθωσάμενοι δὲ πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἐπ' ὀλέθρῳ τῆς πόλεως, καὶ πόλεις ἐπάγοντες, καὶ τελευτῶντες Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ τῶν συμμάχων ὁπόσους ἐδύ-*

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longer expect aid from Sparta, endeavoured to engage other Greek cities in their cause; but their conduct had excited general disgust, and they were expelled from several states by public proclamation. Still they did not drop their projects of ambition and revenge, but began to collect a body of mercenaries at Eleusis, for the purpose of renewing the civil war. The Athenian government sent out the whole force of the city to crush this enterprise; and Xenophon intimates that the oligarchical leaders were drawn into a conference, and put to death.[1] But as he has forborne to mention any of the particulars of this transaction, about which we have no better information from any other source, we would fain hope that the final triumph of the popular cause was not sullied by deliberate treachery. It was certainly signalised in all other respects by wise moderation and exemplary good faith. The seceders, who had many friends and relatives in the city, were induced through their mediation to accept an offer of reconciliation, and to return home; and they were all comprehended in a new act of amnesty, which was as faithfully observed as it was magnanimously granted. The merit of the former was at least shared by the Spartans; the last belonged entirely to Thrasybulus and his friends.

Peace and amnesty.

νωντο πεῖσαι, οὐ διαλλάξαι ἀλλ' ἀπολέσαι παρεσκευάζοντο τὴν πόλιν· εἰ μὴ δι' ἄνδρας ἀγαθούς

[1] II. 4. 43. *ὑστέρῳ δὲ χρόνῳ ἀκούσαντες ξένους μισθοῦσθαι τοὺς ἐν Ἐλευσῖνι, στρατευσάμενοι παυδημεὶ ἐπ' αὐτοὺς τοὺς μὲν στρατηγοὺς αὐτῶν ἐς λόγους ἐλθόντας ἀπέκτειναν . . .*

CHAPTER XXXII.

RETROSPECTIVE SURVEY OF THE INTERNAL CONDITION OF ATHENS DURING THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR, CARRIED FORWARD TO THE RENEWAL OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN ATHENS AND SPARTA.

State of Athens at the Close of the War.— The Assembly.— The Demagogues.— Grievances of the Rich.— The Council of Five Hundred.— The Courts of Justice.— The Sycophants.— The Athenian Character.— State of public Feeling at the Restoration.— The Areopagus.— Revision of the Laws.— Case of Lysias.— Observance of the Amnesty.— Political Trials.— Prosecution of Eratosthenes, Agoratus, and Nicomachus.— Of the Son of Alcibiades.— Of Andocides.— Agyrrhius.— Prosecution of Ergocles.— The Family of Nicias.— Oligarchical Spirit.— Aristophanes.— His poetical Character.— And political Views.— Efforts for Peace.— For the Revival of ancient Manners.— The Sophists.— Attacked by Aristophanes.— Euripides.— His Connection with the Sophists.— Socrates.— Attacked by Aristophanes.— Religious Opinions of Socrates.— Growth of Superstition at Athens.— Intolerance.— Prosecution of Socrates.— The Genius of Socrates.— Causes of his Condemnation.— His Death.

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State of Athens at the close of the war.

THE state of Athens after the expulsion of the Thirty, was in some respects apparently less desolate than that in which she had been left after the battle of Platæa. It is possible indeed that the invasions of Xerxes and Mardonius, may have inflicted less injury on her territory than the methodical and lingering ravages of the Peloponnesians during the Decelean war. But in 479 the city, as well as the country, had been, for a part of two consecutive years, in the power of an irritated enemy. All that it required, both for ornament and defence, was to be raised afresh from the ground. Yet the treasury

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was empty: commerce had probably never yet yielded any considerable supplies, and it had been deeply disturbed by the war; the state possessed no dependent colonies or tributary allies, and was watched with a jealous eye by the most powerful of its confederates. Nevertheless it was impossible for an Athenian patriot to compare the situation and prospects of his country at these two epochs without a sigh. In 479 Athens was mistress of a navy which gave her the pre-eminence over all the maritime states of Greece, and enabled her to carry her arms against any part of the enemy's coasts, to which she might be invited by the prospect of plunder or conquest; and a little vigour and prudence was sufficient to secure the city itself against the hostility of Sparta. The exertions and sacrifices by which she had weakened herself, had also made her formidable to the barbarians, and had won for her the admiration, good-will, and confidence of the Grecian world. In 403, the city indeed stood untouched, except so far as the temples had been deprived of their ornaments and treasures by domestic spoilers. But its magnificence only attested the past greatness which seemed to have sunk for ever. All the sources of public and private wealth, except such as depended on a poor and wasted territory, and on the industry of individuals, were dried up. Not only were all those branches of the revenue which arose out of the sovereignty once exercised by Athens completely cut of—the influx of tribute, a great part of the fees of justice, the expenditure of the numerous foreigners who were drawn as suitors to the imperial city—but Athenian citizens whose property lay abroad, as appears to have been the case with a large class[1], were either wholly deprived of it, or were obliged in their turn to prosecute their claims, under the most

[1] Andoc. De Pace, p. 25., τὰ ἐγκτήματα καὶ τὰ χρέα. Xenophon, R A. i. 19. κτῆσις ἐν τοῖς ὑπερορίοις, and Conviv. iv. 31.

disadvantageous circumstances, at foreign tribunals. Commerce had not only been interrupted by the blockade, but had sustained still greater detriment from the tyranny of the Thirty, which had crushed or scared away the most opulent and industrious of the aliens; and the cloud which continued to hang over the prospects of the state, even after freedom and tranquillity had been restored, tended to discourage those who might have been willing to return. The public distress was such, that it was with the greatest difficulty the council could provide ways and means for the ordinary expenses.[1] Even the ancient sacrifices prescribed by the sacred canons were intermitted, because the treasury could not furnish three talents for their celebration[2]; and the repayment of a loan of two talents, which had been advanced by the Thebans, probably in aid of the exiles[3], was so long delayed through the same cause, that hostilities were threatened for the purpose of recovering the debt. The navy of Athens had now sunk to a fourth of that which she had maintained before the time of Solon, and it was limited to this footing by a compact which could not be broken or eluded without imminent danger. Piræus was again unfortified; the arsenal was in ruins[4]; even the city walls needed repairs, which could not be undertaken for want of money; and on all sides were enemies who rejoiced in her humiliation, and were urged both by their passions and interests to prevent her from again lifting up her head.

We have already endeavoured to point out the connection of the principal steps which led to this cala-

[1] Lysias Nicom. p. 185.

[2] Lysias l. c. *πέρυσιν ἱερὰ ἄθυτα τριῶν ταλάντων γεγένηται τῶν ἐν ταῖς κύρβεσι γεγραμμένων.* Bremi on this passage, and Schneider on Xen. De R. A. III. 8., conclude from it that three talents was the whole sum allowed by Solon for the public sacrifices of the year. Boeckh considers it as the cost of a single sacrifice, Public Econ. of Ath. II. 12.

[3] See Plut. Lys. 27.

[4] But see above, p. 174. Demosth. c. Aristocr. p. 689., mentions the *νεώσοικοι* as if they had suffered little damage.

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mitous reverse, and we traced them to the policy of Pericles, though not so as to exclude the operation of causes which no human foresight could have guarded against. We must now take a nearer view of the manner in which his system worked, and of the changes it underwent during this period; and we shall be led to contemplate some features in the intellectual progress of Athenian society, which were intimately connected with this portion of its political history.

Pericles made few, if any, innovations in the Athenian constitution. The importance of the changes which he introduced into the jurisdiction of the Areopagus, has probably been much exaggerated through the heat of the contest which they excited at the time. But the influence of his administration continued to be long felt—perhaps we may say never ceased to manifest itself—in the spirit of the government, and the views and tastes of the people. The power of the popular Assembly, on which his own was founded, had already in his lifetime reached its utmost extent, and was henceforth only capable of restriction. But the composition and character of the Assembly were considerably affected by the events of the war, and by the manner in which it was conducted under his system. We have already observed that one of the consequences which arose from the ravages of the pestilence, was that foreigners found it easy to gain admission to the franchise, either by legal means or through artifice and connivance. The latter class of cases appears to have been the commonest, as is indicated by the great number of distinguished persons whom we find charged with this kind of fraud; and it is probable that these new citizens crept in chiefly from the lower ranks. What proportion they bore to those of genuine Attic blood, it is impossible to determine. But the same facility

The Assembly.

either of evading the law, or of obtaining the franchise by favour of the people, seems to have subsisted throughout the war. A much more important change however, in the elements of which the Assembly was ordinarily composed, was produced by the measures of Pericles, which drove a large part of the rural population into the city, where few could find employment, and most of them sank into the lowest class of the Athenian populace. The number of citizens of the higher and middle order who were usually absent from Athens in the fleets, armies, and garrisons, must likewise be taken into account, when we are estimating the effects of the war on the character of the Assembly; and it may be added, that the weight of the public burdens was continually depressing all private fortunes, except those which were raised by dishonest arts, to a lower level, and reduced many to indigence. That in the course of the war the poorer class began to preponderate, seems to be indicated by an innovation which took place probably toward the end of this period, though we do not know either its precise date, or any thing more of its author, Callistratus, than his name, which was one common to several Athenians of this age.[1] To him is ascribed the introduction of pay for attendance in the Assembly; and whether the object of this measure was to provide for the more regular transaction of public business, or merely to gratify the multitude, it was alarming as a symptom, and baneful in its consequences. The remuneration which each member of the sovereign body received for the exercise of his functions, under the law of Callistratus, was no more than a single obolus. It would seem to follow that the persons to whom this trifling sum held out such an attraction as might be expected to secure their pre-

[1] See Boeckh, Public Econ. of Ath. II. 14.

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sence, formed either a majority, or a very considerable part of every Assembly.

We may however be in danger of drawing very erroneous inferences from these facts, if we do not bear in mind, that at Athens the wealthy citizens possessed few peculiar advantages of education, and that poverty was accounted an evil indeed, but not a disgrace.[1] The poorest Athenian had means of refining his taste, cultivating his understanding, and acquiring information concerning public affairs, superior to those enjoyed by the great mass of persons in the middle class among ourselves. The Assembly, the courts of justice, the theatres, the market-place, the *lesche*, were so many schools of practical knowledge, as well as of eloquence and wit, which were open to all alike, and were perhaps most frequented by the lowest class. And in fact it is not to the ignorance or incapacity of the sovereign body that the mistakes committed in the management of the war are to be ascribed. There is another point connected with this subject on which prejudices have sometimes been entertained, which it may be useful to correct. The character of Pericles was so noble, that the sway which he exercised was no less honourable to the people than to himself. But among the popular leaders who succeeded him we find several who are represented as men of low, and even servile origin, mean condition, slender abilities, coarse manners, and profligate conduct. And their ascendency may be thought to prove the growing degeneracy of the people, or the predominance of a similar class of persons in the Assembly. But there are two errors which we have to guard against with respect to these demagogues. In the first place, it is probable that we are used to view them in a false light, and that

The demagogues.

[1] So Pericles in Thucyd. II. 40. τὸ πένεσθαι οὐχ ὁμολογεῖν τινι αἰσχρὸν, ἀλλὰ μὴ διαφεύγειν ἔργῳ αἴσχιον.

they were not in general so despicable as, through the force of certain associations, we are apt to consider them. Many of them indeed were engaged in trade. Thus Lysicles and Eucrates, who rose for a short time to some degree of political eminence immediately after the death of Pericles, dealt, the one in cattle[1], the other in flax and bran[2]; Cleon was a tanner, Hyperbolus a lamp-maker[3], Cleophon a manufacturer of lyres.[4] Their occupations afforded a topic of ridicule to their contemporaries, and are often treated as a sufficient evidence of their unfitness for the part which they took in public business. Some of their names indeed cannot be rescued from infamy. Hyperbolus labours under the charge not only of political profligacy, but of private dishonesty in the exercise of his trade[5]; and the epithet which Thucydides applies to him[6], implies that he was capable of any baseness; nor have we any reason to believe that his want of probity was covered by any shining or useful talents. But as far as we know there was nothing in his station, or in that of the rest, to exclude the highest qualifications of an Athenian statesman. It seems rather to deserve notice as a proof of the tenacity of aristocratical prejudices, that, in such a state as Athens, no earlier instance occurs in which candidates for public favour came forward from the same rank; that the people could be expected to join in the laugh raised at the expense of the demagogues on this ground; and that even after the Peloponnesian war,

[1] Lysicles, *ὁ προβατοπώλης*, Schol. Aristoph. Equ. 132., who mentions a Callias who was by some supposed to be alluded to by the poet. But Lysicles is elsewhere described as *ὁ προβατοκάπηλος*, Plut. Nic. 2.

[2] *Στυππειοπώλης* (hence nicknamed *στύππαξ*) *κυρηβιοπώλης* (*μυλωνάρης*), Schol. Aristoph. Equ. 129. 253, 254.

[3] *Λυχνοποιὸς, λυχνοπώλης*: according to Schol. Arist. Equ. 1301. *κεραμεύς*· but this is perhaps a false conjecture of Schol. Arist. Nub. 1061.

[4] *Λυροποιός*.

[5] He is said to have mixed lead with the copper of his lamps to cheat his customers. Schol. Ar. Nub. 1051.

[6] VIII. 73. *μοχθηρὸν ἄνθρωπον*. So Aristoph. Equ. 1301. *μοχθηρὸν πολίτην ὀξίνην Τπέρβολον*.

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Andocides should be found deploring the dishonour which had befallen his hereditary mansion, when during his absence it was inhabited by Cleophon the *lyre-maker*.[1] But it must be remembered that, according to the expression of the Roman satyrist, Lysias and Demosthenes were brought up at the forge.[2] Cleon himself was probably no contemptible orator, and Thucydides did not scruple to put a very artful and dignified harangue in his mouth; and if Lysicles, by means of an union which he contracted with Aspasia after the death of Pericles, became in any sense the first of the Athenians[3], notwithstanding the meanness of his extraction, his mind cannot have been previously uncultivated.

The contrast therefore between Pericles and the demagogues who succeeded him may not have been in this respect so glaring as has been commonly supposed.[4] On the other hand the nature of their popularity has frequently been misrepresented, and the extent of their power overrated. The influence of Pericles was grounded partly indeed on the measures by which he courted popular favour—which would have been equally agreeable if they had been proposed by any other man—but still more on the rare qualities of his genius and his character: on his eloquence, his military talents, his political experience, his prudence, his integrity, his serenity and greatness of soul. It was thus that he was enabled permanently to control the Assembly, and sometimes successfully to resist its declared wishes. No man ever appeared after him at the head of affairs who combined so

[1] Myst. p. 19.
[2] Juvenal, x. 130.
[3] Æschines (the Socratic), in Plut. Nic. 2.
[4] It deserves to be remarked, that the Scholiast of Aristophanes, in a note which seems to have been drawn from good sources (Pax, 680.), observes that it was with Hyperbolus the Athenians began to commit the administration of their affairs to worthless persons (φαύλοις, πρότερον δημαγωγούντων πάνυ λαμπρῶν πολιτῶν), who would thus seem to include Lysicles, Eucrates, and Cleon himself — for it is said before: οὗτος μετὰ τὴν τοῦ Κλέωνος δυναστείαν διεδέξατο τὴν δημαγωγίαν.

many claims to general confidence and respect. But with regard to the demagogues who succeeded him in the period which we are now reviewing, it is clear that, with one exception, none of them possessed any personal influence, or was indebted for the degree of favour he enjoyed to any other instruments than the arts with which he flattered the passions of the people. The Athenians seem very well to have understood the character of their servants and courtiers, and, even when they were following the worst guidance, not to have bestowed their good-will and esteem upon unworthy objects. Nicias and Cleon, though neither of them in any respect equalled Pericles, may be considered as representing, one the better, the other the worse side of his public character and policy. The boisterous, impudent, dishonest, ferocious, demagogue often, perhaps generally, prevailed in the Assembly over the calm, prudent, and upright statesman; but it was not because he stood highest in public opinion. As the history of the Sicilian expedition shows that the merits of Nicias were at least not underrated, so the scene which gave occasion to the expedition against Sphacteria, proves that the people were not blind to Cleon's worthlessness. The tradition that the ostracism fell into disuse, because it was universally considered as degraded when it had been employed to expel Hyperbolus, indicates perhaps still more strongly the estimation in which he was held. Such men were only favourites with the multitude, because they ministered fuel to its vices. The man whose personal influence was greatest, the only one who was regarded with a feeling of fondness, which even the deepest injuries could never entirely extinguish, was a demagogue of a very different stamp; the noble, refined, accomplished Alcibiades. It would be hard to reproach the Athenians with a partiality

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which Socrates was not ashamed to acknowledge; yet the counsels of Alcibiades led them into measures more injurious to their interest and their honour, than any which were ever proposed by Cleon, or Hyperbolus, or Cleophon; for he was the author of the Sicilian expedition, and the Melian massacre.[1]

But it was the very calamity of the times that no extraordinary abilities, or eminent merit of any kind, were needed to pursue the track which had been opened by Pericles; the vilest and feeblest demagogue might easily go beyond him in the same course, and could thus gain the ear of the Assembly, and acquire an habitual ascendency over it. The smallest of the evils which ensued was, that the people grew more and more extravagant in its aims, elated with a more presumptuous confidence, more impatient of resistance to its will, and more furious in its resentment against those who opposed it. A still more pernicious result was, that the public affairs were conducted on a false principle, that the real and permanent interests of the whole commonwealth were postponed to the apparent and temporary advantage of a class, the largest indeed, but still only one, which was thus placed in a hostile position toward the wealthier citizens, who felt themselves burdened and aggrieved, and became on that account objects of a well-founded distrust, as disaffected to a government in which they had so little share, and from which they suffered such harsh treatment.[2] Even in time of peace the rich Athenian was somewhat heavily

Grievances of the rich.

[1] See Vol. III. p. 361., where a reference should have been added to Andocides, Alcib. p. 32.

[2] A humorous picture of the advantages which poverty enjoyed over wealth at Athens is given by Xenophon in his Banquet, iv. 30. under the person of Charmides (probably a different person from the cousin of Critias,) who had experienced both conditions, having been deprived of his property abroad (τὰ ὑπερόρια) and of the enjoyment of his estates in Attica (τὰ ἔγγαια) by the war. This has been treated as a very important testimony by several writers, who have neglected to mention that at the end Charmides, being asked by his host whether he does not pray that he may never be rich again, answers: *Not so; I am very ready to run the risk.*

taxed for the mere amusement of the less opulent, under the system of *liturgies:* the name given at Athens to those public services which demanded both money and personal attention from the contributor, and which were often accompanied with much trouble and anxiety. We will not trespass on a field of antiquarian learning which has been very fully and ably explored, to repeat any of the details belonging to this copious subject. We shall only observe that the theatrical, musical, and gymnastic exhibitions, and other recreations connected with the religious festivals, which at Athens were more numerous than in any other Greek city[1], were all so many occasions on which some or other of the wealthy citizens—according to an order determined by the law, which provided for the equable distribution of the burden, as well as for the performance of the duty[2]—were responsible, with their purse and their time, for some essential part of the entertainment expected by the people. Yet the weight of this impost, though it was sufficient to press sensibly even on the largest fortunes, was relieved by its graceful and liberal form: by the opportunity which it afforded of exercising a refined taste, by the emulation excited, the applause, and reputation, which were earned by the successful competitors. But the pressure of the war taxes, which fell upon the rich in various shapes, both in the expense of military and naval equipments, and in extraordinary pecuniary contributions[3], which were levied whenever the treasury was exhausted, was still heavier, and was not mitigated by so many alleviating circumstances;

[1] De Rep. Ath. III. ἄγουσι ἑορτὰς δισχιλίους ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι, which must be interpreted by the previous more moderate statement, ὅσας οὐδεμία τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων. Plato Alc. II. p. 148. πλείστας μὲν θυσίας καὶ καλλίστας τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἄγομεν ἀναθήμασί τε κεκοσμήκαμεν τὰ ἱερὰ αὐτῶν, ὡς οὐδένες ἄλλοι, πομπάς τε πολυτελεστάτας καὶ σεμνοτάτας ἑδωροὑμεθα τοῖς θεοῖς ἀν' ἕκαστον ἔτος, καὶ ἐτελοῦμεν χρήματα ὅσα οὐδ' οἱ ἄλλοι ξύμπαντες Ἕλληνες.

[2] By the διαδικασία (De Rep. Ath. III. 4.) and the ἀντίδοσις.

[3] Εἰσφοραί.

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though undoubtedly the trierarchy was not without its honours and advantages, to counterbalance its cost, cares, and toils. At the same time, the value of their estates in Attica was greatly reduced by the enemy's ravages, which, in the latter years of the war, entirely deprived them of the enjoyment of their landed property.[1] Their losses were embittered by the reflection, that it was not to the public good, but chiefly to the ambition and cupidity of the demagogues, that their patrimonies were sacrificed. The motives which led such demagogues as Cleon to promote the continuance of war, are manifest enough, and have been already pointed out. To the people of all classes, upon a sober view of their own interests, peace should have appeared much more desirable.[2] But they were urged to prosecute the contest by a variety of inducements, which, in every posture of public affairs, furnished plausible arguments to the advocates of war. It was sometimes jealousy of Sparta, sometimes resentment against her or her allies, sometimes the prospect of conquests which promised an increase of revenue, that afforded a ground for rejecting pacific overtures, or for renewing hostilities; and even when the need of peace became most pressing, when nothing could be reasonably hoped, and the worst was to be feared, from war, there was still a motive by which the Assembly might be deterred from sheathing the sword; and it was of such a nature as to appear strongest when all others failed. For it was in seasons of danger and distress that suspicions of treasonable designs were most readily entertained, and that there was really most reason to feel some anxiety for the safety of the constitution. This indeed seems to have been very early a common topic with the demagogues and

[1] Lysias ὑπὲρ τοῦ σηκοῦ. p. 108. τὰ μὲν ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων ἐτέμνετο, τὰ δ' ἐγγὺς ὑπὸ τῶν φίλων διηρπάζετο.

[2] Aristoph, Pax 619.

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sycophants; though we do not think the humorous exaggeration of the comic poet, from whom we learn this fact[1], sufficient ground for believing that the people lived in a continual feverish dread of conspiracies against its liberty.[2] But a vague opinion had at length prevailed, so as to be publicly assumed as an acknowledged truth, that a state of war with Sparta was, if not absolutely necessary, at least the most favourable to the security of the democracy[3]; and whoever raised his voice for peace, exposed himself to the imputation of oligarchical principles, and perhaps of an intention to use the negotiation with the enemy as a cover for a treasonable correspondence. The people was thus entangled in a maze, from which it could scarcely be extricated without a violent convulsion; the precautions taken to guard against the machinations of the disaffected, tended to increase their number and their malignity.

The council of Five Hundred.

We have already observed, that the Council of Five Hundred, though, according to the design of Solon's institution, it was to prepare all the measures which passed through the Assembly, really exercised very little control over its proceedings, because a proposal sent down from the Council might be modified at the pleasure of the sovereign body[4]; and it even appears that a decree might be first moved in the

[1] Aristoph. Vesp. 488. 502. — Equ. 236.

[2] We could have wished for some better proof than the passages quoted from Aristophanes, for Wachsmuth's assertion (H. A. I. 2. p. 154.) "the people was always dreaming of conspiracies, and the loss of its absolute power: the words, *dissolution of the democracy* (*κατάλυσις τοῦ δήμου*) produced a feverish uneasiness."

[3] Andoc. De Pace, p. 23. *λέγουσι ὡς ἔστι δεινότατον τῷ δήμῳ, γενομένης εἰρήνης, ἣν νῦν οὖσα πολιτεία μὴ καταλυθῇ.*

[4] To satisfy the law which directed that every decree of the Assembly should be preceded by a resolution of the Council (*προβούλευμα*) on the subject, it was only held to be necessary, that the Council should make a proposition on which the Assembly might deliberate. But the Assembly was not bound simply to adopt or reject the proposed measure, but might immediately pass a decree of a totally different nature. To the examples of such a proceeding given by Schoemann (De Com. Ath. p. 98.) from a later period, may be added that of the decree moved by Euryptolemus (Xen. Hell. I. 7. 37.) in direct opposition to that which had been sent down from the Council for regulating the trial of the generals after the battle of Arginusæ.

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Assembly, and then be sent up to receive the formal sanction of the Council, which could not be withheld; or at least that the Assembly took upon itself to prescribe the subjects which the Council should propose in the usual form for its deliberation.[1] Still there was one important part of Solon's constitution which seems hitherto to have remained almost untouched[2]: the business of legislation, including the revision of the laws, still continued to be committed to a select body drawn from the Heliæa, and it does not appear that the Assembly had deliberately attempted to encroach upon its province, though it is probable that decrees were sometimes passed, which would more properly have been called laws.[3] The security afforded by this institution against rash innovations and the excessive multiplication of the laws, was indeed extremely valuable, though imperfect. But its beneficial effects were in a great measure counteracted by the vicious administration of the laws in the courts of justice, which introduced uncertainty and confusion into all the relations and transactions of private life, and contributed more than any other cause to the public disasters, while it corrupted

The courts of justice.

[1] So we find the Assembly decreeing that the Council should bring in a proposal (*προβουλεύσασαν εἰσενεγκεῖν*) for regulating the proceedings against the generals (Xen. Hell. I. 7. 7.); and yet, after it was brought in, it was as liable as any other to be rejected or totally altered.

[2] See Vol. II. p. 52. We ought perhaps to have noticed that according to Wolf's view (in his Prolegomena to the Oration against Leptines, p. CXXXV.) the business of legislation was committed by Solon to the Council and the Assembly, and was only at a later period transferred to a section of the Heliæa, under the regulations which we have described. That the reverse of this was the case, appears to us clear, not only from the testimonies adduced by Schoemann (De Com. Ath. p. 266.) but from the whole tenor of Athenian history, which shows a perpetual tendency in the Assembly to enlarge its powers. The new practice of which Demosthenes complains, and to which he ascribes the frequent changes of the laws in his own day, is evidently no other than what Wolf considers as the ancient institution. Xenophon indeed, or whoever else is the author of the treatise De Rep. Athen. speaks, III. 2., of deliberations about the enactment of laws, as forming a considerable part of the business of the Council (*τὴν βουλὴν βουλεύεσθαι πολλὰ περὶ νόμων θέσεως*). But it is not even certain that the word *νόμοι* is here to be taken in its strict sense.

[3] Such, according to Xenophon's description (Hell. I. 7. 21.) was the decree of Cannonus.

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the character of the people.[1] Solon, when he regulated the constitution of the tribunals, seems to have thought it desirable that every citizen of mature age should from time to time be called upon to discharge the functions of a juror, and to have apprehended no danger from the great number of persons who were to be invested with them at the same time, but rather to have considered this as an additional safeguard against venality and fraud. And in fact it was not until near the end of the war, that verdicts were obtained by direct bribery: a practice which appears to have had its origin in the oligarchical associations which began to be formed, or to acquire a new character, in that period.[2] But Solon relied on the authority of the magistrates, the simplicity and notoriety of the laws, and above all on the public spirit and pure intentions of the large assemblies whom he intrusted with the administration of justice. He calculated on the state of things which existed in his own day, but which was afterwards entirely changed, when the judicial duties of the presiding magistrates became merely formal; when the numerous body which was drawn indiscriminately from all classes, and therefore chiefly from the lowest, to decide a cause affecting life or property without appeal and without responsibility, was left wholly to its own discretion, which was neither enlightened nor controlled by any superior; when the laws became more multifarious and complicated; but especially when the spirit of the people had begun to degenerate, had contracted a

[1] The friends of a client of Isocrates represent to him, *ὡς πολλὰ παρὰ γνώμην ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ἀποβαίνει, καὶ ὅτι τύχῃ μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ δικαίῳ κρίνεται τὰ παρ' ὑμῖν.* c. Callim. § 12.

[2] Diodorus, XIII. 64. and Aristotle (in Harpocration *Δεκάζων*) refer the origin of the practice to Anytus, whose case was probably the first in which it was known to have been used. At the time when the treatise De Rep. Athen. was written, the multitude of the jurors was considered as a sufficient obstacle to it. Yet according to Schneider's highly probable correction of the passage, III. 7., the terms *δεκάζειν* and *συνδεκάζειν* were then already current.

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wrong bias, had lost its early reverence for truth and right, and had become capable of sacrificing them to its interest and its passions.

The corruption of the Athenian courts of justice probably began with that great extension of their business which took place when the greater part of the allies had lost their independence, and were compelled to resort to Athens for the determination of all important causes. At the same time the increase of wealth and the enlargement of commerce multiplied the occasions of litigation at home. The taste of the people began to be more and more interested in forensic proceedings, even before it was attracted toward them by any other inducement. The pay of the jurors introduced by Pericles strengthened this impulse by a fresh motive, which, when Cleon had tripled its amount, acted more powerfully, and on a larger class. A considerable number of citizens then began to look to the exercise of their judicial functions as a regular source both of pleasure and profit. Several very pernicious consequences arose from this bent of mind, when it prevailed in the majority. It created a prepossession in favour of the party who brought his case before the court, and particularly of the persons who most frequently appeared there as claimants or accusers. It fostered a habit of viewing judicial business as a pastime, and of paying more attention to the manner in which a cause was conducted than to its merits. The taste of an Athenian audience on all literary subjects was correct and fastidious; it was keenly sensible of all the beauties of expression, and could not tolerate any deviation from the strictest propriety of language. But among the Athenians, as among the Greeks in general, the faculty of weighing the force of arguments and evidence was rare, and it was little cultivated by the practice of the popular tribunals. Even

in their best mood the Athenians came to the hearing of a cause with a disposition too like that with which they took their places at the theatre to compare the compositions of rival poets; and in later times, at least, a skilful advocate seized every opportunity of interspersing his pleading with long poetical quotations.[1] Such hearers were easily dazzled by eloquence, and when their attention had been diverted from the state of the question by the art of the orator, it was never recalled to the point at issue by the presiding magistrate, whose duties were confined to the preliminaries of the trial and the reception of the verdict.

But the prevalence of this frivolous habit was not the worst fault of the Athenian courts. In the most important class of cases, the criminal prosecutions, they were seldom perfectly impartial, and their ordinary bias was against the defendant. This general tendency to rigour, which appeared both in their verdicts and judgments, arose, independently of the cause which has been already mentioned, from the desire of exercising their power in the manner which rendered it most formidable, and which raised the importance of all the individuals who shared it.[2] Even this propensity however was not so odious as another motive by which it appears to have been frequently seconded. The juror in the discharge of his office did not forget his quality of citizen, and was not indifferent to the manner in which the issue of a trial might affect the public revenue, and thus he leaned toward decisions which replenished the treasury with confiscations and pecuniary penalties,

[1] Spengel (*Artium Scriptores*, p. 20.) observes, that if we judge from the remains of the orators, we should believe that this practice did not begin much before the age of Demosthenes; a large class of cases hardly admitted of it; and no instances of it are found either in Lysias or Andocides, much less could they be expected in Isæus. But the taste of the Athenian courts in the time of Aristophanes is sufficiently proved by his allusions in the Vesp. 579.

[2] De Rep. Ath. i. 18. Aristoph. Vesp. 554.

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while they also served to terrify and humble the wealthy class which he viewed with jealousy and envy. It was more especially in trials for political offences that these motives most frequently co-operated in their full force to the defendant's ruin. A large fortune was both an object of cupidity, and of itself raised a suspicion of disaffection toward the democracy, which was sufficient to cover many defects in the evidence brought against the possessor, unless he could show that he had reduced his income by voluntary and liberal sacrifices for the public benefit. This iniquitous prejudice was not only the cause of many unjust sentences, but subjected the rich to a kind of persecution, which was continually threatening their peace, even if it did not actually assail them. For on this notorious temper of the courts was grounded the power of the infamous sycophants who lived by extortion, and generally singled out, as the objects of their attacks, the opulent citizens of timid natures and quiet habits, who were both unable to plead for themselves, and shrank from a public appearance. Such persons might indeed procure the aid of an advocate, but they commonly thought it better to purchase the silence of the informer—unless they could shelter themselves by such an expedient as that which Socrates suggested to his friend Crito[1]—than to expose themselves to the risk and the certain inconvenience of a trial. The resident aliens were not exempt from this annoyance; and, though they were not objects of fear or jealousy, they were placed under many disadvantages in a contest with an Athenian prosecutor.[2] But the noble and affluent citizens of

The sycophants.

[1] See above, p. 114. It is not clear that the thought was new, but the expedient cannot have been very frequently employed before.

[2] Cleon in Aristoph. Equ. 347. seems to treat the management of a cause against an alien as the easiest kind of practice in which a rising sycophant usually acquired the rudiments of his art — *εἴ που δικίδιον εἶπας εὖ κατὰ ξένου μετοίκου . . . φοῦ δυνατὸς εἶναι λέγειν.*

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the subject states, above all, had reason to tremble at the thought of being summoned to Athens, to meet any of the charges which it was easy to devise against them, and connect with an imputation of hostile designs or disloyal sentiments; and they were ready to stop the mouths of the orators with gold.[1] The states themselves might often find it necessary to gain the protection of a powerful demagogue against the oppressive demands of the sovereign city, as we know Cleon was once bribed by some of the islanders to exert his influence to relieve them from an extraordinary impost; and the commanders of the Athenian squadrons, especially those who were employed in collecting contributions from the allies, had unbounded opportunities of enriching themselves by the terror which their presence inspired.

There is no room for doubt as to the existence of the evils and vices we have been describing, though the most copious information we possess on the subject is drawn not from purely historical sources, but from the dramatic satires of Aristophanes. But there may still be a question as to the measure of allowance to be made for comic exaggeration, or political prejudices, in the poet; and it seems probable that the colours in which he has painted his countrymen are in some respects too dark. If we should be willing to believe that the people, instead of being blinded by the demagogues, acted on a Turkish system toward them, and connived at their peculation and extortion in the prospect of afterwards reaping the fruits of their crimes while it punished the delinquents[2], we should still require stronger evidence to satisfy us, that what we have considered merely as a bias which perverted the administration of justice, was accompanied with a

[1] Pax. 622. *τῶν δὲ ξυμμάχων ἔσειον τοὺς παχεῖς καὶ πλουσίους, αἰτίας ἂν προστίθεντες, ὡς φρονοῖ τὰ Βρασίδου . . . οἱ δὲ . . . χρυσίῳ τῶν ταῦτα ποιούντων ἐβύουν τὸ στόμα.*

[2] Aristoph. Eq. 1117. foll.

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distinct consciousness of its nature and tendency, and that the Athenian courts in all their proceedings deliberately obeyed the foulest motives, and must be looked upon as dens of robbery and murder. That the mass of the people had not sunk to this degree of depravity, may we think be inferred from the grief and indignation which it is recorded to have shown on some occasions, where it had been misled into an unjust sentence, by which it stained itself with innocent blood: as Callixenus, who however was not worse than other sycophants, though he was among those who returned after the expulsion of the Thirty, and enjoyed the benefit of the amnesty, died, universally hated, of hunger. This conclusion will be confirmed by facts which we shall soon have to relate. The Athenian character had undoubtedly been much corrupted by the influence of the most unfavorable circumstances to which the virtue of a nation was ever exposed, which may perhaps all be traced to the first signal breach of faith and justice by which the contributions of the allies had been diverted into the Athenian treasury; but still the portrait in which Parrhasius endeavoured to represent the lights and shades with which it was singularly chequered, was probably not less applicable to the people in this than in any other stage of its history: if it was fickle, passionate, often unjust, it was still always capable of mercy and pity; a compound of generosity and meanness, and of numberless other contrasts, which by turns excited regard and indignation, admiration and contempt in the beholder.[1]

The Athenian character.

The danger with which the state had been threatened by the disastrous event of the Sicilian expedition had, as we have seen, awakened a spirit of more sober

[1] Plin. N. H. xxxvi. 10. Pinxit et Demon Athenienſium argumento quoque ingenioso. Volebat namque varium, iracundum, injustum, inconstantem, eundemque exorabilem, clementem, misericordem, excelsum, gloriosum, humilem, ferocem, fugacemque, et omnia simul ostendere.

reflection, which appeared not only in the measures immediately adopted for the public safety, but in the patience with which the people afterwards listened to proposals for a reform of the constitution, and submitted to that limitation of the democracy which was retained after the oligarchy of the Four Hundred had been overthrown. But the calamitous issue of the war, the sufferings of the siege, and of the terrible period which ensued, were still more adapted to direct general attention toward the causes of these evils, and to produce an earnest inquiry after a remedy for the inward disorders out of which they had mainly arisen. And accordingly after the expulsion of the Thirty there was not wanting in the body of the people a strong disposition to profit by past experience, to correct abuses, and to guard against their recurrence. Perhaps if the past could have been really buried in oblivion, or the feelings which it excited could have been perfectly allayed, it might not have been difficult to devise measures which would have secured a better state of things for the future, without either the sacrifice of liberty, or any material encroachment on popular rights. The immediate source of the evil, as seems to have been almost universally felt and acknowledged, lay in the predominance of the demagogues and sycophants.[1] To prevent the revival of their sway, it would have been necessary above all things to reform the constitution of the courts of justice, and at least to give property so much weight in them, as would have sufficed to counterbalance the influence of mercenary motives. Another safeguard against popular levity would have been obtained, if the qualification required for admission to the Council had been newly regulated on a like principle, and its prerogatives

[1] Lysias περὶ δήμ. κατ. p. 174. πᾶσιν ἤδη φανερόν ἐστιν, ὅτι διὰ μὲν τοὺς ἀδίκως πολιτευομένους ἐν τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ δημοκρατία γίγνεται, διὰ δὲ τοὺς ἐν τῇ δημοκρατίᾳ συκοφαντοῦντας ὀλιγαρχία δὶς κατέστη.

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enlarged, so as to enable it more efficaciously to direct the proceedings of the Assembly. If to such measures had been added some provision for the more economical application of the public revenue, and for compelling the poorer citizens to resort to pursuits of honest industry for their subsistence, the Assembly might perhaps have been safely left in possession of its ancient functions. The government would then have become a polity, while it would have preserved one of the most essential and most valued characters of a pure democracy.

State of public feeling at the Restoration.

Changes of this kind might perhaps have been practicable if there had been wisdom and virtue enough in the leading men to make a patriotic use of the opportunity for salutary innovation which presented itself at the close of the war. But after the revolution which has been described in the preceding chapter, the time for such an attempt had gone by. The people had been taught that the worst abuses of the old democracy were light in comparison with the excesses of an oligarchical government. Their experience in the artifices of the oligarchical faction led them to view every limitation of their political privileges as a step toward the bondage from which they had just escaped.[1] To part with any portion of their power, and especially to transfer it to the class to which their late oppressors belonged, would at this juncture have been deemed the height of frenzy. A proposal indeed was made by one of the party of Piræus, named Phormisius, to restrict the enjoyment of political rights to the owners of land. This measure would have excluded 5000 citizens from the full franchise. Strong intimations were given, in a form, as it would seem, almost amounting to a threat, that it would be highly accept-

[1] As Lycurgus says, c. Leocr. p. 165. πεπειραμένοι καὶ εἰδότες τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς ἐφόδους τῶν τὸν δῆμον προδιδόντων.

able to the Spartan government.[1] But Lysias prepared a speech for one of his friends, a part of which has been preserved, in which it is treated as a death-blow to liberty, and an intolerable disgrace; and it seems to have found no effectual support. The first condition of future prosperity, even in the judgment of upright and enlightened men, was to keep the old constitution entire; the second, to restore it to its primitive purity, and to adopt such precautions as were consistent with its safety against the abuses which had crept into its practice. Such appears to have been the tone and the feeling which prevailed for some time after the civil war. The termination of the Anarchy[2] was to be the beginning of a new period, a reign of law and order, under which the pests which had long afflicted and dishonoured the commonwealth were never to be seen again. Nor were these mere empty professions accompanied by no attempt to carry them into effect. The sincerity of the people's intentions manifested itself, if not in the most judicious manner, yet by several unequivocal proofs.

The first object of public attention was the state of the laws. Nicomachus, as we have seen, had not completed his task before it was interrupted by the establishment of the oligarchy. Notwithstanding the services which he had rendered to the oligarchical faction in the case of Cleophon, he had been compelled by the Thirty to quit Athens, and had returned with the companions of Thrasybulus. One of the first measures of the restored Assembly was to pass a decree, on the motion of one Tisamenus[3], who, like

[1] Dionys. De Lys. Jud. 32.

[2] For the meaning of this term see the Appendix, *On the interval between the surrender of Athens, and the appointment of the Thirty.*

[3] Andocides, Myst. p. 11. The description which the orator gives of the decrees which were passed on the subject of the new legislation, does not perfectly tally with that of Tisamenus, which is afterwards inserted at length. Andocides seems to speak only of alterations and omissions which were found necessary; Tisamenus of additions to the old laws. The law of Diocles cited by Demo-

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Nicomachus, had filled the office of a public scribe, which,—after declaring that the Athenians were henceforth to be governed by their hereditary institutions, and would retain not only the laws of Solon, but his weights and measures, together with the statutes of Draco which had been heretofore in use—directed that a legislative committee, to be appointed by the Council, should examine the existing laws, and should propose any changes which they might think proper. These alterations or additions, which were to be published within a month, were then to be submitted to the inspection of the Council and of another legislative body appointed by a more popular mode of election[1], and it was expressly provided that any private citizen, who thought he could offer useful suggestions, might assist them with his counsels. The whole code, when passed, was to be transcribed on the walls of a portico which had been before used for this purpose. The newly awakened reverence for antiquity which breathes through the decree, was still more strongly expressed by another clause, which directed that, when the laws should have been enacted, the council of Areopagus should watch over them, and see that the magistrates carried them into execution. The Areopagus, which, since its authority had been reduced by Ephialtes, had discharged its remaining functions in great obscurity, though it had maintained its ancient character of strict probity and sober judgment[2], had again begun to attract notice during

The Areopagus.

sthenes, Timocr. p. 713., repeats the most important provisions of the decree of Tisamenus — for the *νόμοι οἱ πρὸ Εὐκλείδου τεθέντες ἐν δημοκρατί* are no others than those of Solon — and only adds a clause as to the date from which those passed after the archonship of Euclides were to come into force.

[1] Andoc. Myst. p. 11. *οἱ νομοθέται οἱ πεντακόσιοι οὓς οἱ δημόται εἵλοντο.* This reminds us of that use of the word *δημόται* which is said by an ancient grammarian to have been peculiar to Xenophon, and which Schneider considers as the only argument, which he is not able to get rid of, for attributing the treatise De R. A. to him. Xenophon, vol. VI. p. 95.

[2] In the Memorab. III. 5. 20. Socrates asks Pericles the younger, first whether he is not aware, that the Areopagus is composed of citizens who have undergone the legal scrutiny (*δοκιμασία*); and then proceeds to inquire; *οἶσθα οὖν τινὰς κάλλιον ἢ νομιμώτερον ἢ σεμνότερον ἢ δικαιότερον τὰς τε δίκας δικάζοντας, καὶ τἆλλα πάντα πράττοντας*; *Οὐ μέμφομαι, ἔφη, τούτοις.*

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the siege by some steps—the precise nature of which is not explained by Lysias, from whom we learn the fact—for the public safety.[1] It was however probably not so much on account of the zeal it had displayed on this occasion, as with the view of bringing the constitution back as far as possible to its ancient form, that it was now invested with this indefinite power. In the mean while it seems that a different body, consisting of twenty persons, apparently resembling the kind of privy council which was created after the Sicilian expedition, was appointed with extraordinary authority as guardians of the public peace and safety, until the work of legislation should be completed.[2] That the laws in their new form might be a perpetual monument of the epoch at which they were restored, it was ordered on the motion of Archinus that they should be written with the enlarged or Ionian alphabet, which, in Solon's time, had not come into use in Attica, and was now first employed in state documents. Hence the archonship of Euclides, which followed the Anarchy, is memorable in a literary, as well as in a political point of view.

Revision of the laws.

Whether the legislators proceeded with their task so rapidly as the decree enjoined, is not certain; but at least the transcription of the laws appears to have occupied a longer time than had been expected, and we learn, not without surprise, that this delay was imputed to Nicomachus: that he was again entrusted with the office which he had discharged so ill before, and that he again abused it for his own advantage. He had filled it more than a year[3], when he was

[1] Eratosth p. 126. πραττούσης τῆς ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ βουλῆς σωτηρίαν.

[2] Andoc. Myst. p. 11. εἵλεσθε ἄνδρας εἴκοσι, τούτους δὲ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῆς πόλεως, ἕως ἂν οἱ νόμοι τεθεῖεν.

[3] Lysias, Nicom. p. 183, speaks first of a term of six years, and then of a term of four years, during which Nicomachus retained his office, though it had been limited to four months. It seems clear that the four years are included in the six, which were made up by the time which had elapsed since the Anarchy to the date of the trial. Wachsmuth (i. 2. 269.) supposes that both the four months and the

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called to account by a client of Lysias, from whose oration we derive our knowledge of his history. The orator charges him both with wilful tardiness and with arbitrary interpolations, committed not only before but since the Anarchy. But the only instance he mentions as belonging to the latter period, is one in which Nicomachus was not personally interested, and which he seems to have been ready to vindicate rather than to deny. He had changed the sum allotted by Solon for the public sacrifices from three to nine talents, and thus, according to the orator, had wantonly increased the burdens of the state, at a juncture when the treasury was unable to meet the most pressing demands. Tisamenus, though not involved in the accusation, is mentioned with contemptuous indignation as a colleague of Nicomachus. We cannot ascertain the real state of the case; but it is hardly possible to believe that the publication of the laws was so long delayed. Perhaps after the rest had been passed, Nicomachus may still have been engaged in the transcription of those which related to sacred things. However this may be, when the new code was finished, other enactments were annexed to it, for the purpose of guarding it from infringement and abuse. The magistrates were forbidden in any case to make use of an unwritten law. The law was declared to be of higher authority than the decrees of the Council and the Assembly; and no law was hereafter to be passed affecting a single individual, except by a majority of 6000 secret votes. Among the indications afforded by these legislative proceedings of the spirit of the times, may be mentioned the revival of the law which had been first proposed by Pericles, but had either been repealed

six years began after the Anarchy; but this seems inconsistent with the plainest allusions of the speech (ἐν δυοῖν ἐτοῖν πλείω ἤδη τοῦ δέοντος δώδεκα ταλάντοις ἀνάλωσε. p. 185.).

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for his sake, or had fallen into disuse, for limiting the franchise to the children of Athenian parents[1]; though it has been surmised[2] that this measure was chiefly pointed against the exiles, many of whom had probably returned with children born of foreign mothers; but it is certain that if it was originally retrospective, it was afterwards restricted in its operation to the period beginning with the archonship of Euclides.[3] A new decree, which was inscribed on a pillar in the Council-chamber[4], and which, if it had been passed at any other time, would have been a monument of extravagant folly, and of atrocious injustice, enabled any one who discovered another to be aiming at tyranny, or at the subversion of democracy, or at any kind of treachery toward the state, to kill him with impunity: and it seems that the citizens all took an oath to exercise this dreadful licence[5]: a measure which cannot be defended, but which seems to have been calculated more for a temporary impression on the public mind than for permanent force.

The zeal with which the people was animated for

[1] See Vol. III. p. 134. It was revived by Aristophon the Azenian.

[2] By Schæfer in Scheidewin's *Philologus*, I. 2. p. 189. (*Athenische Staatsmänner nach dem Peloponnesischen Kriege*).

[3] A decree to this effect is said (by Eumelus in the Schol. on Æschines c. Tim. § 39.) to have been passed on the motion of Nicomenes. Meineke (*Hist. Crit. Com. Græc.* p. 449. 3.) treats this as the same measure with that of Aristophon; as do C. F. Hermann (*Lehrbuch*, § 118.) and Meier (De Bon. Damn. p. 72.), both of whom follow the old and bad reading ἀπ' Εὐκλείδου instead of ἐπ' Εὐκλ. in Athenæus, XIII. p. 577. D. Schæfer (u. s. p. 190.) thinks that the decree of Nicomenes modified that of Aristophon.

[4] Lycurg. c. Leocr. p. 165. στήλης ἐν τῷ βουλευτηρίῳ. This was a refinement upon the ancient law of treason, which was inscribed on a column in front of the Council-chamber (ἐν τῇ στήλῃ ἔμπροσθεν τοῦ βουλευτηρίου. Andocides, Myst. p. 12.), and is attributed by Andocides to Solon, but had apparently been revived by Demophantus. See Meier de Bon. Damn. p. 3. foll. It only provided that whoever should bear office in the city, when democracy was abolished, might be killed with impunity, and that the slayer should be rewarded with the property of the deceased. Scheibe, p. 138., observes that it was necessary to declare this law invalid, (that is, to repeal it,) because all the oligarchs of the time of the Thirty would have incurred its penalty. But this seems to be a mistake. They would have been protected from its operation by the amnesty. It seems rather to have been superseded by the new and more stringent law, of which, singularly enough, Scheibe takes no notice.

[5] Ἐψηφίσαντο καὶ ὤμοσαν.

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the maintenance of the laws showed itself more especially in the temper with which the courts of justice continued for some time to receive impeachments brought against the authors of illegal propositions. In such cases the words of the law which was alleged to have been infringed were scrupulously weighed, and a very minute violation of its letter was sufficient to turn the verdict against the defendant.[1] A signal example of this severity occurred not long after the Anarchy. Lysias, by his sufferings, his services, and his talents, might fairly claim the honour of the Athenian franchise[2], which had been so often bestowed on worthless objects. Thrasybulus himself moved a decree for so rewarding him, which was carried. The proposal was perhaps suddenly suggested to him, and, confiding in the acknowledged merits of Lysias, and the favour of the Assembly, he thought it unnecessary to procure the preliminary vote of the Council, which the law required. On this ground he was impeached by Archinus of Cœle, his personal friend, the companion of his exile, who had himself proposed the recompence which was conferred on him and the partners of his enterprise against Phylé. There is no reason for believing that Archinus entertained any ill-will toward Lysias; but he took the lead in the new measures—animated perhaps by domestic recollections[3]—and probably thought that such an example of jealous vigilance in behalf of the laws might produce a salutary effect. Thrasybulus, or at

Case of Lysias.

[1] Æschines Ctes. p. 81.

[2] He speaks of his own merits, De Aristoph. Bon. p. 153. *τὸ πλῆθος τὸ ὑμέτερον πλεῖστα ἀγαθὰ πεποιηκότος.*

[3] He had a son named Myronides (Demosth. Timocr. § 154. Bekk.) and hence C. F. Hermann *Lehrb.* § 169. 1. and Sievers (*Geschichte Griechenlands vom Ende des Pelop. Krieges bis zur Schlacht bei Mantinea*, p. 107.) infer that he was probably a son of the old general, whose name was almost symbolical of the good old times. *Μυρωνίδης ὅτ' ἦρχεν ὁ γεννάδας, οὐδεὶς ἂν ἐτόλμα τὰ τῆς πόλεως διοικεῖν ἀργύριον φέρων.* Aristoph. Eccl. 303.

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Observance of the amnesty.

least his decree, was condemned, and Lysias lost the franchise, which he never recovered.[1]

Archinus, and all the other true friends of the people, laid great stress on the religious observance of the amnesty, which they perceived to be absolutely necessary to the peace and safety of the commonwealth. Without it the sycophants would have found such an ample field for the exercise of their nefarious craft, that they would probably have kindled another civil war, or have given occasion for Spartan interference. Beside the oath which was taken by all the citizens, and by each of the councillors and the jurors in their official capacity, to fulfil the compact made with the party of the city, one of the new laws provided that no criminal proceedings which had been instituted before the archonship of Euclides, should be revived, though judgments given in civil actions remained in force.[2] To this law Archinus added another, which enabled a citizen who should be charged with any offence which was covered by the amnesty, to bar the indictment, by a plea which, if established, subjected the prosecutor to a heavy penalty.[3] These enactments however would not of themselves prove any thing more than the aim of their authors; unless the spirit of the people supported them, they could never have been more than a dead letter. We have however the highest authority to prove that on the whole the amnesty was faithfully observed; for Xenophon, in a passage of his history which was probably written several years after the event which it relates, says that the two parties continued to live in concord together, and that which had triumphed to abide by its oaths.[4] And this testimony is confirmed by a remarkable fact, which Xenophon indeed did not think worth

[1] X. Orat. Vit. Lysias. Æschines Ctes. p. 82.
[2] Isocrates c. Callim. p. 371.
[3] Andoc. Myst. p. 12.
[4] Hell. II. the end.

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recording, but which is well attested[1], and seems a striking indication of the excellent temper which prevailed for some time in the popular Assembly, as well as in the courts of justice. We may the more safely use it for this purpose, because it is so treated by Isocrates, who, though not more prepossessed in favour of democratical government than Xenophon, repeats his assertion on this subject in still stronger and more explicit language. The Spartans, who soon began to regret the part they had taken in composing the discord of the Athenian factions, were not prevented by the distress which followed the Anarchy, from demanding the reimbursement of the 100 talents which they had advanced to the party of the city, for the purpose of overpowering that which was now predominant; and when payment was delayed, they backed their application with threats. They indeed might consider this as a debt of the state, and their claim as not at all affected by the recent revolution; but at Athens it could not but be viewed in a very different light. There it was natural, perhaps reasonable, certainly consistent with the ordinary maxims of all Greek factions, to treat it as a transaction which only concerned the defeated party, and to compel those who had received the subsidy, or for whose benefit it was intended, to refund it. And this was the course proposed by many speakers, in an Assembly which was held to deliberate on the subject. The treasury was at this time, as we have seen, reduced so low, that it could not furnish funds for domestic expenses, which were accounted most indispensable, and that the satisfaction of the Bœotians—though the small debt due to them, if the individuals who contracted it were unable to

[1] Beside Isocrates and Demosthenes (Leptin. p. 460.) Aristotle appears to allude to it Pol. III. 1. where he says: ἀποροῦσί τινες, πόθ' ἡ πόλις ἔπραξε καὶ πότε οὐχ ἡ πόλις· οἷον ὅταν ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας ἢ τυραννίδος γένηται δημοκρατία· τότε γὰρ οὔτε τὰ συμβόλαια ἔνιοι βούλονται διαλύειν, ὡς οὐ τῆς πόλεως ἀλλὰ τοῦ τυράννου λαβόντος.

discharge it, should on every ground of policy, justice, honour, and gratitude, have been adopted by the state, and have been preferred to the claims of Sparta —had been hitherto postponed at the risk of hostilities with a formidable neighbour. Nevertheless for the sake of concord the Assembly charged itself with the repayment of the 100 talents, and decreed that they should be raised by an extraordinary general contribution.[1] Testimony, little less forcible, to the good faith of the people was tacitly given by several of the worst tools of the oligarchy, who, though stained with innocent blood, and objects of universal abhorrence, remained at Athens, as we learn from a contemporary orator[2], relying on the amnesty, and enjoying its protection. On the other hand it appears from a remarkable example, as if the amnesty was not held to be a sufficient protection for persons who had been living in exile on account of offences against the state at the end of the war, but had not either taken advantage of the article in the treaty to return on the surrender of the city, or assisted in the overthrow of the the oligarchy. Such was the case with the historian Thucydides, who after twenty years of exile was restored to his country by a decree of the people on the motion of one Œnobius. But before he could bring his great work to a close he was cut off by a violent death.[3] So much is unhappily certain; but all the circumstances of his fate are involved in impenetrable obscurity.

But both Xenophon and Isocrates were aware that

[1] Demosth. Lept. p. 460. *τὸν δῆμον συνεισενεγκεῖν.* Isocr. Areop. p. 225. *κοινὴν ποιήσασθαι τὴν ἀπόδοσιν.*

[2] Andocides, Myst. p. 13.

[3] Paus. i. 23. 9. *ψήφισμα ἐνίκησεν Οἰνόβιος κατελθεῖν ἐς Ἀθήνας Θουκυδίδην, καὶ οἱ δολοφονηθέντι, ὡς κατῆει, μνῆμά ἐστιν οὐ πόρρω πυλῶν Μελιτίδων.* There seems to be no reason for suspecting a mistake about the object of the decree, any more than for questioning its genuineness, or that it was passed after the Anarchy. All the questions relating to it are copiously discussed by Krueger, *Leben des Thukydides*, p. 52. foll.

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their assertions as to the fidelity with which the amnesty was observed were true only in a general sense, and did not wish them to be interpreted with such rigour as to exclude all exceptions or limitations. Their meaning can only have been, that the victorious party adhered to its engagements as closely as it was reasonable to expect under such circumstances, or at least so as to prove that the prevailing disposition was on the side of peace and concord.[1] Their full knowledge of the real state of the case gives the greater weight to their testimony. It would have been extravagant to suppose it possible that all traces of the past struggle should be at once effaced, all injuries forgiven, all resentments appeased, or that private passions should not give rise to many attempts, which could scarcely be all unsuccessful, to violate the public compact. There were numbers who had personal wrongs to revenge. The sycophants of the former period had been thinned, but not exterminated, by the Thirty; many of those who had escaped returned among the other exiles with the merit of their recent sufferings; and, if they needed any new inducement, might be driven by poverty into their old pursuits. The finances were also in such a state, that it was more difficult than ever for those who depended, for most of their enjoyments, if not for subsistence, on the revenue, to be indifferent as to the issue of a cause by which the treasury might be relieved. And we find but too abundant evidence in contemporary authors, more especially in the works of Lysias, of the pernicious operation of all these causes.

[1] The Athenian amnesty has perhaps acquired a little more celebrity than it is entitled to. It differed only in the express reference to past causes of animosity from the oath of concord, which, as we learn from a passage of the Memorabilia, was taken in every Greek city. Socrates is there made to say (iv. 4. 16.), *παντα-χοῦ ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι νόμος κεῖται, τοὺς πολίτας ὀμνύναι ὁμονοήσειν, καὶ παντα-χοῦ ὀμνύουσι τὸν ὅρκον τοῦτον.* There were probably many states where the oath was less scrupulously observed than at Athens, though the temptation to violate it was nowhere so great.

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Political trials.

Lysias himself was, like Antiphon, an advocate by profession, whose pen was at the service of every suitor. His practice was very large, his style highly admired, and his skill, as well as his good fortune, must have been great, if out of 230 orations which he composed two only were unsuccessful. Those which have been preserved almost all relate to the period following the Anarchy; and they show that, if the oaths and the laws by which the amnesty was guarded were not formally broken, they were sometimes eluded, and that the sycophants began by degrees to lift up their heads again. Among them is one which was delivered by Lysias himself, and which seems directly to violate the amnesty. It is an accusation of Eratosthenes, who had arrested his brother Polemarchus, but had remained at Athens with Phido, after his other colleagues had retired to Eleusis, and at the peace did not think it necessary to leave the city. He relied, it appears, chiefly on his connection with Theramenes, who was now considered by many as a martyr for the cause of freedom, and on the general moderation which, notwithstanding his participation in the atrocious measure through which Lysias lost his brother, he had shown in his office. Though his defence is, as usual, anticipated, we find no intimation that he either had pleaded, or meant to avail himself of the amnesty. It seems therefore that this prosecution was treated as an inquiry, to which, by the express terms of the agreement, as it is reported by Andocides[1], the Thirty and the Eleven, if they desired to return to Athens, were still liable. Another oration, which, though the prosecution for which it was composed was not instituted by

Prosecution of Eratosthenes,

Agoratus,

[1] De Myst. p. 12. *οὐ μνησικακήσω τῶν πολιτῶν οὐδενί, πλὴν τῶν τριάκοντα καὶ τῶν ἕνδεκα· οὐδὲ τούτων ὃς ἂν ἐθέλῃ εὐθύνας διδόναι τῆς ἀρχῆς ἧς ἦρξεν.* But it seems probable that the words *καὶ τῶν δέκα* (the Ten of Pirœus) have dropt out, and ought to be inserted after *ἕνδεκα*, according to a conjecture of Valesius, said by Scheibe to be adopted by Schneider, on Xen. Hell. II. 4. 38., where however I find no note on the subject.

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Lysias himself, must be regarded as describing his own views and feelings, calls for justice against the informer Agoratus, to whose villany it imputes a great share in producing the recent calamities. But Agoratus, notwithstanding the services he had done to the oligarchy, had, like Nicomachus, found himself obliged to fly from Athens under the Thirty, and only returned with Thrasybulus. He was expected to allege his exile as a proof of his patriotism; he also pretended to a share in the assassination of Phrynichus, which indeed according to the existing law was a praiseworthy act, and the speaker takes pains to divest him of this merit; but he likewise claimed the benefit of the amnesty; and this last plea is only met by an attempt to show that none but the party of the city are entitled to it: a distinction which seems manifestly contrary to the spirit and purpose of the measure, and may more easily be excused in Lysias than defended on general grounds. The charge brought against Nicomachus included some points of his conduct in the period after the Anarchy, but the main ground of accusation was the aid which he had afforded to the oligarchical party in the proceedings against Cleophon. On the other hand we find that Nicomachus had charged the prosecutor, who had staid at Athens during the government of the Thirty, with having been one of the Four Hundred.

and Nicomachus.

Another cause in which Lysias was employed by the prosecutor relates to a much more celebrated person. It was the son of Alcibiades who was charged with a breach of military discipline. The merits of the case are doubtful, and are of little importance for our present purpose; but the speech illustrates some of the prevailing defects of the Athenian administration of justice, as well as the state of public feeling. The speaker avows that his motive is hereditary and personal enmity toward the defendant; he enters into a

Of the son of Alcibiades.

history of his early life, which, unless it is a tissue of gross falsehoods, proves that he resembled his father chiefly in some of his worst vices, but is wholly irrelevant to the proper question; and he dwells at some length on the political offences of the elder Alcibiades, as a ground for condemning the son. We learn from one of the allusions, that the young man, when a child, was in danger of being involved in the same sentence with his father, by the fury of the people, or the malice of the adverse faction[1]; and that, among the reports which were spread about the causes of the disaster of Ægos-potami, one attributed it to the treachery of Alcibiades, no less than to that of Adimantus. The speaker adopts this calumny as an unquestionable fact; and thus contrives to represent him as a main author of the late calamities, and as deserving a share of the hatred due to the Thirty. It appears however likewise, that the name of Alcibiades was still popular enough to serve with many as a screen for the failings of his son.

Of Andocides.

Though we cannot trust the title of an oration against Andocides which is attributed to Lysias, we have one still left in which Andocides pleaded his own cause in answer to the same charge, and it is from this defence that we learn some of the most important facts in his own history, as well as many others which throw light on that of the times. He had been released from prison after the information with which he had allayed the popular ferment in the affair of the Hermes-busts. But some time after, notwithstanding the assurance of impunity which he had received, he was branded with ignominy by a decree which excluded him from the agora and the temples — in other words from the civil and religious pri-

[1] Alcib. i. p. 141. ὅτε παῖς ἦν διὰ τὰ τοῦ πατρὸς ἁμαρτήματα ὀλίγου τοῖς ἕνδεκα παρεδό η. Isocr. De Big. p. 356. οὔπω τέτταρα ἔτη γεγονὼς διὰ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς φυγὴν περὶ τοῦ σώματος εἰς κίνδυνον κατέστην, and he proceeds to say that he was banished while yet a boy by the Thirty.

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vileges of a citizen. Residence at Athens was insupportable under such privations, and he went abroad, and in the course of his travels visited almost every corner of the Grecian world, Sicily, Italy, Thessaly, Macedonia—where at the court of Archelaus he renewed the hereditary connection between his family and the Macedonian kings—Ionia and Cyprus, where he also gained the favour of the king of Citium, according to some later authors by a very nefarious action[1], but afterwards lost it again, and was forced to leave the island. While the Athenian fleet lay at Samos, he made use of his interest with Archelaus to procure some naval stores which it wanted from Macedonia, hoping, as he says, to conciliate the good-will of his countrymen; but when he proceeded to Athens, not having heard of the revolution which had happened there, to claim the reward of his services, he was arrested by the Four Hundred at the instance of Pisander, and narrowly escaped with his life. Nevertheless, after the restoration of democracy, he applied without success for the repeal of the ignominious decree, and was again forced to retire into exile, from which he did not return before the expulsion of the Thirty. He now began again to take an active part in public affairs, but was twice called upon to defend himself against a criminal information grounded on the decree which had deprived him of his civil privileges. It is to the second of these occasions that his speech refers.

The accusation comprised several heads, and it was set on foot by several persons, who on various causes were his private enemies. Foremost among them was

[1] The abduction of a daughter of Aristides (she must have been a grand-daughter at least) whom he is said to have sold to the king of Citium. See Sluiter, Lect. Andoc. c. 4. According to Tzetzes Chil. VI. Hist. 49.

> Καί τὴν αὐτοῦ ἀνεψιὰν ὁ Ἀνδοκίδης οὗτος
> Πυρῶν πωλεῖ τῷ βασιλεῖ τῷ τότε τῶν Κυπρίων·
> Τοῦ Ἀριστείδου δὲ ἡ παῖς ἀνιγάτριον ὑπῆρχεν.

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the wealthy and profligate Callias, the chief of the noble family which possessed the hereditary superintendence of the Eleusinian mysteries, and who himself at this time filled the office of Torchbearer. If we may believe Andocides, Callias was provoked by the resistance which he experienced from him in a most iniquitous attempt, and had not only suborned a sycophant named Cephisius to lay the information, but had forged another charge against him, of a breach of a sacred law relating to the sanctuary called the Eleusinium. With them were associated some persons who bore him a grudge, because he had thwarted them in their contract for a part of the revenue, out of which they had been used to make an enormous profit. What is certain is, that the greater part of the oration is taken up in the vindication of his own conduct in the affair which caused his disgrace, and with the arguments by which he claims the benefit of the amnesty. He urges, that if a verdict should be given against him, the same principle would apply to a vast number of citizens who were now living in secure reliance on the public faith, notwithstanding political offences much greater than those with which he was charged, and among them to one of his accusers who had been a member of the council under the Thirty. *Make this precedent*, he says, *and every one of this number will be in danger, either from private enemies, or from sycophants, who will start up in crowds.* It was in the third year after his return that this cause was tried, and if this language shows the evil which was then threatening the public peace, it also clearly implies that it had not yet risen to any considerable height. The issue of this trial was in favour of Andocides, who remained, as we shall see, several years longer at Athens.

It would be easy, but superfluous, to accumulate proofs and illustrations on this head. We will only

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notice two or three examples, drawn from the works of Lysias, which indicate that the evil was on the increase, and the spirit of sycophancy growing bolder. One of his clients is obliged to defend himself from a charge, which, so far as we can judge from the speech, applied to him only in common with all the citizens who had remained in the city during the Anarchy. He rests his defence partly on the innocence of his life, and the liberal use which he had made of his fortune, and partly on the amnesty, and concludes with the remarkable expressions: *we (the party of the city) think it just that you should abide by your covenants and oaths with all your fellow-citizens. Still when we see the guilty punished, remembering your past wrongs, we think you excusable; but when your vengeance falls on the innocent and the guilty without distinction, all are reduced to the same state of insecurity and distrust.*[1] In another speech, which was delivered at least thirteen years after the Anarchy[2], we find Ergocles, a friend of Thrasybulus, charged with having urged him to a treasonable enterprise on the ground of the danger which threatened him and his friends from the sycophants; and we observe with surprise, that one who is using the words of Lysias, throws out an intimation, that Thrasybulus had listened to this advice, and had perhaps only been prevented by his death from sullying his reputation by an act of open rebellion.[3]

We learn from the same authority, how greatly the evil was aggravated by the poverty of the state and of individuals, which was but slowly relieved, and while it whetted private rapacity, sharpened the rigour of the tribunals in all cases affecting the interests of the treasury. And its effects were no less visible in the

[1] De Affect. Tyr. fin. There is a chasm at the end; but the sense of the unfinished sentence is sufficiently clear.

[2] After the death of Thrasybulus which happened in 389.

[3] C. Ergoclem, p. 180.

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Council than in the courts of justice, though here perhaps the immediate cause was not so much cupidity as fear of the people. But Lysias mentions as a notorious fact, that the Council, when it was at a loss for ways and means, was constrained to receive informations, and to confiscate the property of citizens, and to listen to the worst advice.[1] There was at Athens—and as far as we know it was an effect of Athenian humanity which was not imitated in any other part of Greece—a kind of poor-law by which an indigent citizen, who through infirmity was unable to maintain himself by labour, obtained a small daily allowance, which in the time of Lysias was only an obolus. One of his clients is indicted before the Council, which examined all claims of this nature, for having received the alms of the state when he was able to gain his own living. The case, even if it is a fictitious one[2], seems to show either that the pensioners were very numerous or that the slightest burdens were felt. Yet it was not from parsimony and industry that the alleviation of the public distress was sought. It was so far from giving rise to vigorous measures of retrenchment, that, within a few years after the Anarchy, on the motion of a demagogue named Agyrrhius, the pay for attendance in the assembly was raised from one obolus to three[3]; and all the abuses of the *theoric*

Agyrrhius.

[1] Nicom. p. 185. But the orator's language does not bear out Hume's remark (*Essays*, vol. I. p. 401.): that he *speaks of it, as a maxim of the Athenian people, that, whenever they wanted money, they put to death some of the rich citizens as well as strangers for the sake of the forfeiture.*

[2] So Boeckh suspects (Pub. Econ. of Ath. II. 17. not 404.) on account of a vein of pleasantry which runs through the speech, but which he seems to me to describe in rather too strong terms, when he speaks of the *possierlichen Tone* and *Spasshaftigkeit*. It remains however to be considered, whether such a tone is more likely to have been assumed in a declamation on the subject. Perhaps one might rather be surprised not to find more instances of wit in Athenian pleadings, and we may look upon this as a valuable specimen of those ἀστεῖα, to which Demosthenes (Aristocr. p. 689.) attributes so much efficacy. Another is given in the Greek life of Aristophanes, p. XIV. Bekk. Compare Vesp. 567. οἱ δὲ σκώπτουσ', ἵν' ἐγὼ γελάσω, καὶ τὸν θυμὸν κατάθωμαι.

[3] The τριώβολον ἐκκλησιαστικόν had been introduced shortly before the exhibition of the Ecclesiazusæ, as appears from 308. νυνὶ δὲ τριώβολον ζητοῦσι λαβεῖν· and as Agyrrhius is said by the Scholiast on 102. to have been the first who gave pay for

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fund were renewed and aggravated. In one article only Agyrrhius showed a disposition to economy: he cut down the remuneration which had been hitherto given to the poets whose ingenuity furnished the best part of the public entertainments; and it seems not improbable that his motive for this paltry reduction was the desire of revenge for the dramatic satire under which he had smarted. There was, as we learn from Lysias, a whole class of prosecutions, which arose immediately out of the wants of the treasury. It appears that a new board of magistrates, under the title of Syndics[1], was appointed immediately after the Anarchy, to receive informations about property due to the state. When the property of a delinquent had been confiscated, if it did not prove equal to the expectations which had been formed of its amount, his nearest relatives and most intimate friends incurred the suspicion of having secreted a part of it, and became liable to a charge which it was generally extremely difficult to repel. So after Ergocles, the defendant in the cause already mentioned, had been put to death for peculation and treason, his kinsman and friend Philocrates was accused of embezzling his property, and in the speech composed by Lysias for the occasion is called upon to prove either that others were in possession of it, or that the judgment under which Ergocles had suffered was unjust. But two facts which are incidentally disclosed in the speech are more important than the case itself. Ergocles, it is said, had deposited three talents with his advocates, which they were to retain if he gained his cause; and at the time of his trial his friends had publicly boasted that

Prosecution of Ergocles.

attendance in the assembly (*πρῶτος ἐκκλησιαστικὸν δέδωκεν*) Boeckh (Ath. Staats. I. p. 247.) approves of the inference that it was he who raised the pay from one obolus to three. Sievers (Gesch. Griech. p. 99.) thinks it more probable that the pay of the ecclesiasts was not restored immediately after the Anarchy, and that it was Agyrrhius who revived it; which would explain the Scholiast's statement, whether he was also the author of the augmentation or not.

[1] Harpocratio *Σύνδικοι*.

they had purchased 1500 votes in Piræus and 1600 in the city. In another case of a like nature the client of Lysias is able to give seemingly very clear proofs that the property which he was accused of embezzling did not exist; he was also able to plead the extraordinary liberality with which his family had contributed to the public exigencies and had relieved the distress of individuals; for his father had not only discharged the most expensive liturgies, but had portioned out several poor girls, had ransomed captives, and defrayed the cost of burials, and had thus spent the greater part of a large fortune; still he thinks it necessary to deprecate the adverse prejudices of the court by the remark, that it would be not only for the honour but for the interest of the people that he should be permitted to retain the small remnant that was left of his family property, which would still be employed as before in the public service.[1] The same ground is taken by the speaker in another case, which is much more remarkable on account of the parties interested, though it is not equally intelligible. The brother and son of the unfortunate Nicias had, as we have seen, been put to death by the Thirty, though it was generally believed that, if they had been willing, they might have shared the power of the oligarchs. Their children had been presented to Pausanias, to incline him toward the cause of the exiles, or to afford him a pretext for embracing it. Yet, many years after the Anarchy, we find the son of Eucrates pleading to

The family of Nicias.

[1] Pro Bon. Aristoph. It is a little surprising, that in Bremi's edition of this speech, in the *Bibliotheca Græca*, which is superintended by two of the most eminent scholars of Germany, so great a mistake should have been permitted to remain as that which the editor has made about the history of Nicophemus and Aristophanes, who, as he informs his readers, were put to death under the Thirty; though it is quite clear from the speech that they survived the battle of Cnidus four or five years. Bremi however justly remarks that the violence with which they are said to have been destroyed was common under the Thirty; while it was so contrary to the practice and spirit of the democracy, that no candid writer could have thought of drawing any inference from the obscure allusions made to it in the speech.

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avert the confiscation of his father's property. And it appears that his patrimony had been claimed by the treasury shortly after the restoration of democracy; that it had then been successfully defended, but was now again threatened; under what title or colour we are unable to discover. Lysias however makes his client, after having urged the claims of his family on the public gratitude, appeal to the interest of the people, which he considers as represented by the court. *If you were really gainers by unjust confiscations*, he argues, *there would be some ground for disregarding our pleas. But such proceedings must tend to disturb that concord which you have acknowledged by your public acts to be the greatest of blessings.* And then he adds another argument similar to that of the orator's client in the last-mentioned case: *Our property, if confiscated, will be wasted by those who claim it for the treasury; if left in our hands it will be expended in the public service.*

These instances appear to betray a very low tone of public morals, though they may for the most part be referred to the abuse of a principle, which was recognised in every Greek state, that the interests of individuals were in all cases to be sacrificed to the public good. But the comedies of Aristophanes exhibit his fellow-citizens in a still more unfavourable light, as well by his general complaints of their degeneracy, as by a variety of particular and personal allusions. We perceive that gross vices had become so common, that they were scarcely thought to need concealment; and the habits and character of the women are objects of unsparing and indiscriminate satire. The corruption was probably deep and widely spread; though as poverty was the source of many misdeeds to which the affluent were never tempted, the higher and middling classes may have retained much of the ancient purity of manners. But the

Oligarchical spirit.

influence of the men whose character and station might have enabled them to check the evil tendencies of the age, and even to enlighten and direct the rest of the community, was not proportioned to their numbers, and was not always exerted for salutary ends. Some were prevented by timidity or by their love of quiet, or by want of the talents or the physical powers required for appearing as speakers in the Assembly or the tribunals, from taking a part in public business.[1] Many, irritated or disheartened by their political disadvantages, kept sullenly or despondingly aloof from the great body of their fellow-citizens, nourishing a secret hatred to the constitution, and anxiously waiting for an opportunity of overthrowing it, and avenging themselves for past injuries and humiliation. The spirit which prevailed in a large part of the higher order of citizens, is illustrated by many passages, and indeed by the whole tenor of the treatise, or fragment, preserved among the works of Xenophon under the title of *the Athenian Commonwealth*. Its value in this respect is the same, whether Xenophon or any one else was the author; for it was probably written during the Peloponnesian war, and apparently before the end of the Sicilian expedition. The whole is one bitter sarcasm, and in every sentence breathes the rancorous scorn with which the writer regarded the government and the mass of the people. According to his view the contrast between the upper and the lower class is equivalent to that between vice and virtue. The rich are the worthy, the excellent, the wise; the poor are ignorant and depraved. Hence the two classes are irreconcilably hostile to each other. All the world over the best class is adverse to democracy, and is therefore oppressed by

[1] Such was the case with Charmides, who needed the exhortations of Socrates to encourage him to enter into public life (Xen. Mem. III. 7.), and with the persons mentioned by Xenophon Mem. I. 2. 48.

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the other, when this happens to gain the upper hand. The common people will not be governed by the counsels of the wise and virtuous, because, ignorant and foolish as they are, they still have sense enough to know that the good men are their mortal enemies, and if they were trusted with power, would very soon deprive them of their liberty.[1] Such is the strain in which the book opens, and proceeds to the end; it breathes the spirit of the oath which in the time of Aristotle was taken by the members of the ruling body in some of the Greek oligarchies: *I will be hostile to the commonalty, and will do it all the harm in my power by my counsels*[2]; and one reason for doubting that it has been rightly attributed to Xenophon, is, that in his other works, which were all written later, he nowhere betrays such violent oligarchical feelings. There are also indications that it was written at a distance from Athens[3], and therefore most probably by an exile. But still it may justly be considered as representing the sentiments of a large body of Athenians, the same who constituted the strength of the Four Hundred and of the Thirty.

There were however others who though very much dissatisfied with the existing state of things, were willing to accept and even eagerly sought the highest offices under the democratical government, some from common motives of ambition, others with dishonest and malignant designs. Xenophon has reported a conversation between Socrates and the younger Pericles, which must have taken place during the peace of Nicias.[4] Pericles had either been elected general, or aspired to the office. Yet Socrates, after having endeavoured to convince him

[1] I. 4—9.

[2] Pol v. 7. 19. Καὶ τῷ δήμῳ κακόνους ἔσομαι, καὶ βουλεύσω ὅ τι ἂν ἔχω κακόν.

[3] Ἀθθ. I. 2. 10. II. III. 1.

[4] Mem. III. 5. The date is determined by the state of public affairs described in the fourth section.

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that the Athenians are not so incurably degenerate as he thinks them, delicately reminds him, that he has not yet qualified himself for the station which he covets; and Pericles admits the justice of the reproof. Nicias affords an example of a better spirit, which, though rare, was not wholly wanting in any period of Athenian history. Though he both saw and suffered from the defects of the government, he served his country zealously and faithfully, and, as far as we can judge, without any oblique aim. Such was probably also the case with his brother Eucrates, Conon, Diomedon, Leon, and perhaps with several others among the generals and statesmen who have been already named. But a still higher praise seems to belong to the poet Aristophanes; and his genius, wonderful as it is, is less admirable than the use which he made of it. He, whose works have furnished the most abundant materials for all the repulsive descriptions of his contemporaries which have been given in modern times, never ceased to exert his matchless powers in endeavours to counteract, to remedy, or to abate, the evils which he observed. He seems to have neglected no opportunity of giving wholesome advice in that which he judged the most efficacious form; and only took advantage of his theatrical privilege to attack prevailing abuses, and to rouse contempt and indignation against the follies and vices which appeared to him most intimately connected with the worst calamities and dangers of the times.

Aristophanes.

The patriotism of Aristophanes was honest, bold, and generally wise. He was still below the age at which the law permitted a poet to contend for a dramatic prize, and was therefore compelled to use a borrowed name, when, in the year after the death of Pericles, he produced his first work, in which his chief aim seems to have been to exhibit the contrast

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between the ancient and the modern manners.[1] In his next his ridicule was pointed more at the defects or the perversion of political institutions, and perhaps at the democratical system of filling public offices by lot.[2] In both however he had probably assailed many of the most conspicuous persons of the day, and either by personal satire, or by attacks on the abuses by which the demagogues throve, he provoked the hostility of Cleon, who endeavoured to crush him by a prosecution. Its nominal ground was it seems the allegation, that the poet, who in fact according to some reports was of foreign origin, was not legally entitled to the franchise.[3] But the real charge was that in his recent comedy he had exposed the Athenian magistracy to the derision of the foreign spectators. Cleon however was baffled; and though the attempt was once or twice renewed, perhaps by other enemies of Aristophanes, it failed so entirely, that he

[1] The Δαιταλεῖς. The chorus consisted of a party which had just risen from a feast in the sanctuary of Hercules (Orion Δαιταλεύς). One might be tempted to conjecture that it was a sacrifice to Hercules in his character of Ἀλεξίκακος, and that it was one object of the piece, which was exhibited while the plague was at its height (ἀκμάζοντος τοῦ λοιμοῦ, Schol. Ran. 504. See however on this Scholium F. Ranke, *Commentatio de Aristophanis Vita*, p. cxcv. in the ed. of B. Thiersch, vol. I.), to intimate that the favour of the god (the patron of gymnastic exercises) might be best propitiated by a return to the ancient course of education, which was no doubt contrasted with that of later times, in the scene between the sober and the wanton youth, perhaps with some allusions to the celebrated Hercules of Prodicus. δαιταλεῖς sunt, qui alias παράσιτοι antiquo more appellabantur: mos enim apud Athenienses fuit in unoquoque pago duodecim eligere viros, generis nobilitate et vitæ probitate insignes, qui dicta die quovis ut videtur mense in Herculis fano epularentur. Poeta ut ostenderet quantum Athenienses jam ab antiqua ista disciplinæ severitate descivissent, induxit senem aliquem virum probum et procul ab urbis deliciis rure vitam transigentem, qui ex duobus filiis unum antiquo ipse more educavit, alterum in urbem miserat erudiendum: qui cum ad patrem reversus esset eo ipso die quo in Herculis fano epulones illi, quibus interfuit pater, convivium agebant, pater explorabat quo pacto ille esset moratus et quibus disciplinis eruditus: rediit enim filius ille ad patrem omnibus novitiæ disciplinæ imbutus vitiis: itaque gravissima rixa atque expostulatio inter patrem filiumque exorta. Meineke, Fragm. Com. Antiq. II. 2. pp. 1022. 1026.

[2] The Βαβυλώνιοι, in which διέβαλε τῶν Ἀθηναίων τὰς κληρωτὰς ἀρχάς. Aristophanes Vit. Bekk. p. XIII. The new sophistical rhetoric (particularly that of Gorgias) and the extortion practised on the allies, appear also to have been prominent objects of satire in this piece.

[3] These reports are elaborately examined by Ranke (u. s. pp. CCI—CCLVI.) who refers all that is said of the poet in the Acharnians to Callistratus, and endeavours to account for the misunderstanding through which the poet's origin was assigned sometimes to Ægina, sometimes to Rhodes and to Naucratis.

seems to have been soon left in the unmolested enjoyment of public favour[1]; and he not only was encouraged to revenge himself on Cleon by a new piece, in which the demagogue was exhibited in person, and was represented by the poet himself—who it is said could not find an actor to undertake the part, nor even get a suitable mask made for it—but he at the same time ventured on an experiment which it seems had never been tried before on the comic stage. The people had been accustomed to see the most eminent Athenian statesmen and generals brought forward there and placed in a ludicrous light; but it had never yet beheld its own image set before its eyes as in a mirror, which reflected the principal features of its character, not indeed without the exaggeration which belonged to the occasion, but yet with a truth which could not be mistaken or evaded.[2] This was done in the same play which exposed Cleon's impudence and rapacity; and the follies and faults of the assembled multitude, which appears under its proper name of Demus, as an old dotard, not void of cunning, though incapable of governing himself, are placed in the strongest relief by the presence of its unworthy favourite, who is introduced, not indeed by name, but so as to be immediately recognised, as a lying, thievish, greedy, fawning, Paphlagonian slave.

[1] Δεύτερον καὶ τρίτον συκοφαντηθεὶς ἀπέφυγε. Aristoph. Vit. Bekk. p. xiv.

[2] In the treatise De Rep. Ath. II. 18. the author remarks: κωμωδεῖν καὶ κακῶς λέγειν τὸν δῆμον οὐκ ἐῶσιν ἰδίᾳ δὲ κελεύουσιν εἴ τίς τινα βούλεται. Schneider and Delbrueck (*Xenophon*, p. 144. probably the only reader of the work who has been unable to discover any satirical invectives in it) infer from this passage that it was written before the Knights. Boeckh (Public Econ. of Ath. III. 5.) thinks that it might nevertheless have been written after the Anarchy, and that the restriction alluded to is that which was then imposed upon comedy by the jealousy of the people. But it is not clear, that, in the sense in which he understands the expression, κωμωδεῖν τὸν δῆμον, it was forbidden to do so even then; and indeed the Ecclesiazusæ affords proof to the contrary. On the other hand it is certain that Aristophanes had made the people the object of his satire before the production of the Knights (see Acharn. 606. διαβαλλόμενος—ὡς κωμωδεῖ τὴν πόλιν ἡμῶν καὶ τὸν δῆμον καθυβρίζει). So that, if the treatise De R. A. was written before that time, the assertion above quoted would, as Boeckh observes, be equally false; and it must therefore be looked upon as one of the author's hasty or wilful misrepresentations. Still the Athenian Demus appears to have been a new character.

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The poet's boldness was so far successful, that instead of offending the audience he gained the first prize: but in every other respect he failed of attaining his object; for Cleon, as we have seen[1], maintained his influence unimpaired to the end of his life, and the people showed as little disposition to reform its habits, and change its measures, as if the portrait it had seen of itself had been no less amiable than diverting. But the issue of this attempt did not deter him from another, which, but for the applause which had crowned the first, might have appeared equally dangerous. As in the Knights he had levelled his satire against the sovereign Assembly, in the Wasps, which he exhibited in the year before Cleon's death, he attacked the other stronghold of his power, the courts of justice, with still keener ridicule.

His poetical character.

The vehicles in which Aristophanes conveyed his political lessons, strange as they appear to us, were probably judiciously chosen, as well with the view of pointing the attention of the audience more forcibly to his practical object, as of relieving the severity of his admonitions and censures. As time has spared only a few fragments of the earlier and the contemporary productions of the comic drama, it is only from the report of the ancient critics that we can form any notion of the relation in which he stood to his theatrical competitors. He is said not only to have introduced several improvements in the structure of the old political comedy, by which he brought it to its highest perfection[2], but to have tempered the bitterness and the grossness of his elder rival Cratinus, who is described as the comic Æschylus.[3] It is not

[1] Vol. III. p. 282. where the words *soon after*, in line 29. should be omitted.

[2] Μεθοδεύσας τεχνικώτερον τὴν κωμῳδίαν — πολλὰ προσφιλοτεχνήσας in the fragments, vol. I. pp. VI, VII. of Bekker's Aristophanes. Yet it is not quite certain that this means any thing more than what the poet himself boasts of, Nub. 529. foll. Pax 723. foll.

[3] Γέγονε ποιητικώτατος, κατασκευάζων εἰς τὸν Αἰσχύλου χαρακτῆρα.

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quite clear in what sense this account is to be understood, for it is difficult to conceive that the satire of Cratinus can have been either freer or more licentious. But the difference seems to have consisted in the inimitable grace with which Aristophanes handled every subject which he touched. We are informed indeed that even in this quality he was surpassed by Eupolis, who is also said to have shown more vigour of imagination in the invention of his plots.[1] Yet another account represents Eupolis as more nearly resembling Cratinus in the violence and homeliness of his invectives[2]; and the testimony of the philosopher Plato, who in an epitaph called the soul of Aristophanes a sanctuary of the Graces, studied his works as a model of style for the composition of his own dialogues, and honoured him with a place in one of his masterpieces, seems sufficient to prove that at least in the elegance of his taste, and the gracefulness of his humour, he had no equal. We are still less able to pronounce whether he was exclusively or pre-eminently entitled to the praise of patriotism which we have bestowed on him. Many themes of his satire were undoubtedly common to him with most of his rivals. Eupolis even claimed a share in the composition of the Knights[3]; though Aristophanes would not own his obligations to him, and charged him with having borrowed the plan of a celebrated

And political views.

[1] Εὔπολις εὐφάνταστος εἰς ὑπερβολήν ἐστι κατὰ τὰς ὑποθέσεις.

[2] Πικρότερόν τε καὶ αἰσχρότερον Κρατίνου καὶ Εὐπόλιδος βλασφημούντων ἢ ἔδει. A critic of high authority on this subject (Meineke, Fragm. Poet. Com. Antiq. II. 2. p. 896.) distinguishes between the earlier and the later plays of Aristophanes in this respect. Est, ut juvenes solent, Aristophanes acerrimus vindex severissimusque judex: itaque etiam comœdiæ quas tunc composuit, habent austeri quid et proxime ad Cratini indolem accedunt: maximeque desideratur ingeniosa illa licentia, qua usus postea quidquid sibi proposuit, conformavit et pro arbitrio finxit. Quamvis igitur antiquiores comœdiæ propius ad veritatem ipsiusque vitæ consuetudinem accedant, tamen gratia illa atque lepore, qui decet poetam, minus sunt insignes. Compare T. Bergk. Comment. De Reliq. Comœd. Ath. Antiq. Præf. p. x.

[3] Schol. Aristoph. Nub. 544. Eupolis had said in the Baptæ τοὺς Ἱππέας συνεποίησα τῷ φαλακρῷ καδωρησάμην, and Cratinus in the Πυτίνῃ (Schol. Aristoph. Eq. 528.) had charged Aristophanes with borrowing from Eupolis.

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comedy, in which he attacked Hyperbolus[1], from the Knights. These instances indicate that, as their poetical merits were in many respects evenly balanced, so their political sentiments were on several points congenial to each other. But whether the works of any other comic poet, if they had been preserved, would have exhibited the unity of design, and the depth of patriotic feeling, which we find in Aristophanes, is a different question, which we have no means of deciding.

How much Aristophanes was in earnest with his subject, how far he was from regarding it merely as an occasion for the exercise of his art, and how little he was swayed by personal prejudices, which have sometimes been imputed to him, is proved less by the keenness of his ridicule than by the warmth of his affection for Athens, which is manifest even under the comic mask. In his extant plays he nowhere intimates a wish for any change in the form of the Athenian institutions. He only deplores the corruption of the public spirit, points out its signs and causes, and assails the persons who minister to it. It is indeed the Athens of another age that he heartily loves; but that age is no remote antiquity; it is, if not within his own memory, near enough to be remembered by the elder part of his audience. He looks back indeed to the days of Miltiades and Aristides, as the period when the glory of Athens was at its height. But those of Myronides and Thucydides, the rival of Pericles, likewise belong, in his view, to the good old times, which he sighs for; and the evils of his own are of still more recent origin. He traces them to the measures of Pericles: to the position in which he had placed Athens with regard to the subject states, and above all to the war in which he had involved her. The Peloponnesian war he treats as

[1] The *Μαρικᾶς*. Nub. 545.

entirely the work of Pericles, and he chooses to adopt the popular rumours which ascribed it to his fears for his own safety, or to the influence of Aspasia, and to consider the quarrel with Megara as only the occasion or colour for it. This must not be looked upon as mere vulgar slander; it was probably designed to express the poet's real opinion, that all the grounds alleged in favour of the war were frivolous in comparison with those which an unbiassed view of the true interest of Athens would have suggested against it.[1] The restoration of peace is the object of his most ardent wishes; and he appears to believe, that it would be a sufficient remedy for the worst disorders of the state. The war he regards as the main foundation of the power of such demagogues as Cleon and Hyperbolus. If peace were only restored, he hopes that the mass of the people would return to its rural occupations and to its ancient tastes and habits; that the Assembly and the courts of justice would no longer hold out the same attractions; that litigation would abate, and the trade of the sycophants decay. Cleon is reproached in the Knights with having caused the Spartan overtures to be rejected, because he knew that it was by the war he was enabled to plunder the subject cities, and that if the people were released from the confinement of the city walls, and once more to taste the blessings of peace and of a country life, he should no longer find it subservient to his ends. Hence we may perhaps conclude that when, at the end of the same play, Demus (the personified people) is introduced as newly risen out of a magic cauldron, restored to the vigour and comeliness of

Efforts for peace.

[1] I cannot believe with Roetscher (*Aristophanes und sein Zeitalter*, p. 98.) that Aristophanes invented either of these stories, nor do I understand how he can be supposed to have done so with a view to weaken the authority of Pericles, unless it be thought credible that the Athenians were induced to prolong the war by their respect for his memory. Trygæus indeed professes never to have heard the scandal about Phidias before (Pax 600.); but Plutarch (Per. 31.) speaks of it as ἡ χειρίστη μὲν αἰτία πασῶν, ἔχουσα δὲ πλείστους μάρτυρας.

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youth, in a garb and port worthy of the companion of Aristides and Miltiades, with his eyes opened to his past errors, and with the purpose of correcting them, the poet did not conceive the change thus represented as hopeless, and still less meant to intimate that it was impossible.[1]

Yet it would seem as if this hope had gradually lost strength. Three of his remaining comedies are entirely dedicated to the purpose of recommending peace, but there is a remarkable difference in his manner of treating the subject between the first two and the last of the three. In the Acharnians, which was produced in the sixth year of the war, and in the Peace, which appeared in the thirteenth, he aims at reviving the old taste for rural pursuits, by a lively description of the pleasures of the husbandman's life, its quiet, freedom, plenty, simple and cheerful festivals. In the Lysistrata—which was exhibited in the second year after the disastrous termination of the Sicilian expedition, when the public prospects were most gloomy, when the Athenians were threatened abroad with the united attacks of the Peloponnesian confederacy and Persia, and at home were harassed with a round of military duties, which, as Thucydides informs us, kept them day and night under arms[2], while the factious intrigues which ended in the oligarchy of the Four Hundred were already beginning to agitate the state—peace is considered simply as a deliverance from the intolerable pressure of domestic evils, and is represented as brought about by compulsion, as the close of a civil war between the sexes. The whole play, though several scenes are extravagantly ludicrous, wants the hearty gaiety

For the revival of ancient manners.

[1] Precisely the same thought is exprest by the Chorus in the Peace (346—352.) by a simple metaphor: *οὐκέτ' ἂν μ' εὕροις δικαστὴν δριμὺν οὐδὲ δύσκολον . . . ἀλλ' ἁπαλὸν ἄν μ' ἴδοις καὶ πολὺ νεώτερον.*

[2] It is to this the poet alludes, Lys. 555. foll., where he describes the citizen . . s marketing in full armour.

which breathes through the two others. There is much more of earnestness than of humour in the poet's allusions to the distress of the times[1], and to the general poverty[2], as well as in the warnings which he puts into his heroine's mouth against the political associations[3]: a passage which is extremely interesting, both because it proves how far he was from siding with the oligarchical faction, and on account of the proposal it contains for strengthening the commonwealth by a liberal communication of the franchise to deserving aliens, and by a policy which would bind the colonies of Athens more closely to the parent state. In the piece which he exhibited during the oligarchy of the Four Hundred he abstains almost entirely from political allusions, though a passage in which the tutelary goddess is invoked as the enemy of tyrants, may be thought to have been pointed against the ruling faction; and another seems to censure the resignation of the Council of Five Hundred.[4]

But though in the eyes of Aristophanes the war was the capital evil of his time, was the source of many others, and aggravated all the rest, there were some of great magnitude distinct from it, and of earlier origin, and only so far connected with it, as they had either in some degree contributed to produce and prolong it, or were themselves maintained and fostered by its continuance. The pernicious effects of the war, as far as it affected the character of the people, were most immediately and principally visible in the lower order of citizens; but changes had likewise taken place in the education, habits, and modes of thinking of the higher classes, which he looked upon as fraught

[1] 1047. *ἱκανὰ τ' κακὰ καὶ τὰ παρακείμενα.*

[2] 1049—1071. and 1189—1215. Bekk. [3] 573. foll.

[4] Thesmophoriazusæ 1143. *φάσηθ' ὃ τυράννους στυγοῦσ', ὥσπερ εἰκός.* Wachsmuth (i. 2. p. 171.) thinks the allusion evident; to me it seems rather doubtful; but in 308. the poet certainly alludes to the manner in which the Council of Five Hundred was turned out of office. Whether, as Wachsmuth supposes, he means to reproach it with folly or pusillanimity on account of its passiveness, is not so clear.

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with the most dangerous consequences, and which he laboured to counteract with no less zeal than he displayed in combating political errors and abuses. Here however, though his patriotism was equally sincere, it does not seem to have been equally enlightened. What he attempted was neither possible nor advisable. When he was entering on his dramatic career Athens had been during half a century securely seated on that eminence of power and glory, to which she rose immediately after the Persian war; and during a great part of that time her counsels had been guided by a man whose personal taste, no less than his policy, led him to encourage the cultivation of every branch of art and literature. It was a period of great intellectual activity; and the simple course of education under which the conquerors of Marathon and Salamis had been reared, no longer satisfied the wants of the noble, wealthy, or aspiring part of the Athenian youth. Their learning had not gone beyond the rudiments of music, and such a knowledge of their own language as enabled them to enjoy the works of their writers, and to express their own thoughts with ease and propriety, and they bestowed at least as much care on the training of the body, as on the cultivation of the mind. But in the next generation the speculations of the Ionian and Eleatic schools began to attract attention at Athens; the presence of several celebrated philosophers, and the example of Pericles, made them familiar to a gradually widening circle, and they furnished occasion for the discussion of a variety of questions intimately connected with subjects of the highest practical moment. Still the influence of these speculations on the general state of society would probably have been very slight—as in their own nature they were only capable of interesting a few inquisitive minds—if it had not been at once extended and perverted by the rise of a new class of men, who occupy

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The Sophists.

a prominent place in the history of Greek philosophy and literature, under the name of the Sophists.

We do not propose here to enter into an examination of the many obscure points connected with this celebrated name. We will only observe, that to form a just notion of the men who bore it, it is necessary in the first place, to beware of confounding them together as if they were all of kindred spirit and similar pursuits, and in the next place, to discriminate between their literary and their philosophical character. We are for the present only concerned with two or three features which appear to have been common to the whole class from its earliest origin, and to distinguish it from every other. The sophists made a profession both of philosophy and of rhetoric, and exhibited their art, and communicated their knowledge, to all who were willing to purchase their lessons. This last is the mark by which the ancients most frequently describe them; and though it is one on which too much stress may have been laid, and which may have raised an unjust prejudice against some individuals of the class[1], it certainly ought not to be overlooked, when we are considering the causes which determined the bent of their pursuits, and the effect which they produced on their contemporaries. It is true that it was not more usual among the Greeks than among any people of modern times to labour gratuitously for the benefit of others, and that the masters of eloquence and of reasoning might as fairly claim a reward for the pleasure or the instruction they afforded as the poets, physicians, painters, sculptors, or artists of any other kind. But among philosophers the practice was certainly an innovation, and indicated a very different spirit from that in which those of earlier times had been used to prosecute their re-

[1] See on this subject Spengel *Artium Scriptores*, p. 40., and Welcker in the *Neue Rheinisch. Museum*, I. p. 30. foll.

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searches. Some of them are said to have reduced themselves to poverty, none to have enriched themselves by their philosophical pursuits. If they travelled, it was to acquire knowledge, not to display it; and they consigned the fruit of their meditations either to books or to a select circle of hearers. It is doubtful whether Zeno the Eleatic is to be considered as an exception, or is to be placed in this respect, as he was by some of the ancients on other accounts, at the head of the sophists.[1] But it cannot be denied that the tendency of this practice in men who combined philosophy with rhetoric, even if it did not affect the nature of their doctrines, was to make them subordinate to the art by which they were expounded and maintained. And accordingly it appears that the most eminent even among the earliest sophists, as Protagoras of Abdera, and Prodicus of Ceos, attracted listeners, and excited admiration, much less by the novelty of their speculations, than by their rhetorical talents.

At Athens especially, where the value of eloquence, as a weapon or a shield, was felt every day more and more, the youths who flocked round the sophists, were in general much less curious about any truths which they had to deliver, than desirous of acquiring the art which would enable them to shine in the Assembly, to prevail in the courts of justice, and to argue on any subject and on any side, so as to perplex their adversary, and to impose upon the hearers. It was not by an accidental coincidence that the masters who taught this art, also held doctrines which tended to universal scepticism. It is probable indeed that each sophist had some favourite topics on which he discoursed more readily than on others; but still it seems that they were all ambitious of the reputation of being able to

[1] Pseudo-Plato Alcib. i. p. 119. But perhaps this is scarcely sufficient authority for the fact.

discuss any subject that might be proposed to them; though it is only of Gorgias we hear that he publicly undertook to speak on any thesis, and to answer any question. All subjects might equally serve for dialectic or rhetorical exercises; and as none were exempt from controversy, so according even to the avowed doctrines of Protagoras and Gorgias, no truth could claim any higher value than that of a plausible opinion; the newest and boldest proposition afforded most room for the display of acuteness and ingenuity. It may easily be imagined how many popular prejudices which had long been held sacred, must have been violently shaken by these disputations; how many objects which had hitherto been viewed with awe, must have lost their venerable aspect, among men whose minds had been chiefly formed by a poetical literature, and who had been used to connect not only their religious belief, but their social duties, with the rites of a superstitious worship, and the traditions of a fantastical mythology. The masters who had helped to excite this fluctuation and conflict of opinion, neither wished, nor were able, to lay it. They had nothing intrinsically more valuable or solid to substitute for the vulgar errors which they had dislodged.

Attacked by Aristophanes.

It was not therefore without reason that Aristophanes, in common with all Athenians who loved and regretted the ancient times, regarded the sophistical circles with abhorrence, not only as seminaries of demagogues and sycophants, but as schools of impiety and licentiousness. That the attention of the Athenian youth should be diverted from military and athletic exercises, from the sports of the field, and from the enjoyment of that leisure which had once been esteemed the most precious privilege of a Greek freeman, to sedentary studies, which at the best only inflated them with self-conceit, and stimulated them to lay aside the diffidence which befitted their age, and

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come forward prematurely in public, to exhibit their new acquirements and to supplant the elder and graver citizens on the bema, or to harass them before the popular tribunals[1]: this in itself he deemed a great evil. And, in the last scene of the Knights, one of the resolutions which Demus adopts, when his faculties have been restored to their youthful vigour, is that he will bar the agora and the Pnyx against the beardless youths who now pass so much of their time in places of public resort, where they amuse themselves with discussing the merits of the orators in technical language, and will force them to go a-hunting, instead of making decrees. But it was a still more alarming evil, that, by way of preparation for this pernicious result, the religious belief of the young Athenians should be unsettled, their moral sentiments perverted, their reverence for the maxims and usages of antiquity extinguished; that subjects which had never before been contemplated but at an awful distance—the being and nature of the gods, the obligations arising from domestic and civil relations—should be submitted to close and irreverent inspection. It was according to the view of Aristophanes a matter of comparatively little moment, what turn such discussions happened to take, or what was the precise nature of the sophistical theories. The mischief was already done, when things so sacred had once been treated as subjects for inquiry and argument. But he perceived the evil much more clearly than the remedy. He would fain have carried his countrymen half a century backward, and have forced them to remain stationary at the stage which they had then reached in their intellectual progress; and it seems as if he wished to see the schools of the new philosophy forcibly suppressed, and with this view attempted to direct popular indignation against

[1] Aristoph. Ach. 650.

them. Unhappily the only case in which this attempt succeeded was one in which the poet himself, if he had been better informed, must have desired it should fail.

Aristophanes closely watched all the workings of the sophistical spirit, and was sagacious enough to perceive that they were not confined to any particular sphere, but pervaded every province of thought and action. He was naturally led to observe its influence with peculiar attention in the branches of literature or art which were most nearly allied to his own. He was able to trace it in the innovations which had taken place in music and lyrical poetry, but above all in the tragic drama; and Euripides, the last of the three tragic poets who are known to us by their works, appeared to him as one of the most dangerous sophists, and was on this account among the foremost objects of his bitterest ridicule. The earnestness with which Aristophanes assailed him seems to have increased with the growth of his reputation; for of the three comedies in which he is introduced, the last, which was exhibited after his death, contains by far the most severe as well as elaborate, censure of his poetry. It is not however quite certain that Euripides, even in the latter part of his career, was so popular as Sophocles. In answer to a question of Socrates, in a conversation which Xenophon probably heard during the latter part of the Peloponnesian war, Sophocles is mentioned as indisputably the most admirable in his art.[1] It has often been observed, that the success of Euripides, if it is measured by the prizes which he is said to have gained, would not seem to have been very great: and perhaps there may be reason to suspect, that he owed much of the applause which he obtained in his lifetime to the

Euripides.

[1] Mem i. 4. 3. He is classed with Homer, the dithyrambic poet Melanippides, Polyclitus, and Zeuxis.

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favour of a party, which was strong rather in rank and fortune than in numbers; the same which is said to have been headed by Alcibiades, and, on an occasion which will be afterwards mentioned, to have deprived Aristophanes of the prize.[1] Alcibiades, as we have seen[2], employed Euripides to celebrate his Olympic victories; and his patronage was sufficient to spread the poet's fame at home and abroad. The anecdote about the celebrity which he had acquired in Sicily is perfectly consistent with this view; as is the invitation which he received a little before his death from Archelaus of Macedon, at whose court he ended his life; and the admiration which Dionysius of Syracuse expressed for him, by buying his tablets and pen at a high price, to dedicate them in the temple of the Muses.

Aristophanes was so far from being blind to the poetical merits of Euripides, that he was himself charged by his rivals with borrowing from him[3], and in one of his lost plays acknowledged that in his diction he had imitated the terseness of the tragic poet, but asserted that his thoughts were less vulgar.[4] How accurately he had studied the works of the tragic drama, how vividly he perceived the genuine character of Greek tragedy, and the peculiar genius

[1] Even by Aristophanes (Ran. 770.) Euripides is represented as the favourite only of a class in Hades — which indeed is said to be there the largest — composed of the footpads, cutpurses, parricides, and housebreakers, who are delighted with his rhetorical artifices. This is evidently the same class as that which in the Wasps 1038, Aristophanes describes himself to have attacked in the Clouds — the ἠπίαλοι and πυρετοί, οἳ τοὺς πατέρας τ' ἤγχον νύκτωρ καὶ τοὺς πάππους ἀπέπνιγον, who are continually occupied with pleadings and chicanery. In Athens the τοιχώρυχοι are said to be πολλοί, but not the πλῆθος. (Ran. 807.) Xanthias expresses surprise that Euripides had not been pelted for his impudence in disputing the throne with Æschylus; and asks why Sophocles had not claimed it.

[2] Vol. III. p. 317.

[3] Schol. Plato Apol. I. p. 390. Bekker, Aristophanes ἐκωμῳδεῖτο ἐπὶ τῷ σκώπτειν μὲν Εὐριπίδην μιμεῖσθαι δ' αὐτόν. Hence Cratinus had coined the word εὐριπιδαριστοφανίζων. Did he apply it to Aristophanes himself? See Pflugk. Eurip. Præf. p. XXXVIII.

[4] Schol. Plato Apol. I. p. 331. αὐτὸς ἐξομολογεῖται Σκήνας καταλαμβανούσαις.

Χρῶμαι γὰρ αὐτοῦ τοῦ στόματος τῷ στρογγύλῳ,
Τοὺς νοῦς δ' ἀγοραίους ἧττον ἢ 'κεῖνος ποιῶ.

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His connection with the sophists.

of each poet, is sufficiently proved by the mode in which he has conducted the contest which he feigns between Æschylus and Euripides. But his criticism would probably have been less severe, if he had not considered Euripides less in his poetical character than in his connection with the sophistical school.[1] Euripides had in fact been a hearer of Anaxagoras, and probably both of Protagoras and Prodicus. In his house Protagoras was said to have read one of his works by which he incurred a charge of atheism. He was also on intimate terms with Socrates, who was therefore reported to have aided him in the composition of his tragedies, and perhaps may have done so, in the same way as Prodicus and Anaxagoras; and this connection was, as we shall see, of itself a sufficient ground with Aristophanes for suspicion and aversion. The strength of Euripides lay in passionate and moving scenes; and he sought like other poets for situations and characters which afforded the best opportunity for the display of his powers. But he was too frequently tempted to work upon the feelings of his audience by an exhibition of sufferings which were quite foreign to the heroic dignity of the persons who endured them, who were therefore degraded by the pity they excited. The misery of his heroes often consisted chiefly in bodily privations, which were presented to the eye, and could only awaken the sympathy of the spectator's animal nature. Aristophanes ridicules the aid which he borrowed for this purpose from the tragic wardrobe; but it was not so much the poverty of poetical invention betrayed by such scenes, as their tendency to bring down persons whose names were hallowed in epic song or in religious traditions, to the common level of humanity, and thus to weaken the popular reverence for

[1] Tzetzes had read somewhere that Theramenes was a disciple of Euripides, Ὁ Θηραμένης μαθητὴς ὑπῆρχεν Εὐριπίδου. Chil. XII. Hist. 416.

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antiquity, that really provoked his satire, and he seems, according to his usual practice, to have fixed on this palpable example of the manner in which the modern tragedy had lowered the ancient majesty of the art, which he expresses more generally by the boast put into the mouth of Euripides, that he had adapted his poetry to the uses of domestic life.[1]

But the affinity between Euripides and the sophists was still more conspicuous in some other peculiar features of his poetry. He made it a vehicle for rhetorical declamations, conducted in the forensic tone and spirit[2]; for long debates, evidently protracted for no other purpose than a display of dialectic dexterity; for philosophical reflections and disquisitions, studiously introduced as if with the design of shaking the established belief in articles of the highest importance. Traces of his acquaintance with the physical speculations of Anaxagoras, which at Athens were accounted irreconcilably opposed to the state religion, occur not unfrequently in his remaining works[3], and they were at least common enough, coupled with the freedom of his remarks on many points of the received theology, to afford Aristophanes a colour for representing him as little better than an atheist; for he worships only gods of his own, and they turn out to be nothing more than the powers of his own understanding.[4] His irreligion is contrasted with the piety of Æschylus, who invokes the goddess of the Eleusinian mysteries: a hint which, after the prosecution of Alcibiades, was easily understood, as to the party to which Euripides belonged. It was probably in the same point of view that Aristophanes considered the plays which he founded on tales of criminal, and

[1] Ran. 957. 975.

[2] Ἐκ παντὸς ἄν τις πράγματος δισσῶν λόγων
ἀγῶνα θεὶς' ἄν, εἰ λέγειν εἴη σοφός.
Fragm. Antiop. ap. Stob.

[3] See Porson ad Eurip. Orest. 971.

[4] Ran. 888.

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even of incestuous passion. Euripides was undoubtedly induced to select such subjects, some of which were new to the Greek stage, chiefly by the opportunity they afforded him of displaying his peculiar dramatic talent. But in his hands they seldom failed to give occasion for a sophistical defence of conduct repugnant to Greek usages and feelings, which to Aristophanes would apprear much more pernicious than the example itself. But his plays were likewise interspersed with moral paradoxes, which in more than one instance are said to have excited the indignation of the audience. A line in which the most pious of his heroes distinguishes between the oath of the tongue and that of the mind, in terms which might serve to justify any perjury, became very celebrated, and Aristophanes dwells upon it[1], apparently as a striking illustration of the sophistical spirit. It seems clear that these, and others of the novelties just mentioned, cannot have been designed to gain the general applause of the audience. Though we must reject a story told by some of his Greek biographers, which indeed is at variance with chronology, that the fate of his master Anaxagoras deterred him from philosophical pursuits, and led him to turn his thoughts to the drama, we might still wonder at his indiscretion, if it had not appeared probable that he aimed at gratifying the taste, not so much of the multitude, as of that class of persons which took pleasure in the new learning, and was in fact the favourite poet, not so much of the common people, as of a party, which was growing more and more powerful throughout his dramatic career.

Socrates.

Euripides however occupies only a subordinate place among the disciples and supporters of the sophistical school, whom Aristophanes attacked. The person

[1] Ran. 101. 1467. Thesm. 275.

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whom he selected as its representative, and on whom he endeavoured to throw the whole weight of the charges which he brought against it, was Socrates. In the Clouds, a comedy exhibited in 423, a year after the Knights had been received with so much applause, Socrates was brought on the stage under his own name, as the arch-sophist, the master of the free-thinking school. The story is of a young spendthrift, who has involved his father in debt by his passion for horses, and having been placed under the care of Socrates is enabled by his instructions to defraud his creditors, but also learns to regard filial obedience and respect, and piety to the gods, as groundless and antiquated prejudices; and it seems hardly possible to doubt that under this character the poet meant to represent Alcibiades[1], whom it perfectly suits in its general outline, and who may have been suggested to the thoughts of the spectators in many ways not now perceived by the reader. It seems at first sight as if, in this work, Aristophanes must stand convicted either of the foulest motives or of a gross mistake. For the character of Socrates was in most points directly opposed to the principles and practice which he attributes here and elsewhere to the sophists and their followers. Socrates was the son of a sculptor of little reputation, and himself for some time practised the art with moderate success. But he abandoned it that he might give himself up to philosophy, though his income was so scanty that it scarcely provided him with the means of subsistence. In his youth he had made himself master of every kind of knowledge then attainable at Athens which his narrow fortune permitted him to acquire, and he purchased the lessons of several of the learned men who came to sojourn there, at a price which he was never well able to spare. Yet when his own

[1] See Suevern's Essay on the Clouds translated by Mr. Hamilton.

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talents had attracted a crowd of admirers and among them some of the wealthiest youths, he not only demanded no reward for his instructions, but rejected all the offers which they made to relieve his poverty.[1] We have already seen some specimens of the manner in which he discharged the duties of a soldier and a citizen: how he braved the fury of the multitude, and the resentment of the tyrants, in the cause of justice. It is not my intention here to speak of the place which he holds in the history of Greek philosophy. But we have already had occasion to mention his contests with the sophists, and we have ample evidence that his discourses as well as his life were uniformly devoted to the furtherance of piety and virtue. Yet in the Clouds this excellent person appears in the most odious as well as ridiculous aspect; and the play ends with the preparations made by the father of the misguided youth to consume him and his school. The wrong done to him appears the more flagrant on account of its fatal consequences. The wish which the poet intimates at the close of his play, with an earnestness which almost oversteps the limits of comedy, was fulfilled, though not till above twenty years later, after the restoration of the democracy (B. C. 399), when Socrates was prosecuted, and put to death, on a charge which expressed the substance of the imputations cast on him in the Clouds; and Aristophanes was believed by their contemporaries to have contributed mainly to this result.

Attacked by Aristophanes.

There are two points with regard to the conduct of Aristophanes which appear to have been placed by recent investigations beyond doubt. It may be considered as certain that he was not animated by any personal malevolence toward Socrates, but only attacked him as an enemy and corrupter of religion and morals; but on the other hand it is equally well esta-

[1] Diog. Laert. II. 24. 31. Alcibiades offered him land, Charmides slaves.

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blished that he did not merely borrow the name of Socrates for the representative of the sophistical school, but designed to point the attention, and to excite the feelings of his audience against the real individual. The only question which seems to be still open to controversy on this subject, concerns the degree in which Aristophanes was acquainted with the real character and aims of Socrates, as they are known to us from the uniform testimony of his intimate friends and disciples. We find it difficult to adopt the opinion of some modern writers[1], who contend that Aristophanes, notwithstanding a perfect knowledge of the difference between Socrates and the sophists, might still have looked upon him as standing so completely on the same ground with them, that one description was applicable to them and him. It is true, as we have already observed, that the poet would willingly have suppressed all reflection and inquiry on many of the subjects which were discussed both by the sophists and by Socrates, as a presumptuous encroachment on the province of authority. But it seems incredible, that if he had known all that makes Socrates so admirable and amiable in our eyes, he would have assailed him with such vehement bitterness, and that he should never have qualified his satire by a single word indicative of the respect which he must then have felt to be due at least to his character and his intentions.

But if we suppose what is in itself much more consistent with the opinions and pursuits of the comic poet, that he observed the philosopher attentively indeed, but from a distance which permitted no more than a superficial acquaintance, we are then at no loss to understand how he might have confounded him with a class of men, with which he had so little in common, and why he singled him out to represent them. He

[1] See Roetscher, *Aristophanes*, &c.

obably first formed his judgment of Socrates by the ciety in which he usually saw him. He may have own that his early studies had been directed by Arelaus, the disciple of Anaxagoras; that he had both mself received the instruction of the most eminent soists, and had induced others to become their hearers[1]; at Euripides, who had introduceed the sophistical irit into the drama, and Alcibiades who illustrated most completely in his life, were in the number of s most intimate friends. Socrates never willingly irred beyond the walls of the city, and lived almost holly in public places, which he seldom entered ithout forming a circle round him, and opening me discussion connected with the objects of his philophical researches; he readily accepted the invitations his friends, especially when he expected to meet arned and inquisitive guests, and probably never failed give a speculative turn to the conversation. Aristoanes himself may have been more than once present, Plato represents him, on such occasions. But it as universally notorious, that, wherever Socrates apared, some subtle disputation was likely to ensue; e method by which he drew out and tried the inions of others, without directly delivering his own, id even his professions — for he commonly described mself as a seeker, who had not yet discovered the uth — might easily be mistaken for the sophistical epticism, which denied the possibility of finding it. ristophanes might also, either immediately or rough hearsay, have become acquainted with exessions and arguments of Socrates, apparently ntrary to the established religion. And indeed it extremely difficult to determine the precise relation which the opinions of Socrates stood to the Greek lytheism. He not only spoke of the gods with

Religious opinions of Socrates.

[1] Plato Theætet. p. 151. πολλοὺς μὲν δὴ ἐξέδωκα Πρωδίκῳ, πολλοὺς δὲ ἄλλοις σοφοῖς καὶ θεσπεσίοις ἀνδράσι.

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reverence, and conformed to the rites of the national worship, but testified his respect for the oracles in a manner which seems to imply that he believed their pretensions to have some real ground. On the other hand he acknowledged one Supreme Being, as the framer and preserver of the universe[1]; used the singular and the plural number indiscriminately concerning the object of his adoration[2], and when he endeavoured to reclaim one of his friends, who scoffed at sacrifices and divination, it was, according to Xenophon, by an argument drawn exclusively from the works of the one Creator.[3] We are thus tempted to imagine, that he treated many points to which the vulgar attached great importance, as matters of indifference, on which it was neither possible, nor very desirable, to arrive at any certain conclusion; that he was only careful to exclude from his notion of the gods, all attributes which were inconsistent with the moral qualities of the Supreme Being; and that, with this restriction, he considered the popular mythology as so harmless, that its language and rites might be innocently adopted. The observation attributed to him in one of Plato's early works[4], seems to throw great light on the nature and extent of his conformity to the state religion. Being asked whether he believes the Attic legend of Boreas and Orithuia, he replies, that he should indeed only be following the example of many ingenious men, if he rejected it, and attempted to explain it away[5]; but that such speculations, how-

[1] Mem. IV. 3. 13. ὁ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον συντάττων τε καὶ συνέχων.

[2] Οἱ θεοί, ὁ θεός, τὸ θεῖον, τὸ δαιμόνιον.

[3] Mem. I. 4. If the conversation has been faithfully reported by Xenophon, Aristodemus shifted his ground in the course of the argument. But he suggests no objection to the inference drawn by Socrates from the being and providence of God, as to the propriety of conforming to the rights of the state religion, and Xenophon himself seems not to have been aware that it might be disputed. He thinks that he has sufficiently refuted the indictment, which charged Socrates with disbelieving the existence of the gods acknowledged by the state, when he has proved that he believed in a deity.

[4] Phædrus, p. 229.

[5] I should say that she had been carried by the north wind over the cliffs near which she was playing with Pharmacea.

ever fine, appeared to him to betoken a mind not very happily constituted; for the subjects furnished for them by the marvellous beings of the Greek mythology were endless [1], and to reduce all such stories to a probable form was a task which required much leisure. This he could not give to it; for he was fully occupied with the study of his own nature. He therefore let those stories alone, and acquiesced in the common belief about them. [2]

The motives which induced Aristophanes to bring Socrates on the stage in preference to any other of the sophistical teachers, are still more obvious than the causes through which he was led to confound them together. Socrates, from the time that he abandoned his hereditary art, became one of the most conspicuous and notorious persons in Athens. There was perhaps hardly a mechanic who had not at some time or other been puzzled or diverted by his questions. [3] His features were so formed by nature as to serve with scarcely any exaggeration for a highly laughable mask. His usual mien and gait were no less remarkably adapted to the comic stage. He was subject to fits of absence which seem now and then to have involved him in ludicrous mistakes and disasters. Altogether his exterior was such as might of itself have tempted another poet to find a place for him in a comedy.

Aristophanes justly esteemed the Clouds as one of his master-pieces; yet it did not obtain even an

[1] He mentions the Centaurs, the Chimæra. Καὶ ἐπιῤῥεῖ δὲ ὄχλος τοιούτων Γοργόνων καὶ Πηγάσων, καὶ ἄλλων ἀμηχάνων πλήθη τε καὶ ἀτοπίαι (better perhaps ἀτοπίαν) τερατολόγων τινῶν φύσεων.

[2] Χαίρειν ἐάσας ταῦτα, πειθόμενος δὲ τῷ νομιζομένῳ περὶ αὐτῶν. The last expression is ambiguous; Schleiermacher translates *annehmend was darüber allgemein geglaubt wird, adopting the common belief about them*; but it seems to admit the sense, *complying with the common usage about them*; and this might mean nothing more than, forbearing to explain them away, as others had done. This seems more consistent with the epithets, so strongly expressive of incredulity, which he had just before applied to them.

[3] Mem. I. 2. 37.

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inferior prize; and though he altered it for a second exhibition, he either did not venture to produce it again, or, according to another account, the repetition was still more unsuccessful. We see no sufficient reason for rejecting a tradition preserved by one of the ancient commentators on the poet[1]: that this failure was caused by the intrigues of Alcibiades, concerning whom we hear many similar stories, and who probably perceived that he himself was one of the foremost objects of the poet's satire. And it seems not improbable that Socrates was partly screened from the danger which threatened him by the same powerful protection. But as he continued unmolested to the end of the Peloponnesian war, we must also conclude that his poverty, and the favourable impression which was generally produced by intercourse with him among all classes, co-operated with the growing number of his friends and admirers to shield him from prosecution. After the Anarchy the state of public feeling was changed in a manner which tended to raise a strong prejudice against him. We find several indications, that during the war, while the public morals were more and more infected with licentiousness, and while the new sceptical opinions were spreading among the upper classes, superstition was gaining ground in the great body of the people. The proceedings and disclosures which followed the mutilation of the Hermes-busts, are not to be overlooked as illustrations of the state of religion, though they were the result of political intrigues. But the remains of the old comedy contain many allusions to the introduction of new rites, all of a mystic and enthusiastic nature, and belonging to foreign and barbarous superstitions, which seem either to have been newly imported during this period into Athens, or to

Growth of superstition at Athens.

[1] Argument II. Bekk.

have attracted a greater number of devotees than before, especially among the women. Such were the orgies of the Thracian goddess Cotytto, those of the god Sabazius, the Phrygian Bacchus, the worship of Rhea or Cybele, and of Adonis. Some of these rites appear, like the Roman Bacchanalia, to have been used as a cover for the grossest licentiousness: as those secret orgies of Cotytto, which were the subject of a play of Eupolis, by which he is said to have provoked the resentment of Alcibiades whom he must therefore have represented as partaking in them.[1] Others only afforded an opportunity to impostors of profiting by vulgar credulity, and their credit was promoted by a great mass of literary forgeries, especially by numerous works bearing the revered names of Orpheus and Musæus[2], in which the authority of the most remote antiquity was claimed for these institutions, and their objects were described in language which bewildered the understanding, no less than the rites themselves excited the senses. It was generally noticed as an ill omen, that the festival of Adonis, which was celebrated by the women with the representation of funeral exsequies, fell on the day on which the Sicilian expedition was decreed.[3] And Aristophanes, in the passage where he alludes to this fact, intimates that such superstitions had not been long prevalent, and that they were attended with pernicious effects on female manners.[4] It seems probable that their introduction, or at least their more extensive diffusion, may be ascribed to the influence of the pestilence, both in its immediate

[1] See Vol. III. p. 319. Compare what is said of the mysteries of Rhea in Schol. Aristoph. Av. 877.

[2] Plato Polit. II. p. 364.

[3] Plut. Alc. 18. compared with the passage of Aristophanes quoted in the next note.

[4] Lys. 387.

Ἆρ' ἐξέλαμψε τῶν γυναικῶν ἡ τρυφή,
Χὠ τυμπανισμὸς χοἱ πυκνοὶ Σαβάζιοι,
Ὅ τ' Ἀδωνιασμὸς οὗτος οὐπὶ τῶν στεγῶν;

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effects, and its remoter consequences. It may have driven many to seek refuge or consolation under the pressure of public and private distress in new forms of religion, which held out easy modes of expiation to a stricken conscience, and brighter prospects to a desponding spirit. But Aristophanes also gives a hint which may lead us to suspect, that the propagation of these foreign rites was connected with that influx of new citizens, many of whom were of barbarian origin, which, as we have seen, was one result of the calamity.[1]

Intolerance.

Intolerance, as usual, kept pace with superstition and fanaticism. Not long before the exhibition of the Clouds, Diagoras of Melos, having either divulged or derided the mysteries of Eleusis, and in various other ways subjected himself to the charge of atheism, was proscribed at Athens: a decree engraved on a brazen column offered a talent to any one who should kill him, and two to any who should bring him to justice.[2] To intimate the affinity of their opinions, the poet in the play described Socrates as the Melian. Not many years before the end of the war[3], it became known that Protagoras, for the entertainment of a select circle assembled in the house of Euripides[4], had read a work *on the nature of the gods*, which began with a declaration that he was unable to ascertain whether the gods existed or not: because the subject was too obscure, and life too short, to investigate it. He was charged with impiety by Pythodorus, afterwards Archon under the Thirty, and, probably at the time of the accusation, one of the Four Hundred[5],

[1] Av. 1525.

[2] Schol. Aristoph. Av. 1073.

[3] The lines of Timon, from which it has sometimes been inferred (see Herbst in Petersen's *Studien*, I. p. 97.) that Protagoras survived Socrates, do not appear to have been intended to convey that meaning.

[4] Diog. Laert. IX. 54. According to others it was in the house of one Megaclides. It might have been read in both; but if it was read in the Lyceum, which was the case according to another account, Protagoras can scarcely have been aware of his danger.

[5] Diog. Laert. u. s. calls him son of Polyzelus, but it appears clear that it is the same person who is described in the first Alcibiades, p. 119. A. as the son of Isolo-

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and condemned to death, according to some accounts without a regular trial. He however escaped, and was soon after drowned in his voyage to Sicily; but the offensive book was publicly burnt in the Athenian agora, and all who possessed copies were ordered by public proclamation to give them up.[1] That, while such a spirit prevailed at Athens, Socrates, though he was accused, and probably was generally suspected, of holding like opinions, should have been so long spared, is much more surprising than that he should at last have been prosecuted, even if there had been no peculiar causes to operate against him. For Aristophanes was not the only comic poet who traduced him and his disciples upon the stage[2]; he continued to enforce the impression he had made by occasional allusions; and perhaps scarcely a year passed in which a theatrical audience did not hear the name of Socrates coupled with some odious imputations.

Prosecution of Socrates.

The time in which he was brought to trial was one, as we have seen, in which great zeal was professed, and some was undoubtedly felt, for the revival of the ancient institutions, civil and religious, under which Athens had attained her past greatness; and it was to be expected that all who traced the public calamities to the neglect of the old laws and usages, should consider Socrates as a dangerous person. But there were also specious reasons which will shortly be mentioned, for connecting him more immediately with the tyranny under which the city had lately groaned. His accusers however were neither common sycophants, nor do they appear to have been impelled by purely patriotic motives. This however is a point

chus, see Bergk, *Comm. de reliq. com. Ath. ant.* p. 100. Aristotle (Diog. Laert. u. s.) had written that Euathlus was the accuser of Protagoras; Bergk supposes that both took part in the prosecution.

[1] Τὰ κήρυκα ἀναλεξάμενοι παρ' ἑκάστου τῶν κεκτημένων.

[2] Eupolis had charged him with a sleight of hand like that described in the Clouds (see Schol. Nub. 180.), and had introduced Chærephon in his Κόλακες as a parasite of Callias. Schol. Plat. Bekker, p. 331.

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which must always remain involved in great uncertainty. Anytus, who seems to have taken the lead in the prosecution, and probably set it on foot, is said to have been, like Cleon, a tanner, and to have acquired great wealth by his trade[1]; but he was also a man of great political activity and influence, for the Thirty thought him considerable enough to include him in the same decree of banishment with Thrasybulus and Alcibiades[2], and he held the rank of general in the army at Phyle.[3] With him were associated two persons much inferior to him in reputation and popularity: a tragic poet named Melitus or Meletus, in whose name the indictment was brought, and who, if we may judge of him from the manner in which he is mentioned by Aristophanes, was not very celebrated or successful in his art[4], and one Lycon, who is described as an orator[5], and probably furnished all the assistance that could be derived from experience in the proceedings and temper of the law courts. According to an opinion ascribed to Socrates himself[6], they were all three instigated by merely personal resentment, which he had innocently provoked by his ordinary habits. Chærephon, one of his most ardent disciples and admirers, had, it seems—though the story is one which we can neither safely reject nor satisfactorily explain—consulted the Delphic oracle, perhaps by the advice of Socrates himself, to learn whether he

[1] Schol. Plat. Apol. Socr. p. 331. Bekk. If the Scholiast is right he was the same person of whom Plutarch tells the anecdote, Alc. 4.

[2] Xenophon, Hell. II. 3. 42. [3] Lysias, Agorat. p. 137.

[4] In the Γηρυτάδης he was introduced as one of the deputies sent to the poets in Hades, and was selected for the embassy, with Sannyrion and Cinesias, on account of his light weight, and his natural tendency to the lower regions (οὐ σάφ' ἴσμεν, διὰ φορτίον τι, καὶ διαὶ Ἑκάτην' ἀθλοχαριόντως. To understand the point of the sarcasm we must compare the balancing scene in the Frogs, and the remark of Æschylus, 867. ὅτι ἡ πόλις οὐχὶ συντέθραπταί μοι, τούτῳ δὲ συντέθραπται). See also the Scholiast on Av. 1406.

[5] Apol. p. 24. ῥήτωρ. Diog. Laert. II. 38. προσεποιοῦντο πάντα Λύκωνα ὁ Σωκρατικός. According to Maximus Tyrius, IX. 3. Μέλητος μὲν ἐγράψατο, Ἄνυτος δὲ ἐσυκοφάντει, Λύκωνα δὲ ἔδιωκεν.

[6] Apol. p. 23.

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could find any master wiser than Socrates; and the oracle is said to have declared Socrates the wisest of men.[1] Socrates however, who was deeply conscious of the imperfection of his own knowledge, and always disavowed all claims to wisdom, was only induced, it is said, by the answer of the oracle to scrutinise more accurately the pretensions of others, and was thus by degrees convinced that the superiority which it attributed to him over other men consisted only in his clearer insight into his own ignorance. Among the numerous persons whom in the course of this inquiry he had convicted of an empty profession of knowledge were, as he is made to assert, his three prosecutors. And in fact Plato, in one of his dialogues, introduces Anytus as vehemently offended with Socrates on account of the turn which his discourse had taken, and as quitting him with a threat, which, if it was ever uttered, was fulfilled by the indictment.[2]

It charged him with three distinct offences: *Socrates*—so it ran—*is guilty of not believing in the gods which the state believes in, and of introducing other new divinities*[3]*; he is moreover guilty of corrupting the young.* The case was one of those in which the prosecutor was allowed to propose the penalty which he thought due to the crime[4]; and Melitus proposed death. Before the cause was tried, Lysias composed a speech in defence of Socrates, and brought it to him for his use. But he declined it as too artificial for his character. Among the works of Plato is an apology which purports to be the defence which he

[1] Ἀνδρῶν ἁπάντων Σωκράτης σοφώτατος. The comparison with Sophocles and Euripides (Schol. Aristoph. Nub. σοφὸς Σοφοκλῆς· σοφώτερος δ' Εὐριπίδης) must have been prefixed afterwards. In the Apology attributed to Xenophon the answer has been arbitrarily altered.

[2] Meno, p. 95.

[3] Ἕτερα καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσηγούμενος. The ambiguity of the word δαιμόνια cannot be easily imitated in English. See the Philological Museum, vol. II. p. 581.

[4] Ἀγὼν τιμητός.

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really made; and, if it was written by Plato, it probably contains the substance at least of his answer to the charge.[1] The tone is throughout that of a man who does not expect to be acquitted; and he represents himself as labouring at once under the obloquy which had been thrown upon him, especially by Aristophanes, and under the ill-will which he had provoked by the performance of that which he considered as a service due to the Delphic god. The first head of the indictment he meets with a direct denial, and observes that he has been calumniously burdened with the physical doctrines of Anaxagoras and other philosophers. But that part which related to the introduction of new divinities he does not positively contradict; he only gets rid of it by a question which involves his adversary in an apparent absurdity. The charge itself seems to have been insidiously framed, so as to aggravate and distort a fact, which was universally notorious, but which was then very little understood, and has continued ever since to give rise to a multitude of conjectures. Socrates, who was used to reflect profoundly on the state of his own mind, had it seems gradually become convinced that he was favoured by the gods—who as he believed were always willing to communicate such a knowledge of futurity to their worshippers as was necessary to their welfare—with an inward sign, which he described as a voice, by which he was never indeed positively directed, but was often restrained from action. It was by this inward monitor that he professed to have been prohibited from taking a part

The *genius* of Socrates.

[1] Schleiermacher's arguments for this proposition in his introduction to the Apology, have not, as far as we know, been hitherto confuted. They are not met by Stallbaum's remarks in his preface to the edition of the Apology in the Bibliotheca Græca. There are however several difficulties, besides those discussed in the article above referred to of the Philological Museum. It is a little singular that the Apology makes no mention of Alcibiades or Critias. This — at least with regard to Critias — would have been natural for Plato, but is not so easily explained with respect to Socrates.

in public business. In the latter part of his life its warnings had been more frequently repeated, and it had consequently become a matter of more general notoriety. There was nothing in such a claim at all inconsistent with any doctrine of the Greek theology. But the language of the indictment was meant to insinuate that in this supernatural voice Socrates pretended to hear some new deity, the object of his peculiar worship.

Causes of his condemnation.

His answer to the third charge is also somewhat evasive, and seems to show that he did not understand its real drift. Nevertheless we have the best evidence, that it was on this the event of the trial mainly turned. Æschines, who had probably often heard all the particulars of this celebrated cause from his father, asserts that Socrates was put to death because it appeared that he had been the instructor of Critias[1]; and that the orator neither was mistaken, nor laid too much stress on this fact, seems to be clearly proved by the anxiety which Xenophon shows to vindicate his master on this head.[2] But at the same time we learn from him, that the prosecutors did not confine themselves to this example of the evils which had arisen from the teaching of Socrates, and that they made him answerable for the calamities which Alcibiades had brought upon his country. It was however no doubt the case of Critias that supplied them with their most efficacious appeals to the passions of their hearers. Critias, the blood-thirsty tyrant, the deadly enemy of the people, had once sought the society of Socrates, and had introduced his young cousin and ward Charmides—the same who shared his power and fell by his side—to the philosopher's acquaintance.[3] It was true, and probably was not

[1] Timarch. p. 24. ὑμεῖς Σωκράτην τὸν σοφιστὴν ἀπεκτείνατε, ὅτι Κριτίαν ἐφάνη πεπαιδευκώς. Plutarch (Nicias 23.) attributes his fate as exclusively to a different cause: ἀπώλετο διὰ φιλοσοφίαν.

[2] Mem. i. 2.

[3] Plato, Charmides.

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disputed by the accusers of Socrates, that Critias had afterwards been entirely alienated from him. He had been deeply offended by the freedom with which Socrates reproved his vices. During the Anarchy a law or edict was made forbidding any one to teach the art of speaking.[1] Xenophon says that it was aimed at Socrates, though he did not profess this art; but it furnished Critias with a pretext for commanding him to abstain from his usual disputations. Socrates had openly spoken against the proceedings of the oligarchical government, he had disobeyed his commands, as we have seen, in the case of Leon. He himself mentioned this transaction in his defence, and expressed his belief that, if the Thirty had retained their power a little longer, they would have put him to death. But these facts were not likely to counteract the impression which must have been made upon his judges by the persuasion that he had contributed to form the mind and character of Critias. There was another point of view in which this example must have appeared to illustrate and confirm the other charges. Critias, whose talents were as brilliant as his passions were headstrong, had stored his mind with all the learning that could be acquired by a man of the highest rank at Athens, and might be considered as a model of an accomplished sophist, and, as we have seen, appears to have made no secret of his contempt for the belief of the vulgar, nor of his opinion that all religions were mere political contrivances, designed to supply the defects of human laws. When we consider that Socrates, notwithstanding his conduct during the Anarchy, must have been accounted one of the party of the city, since he remained there throughout the whole period, and that the prosecutors were probably able to give evidence of many expressions

[1] Λόγων τέχνην. Mem. i. 2. 32.

apparently unfavourable to democracy, which had fallen from him in his manifold conversations[1], we cannot be surprised that the verdict was against him, but rather, as he himself professed to be, that the votes of the judges were almost equally divided. It appears indeed most likely, that if his defence had been conducted in the usual manner, he would have been acquitted; and that even after the conviction he would not have been condemned to death, if he had not provoked the anger of the court by a deportment which must have been interpreted as a sign of profound contempt or of insolent defiance. When the verdict had been given, the prisoner was entitled to speak in mitigation of the penalty proposed by the prosecutor, and to assign another for the court to decide upon. Socrates is represented as not only disdaining to deprecate its severity by such appeals as were usually made in the Athenian tribunals to the feelings of the jurors, but as demanding reward and honour instead of punishment; and he was at last only induced by the persuasions and offers of his friends to name a trifling pecuniary mulct. And it seems to be the preferable opinion, though one on which the investigators of Attic juriprudence are not agreed, that the law required judgment to be passed according to the proposal either of the prosecutor or the defendant.[2] The execution of the sentence was delayed by the departure of the Theoris, the sacred vessel, which carried the yearly offerings of the Athenians to Delos. From the moment that the priest of Apollo had crowned its stern with laurel until its return, the law required that the city should be kept pure from all pollution, and therefore that no criminal should be put to death.

[1] See Mem. I. 2. 58. III. 7. 6. and the remark attributed to him about Antisthenes in Diog. La. II. 31.

[2] Meier and Schoemann, *Attische Process*, p. 181., where however it is admitted in the note, that a passage of Isocrates c. Lochit. § 23. (Bekker) can hardly be reconciled with this opinion.

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The opening ceremony had taken place on the day before the trial of Socrates, and thirty days elapsed before the Theoris again sailed into Piræus. During this interval some of his wealthy friends[1] pressed him to take advantage of the means of escape which they could easily have procured for him. But he refused to prolong a life which was so near its natural close —for he was little less than seventy years old— by a breach of the laws, which he had never violated, and in defence of which he had before braved death; and his attachment to Athens was so strong that life had no charms for him in a foreign land.[2] His imprisonment was cheered by the society of his friends, and was probably spent chiefly in conversation of a more than usually elevated strain. When the summons came, he drank the fatal cup, in the midst of his weeping friends, with as much composure, and as little regret, as the last draught of a long and cheerful banquet. The sorrow which the Athenians are said to have manifested for his death, by signs of public mourning and by the punishments inflicted on his prosecutors[3], seems not to be so well attested as the alarm it excited among his most eminent disciples, who perhaps considered it as the signal of a general persecution, and are said to have taken refuge in Megara[4], and other cities.[5]

[1] Crito more probably than Æschines, to whom Idomeneus attributed the proposal (Diog. La. II. 60.), for Æschines seems to have been at this time extremely poor.

[2] Plato Crito, p. 52. b.

[3] According to Diog. La. II. 43. they immediately repented, so as to close the palæstras and the gymnasia, and condemned Anytus and Lycon to banishment, Melitus to death. We also read in Pseudo-Plutarch Vit. x. Orat. that Isocrates appeared in mourning for Socrates the day after his execution. Origen c. Cels. I. 3. ἐπὶ Σωκράτει μὲν αὐθέως Ἀθηναῖοι μετενόησαν, καὶ οὐδὲν παρέμεινεν αὐτοῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ πικρόν.

[4] Hermodorus in Diog. II. 106. but the addition δείσαντας τὴν ὠμότητα τῶν τυράννων seems to imply great ignorance or carelessness in the writer.

[5] Libanius, Socr. Apol. III. p. 63. Reisk. mentions Corinth, Elis, and Eubœa, among their places of refuge; probably meaning to display his learning. It may, however, be no more than a rhetorical flourish.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

THE EXPEDITION OF CYRUS THE YOUNGER.

Accession of Artaxerxes Mnemon. — Preparations of Cyrus. — Clearchus. — Aristippus. — Cyrus begins his March. — March through Asia Minor. — Epyaxa. — Arrival at Tarsus. — Hesitation of the Greeks. — March through Syria. — Passage of the Euphrates. — Trial of Orontes. — Preparations for Battle. — Battle of Cunaxa. — Death of Cyrus. — The Greeks victorious. — Receive a Message from the King. — Join Ariæus. — Are visited by Tissaphernes. — Conclude a Treaty with the King. — Sitace. — Passage of the Tigris. — Interview between Clearchus and Tissaphernes. — Arrest of the five Generals. — Their Fate.

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BEFORE we proceed with the history of the period which followed the close of the Peloponnesian war, our attention must for a time be turned to a series of events, which, though they took place for the most part far beyond the limits of Greece, and did not immediately affect its interests, will be found to be most intimately connected with its final destinies, and with some of the greatest revolutions of the ancient civilised world; and, in the brief account which we are about to give of them, we shall be chiefly guided by this view of their relative importance.

They arose out of the ambition of Cyrus, of whose abilities and enterprising spirit some specimens have been already seen, and were the results of an attempt which he made to place himself on the throne of Persia. He was the second of the four sons of Darius and Parysatis[1], and, according to the customs of the

[1] Xenophon, only having occasion to mention the two rivals, speaks (Anab. I. 1.) as if Darius had no other children by Parysatis. The two younger brothers were named Ostanes and Oxathres. Plut. Artax. 1.

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monarchy, his elder brother Artaxerxes was the legitimate heir apparent.[1] But Cyrus was the first son born to Darius after his accession to the throne, and he was his mother's favourite. She had encouraged him to hope that as Xerxes, through the influence of Atossa, had been preferred to his elder brother who was born while their father was yet in a private station, so she should be able to persuade Darius to set aside Artaxerxes, and declare Cyrus his successor. In the mean while he was invested with the government of the western provinces, and the extraordinary command which we have seen him administering in a manner so fatal to the interests of Athens. This appointment he seems from the first to have considered as a step to the throne; and though he continued to rely chiefly on his mother's influence, he was perhaps aware that, even if her intrigues proved successful, he might still have need of all the aid he could obtain, to secure the object of his ambition. But he also had sagacity and courage enough to perceive that should he be disappointed in his first expectations, the co-operation of the Greeks might still enable him to force his way to the throne. It was with this view that he so zealously embraced the side of Sparta in her struggle with Athens, both as the power which he found in the most prosperous condition, and which had the fairest prospect of triumphing with his assistance, and as that which was most capable of furthering his designs. The treasure which he spent in her cause he regarded as part of the price which he had to pay for the attainment of his wishes; and hence,

[1] We can find no foundation for Baehr's assertion (in a note on Plutarch's Artaxerxes, in Creuzer's *Meletemata*, III. p. 13.), that the order of succession adopted in the case of Xerxes was the law of the monarchy (*lege quadam cautum ut e regis filiis non alius maximus natu patri in regno succederet, quam qui maximus fuit natu patre jam regnum adepto atque administrante*). The reigning king seems always to have had the power of appointing his successor, but the law or custom simply regarded primogeniture. Herodot. VII. 2.

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B. C. 404.

when he was called away to his father's court, he placed his whole revenue, as we have seen, at Lysander's disposal, with instructions and admonitions, which proved how deeply he felt his own interest to be concerned in his success.

According to Plutarch's authors[1], Cyrus went to attend his father's sick bed with sanguine hopes that his mother had accomplished her purpose, and that he was sent for to receive the crown. He took with him the small Greek force which we have mentioned, less perhaps with a view to his immediate security, than to the effect which the report of the treatment they experienced might have in attracting other Greek adventurers into his service. But on his arrival at court he saw himself disappointed in his expectations, and found that he had only come to witness his father's death, and his brother's accession to the throne.

Accession of Artaxerxes Mnemon.

He accompanied Artaxerxes, whom the Greeks distinguished by the epithet Mnemon[2], to Pasargadæ, where the Persian kings went through certain mystic ceremonies of inauguration, and Tissaphernes took this opportunity of charging him with a design against his brother's life. It would seem from Plutarch's account that one of the officiating priests was suborned to support the charge; though it is by no means certain that it was unfounded. Artaxerxes was convinced of its truth, and determined on putting his brother to death; and Cyrus was only saved by the passionate entreaties of Parysatis, in whose arms he had sought refuge from the executioner. The character of Artaxerxes, though weak and timid, seems not to have been naturally unamiable; the ascendency which his mother, notwithstanding her undissembled predilection for her younger son, exercised over him, was the

[1] Artax. 2.

[2] It would seem to be implied that he was celebrated for the tenacity of his memory, yet Plutarch had no anecdotes to tell on the subject.

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source of the greater part of his crimes and misfortunes. On this occasion he suffered it to overpower both the suspicions suggested by Tissaphernes, and the jealousy which the temper and situation of Cyrus might reasonably have excited. He not only pardoned his brother, but permitted him to return to his government.

Cyrus felt himself not obliged, but humbled, by his rival's clemency; and the danger he had escaped only strengthened his resolution to make himself as soon as possible independent of the power to which he owed his life. Immediately after his return to Sardis, he began to make preparations for the execution of this design. The chief difficulty was to keep them concealed from Artaxerxes until they were fully matured; for, though his mother, who was probably from the beginning acquainted with his purpose, was at court, always ready to put the most favourable construction on his conduct, Tissaphernes was at hand to watch it with malignant attention, and to send the earliest information of any suspicious movement to the King. Cyrus however devised a variety of pretexts to blind Tissaphernes and the court, while he collected an army for the expedition which he was meditating. His main object was to raise as strong a body of Greek troops as he could; for it was only with such aid that he could hope to overpower an adversary who had the whole force of the empire at his command; and he knew enough of the Greeks to believe, that their superiority over his countrymen in skill and courage was sufficient to compensate for almost any inequality of numbers. One pretext was furnished by the state of the Greek cities, which had formerly been considered as belonging to the satrapy of Tissaphernes, who still claimed dominion over them. Cyrus perhaps contended that they had been subjected to his authority by the general terms of his father's grant,

Preparations of Cyrus.

which constituted him governor of the sea-coast[1], or that they were appendant to the satrapy of Lydia.[2] However this may be, he encouraged them to transfer their obedience from Tissaphernes to himself; and all, except Miletus, declared for him, and received the garrisons which he sent to take possession of them. But he still affected to apprehend that they were threatened with the attacks of Tissaphernes, and ordered his commanders to strengthen their garrisons with as many of the best Peloponnesian troops as money could procure. The whole body of mercenaries thus collected he placed under the command of Xenias, an Arcadian, the leader of the band of Greeks which had escorted him on his last journey to his father's court. Miletus had been prevented from following the example of the other Ionian cities by the timely intervention of Tissaphernes, who put some of the malcontents to death, and banished others. The exiles took refuge at the court of Cyrus, and afforded him another welcome pretext for raising a sea and land force, with which he laid siege to Miletus. This feud with Tissaphernes was especially serviceable to him in stilling the suspicions of Artaxerxes, to whom he addressed several submissive letters, requesting that the contested cities might be placed under his authority; Parysatis seconded these solicitations, and thus contributed to persuade the King, that his brother's thoughts were engrossed by this petty object. He was too well pleased with the quarrel, and with the expense in which it involved Cyrus, to interfere for the purpose of ending it; especially as his brother regularly transmitted the tribute due from the cities which he held, to the royal treasury.

[1] Xen. Hell. I. 4. 2. ἀρξων πάντων ἐπὶ θαλάττῃ.

[2] Manso indeed (*Sparta*, III. 2. p. 33.) asserts that Artaxerxes was prevailed on by his mother to annex the sea-coast to the satrapy of Cyrus, and allowed him (!) to make war on Tissaphernes. But the passages to which he refers (Anab. I. 1. 6—8. and IX. 9.) contain not a word in proof of this statement, but rather imply the contrary.

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Clearchus.

Adventurers of every class, but especially Greeks whose talents or station rendered them fit instruments for the designs of Cyrus, were sure to find an asylum at his court, and were soon won by his affability and munificence. Among those who took refuge there was the Spartan Clearchus, whose name last occurred to us when Byzantium during his absence was betrayed to Alcibiades.[1] It seems that he was called to account for the loss of the place, which was deeply felt at Sparta, and sentenced to a fine.[2] Yet when, at the end of the Peloponnesian war, the Byzantians, and the other Greeks on the adjacent coast of Thrace, were obliged to apply to Sparta for succour against the attacks of the neighbouring barbarians, he was again sent by the ephors to take the command there.[3] But he had proceeded no further than the Isthmus, when they began to repent of their choice, and despatched a messenger to recall him; but he refused to return, and pursued his journey to Byzantium. He found admission there, notwithstanding the severity which had made him odious during his former command; the present danger perhaps effaced all recollection of the past; but he took advanof the confidence reposed in him, to put to death the magistrates and many of the principal citizens, to banish others, and to enrich himself with the confiscation of their property, which enabled him to raise a strong body of mercenaries, and to make himself absolute master of the city. His tyranny became so oppressive, that the Spartans thought it proper, either

[1] Above, p. 80.

[2] Polyænus, II. 2. 7.

[3] Diodorus, XIV. 12. Xenophon Anab. II. 6. 2. Schneider very justly remarks that Xenophon's account of the proceedings of Clearchus can hardly be reconciled with that of Polyænus in the passage just cited, where Clearchus is represented as having never returned to Sparta after the loss of Byzantium, before he established his tyranny there. It is the more surprising that Schneider should say elsewhere (on Xen. Hell. I. 1. 35.) that Polyænus gives a more accurate account of this matter than Diodorus, whose narrative, as he himself observes, is not inconsistent with Xenophon's.

for the sake of the Byzantians, or for their own honour, to interfere. If we may believe Diodorus, though he had been condemned to death for his contumacy, the government first attempted by an embassy to persuade him to lay down his usurped authority, and on his refusal sent an armament under the command of Panthoides to reduce him to submission. He did not venture to await its approach at Byzantium, but removed his troops and treasure to Selymbria, and not long afterwards, having been defeated and shut up in the town, seeing his affairs desperate, made his escape, and proceeded to the court of Sardis. Cyrus—an excellent judge of character and abilities—soon discerned the value of his military talents, and his fearless and enterprising, though stern and imperious spirit, and intrusted him with a sum of money for levying troops, which were avowedly destined to protect the Thracian Chersonesus against its barbarian neighbours, but were always in readiness for other purposes. Clearchus executed this commission so ably, and with so much benefit to the Greek towns on the Hellespont, that they aided him with voluntary contributions, and thus strengthened the force which waited on the orders of Cyrus in this quarter.

Aristippus.

A Thessalian named Aristippus, who had been previously connected with him by ties of hospitality, met with an equally friendly reception, when he came to request a subsidy to enable him to carry on a contest in which he was engaged with an opposite faction at home. He asked but for the means of raising 2000 men, and of maintaining them for three months. Cyrus gave as much as sufficed for twice the number and the time, and thus might reckon on finding another body of troops at his disposal. At the same time, he commissioned other Greek officers to levy troops for the war against Tissaphernes, and

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directed Proxenus, a Theban who had been attracted to his court by the hope of raising his fortunes, to collect forces for an expedition against the Pisidians, who, strong in the fastnesses of their mountains, infested the borders of his satrapy, and defied the King's authority. While he thus cultivated the good-will and employed the services of the Greeks, he neglected no opportunity of winning the affections of his own countrymen; and, according to Plutarch[1], there were many Persians who felt that the safety of the monarchy demanded a ruler of his character, and gave him assurances which led him to believe that he should find a general disposition in his favour even in the upper provinces.

More than a year was spent in these preparations; and when the time approached for the decisive step, he sent envoys to Sparta to claim a return for the great services which he had recently rendered to the commonwealth. According to Plutarch he accompanied his request with promises of reward to all adventurers who should take part in his enterprise, in a style of Oriental exaggeration, and with a vaunting comparison of his own merits with his brother's; and the terms in which Xenophon reports his application to the Spartan government seem also to show that he at least gave sufficient intimations of the real object of his expedition. Lysander, whom after his victory at Ægos-potami he had honoured with a magnificent present — a model of a galley three cubits long in ivory and gold[2] — undoubtedly exerted all his influence in his behalf; and the ephors were disposed to aid an ally to whom they owed so much, and who might again be useful. They directed their admiral Samius, who was cruising in the Ægean with

[1] Artax. 6.

[2] Plut. Lys. 18. It was deposited at Delphi, in the treasury of Brasidas and the Acanthians.

a squadron of twenty-five galleys, to obey his orders, and sent 700 heavy infantry under Cheirisophus to join his land-forces.

Cyrus begins his march.

In the spring of 401 Cyrus began his march from Sardis. He had been previously joined by Xenias with all the troops which could be spared from the garrisons of the Greek towns, amounting to 4000 heavy infantry, and by those which had been employed in the siege of Miletus. The Milesian exiles were also readily induced to take part in the expedition by the promises of Cyrus, that as soon as he had accomplished his own object, he would attend to their interests, and would not rest until he had restored them to their homes. Of the besieging forces one division, under Socrates an Achæan, consisted of 500 heavy infantry; another under Pasion, a Megarian, of 300 heavy armed, and as many targeteers.[1] Proxenus had also arrived with 1500 heavy infantry and 500 light troops; and Sophænetus, an Arcadian of Stymphalus, one of the officers charged with the levies for the war against Tissaphernes, had brought 1000 heavy infantry. This was the whole of the Greek force with which Cyrus left Sardis. He had summoned Clearchus to join him with all his troops, and had called upon Aristippus to settle his differences as soon as possible with his political adversaries, and to send over the men whom he had been employing in Thessaly. But he did not wait for these reinforcements, which he expected would overtake him on his march. The army which he had raised from his barbarian subjects amounted to about 100,000 men. His admiral Tamos, an Egyptian, who had been, as we have seen, one of the lieutenants of Tissaphernes, but had abandoned his service for that of Cyrus, was

[1] According to another reading, which happens remarkably to coincide with Xenophon's reckoning, Pasion commanded 700 men (*ἑπτακοσίους ἄνδρας*) whom we should suppose to have been heavy armed. But, as Schneider observes, this is not Xenophon's usual mode of speaking.

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recalled from Miletus, which he had been blockading with twenty-five galleys[1], to Ephesus, where he was to be joined by the Laconian squadron, and then to sail eastwards, and support the operations of the army. The declared object of the expedition was the extermination of the refractory Pisidians. But the scale of the armament, more especially the naval preparations, roused the suspicions of Tissaphernes, who hastened to put the King on his guard.

March through Asia Minor.

It soon indeed became evident that the avowed purpose of the expedition was not the real one. Cyrus bent his march toward the south-east without turning aside to invade Pisidia. At Colossæ in Phrygia he was joined by Meno, a Thessalian adventurer, whom Aristippus had sent with as many of his mercenaries as he could part with. They amounted to no more than 1000 heavy armed and 500 targeteers. At Celænæ, near the sources of the Mæander, he halted for thirty days; probably to allow time for the other reinforcements which he expected. A royal palace, which had been built here by Xerxes, and a park abounding in game, may perhaps have induced him to protract his sojourn. Here he was joined by Clearchus, who brought 1000 heavy infantry, 800 Thracian targeteers, and 200 Cretan bowmen. Sosias, a Syracusan, also arrived here, with 1000 heavy infantry[2], and 1000 more were brought by Sophænetus, apparently the Arcadian already mentioned, who may have been left behind at Sardis for this purpose. Here Cyrus reviewed his Greek forces in the park; they amounted according to Xenophon to 11,000 heavy infantry and about 2000 targeteers.[3] After traversing

[1] Anab. i. 4. 2. Diodorus, xiv. 19., makes the Persian fleet amount to fifty galleys, before it was joined by any Lacedæmonian squadron.

[2] According to another reading 300.

[3] Schneider has devoted one of his long and elaborate notes to a computation and critical examination of the numbers which compose this sum; with what success and profit to his readers may be inferred from the fact, that he has altogether

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a part of Mysia, he arrived at a town, the name and situation of which are very obscure—Xenophon calls it Cayster-plain[1]—where he was detained by a new embarrassment. His treasury seems to have been exhausted by the expense of his preparations, and the pay of the Greeks was three months in arrear. They began to besiege the door of his lodging with importunate demands, which he found it very difficult to appease. But he was relieved by the appearance of Epyaxa. Epyaxa, the consort of Syennesis, the king, or hereditary satrap of Cilicia[2], who came escorted by a guard of Cilicians and Greeks of Aspendus, either attracted by his rank and reputation or on a secret mission from her husband, who probably divined his design, and desired to remain neutral; and either to propitiate his favour, or as Xenophon intimates, captivated by his personal qualities, furnished him with the means of

Epyaxa.

omitted to take into the account the 1000 heavy infantry, and 500 targeteers, commanded by Meno. According to the readings which he himself adopts in his text for the numbers assigned to Pasion and Sosias, there would be an excess of 300 over the 11,000, and of 100 over the 2000. This would perhaps agree very well with Xenophon's expression as to the latter number (*ἀμφὶ τοὺς δισχιλίους*), but it is not probable that he would have stated the other number without any such qualifying preposition, if he had been aware that it was short by 300 of the precise amount. But in his list Schneider adopts the readings which he has rejected in his text, giving 700 men to Pasion, and 300 to Sosias, and thus makes the whole amount of the heavy infantry to be 10,000, which, with the addition of Meno's 1000, is exactly Xenophon's number. And, according to the same readings, if the Cretan bowmen are included among the targeteers, their sum will likewise be just 2000; namely:

Clearchus - -	1000
Proxenus - -	500
Meno - - -	500
	2000

Yet Schneider exclaims in the same note: *Miror equidem Interpretes, qui sedere ad rationes noluerint.*

[1] According to Mannert's conjecture, *Κάστρου πεδίον*, the town meant would be Sagalassus in Pisidia. But (not to speak of the improbability that it should have been so described) if Cyrus had really invaded Pisidia, which was the avowed object of his hostility, Xenophon could scarcely have failed to make at least some such remark as he does afterwards about Lycaonia. Mr. Ainsworth (*Travels in the Track of the Ten Thousand Greeks*), p. 27., identifies it with "the plain of Surmeneh, a high and barren upland (as its ancient name designates) on or near to which were the town of Docimeum and the marble quarries of Synnada."

[2] Xenophon gives him the title of king, Anab. i. 2. 12.; but afterwards, vii. 8. 25., numbers him among the satraps, *ἄρχοντες τῆς βασιλέως χώρας*. Ctesias is made by Photius to say of him, *ἅμφω συνεμάχει Κύρῳ τε καὶ Ἀρταξέρξῃ*.

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satisfying the claims of the troops, and of giving them a month's pay in advance. She afterwards accompanied him on his march toward the frontiers of her husband's territories. At Tyriæum, a town seated on one of the great plains of Phrygia, in compliance, as it was generally believed, with her wish, he reviewed his army. When the whole host had passed by, he sent his interpreter to the Greek generals with orders to exhibit their manner of charging. The Greeks were drawn up by themselves four deep, uniformly equipt, with brazen helmets, greaves, and scarlet tunics; and their shields were burnished for the occasion. The word was given; the trumpet sounded, and the phalanx advanced, with spears couched; but by degrees the men quickened their step, while they raised their war shouts, and, at length as they approached the tents, ran at full speed. The followers of the camp, and the barbarians in general, were thrown into consternation by their onset; and Epyaxa herself was so much alarmed by the novelty of the spectacle, that she alighted from her chariot, and fled with the terrified crowd. Cyrus, more anxious about the success of his enterprise than the fate of the Persian monarchy, was delighted at observing the impression which these few Greeks made upon the barbarian multitude, and the contempt which they manifested by their noisy laughter for the fears they excited.

Lycaonia, as a hostile territory, was given up to the ravages of the Greeks. But when the army had reached the borders of Cappadocia, Cyrus directed Meno to escort the Cilician princess into her own country by the shorter of the two roads which led to it, while he himself, with the rest of his forces, took the other. Each of these roads crossed the mountains which bounded Cilicia on the north-west through a defile which might have been easily guarded by a few

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n against a host. The pass toward which Cyrus was rching was said to be occupied by Syennesis him- f; and Cyrus halted for a day in the plain to ascer- n his movements. But the day after advice came ıt the Cilicians had left the pass clear. Their reat was caused by the intelligence which their ıg had received, that Meno had already entered his ninions, and that the armament commanded by mos had appeared off the coast. Cyrus descended o the plains of Cilicia, and arrived at Tarsus, the ɔital, without interruption. He there found Meno l Epyaxa, who had reached it five days sooner. ır husband and the greater part of the inhabitants l retired to a stronghold in the mountains, and ɔno's troops had sacked the city and the royal palace, revenge the loss which they had suffered in crossing ɔ frontiers, when a hundred of the heavy infantry, ıo had been separated from the main body, had her missed their way and perished, or had been cut , while engaged in plunder, by the Cilicians.[1] ıis occurrence seems to have disposed Syennesis— ɔugh he affected entire independence—to listen ɔre willingly to the persuasions of his queen, and to ne to an interview with Cyrus, who bestowed on n the presents which were accounted most honour- le at the Persian court—golden arms and ornaments and undertook to protect his territory from further ɔliation, and in return received a large subsidy.

Arrival at Tarsus.

But as it was now clear that the invasion of Pisidia s not the object of the expedition, the real design Cyrus began to be generally suspected by the eeks; and they refused to follow him any further: was not, they said, to be led against the King that

Hesitation of the Greeks.

Xenophon states the two reports as equally probable; and, vehemently as he ked Meno, he is so far from talking of *his violences at Tarsus*, and *his intole- rapines as he traversed the country*, that he does not impute the slightest onduct to him, and expressly attributes the sacking of Tarsus to the rage of oldiers.

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they had entered his service. Clearchus, who at first attempted to compel his own soldiers to continue their march, narrowly escaped stoning, and was forced to call them together, and assure them that he did not intend to thwart their wishes, or to abandon them, and that deeply as he was indebted to Cyrus, he should be ready to sacrifice his friendship to their good-will. This declaration was warmly applauded, and induced more than 2000 of the troops who had been serving under Xenias and Pasion to join his corps. But he sent a secret message to Cyrus, who was much distressed by the mutiny, encouraging him to hope that all would end well, though it would be necessary for a time to keep up a show of variance between them; and, as if he feared the prince's resentment, he refused, when publicly sent for, to go to him. He then called another assembly, which was attended not only by his own men, but by as many as chose of the rest; pointed out to them the dangers and difficulties of their situation, shut up as they were in a foreign land, and exposed to the displeasure of Cyrus, who might not only withhold the pay to which they had no longer any claim, but might prove as formidable an enemy as he had been a munificent friend; and proposed that they should deliberate on the measures now to be adopted. Among those who offered their opinions were some whom Clearchus had instructed to make the most extravagant proposals, which he hoped would more deeply impress the audience with a right sense of their perilous condition, and would thus lead them more readily to resign themselves to his guidance. One of these speakers, professing the utmost eagerness to return to Greece, moved that they should immediately lay in a stock of provisions, and prepare for their departure, and that they should ask Cyrus for ships to carry them home, or, if he refused them, for a guide to lead them in safety

hrough his territories; or, if they could not even btain this request, that they should put themselves a battle-array, and send a detachment to seize the asses, before they were occupied by Cyrus, or by the ilicians, whose enmity they had provoked by so any aggressions. Clearchus then rose to say, that or various reasons he must decline taking the ommand in this expedition, if it should be resolved n; but that he was willing to obey any general whom hey might elect in his room. It was now the turn f another speaker to point out the absurdity of the ounsel which had been given, and to show that they ight as well request Cyrus to guard the passes for hem, as trust him with the choice of ships or of uides, to help them to desert him; nor was it proba- le that they would be allowed to provide themselves ith the means of subsistence for such a purpose from he market which was held in the camp of the barba- ians, and as little could they hope to effect their etreat unobserved. He therefore proposed, that they hould depute some of their number, with Clearchus t their head, to Cyrus, and inquire what the object as for which he required their services. If it was ne similar to that for which he had before employed enias and his band, that they should proceed with im; but if it was some more arduous and dangerous nterprise, that they should request him not to insist n leading them farther without their consent. This ourse was adopted, and in reply to their question yrus professed that he was marching against an nemy, the satrap Abrocomas, who, as he heard, was osted on the Euphrates; if they should not find him here, they might then deliberate on their next move- ents. Abrocomas was one of the generals of Arta- erxes, and had an army of 300,000 men under his ommand. It is difficult to believe that this fact was nknown to the Greeks, or that after Cyrus's last

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declaration they felt any doubt that he was leading them against the King; though Xenophon only says, that they suspected it. But Clearchus seems to have succeeded in convincing them that there was as much danger in stopping as in going forward; and the promise of an addition of one half to their pay, fixed their determination of continuing their march.

At Issus, near the eastern frontier of Cilicia, the army met the fleet, under Tamos, and the Spartan Admiral Pythagoras, who had superseded Samius, and now brought thirty-two galleys, with Cheirisophus and his troops on board.[1] The object with which Cyrus had caused this maritime force to attend the movements of his army, was to provide against an obstacle which he expected to encounter on the northern confines of Syria, where his road lay through a pass between the chain of Amanus and the sea, strong by nature, and fortified by art. The northern fortress—the Gate of Cilicia—was guarded by a Cilician garrison; but since the treaty concluded with Syennesis, no resistance was to be feared on this side. The Syrian Gate—which was parted from the other by a ravine, and the bed of a narrow stream—Cyrus had expected to find occupied by some of the King's troops; and Abrocomas, whom he professed to be seeking on the Euphrates, had been sent down to Phœnicia apparently for this purpose. Cyrus had intended, if he found him in possession of the pass, to transport a body of troops by sea to the other side, and to attack him at once in front and rear. But Abrocomas, though his army was three times as strong as that of Cyrus, did not venture to await his approach, deterred perhaps chiefly by his naval pre-

[1] Diodorus, xiv. 21., says that the Spartan government wished to preserve the appearance of neutrality between Cyrus and his brother, and therefore affected to consider the troops of Cheirisophus as volunteers. This would imply that the designs of Cyrus were well known at Sparta. But the co-operation of the Spartan admiral could not easily have been reconciled with professions of neutrality.

parations, but possibly in part also by the desertion of a body of Greek mercenaries—400 heavy-armed—who left him, and joined the camp of Cyrus at Issus. Both fortresses were found unguarded, and the army reached the Phœnician seaport of Myriandrus without opposition. During the halt which it made there, Xenias and Pasion embarked with their most valuable property, and sailed away for Greece: offended, as it was believed, with Cyrus, because he had permitted Clearchus to retain the command of their men, who had joined his division at Tarsus. A report ran through the Greek camp, that Cyrus meant to send some galleys in pursuit of them; and though all supposed that their punishment, if they should be overtaken, would be severe, there were many who thought that it would be well deserved, and hoped that they might not escape. Cyrus however assembled the generals, and assured them that he had no intention of pursuing the fugitives, though he had galleys enough, and knew the direction which they had taken; and though their wives and children were in his power—for they had been deposited in the custody of his garrison at Tralles—he did not even mean to detain them. He would let the past services of the two officers compensate for their ungenerous desertion. This well-timed display of magnanimity produced an effect on the minds of the Greeks, which more than made amends for the loss which occasioned it.

March through Syria.

Belesis, the king or satrap of Syria and Assyria, seems to have adhered to Artaxerxes, and Cyrus in revenge burnt his palace and laid waste his beautiful park, which lay near the source of the Daradax, and, as it seems, not far from the Euphrates.[1] But he

[1] Mr. Ainsworth (p. 66.) finds the site of the palace of Belesis at Balis, at about a mile from the Euphrates, and conceives the Daradax to have been a canal which is still to be seen there.

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marched along the bank of the river to Thapsacus without seeing an enemy.[1] As it was here that he meant to cross into Mesopotamia, it was no longer possible to conceal his purpose, and he therefore sent for the Greek generals, and bad them inform the troops, that his expedition was directed against the King, and endeavour to prevail on them to follow him. In the assembly which they called to deliberate on this message, some complaints were heard, that the generals had long been acquainted with the designs of Cyrus; but as they had been at least suspected by every man in the army, before it left Tarsus, it is probable that no very vehement indignation was felt on this account; and it would rather seem that they affected that which they expressed to raise the price of their services. For when Cyrus had promised them a largess of five minas apiece, as soon as they should have arrived at Babylon, and their full pay until he had brought them back to Ionia, the greater part consented to proceed. But before this plan had been adopted, Meno persuaded his own troops to cross the Euphrates, and thus to earn the favour of Cyrus without any sacrifice or risk. *If the rest followed their example they would have the merit of taking the lead; if not, they might still have that of reluctantly joining the retreat of their countrymen.* Cyrus was highly pleased with this example of zeal, and rewarded the men with praise and promises, and Meno himself, as was generally believed, with magnificent presents. He then crossed the river, followed by the whole army. Abrocomas in his retreat had burnt the boats which, in ordinary seasons, afforded the only passage at Thapsacus; but at this juncture the river happened to be so low that

Passage of the Euphrates.

[1] Mr. Ainsworth observes (u. s.), *It cannot be doubted but that the army followed the banks of the river to Thapsacus; for in the Syrian plains or solitudes they would have been without points of rest, without provisions, and without fresh water.*

the men were able to ford it, and found it nowhere more than breast high. This was accounted a manifest interposition of heaven in favour of Cyrus, to whom the river appeared to do homage as to its future sovereign.

He then pursued his march over the desert along the left bank with the utmost expedition: anxious, Xenophon says, to come up with his brother, before he could have time to collect the forces of his vast empire. Yet Artaxerxes had already raised 1,200,000 men, including the division detached under Abrocomas to meet the enemy in Phœnicia, which however had not yet rejoined the main army. Cyrus must, we should have supposed, have been aware, that, if with his comparatively small force he was able to make head against nearly a million of men, he had no reason to fear any addition which might be made to the numbers of such a host, which would only render it more unwieldy, and would thus favour his prospect of victory. But perhaps he hoped that his brother might not so clearly perceive this, and might be induced for the sake of increasing his army to fall back before him upon the upper provinces: a step which would perhaps have given the empire to Cyrus without a battle, and which, according to Plutarch, had been already agitated in the royal council. By a rapid march he would either drive the King to this retreat, or find him, in his own opinion, unprepared.[1]

The army suffered much during this march from hunger and thirst: the provisions of the Greeks were exhausted, and they were obliged to replenish their store at high prices in the market of the barbarian

[1] The remark which Xenophon makes on this occasion, that the Persian empire was powerful in the extent of its territory, and the numbers of its population, but weak on account of the time required to collect its forces, sounds oddly, when we reflect, that Artaxerxes, though taken by surprise, had, according to his own statement, already raised 1,200,000 men.

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camp. One of the slighter difficulties of the way afforded Cyrus an opportunity of exhibiting the devotedness of his attendants; whether more to excite the admiration or the contempt of the Greeks, we do not venture to pronounce. Some of the waggons had stuck fast in the mud in a narrow part of the road, and obstructed the march. Cyrus ordered his two interpreters, with a detachment of the barbarian troops, to extricate them. But as the work seemed to proceed slowly, affecting to be angry at the delay, he directed the courtiers who stood round him, Persians of high rank, to hasten it. They instantly threw aside the more cumbrous part of their gorgeous dress, and leaping into the mud with all their splendid ornaments, shared the labour of the common soldiers with such alacrity, that the obstacle was speedily removed. During a halt which the army made to take in provisions from a city seated on the opposite bank of the river, which the men crossed on skins stuffed with hay, a quarrel arose in the Greek camp, which was near ending in bloodshed, and drew from Cyrus a remarkable acknowledgment of the different light in which he viewed his Greek and his barbarian forces. A dispute had taken place between a soldier of Clearchus and one of Meno's. Clearchus, to whom an appeal was made, decided in favour of his own follower, and punished the other as an aggressor with blows.[1] His comrades were indignant, as at an affront offered to the whole body; and Clearchus, happening to pass the same day through Meno's encampment, was assailed by them with stones, and still more dangerous missiles, and narrowly escaped with his life. He immediately brought up his own troops to revenge this insult, and Proxenus tried in vain to mediate between the an-

[1] Πληγὰς ἐνέβαλεν. It is probable that Clearchus, according to the Spartan custom of which we find so many instances, administered this discipline on the spot with his own truncheon.

tagonists. Clearchus was only appeased by the remonstrances of Cyrus, who bad the Greeks remember that their discord, if they should turn their arms against one another, would prove fatal not only to him, but to themselves. For their barbarian comrades, if ever they saw an opportunity of overpowering them, would show themselves still more hostile to them than the King's troops.

Not long after they had left the scene of this occurrence traces appeared of a hostile body of cavalry, supposed to amount to about 2000, which, preceding the march of the army, laid the country waste before it. Orontes, a Persian of the highest rank, related to the royal family, and esteemed among his countrymen for his military skill, took occasion from this annoyance to request Cyrus to place 1000 horse at his disposal, and undertook with this force to cut off the enemy by an ambuscade. Orontes had experienced the generosity of Cyrus on two previous occasions, and had abused it. After the accession of Artaxerxes, being commander of the garrison of Sardis, he had held the citadel, pleading the King's orders, against Cyrus, and was only reduced to submission by force. The prince however, though he considered his resistance as an act of rebellion, pardoned him, and received him into favour. Orontes, nevertheless, revolted from him, and aided the Mysians in making war on his territory. Yet even after this proof of his animosity, Cyrus, when he had him in his power, again spared him, and after receiving the usual pledges for his future loyalty, restored him to his former station at his court; and he now consented to intrust him with the force he asked for. But an intercepted letter, from Orontes to the King, afforded clear proof that it was his intention to desert with it to the enemy. Cyrus then caused him to be arrested, and brought to trial in his own tent, which, by his command, was surrounded by a

Trial of Orontes.

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guard of Greek troops. Seven Persians, the principal men of his court, were assembled to sit in judgment on the case; and Clearchus, alone of the Greek generals, was associated with them. Cyrus himself undertook the part of accuser, and after having stated the facts, which were admitted by the culprit, called upon Clearchus to deliver his opinion first. His sentence was for capital punishment [1]; it was confirmed by the unanimous concurrence of the other judges, and immediately executed. The judges themselves, at the command of Cyrus, set the example of seizing the criminal, and he was then dragged away by the ministers of death. The Greeks remarked, that even on his way to the place of the execution, which was strictly private, his inferiors saluted him with the wonted signs of respect.

Preparations for battle.

The army had now entered the Babylonian territory, and at the third halting-place after the trial of Orontes, Cyrus, having received information which led him to expect that he should meet the enemy the next morning, reviewed all his forces at midnight. The number of the Greeks is stated by Xenophon on this occasion as between ten and eleven thousand heavy-armed, and 2400 light infantry; that of the barbarians at 100,000. That of the cavalry is not mentioned; but a body of 600, which guarded the person of Cyrus, seems to have been distinguished from the rest by the equipments both of the horses and their riders, which were in part after the Greek fashion. We also hear of 1000 Paphlagonian horse, and of about twenty chariots armed with scythes. Cyrus assigned the command of the right wing to Clearchus, of the left to Meno. The next morning deserters from the royal camp brought intelligence which prepared him for the

[1] After the prisoner's confession, the only question remaining was as to his punishment. How the opinion of Clearchus, that it was inexpedient to spare his life, violated any principle of law or justice known to the Greeks, Xenophon perhaps was not enough a philosopher to perceive.

enemy's approach; and he summoned the generals and other principal officers of the Greek army to a council of war, and having concerted his plan of operations with them, exhorted them *to show themselves worthy of the high esteem which he had conceived for their nation, which rendered them in his eyes of more account than a whole host of barbarians, and of that liberty which he considered as the most precious of all their advantages. He cautioned them not to be startled by the clamour of the enemy; for this was all that they would find formidable in his onset. He was almost ashamed to think, how contemptible the Asiatics would appear to them in every thing but the sound of their voices.* He added large promises of the rewards which should crown their successful valour; and when a Samian exile, who was in his confidence, suggested that there were some who questioned either his willingness or his ability to fulfil these magnificent promises, he reminded his hearers of the vast extent of the Persian empire, and of the immense possessions of his brother's adherents, which, if fortune favoured him, he should have to distribute among his friends: so that he had less reason to apprehend the want of means, than of objects for his munificence. To each of his Greek followers, beside a more solid recompense, he now promised a crown of gold. The language of Cyrus was soon reported throughout the Greek camp; and some, whose rank did not entitle them to a place at the council of war, came to satisfy their curiosity, or to obtain some more explicit declaration. None left his presence without the fullest satisfaction that could be given by words.

Clearchus, on this occasion, had asked Cyrus, whether he thought that his brother would give him battle? The prince replied: *If he is the son of Darius and Parysatis, and my brother, I shall certainly not become master of all he possesses without a struggle.* It was now the eleventh day since a Greek soothsayer,

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named Silanus, had predicted that there would be no engagement within ten days. Cyrus had observed, that, if so, he should not have to fight at all; and he promised ten talents to the soothsayer, if his prophecy should be fulfilled. But in the morning after the review he set forward in order of battle, expecting to meet the enemy in the course of the day. In this march he passed by the extremity of a deep and broad trench, which Artaxerxes, when he ascertained that his brother was approaching, had formed either as a barrier to be disputed, or according to an Oriental custom, to protect his camp from surprise.[1] An interval of only about twenty feet was left between the one end and the Euphrates. But the royal army had retreated, and had left the trench and the passage unguarded. Cyrus, having passed through, and reached his halting-place, without seeing any thing but traces of the enemy's retreat, paid the sum he had promised to Silanus, and began to conclude that his brother had determined to decline a battle. This opinion, which prevailed generally thoughout the camp, was greatly strengthened when he was allowed to continue his march without interruption to the next halting-place, and on the third day, believing that all fear or hope of a battle was past, he again mounted his travelling chariot, and pursued his way, preceded only by a small body of his troops in their ranks, while the rest followed in disorder, and many of the men had piled their arms on the waggons or the beasts of burden.

Battle of Cunaxa.

But the next day toward noon, when the army, which had probably begun its march before daybreak to avoid the heat, had nearly reached its halting-place

[1] Such would seem to have been its object from a comparison of Cyrop. III. 3. 26. But Xenophon seems here to indicate the other. His description of the trench cannot be reconciled with Diodorus, XIV. 22., who speaks of a rampart of waggons placed round the ditch within which Artaxerxes left his baggage, when he advanced to meet Cyrus.

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for the night, near a village, named Cunaxa, between sixty and seventy miles from Babylon, a Persian officer, high in the confidence of Cyrus, was seen coming up at full speed, his horse covered with foam, calling out to all who met him — and he was able to address the Greeks as well as the barbarians in their own language — that the King's army was approaching in order of battle. The tidings created general consternation; for all feared that they should be attacked before they could recover themselves from the disorder of the march. Cyrus hastily alighted from his chariot, put on his armour, and sprang upon his horse, and immediately gave his orders for forming the line of battle. The Greeks were drawn up nearest to the Euphrates, and according to the previous arrangement Clearchus commanded the right wing, which leaned upon the river, and was supported by the Paphlagonian cavalry and by the Greek light troops: Meno commanded the left wing. The barbarians were all commanded by Ariæus, as lieutenant of Cyrus, who himself, according to the Persian usage, occupied the centre with his 600 horse-guards, armed like them in all points, except that he wore the tiara instead of a helmet. Ample time was allowed for all these preparations, for it was toward the middle of the afternoon before a cloud of dust gave the first intimation of the enemy's presence. A dark mass next became visible, which soon began to send forth flashes of light, from the armour and weapons of the foremost ranks, and by degrees the divisions of the royal army might be clearly discerned.

Artaxerxes had divided the forces which he had hitherto collected into four corps, of 300,000 men each, which he had placed under the command of four generals, Abrocomas, Tissaphernes, Gobryas, and Arbaces. Abrocomas, as we have seen, had been sent down to the coast to check the progress of Cyrus, and so to allow the King more time for receiving the

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reinforcements which he still expected from the remoter provinces of the empire. But though he had retreated before the invader, and had recrossed the Euphrates at Thapsacus, it seems that he had not yet rejoined the King. As to this fact Xenophon can scarcely have been mistaken; though he has left it wholly unexplained. The King was still according to this account at the head of 900,000 men[1]; yet, if we may believe Plutarch, he continued to waver almost to the last between the alternatives of fighting or retreating, and was only diverted from adopting the latter by the energetic remonstrances of Tiribazus. Whether however it was in his timid mood that he abandoned his position behind the trench, or with the purpose of surprising Cyrus, and in the hope that, if he gained the victory, the barrier which he suffered the enemy to pass would render his defeat the more fatal, is a question which we cannot decide. The forces of each of the nations which composed the royal army were formed into a solid square. Xenophon does not enumerate them, but only notices the Egyptians, who were distinguished by the length of their wooden shields, the troops which bore the *gerron*, which according to the description of Herodotus, must have been Persians, Medes, Cissians, or Hyrcanians, the bowmen, and the cavalry, of which the main body seems to have been stationed on the left under the command of Tissaphernes; but a select corps of 6000 was posted in the centre to protect the King's person. Before the left wing, which was opposed to the Greeks, 150 of the scythe-armed chariots were placed at wide intervals from each other, designed to break and spread confusion in the adverse ranks.

[1] Ctesias however, according, to Plutarch, Artax. 13., estimated the royal forces at no more than 400,000. His means of information on this subject were better than Xenophon's, and his statement was adopted by Ephorus (Diodor. xiv. 22.). On the other hand, Xenophon speaks positively; he had read Ctesias, and was followed by Dinon in his Persian history.

The Greek generals had unanimously pressed Cyrus, at the last council of war, not to expose his person in battle; but he had indignantly refused to take his station in the rear, and, as the enemy approached, rode along the ranks at a considerable distance, surveying his own and the hostile array. The royal army was so superior in numbers, that his left wing did not reach to its centre. As he knew that his brother was there, and that it was here the main struggle would probably take place, he rode up with his interpreter, and three or four of his officers, to Clearchus, and ordered him to lead his troops against the enemy's centre: *there*, he added, *is the King; if we conquer there, our work is done.* Clearchus however preferred to proceed according to the rules of his art, and did not choose to expose himself to the risk of being surrounded by the barbarian multitude, as he might have been if he had drawn his right wing away from the bank of the river. The orders of Cyrus he treated as a suggestion, which he might adopt or reject at his discretion, and merely answered, that he would take care all went right. Xenophon, while he does full justice to the motives of Clearchus, seems to intimate, though with great reserve, that in his own opinion he would have acted more wisely if he had obeyed Cyrus.[1] Plutarch's censure of his conduct is perhaps too severe; but, as to the main point, it appears to be fully justified by the event.

The Greeks had scarcely formed their line before the enemy was close at hand.[2] Just as Cyrus was

[1] Such is the impression made on my mind by the form of Xenophon's narrative which seems to be designed to point out how the battle was lost, but at the same time to apologise for Clearchus. Plutarch, if he was able to speak for himself, might perhaps be prepared to retort the charge of *presumptuous ignorance*, which he has incurred for at least a highly probable opinion.

[2] This may appear scarcely consistent with what has been before said, about the time allowed for preparation; and Xenophon does not explain it.

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on the point of returning to take his station in the centre, Xenophon rode up to him, and asked if he had any commands. The prince only bad him announce to his countrymen, that the aspect of the victims was propitious. As he was speaking he heard a murmur in the Greek ranks, and, on inquiring the cause, was informed that the word was passing for the second time. He was not aware that it had been given, and asked with surprise what it was. Xenophon answered, that it was Zeus the Deliverer, and Victory. *I accept the omen*, said the prince; *so let it be;* and rode away.

The royal army advanced in good order, and not, as the Greeks had been led to expect, with loud war-cries, but in perfect silence. But it was only as to this point that Cyrus proved to have been deceived. When the enemy had approached within about half a mile, the Greeks raised their pæan, and advanced toward them. As their line began to undulate, the part which was left behind set off running to keep up with the foremost, who continued to quicken their pace, and at the same time all joined in the Greek battle-shout. They had first to sustain the shock of the chariots; but both the horses and the drivers were terrified by their clamour, which—according to a report mentioned by Xenophon, but not confirmed by his own authority—they heightened by clashing their spears against their shields. Some of the charioteers wheeled round, and fled toward their own ranks; but those who continued their course, did no harm to the Greeks, who opened their files, to let them pass through, and pressed forward to pursue the infantry, who did not wait to receive their charge. When they saw the barbarians put to flight, they exhorted one another to moderate their pace, and to keep their ranks in the pursuit. Xenophon was not

sure that their victory cost them so much as a single life.

This was the only part of the engagement which he witnessed; the contest was decided in another part of the field. Cyrus observed the success of the Greeks with exultation; and his attendants, who saw so large a part of the hostile forces routed, already began to salute him as conqueror and king. But Artaxerxes still kept his ground with the main body, which had not been opposed to any enemy, and now began to wheel round, in order to take his brother's troops in the rear. Cyrus, whose attention was fixed upon his movements, immediately advanced, with his guard of cavalry, against the body of 6000 horse behind which he knew his rival was stationed. This he routed, and slew the commander Artagerses with his own hand. But his own cavalry was dispersed in the pursuit of the defeated enemy, and he was left, with a few of his principal officers and attendants, near the spot where his brother was stationed, surrounded by the more immediate guards of his person. Cyrus, as soon as he perceived him, exclaimed: *I see the man;* and urged his horse against him. The details of the combat which ensued cannot be reported with any certainty. They were minutely described by Ctesias, who was present and near the King's person, as his physician, and might therefore seem entitled to be heard with the highest confidence. Yet his narrative differs so widely from Xenophon's, and is so improbable, that we feel ourselves forced to reject it. The only part of it which we can adopt, is the fact that Cyrus wounded and unhorsed his brother, who however was raised from the ground, and replaced on horseback by his attendants. But nearly at the same time Cyrus himself was wounded in the head with a javelin; whether by one of the royal guards, or by Artaxerxes himself, was not

Death of Cyrus.

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clearly ascertained.[1] Artaxerxes, according to Plutarch's authors, was always extremely anxious for the glory of having killed his brother, and was base and cruel enough to sacrifice two of his servants, one of whom was a young Persian named Mithridates, to his mother's revenge, because they claimed the honour of the blow which delivered him from his rival. Cyrus—by whatever hand—fell, and was finally overpowered and despatched, together with eight of his principal followers. One of them, named Artapatas, proved his fidelity to his master, according to one account, by killing himself upon his corpse, according to another, by clinging to it in an agony of grief until he was himself slain. According to the Persian custom of treating slain rebels, the head and right hand of Cyrus were cut off and brought to the King, who is said himself to have seized the head by the hair, and to have held it up, as a proof of his victory, to the view of the surrounding crowd. Thus ended the expedition of Cyrus. Xenophon pauses to describe the qualities and conduct by which he commanded love and respect, in a manner which shows how important the results of his success might have been to the welfare of Persia; we have now to relate the consequences through which his failure, perhaps still more deeply, affected the interests of Greece.

As soon as the death of Cyrus became known to

[1] Ctesias represented Cyrus as carried away by his horse, after he had wounded his brother, to a great distance from the scene of the combat, through the midst of the enemy, who would not have recognised him, as it was by this time dusk (though according to Xenophon it could not yet have been so late), if he had not discovered himself by his exulting shouts. It was now that Mithridates—without knowing who he was—seeing his tiara fall off, rode up and wounded him in the temple. Cyrus fell off his horse, almost stunned with the blow, but was taken up by some of his attendants, who were carrying him away, when they were recognised by some Caunians, followers of the royal camp, one of whom wounded him from behind. Yet even this blow might not have proved mortal; but it brought him to the ground, and he struck his wounded temple against a stone. So, observes Plutarch, Ctesias at length makes an end of him as with a blunt sword. Dinon's narrative nearly agreed with Xenophon's.

his followers, Ariæus, and the whole of his barbarian troops, took to flight. Artaxerxes, with the forces which remained collected about him, pursued them as far as the camp, through which they passed, without stopping, on to their halting-place of the preceding night. The royal troops plundered the camp of all that fell in their way, but were arrested by a small body of Greeks, who had been left to guard the baggage, and maintained a successful combat against the barbarians. The King was here joined by Tissaphernes, who alone with his cavalry, of all the forces in the left wing of the royal army, had not been put to flight by the Greeks. He had charged their light troops, which opened a passage for him, and as he passed through, galled his flanks so severely, that he felt no disposition to turn upon them, but continued his way by the river side until he reached the camp. It was from him that the King, who had hitherto believed himself to be completely victorious, first learnt the partial success of the Greeks, nearly about the same time that the Greeks, who were between three and four miles off, received information that the enemy was not, as they had supposed, totally defeated, but in their camp, and threatening their baggage. Clearchus upon this intelligence deliberated with Proxenus, who happened to be nearest to him, whether it would be better to send a detachment, or to march with their whole force, to protect the camp. But their course was soon determined; for the King and Tissaphernes, who after their junction had set their forces in order, were marching back to the field of battle, apparently with the design of attacking them. Instead however of advancing directly to meet them, the royal army, simply retracing its steps, threatened, as it came up, to take their left wing in the rear. To guard against this danger Clearchus was about to execute an evolution which would have

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The Greeks victorious.

placed the river behind him. But the enemy passed forwards and resumed the position which he had occupied at the beginning of the battle, and the Greeks raised their pæan, and rushed on with redoubled alacrity to the charge. The barbarians did not await it, but fled with greater precipitation than before, and were pursued by the Greeks as far as a village near the foot of a hillock[1], on the summit of which their cavalry halted round the royal standard. The Greeks still advanced with the purpose of repeating their charge; but by the time they had reached the foot of the hillock, the hostile cavalry had disappeared from the top, and they halted. Clearchus sent two of his officers to the top, to ascertain the enemy's movements, and learnt that they were flying at full speed. It was now near sunset, and the only question was, whether they should remain where they were, and should send for their baggage, or should return to their camp; for they were still ignorant of the fate of Cyrus, whom they supposed either to be engaged in pursuit of the enemy, or to have gone forward to occupy some position, or to accomplish some other object. They resolved to return to the camp, and arrived there at the hour of supper, which they greatly needed, as, when they began the battle they had not yet made their morning meal. But they found that the camp had been plundered of their whole stock of provisions, and were almost all forced to pass the night fasting.

The next morning they learnt the death of Cyrus from two messengers sent to them by Ariæus, who announced that he would wait for them until the next day, but should then set out on his return to Ionia. Clearchus in the name of the other generals bad them carry word back to Ariæus, that the Greeks

[1] γήλοφος. *One of the numerous artificial mounds or tels so characteristic of the Babylonian plan.* Ainsworth, p. 97.

were victorious, and undisputed masters of the field, and that it had been their intention to march against the King; and they now offered to place Ariæus on the throne. The messengers were accompanied by Cheirisophus and Meno, who, having been a friend and guest of Ariæus, was desirous of being employed on this mission. In the mean while, to provide themselves with a meal, the Greeks were compelled to slaughter their beasts of burden, and to dress their food with the arrows, shields, and other relics of the battle, which they found at a short distance from the camp Toward noon some Persian heralds came from the King, accompanied by Phalynus, a Zacynthian, who had gained credit with Tissaphernes by his pretensions to military skill. They were commissioned to summon the Greeks to lay down their arms, and throw themselves upon the King's mercy. Just as they had delivered their message, Clearchus happened to be called away to inspect a sacrifice; and having merely remarked, that it was not usual for conquerors to surrender their arms, he desired his colleagues to return such an answer to the proposal, as might appear to them most becoming. Cleanor, an Arcadian, who was the eldest among them, then declared that they would die sooner than give up their arms. Proxenus asked Phalynus, whether the King demanded them by right of conquest, or begged them as a boon. *If he claimed them by the title of the strongest, why not come and take them; if as a favour, what had soldiers left, when they had parted with their arms?* Phalynus replied, that the King, having killed Cyrus, considered himself as conqueror, and as master of the lives of the Greeks, who were shut up in the heart of his country, separated from their native land by vast tracts, and deep rivers, and would be tired out, even if they had nothing to do but to slaughter the hosts which he could bring against them. A

Receive a message from the King.

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young Athenian, named Theopompus, then observed, that the Greeks had nothing but their arms and their valour, and without their arms their valour would be useless; with them they should be able to contend with the barbarians for their good things. Phalynus answered with a sneer that their valour would be ill matched against the power of the King. — There were others however who took a deprecating tone, and said, that as they had been faithful to Cyrus, so they might be useful to the King, if he wished to employ them either to reduce the revolted Egyptians, or in any other service.

Clearchus now returned from the inspection of the victims, and asked whether they had given their answer to the King's message. Phalynus said, that they had not agreed with one another, and requested Clearchus to deliver his sentiments. Clearchus then appealed to Phalynus himself, as a fellow-countrymen, and conjured him to aid them with his advice; but to propose such a course as would be both safest and most honourable to them, and might reflect the greatest honour on himself, when it came to be known in Greece that it had been adopted on his suggestion. Clearchus hoped that, after such an appeal, Phalynus would have had the generosity to forget his character of envoy from the King, and would have been impelled by his patriotic feelings to confirm his distrest countrymen in the only resolution that was consistent with their honour and their safety. He was however disappointed. Phalynus declared — perhaps with sincerity — that he saw no hope for them but in submission to the King's pleasure. Clearchus then bad him return with this answer: that the Greeks thought, if they were to be the King's friends, they should be more serviceable to him with, than without, their arms; if his enemies, they should have the greater need of arms to defend themselves. Phalynus, before he departed, said that

he had also been ordered to announce to them that, so long as they remained in their present position, the King would consider them as enjoying the benefit of an armistice, but would treat a change of place as a declaration of hostilities. He therefore desired them to say which alternative they chose. Clearchus bad him inform the King, that they adopted his terms. Phalynus asked, which terms he meant. *If we stay, truce; if we go, war.* And Phalynus could extract no other reply from him.

Soon after the envoy's departure, Procles and Cheirisophus returned with the answer of Ariæus; Meno staid behind with his friend. Ariæus declined the offer of the Greeks, on the ground that there were many Persians of superior dignity or merit, who would not bear to see him on the throne. He adhered to his purpose of retreating, and bad the Greeks join him, if they meant to do so, that night, as he should begin his march early in the morning. Clearchus again sent an ambiguous message: *If we come, let it be as you say; if not, do as you think fit.* But toward sunset he assembled the superior officers, and informed them that the aspect of the victims which he had examined in the morning, was unpropitious to an expedition against the King; and, as he had since discovered, with good cause; for the royal army was now on the other side of the Tigris, which they could not pass without boats. But every sign seemed to favour the plan of a junction with Ariæus; and he therefore recommended that they should march that night. His brother officers adopted both his advice and the precautions which he proposed, and henceforth by tacit consent—the result of their conviction of his superior discernment and skill—they acknowledged him as their chief. In the evening after sunset they suffered a loss, which at this juncture was deeply felt. Miltocythes, a Thracian, de-

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Join Ariæus.

serted to the King with forty horse—their whole cavalry—and 300 Thracian infantry. The rest arrived about midnight at the camp of Ariæus, and the Greek officers met in his tent. After the most solemn pledges of mutual good faith had been interchanged, Clearchus asked him, whether he intended to return by the same, or a different road. He said, that to take the same was impossible; for the desert through which they had marched for seventeen days, yielded no provisions, and they had none to carry with them; they must therefore take a more circuitous route, on which they might find a supply; and it would be proper to make some forced marches at first, so as to leave the King two or three days' journey behind them, which would be sufficient to prevent him from ever overtaking them.

With this purpose, which, by whatever words it might be disguised, was, as Xenophon observes, really nothing else than flight, the army began its march the next morning at daybreak. It was a discouraging beginning of such an expedition as they were now undertaking; for they were more than 2000 miles from Ephesus by the road along which they had come. That which they had now before them was certainly much longer, and traversed regions utterly unknown to them; and they were to enter upon it with an attempt to escape from a superior enemy. But as they crossed the plain of Babylon in a south-easterly direction, making for some villages where they expected to arrive about sunset, and to find a supply of provisions, they fell in with some of the beasts of burden belonging to the royal army, and hence concluded that it was not far off. Clearchus however did not think proper to seek the enemy, as the hour was late, and his men fatigued, and in want of food; but he no less cautiously avoided the appearance of shunning an engagement, and pursuing his line of march without any deviation,

alted for the night at the first villages he reached, which he found stripped of every thing, even to the imber of the houses, by the King's troops. The two rmies were so near each other that the voices of the ireeks, who, arriving successively at their halting-lace, called out to one another in the dark, were ieard by the enemy, and caused them to decamp in he night. At least the next morning every trace of heir presence had disappeared. But the Greeks too vere disturbed by a nocturnal panic, which however vas allayed by a stratagem of Clearchus, who ordered iis herald—an Elean gifted with a singularly loud roice—to proclaim a reward for the discovery of the erson *who had let the ass loose in the part of the camp here the arms were piled.*

The next day clear proof appeared of the effect which the approach of the Greeks had produced on he King. For at daybreak other envoys came from iim, not to demand their arms, but to conclude a ruce. Clearchus, who was inspecting his men, kept he Persian ministers waiting, till he had drawn up iis forces so as to present the most imposing aspect; ind then came up to give them audience, accompanied by his colleagues, in the midst of a guard composed of the handsomest and best equipt soldiers in the army. After having heard the proposal of the envoys, he bad them tell their master, that the Greeks must fight before they treated; they had nothing to eat, and no one could venture to propose a truce to them, who did not provide them with a meal. With this answer they departed, but soon returned—thus clearly showing that the King was still near at hand—and said that the King consented to assign guides to the Greeks, who should lead them into plentiful quarters, as soon as they had concluded a truce with him. This proposal was joyfully received; but before he accepted it, Clearchus made the envoys wait, until they began to fear lest he should change his mind.

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At last he concluded the armistice, and ordered the guides to lead the army to the villages where it was to find provisions. In the way they had to cross several canals and trenches, too deep to be forded, and without bridges.[1] Clearchus suspected that they had been recently filled with water by the King's orders—as it was not now the season for irrigating the plain—for the purpose of trying the courage and patience of the Greeks, with a specimen of the obstacles which they were to encounter. But the palm trees, which grew near in abundance, supplied materials for bridges or rafts; and Clearchus roused the exertions of the men by his exhortations and example. With his spear in one hand, and his staff in the other, he urged the labourers whose tasks seemed to linger, and taking part in the work with his own hands, excited the emulation of persons of greater age and dignity to contribute their personal aid. The impediment was thus surmounted in a manner which tended to heighten the respect of the barbarians. The villages to which they were led were found well stocked with provisions, especially corn, dates, and palm wine.

Are visited by Tissaphernes.

Here they remained three days, in the course of which they received a visit from Tissaphernes, who was accompanied by the queen's brother and three other Persians, attended by a numerous train. Tissaphernes came to assure them of the friendship which, as a neighbour of Greece in the place of his ordinary residence, he felt for them, and the sympathy with which he had viewed their embarrassing situation. Relying on their gratitude, and on that of their whole

[1] The description which Xenophon gives of the country, as intersected by numerous ditches and canals, and abounding in palm-trees, leads Mr. Ainsworth (p. 105.) to believe that the Greeks were led into the interior of Babylonia, where "almost every village, neighbouring some canal of irrigation, has its grove of date-trees, which to the south of Babylon constitute an almost perpetual forest along the banks of the river."

nation, he had been exerting all the influence which he had acquired at court by his recent eminent services, to prevail on the King to let him conduct them home in safety. The King had promised to take his request into consideration, and in the mean while had sent him to inquire what was the motive which had engaged them in their expedition against him. To this question he advised them to send a discreet answer, such as might forward his intercession in their behalf. After a private consultation with the other generals, Clearchus in their name replied that they had not set out with any hostile intentions against the King, but had been drawn into the service of Cyrus under various pretences, and had been induced to accompany him, without knowing his real object until they saw him in a situation, in which, after the obligations he had laid upon them, it would have been base to abandon him. Now that he was dead, they had no wish either to attack the King's throne or person, or to do any damage to his territories: if they were not molested, they would return quietly home, but they would defend themselves as well as they could from aggression. On the other hand, they would endeavour not to be outdone in generosity by any one who should render them a voluntary service. Tissaphernes went away with this answer, and returning on the third day after, informed the anxious Greeks, that he had with great difficulty obtained his petition from the King, against the opinion of many persons in the council, who had contended that it was degrading to the King's majesty, to suffer men who had endeavoured to dethrone him to escape with impunity. The terms now offered to them were, that they should have a safe-conduct to their own country, and a market on the road; and that wherever none was furnished for them they should be allowed to take such necessaries as they could find; that on their part they should engage to do no mischief in the King's territories

Conclude a treaty with the King.

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beyond the taking of provisions where they found none offered for sale, and that they should pay for all that they procured from the market. These terms were accepted by the Greeks; and the treaty was ratified in the most solemn manner, by Tissaphernes and the King's brother-in-law on the one side, and by all the principal Greek officers on the other. Tissaphernes then departed, promising, as soon as he should have finished his preparations for his journey to his satrapy, to return and escort them to Greece.

He kept them waiting for him twenty days; and during this interval offers of pardon and amnesty were made to Ariæus and his principal officers, which produced a visible change in his deportment toward the Greeks. Many of them began to entertain suspicions, which they communicated to Clearchus and the other generals, urging them to wait no longer. The King, they said, was no doubt anxious to destroy them for the sake of deterring all other Greeks from similar undertakings. He was probably only inducing them to wait, that he might have time to collect his scattered forces, and fall upon them. In the mean while perhaps he was throwing up intrenchments to bar their retreat, which, if safely effected, would, as he could not but feel, expose him to universal contempt.

Clearchus however checked the impetuosity of the men. He bad them reflect that the first movement which they made from their present quarters, before the return of Tissaphernes, would be construed as a breach of the treaty, and a signal for war. They would then be without provisions, guides, or friends; for Ariæus would immediately separate himself from them, and openly declare himself their enemy. They would have to cross the Euphrates at least, if not other great rivers, in the presence of a hostile army, which could easily bar their passage. And as they had no horse,

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while the enemy's strength lay in cavalry, victory would be of little avail to them, defeat utterly ruinous. With such advantages it seemed to him incredible, that the King, if he was bent on destroying them, should resort to an act of treacherous perjury, which would for ever ruin his credit among the Greeks, when he might as easily effect his purpose by honourable warfare.

Tissaphernes at length arrived, accompanied by Orontes the King's son-in-law, each with a body of troops under his command, and immediately began the march. The Greeks found a market regularly provided for them, but they observed that Ariæus kept close to the two other Persian chiefs, and encamped his forces along with theirs. This excited suspicions which they took no pains to conceal; they marched apart from the barbarians, and encamped at the distance of several miles from them. This exhibition of their distrust roused hostile feelings in those who were its objects, and perhaps were not conscious of having deserved it. The mutual animosity thus excited sometimes found vent in threats and blows, when the foraging parties of the two armies fell in with one another; and every such meeting added to its strength. The road by which they were led by Tissaphernes, still following a southerly direction, brought them first within a great rampart, called the Wall of Media[1], built of baked bricks cemented with asphaltus, which, as they heard, stretched across the plain for about eighty miles, and was 100 feet high, and twenty broad. They then, by bridges or boats, crossed two canals issuing from the Tigris, and at the end of the fifth day's march arrived at a large and populous city, called Sitace, less than two miles from the river, which was here crossed by a bridge. The

Sitace.

[1] Probably, as Schneider conjectures, on III. 4. 11., a woman. It may have been originally one of the numerous monuments ascribed to Semiramis, mentioned by Strabo, XVI. p. 737. τά τε χώματα ἃ δὴ καλοῦσι Σεμιράμιδος, καὶ τεῖχη.

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barbarians passed over to the other side, and moved out of sight; the Greeks encamped in the outskirts of the town, and near the edge of a spacious and thickly-wooded park.[1] Here Xenophon was walking in the evening, with his friend Proxenus, when a man came up to the outposts, and inquired for Proxenus or Clearchus, for whom he brought a message from Ariæus. It was remarked that he did not ask for Meno, the guest and friend of Ariæus, though it seems he was in the camp. But being admitted to an interview with Proxenus, he said that he was sent by Ariæus to warn the Greeks, that they were in danger of being attacked in the night by the barbarians, who had a large body of forces posted in the park, and that it was also the design of Tissaphernes to break down the bridge over the Tigris, so that they might be enclosed by the river and its canals. This information was immediately communicated to Clearchus, who was at first extremely alarmed by it. But one of the officers present had the sagacity to perceive that it could be nothing but a stratagem. The two designs, he observed, attributed to the enemy were not consistent with each other. If Tissaphernes meant to attack them, he would not destroy the bridge, which would be useful to him should he be defeated, and could be of no service to them if he was victorious. This remark opened the eyes of Clearchus to the enemy's real object. He questioned the envoy of Ariæus as to the nature of the region where the Greeks were encamped, and learnt that it was an island formed by the Tigris and its canals, highly fertile, and containing many villages and several flourishing towns. It became evident that Tissaphernes was apprehensive lest the Greeks, attracted by the advantages which it offered, should

[1] Mr. Ainsworth believes that Tissaphernes led the Greeks about thirty-six miles by Sipheirah, at which point he turned round and conducted them through the wall into Sitace, thus leaving them in perplexity with regard to the relations of that fertile province to the city of Babylon, p. 109.

choose to remain and settle there, and had therefore endeavoured to scare them away from it, by a stratagem like that by which Themistocles was said to have hurried Xerxes away from Greece. It was nevertheless deemed advisable to secure the bridge, which they crossed the next morning with great caution, as a report was spread that Tissaphernes meant to attack them during the passage. But this report proved as groundless as the message of Ariæus. No enemy appeared during the whole time, except Glous, one of the officers of Cyrus, with a few attendants, who was evidently watching their movements, and rode away as soon as he saw them beginning to go over. They then proceeded along the left bank of the Tigris. At Opis, a large town on the Physcus, one of the tributaries of the Tigris, they met a half-brother of Artaxerxes, who was on his way from Susa and Ecbatana, with a numerous army, which he had brought to the aid of the King. He halted to view the passage of the Greeks, which Clearchus ordered so as to produce the greatest effect on the barbarian spectators, making them defile in a column, two abreast, and lengthening the time of the march by frequent stoppages. Some Median villages belonging to Parysatis were abandoned to the Greeks by Tissaphernes to be plundered, Xenophon says, by way of insult to the memory of Cyrus. But as the affront and the injury were offered immediately to the queen-mother, whose formidable resentment Tissaphernes could scarcely have wished wantonly to provoke, we might rather be inclined to suspect that his real object was to point it against the Greeks.

Passage of the Tigris.

On the banks of the Zabatus (the greater Zab) they halted for three days. They had now been marching nineteen days in company with Tissaphernes, and no material ground of complaint had occurred between them. Nevertheless the suspicions of the Greeks had

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not subsided, and Clearchus, who placed greater confidence in the satrap's intentions, resolved to try whether more friendly feelings might not be produced by mutual explanations. He therefore sent to request an interview with Tissaphernes; it was readily granted.

Interview between Clearchus and Tissaphernes.

He came, he said, convinced that there was no foundation for the suspicions which some of the Greeks entertained of Tissaphernes; and as he knew that those which Tissaphernes expressed, rather indeed by his actions than his words, of the Greeks were utterly groundless, he wished to remove them by a clear exposure of their unreasonableness. *Even if his countrymen were regardless of the divine wrath, which they would incur by such a breach of faith as Tissaphernes seemed to apprehend, a sense of their own interest would be sufficient to restrain them from it. For to whom but Tissaphernes had they to look for the supply of their daily wants, and for the means of surmounting the various obstacles which they had to encounter. If they should succeed in any hostile design against him, what would they have done but deprive themselves of their most valuable friend, of the man who sheltered them from the King's enmity? For his own part, all his hopes of fortune depended on the favour of Tissaphernes, who was able to gratify all the desires by which he had been drawn into the service of Cyrus. But there were equally strong reasons, which he believed must make Tissaphernes unwilling to forfeit the good-will of the Greek army. It would be able, if it returned safe, to rid him of the troublesome neighbours, such as the Mysians and Pisidians, who invested his province; or it might enable him to quell the revolted Egyptians: one of the most acceptable services which he could render to his master. With this force at his command, which, if it should owe its safe return to his protection, would serve him not as mere mercenaries but with all the zeal of gratitude, he might make himself feared by all his neighbours.*

Clearchus thought it so astonishing that, with such motives for confidence, he should distrust the Greeks, that there was nothing he more desired to know than the name of the person who had instilled such strange suspicions into his mind.

Tissaphernes in reply expressed the pleasure which he felt at seeing that Clearchus took so just a view of his own interests; and begged him to reflect on the absurdity of the suspicions conceived by the Greeks, whether with regard to the King or to himself. *If it was the King's wish to destroy them, could they suppose that he was at a loss for means—with so many troops for every kind of warfare at his command—or for opportunities, during a march in which they had so many plains to traverse, so many mountain-passes to penetrate, so many rivers to cross, some of which they would be unable to pass, not only against his will, but without his help? But if they considered themselves safe from all open attacks, even under such disadvantages, would not fire still do its office? Would it not be easy for the King to lay waste the whole country round them, and, without risking a man, to let famine fight his battle? Was it credible that, with such resources at his disposal, he should prefer a course which would be impious in the sight of the gods, infamous in the eyes of men?—one to which none but the vilest of mankind could be reduced by the hardest necessity? Perhaps however they might say: If the King has us in his power, why has he not already destroyed us? It was to the influence of Tissaphernes they owed their safety, to his desire of establishing a claim upon their gratitude, and thus of securing the advantages which Clearchus himself had pointed out, together with one which he had not mentioned, but which any one might enjoy with such a body of auxiliaries—a spirit as erect as the King's tiara.*

These arguments convinced Clearchus; for they

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were not only in themselves extremely specious, but, as we have seen, and as the wily Persian perhaps knew, they were his own. He declared himself perfectly satisfied, and only anxious for the punishment of the persons whose calumnious insinuations had disturbed the harmony of parties so closely united by their common interest. Tissaphernes declared himself willing to gratify this wish, and promised, if he would bring all his principal officers before him, to point out those who had endeavoured to excite his suspicions. Clearchus assented to this proposal, and engaged at the same time to make the like disclosure as to the source of his own. Tissaphernes now detained him to supper, and loaded him with marks of kindness and respect; so that he returned to the camp the next morning with the most agreeable impressions of the satrap's disposition toward him, and called upon all his officers to accompany him to the proposed interview, that the authors of the calumnies which had done so much mischief, might be detected, and punished, as traitors to the army.

There were even among the common soldiers some who saw the danger of such a step, and who, as soon as the intentions of Clearchus became known, expostulated with him on the imprudence of committing all their officers to the power of a man whom they had hitherto been treating as a covert enemy. He would probably not have been blind to that which they discerned so clearly, if his judgment had not been perverted by two selfish motives: resentment and ambition. He had persuaded himself that Meno, whom he believed to be his enemy and his rival, was the person who had traduced him to Ariæus and Tissaphernes, for the purpose of supplanting him. He hoped to witness the shame and punishment of his adversary, and to establish himself in the undivided command of the army, and therefore disregarded all the remon

strances of his disinterested counsellors. But he could not prevail on more than four of the generals and twenty of the inferior officers to attend him. The generals were Proxenus, Meno, Agias an Arcadian, and Socrates the Achæan. When they came to the head-quarters of Tissaphernes, the five generals were admitted within, and the subalterns remained at the door; they were followed by about 200 of the private soldiers, who came either for the sake of the market, or attracted by curiosity. Ere long a signal was given, upon which the generals were arrested, and a massacre was begun among their countrymen who accompanied them. At the same time a squadron of barbarian cavalry was seen scouring the plain, and cutting down every Greek who fell in their way. The Greeks, who beheld this movement from their camp, were for some time at a loss to account for it. But it was soon explained to them by the appearance of Nicarchus, an Arcadian, who came up severely wounded, and related all that had happened.

Arrest of the five generals.

The Greeks ran to their arms in consternation, apprehending that the enemy would immediately fall upon them. None however appeared but Ariæus and two other generals who had been in the service of Cyrus, and, as the Greeks were informed by their interpreter, a brother of Tissaphernes, with about 300 Persian cuirassiers. The chiefs, having drawn near, desired that some Greek officer should come forward and listen to the message which they had brought from the King. Upon this two of the remaining generals, Cleanor and Sophænetus, advanced duly guarded, accompanied by Xenophon, who was anxious to learn some tidings of his friend Proxenus. When they were within hearing, Ariæus informed them that Clearchus, having been convicted of perjury and breach of treaty, had been punished with death; but that Proxenus and Meno, who had revealed his treach-

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ery, were in high honour. The King now required the rest of the army to surrender their arms, which, as they had before belonged to his subject Cyrus, he now claimed as his own. Cleanor, answering in the name of his colleagues, addressed Ariæus and the other friends of Cyrus with the bitterest reproaches. Ariæus attempted to vindicate himself by repeating the charge against Clearchus. Xenophon then observed that if Clearchus was guilty of the offences imputed to him, he had no doubt suffered justly. But since Proxenus and Meno had conferred an obligation on the Persians, it was reasonable that they should be restored to their troops; for, as they had shown themselves the friends of both parties, both might expect benefit from their counsels. The Persians, after a long conference among themselves, departed without returning any answer.

Their fate.

Xenophon adds but very few particulars as to the fate of Clearchus and his fellow-prisoners. The anecdotes related by Plutarch from Ctesias and other writers are of doubtful credit. But it seems certain that neither Clearchus nor any of his companions were immediately put to death, but were carried to court, and that they were kept for some time in custody. During this interval Parysatis, who regarded them with good-will as friends of her best beloved son, is said to have exerted all her influence to save their lives. But her efforts were counteracted by her rival Statira, the favourite queen of Artaxerxes, whose suit, as it happened to be more in accordance with his own inclination, was on this occasion preferred; and all the generals, except Meno, lost their heads. Xenophon, who describes Meno's character in a strain of satirical invective, mentions the exception made in his favour, apparently to confirm a suspicion which he elsewhere insinuates, that Meno was privy to the treachery of Tissaphernes. Ctesias distinctly charged

him with this baseness; and we may easily believe, if he was such a man as Xenophon represents, that he was quite capable of it. It is not so clear in what way he could have promoted the success of the stratagem[1]; and there is no reason for supposing that he suggested it: the credit of the invention is unquestionably due to Tissaphernes alone. Meno however was spared—whatever may have been the motive—only to be reserved for a death of lingering torture, such as we scarcely hear of anywhere but in the court chronicles of ancient Persia; for it lasted a whole year.[2] This refinement of cruelty seems to indicate the intervention of Parysatis; and it is not improbable that she obtained permission to wreak her vengeance upon him as a compensation for the disappointment she had suffered in her contest with Statira.[3]

[1] Ctesias, though he confirms Xenophon's suspicions of Meno, was so ill informed about the particulars, as to relate, that through Meno's arts Clearchus was compelled by the army, though he himself distrusted Tissaphernes, to put himself in his power.

[2] Xenophon's expression, *αἰκισθεὶς ἐνιαυτὸν*, means something more than *kept in wretched confinement a full year.*

[3] Yet the silence of Ctesias—for it seems clear from the extract of Photius, c. 60., compared with Plut. Artax. 18., that he only related that Meno was not put to death with the other generals—throws considerable doubt on the fact.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

THE RETURN OF THE GREEKS.

Condition of the Greeks.—Xenophon.— His Dream.— Election of new Generals.— Xenophon's Speech.— Passage of the Zabatus.— The Greeks attacked by Mithridates.— March through Media.— Enter the Carduchian Territory.— March through Armenia.— First View of the Sea.— Transactions at Trapezus.— At Cerasus.— At Cotyora.— They arrive at Sinope.— Proceedings at Heraclea.— At Port Calpe.— Xenophon's Project.— The Greeks arrive at Byzantium.— Cœratades.— The Cyreans taken into the Spartan Service. — Consequences of the Expedition.— Fortunes of Xenophon.

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Condition of the Greeks.

THE despondency with which the Greeks viewed the situation in which they were left by the loss of their generals, can only be estimated, if we consider not only its real dangers, but the reluctance with which they had been induced to follow Cyrus on to the goal of his enterprise, and the opinion which Clearchus himself had expressed, on the desperate difficulty of making good their retreat against the will of the enemy, who had just given such a proof of his implacable hostility, as utterly precluded all further attempts at negotiation, and all possibility of compromise. On the other hand, the whole amount of the loss which had been actually sustained through the perfidy of Tissaphernes might be looked upon as confined to the person of Clearchus. Yet this loss might well seem irreparable. For he was the only man who had hitherto displayed the abilities and acquirements requisite for the station which he had filled among his colleagues, whose deference was a

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tacit acknowledgment of their own incapacity. Even he had despaired of conducting them home in defiance of the Persian power. They were now in the case which he had described, left, at the distance of at least 1200 miles from Greece, without provisions, without guides, without a single horseman, to find and fight their way through an enemy's country, across unfordable rivers, with a hostile army watching their movements, and ready to seize every opportunity of falling upon them with advantage; and beside all this, they were without a chief. The night which followed this change in their prospects was, as may easily be imagined, with most of them, a sleepless one. Few could find heart to taste food, or light a fire; and many, instead of coming to the ordinary resting-place near their arms, threw themselves on the ground, wherever else they chanced to be—not to sleep, but to call up the images of their homes, parents, wives, and children, whom they no longer expected ever to see again.

Xenophon.

Hope however was not universally stifled, and the emergency called forth a man—such as among 10,000 Greeks could scarcely ever have been wanting—endowed with all the qualities needed for meeting it. Xenophon, the Athenian, whose name has already occurred more than once in our narrative, had accompanied the expedition, as a private adventurer, without any military rank. He had spent a great part of his youth at Athens, in familiar and habitual intercourse with Socrates, who, struck, it is said, by his promising physiognomy, had drawn him, by a gentle constraint, into his society. It was probably at Athens also that he had formed his intimacy with Proxenus, who is said to have been a disciple of Gorgias, and may have been drawn to Athens by pursuits congenial to those of his Athenian friend. Proxenus, after he had entered the service of Cyrus, wrote from the court of Sardis

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to Xenophon, offering to introduce him to the prince, whose favour he said he himself valued above any thing that his country had to offer. Such an invitation would have had powerful attractions for a man of adventurous spirit, even if he was strongly attached to his native city. To Xenophon perhaps the most tempting part of the prospect was a long absence from Athens, or a permanent settlement in a foreign land. He seems—though it may be unconsciously—to have determined on accepting the proposal of Proxenus, when he communicated it to Socrates, as if for his advice. Socrates was immediately struck with the effect which such a step was likely to produce on the minds of the Athenians, who could not, without some feelings of jealousy, see one of their citizens seeking his fortune in the patronage of the man who had shown himself their implacable enemy, and had been the chief author of their late calamities and degradation. It seems however that he did not otherwise attempt to dissuade his young friend from following the bent of his inclination than by pointing to these consequences, and by advising that before he decided, he should consult the Delphic oracle, which by its authority might either put an end to the project, or give a better colour to the proceeding. Xenophon however, instead of submitting his plan to the decision of the oracle, only inquired about the religious ceremonies by which the adventure which he meditated might be brought to a happy issue. On his return to Athens Socrates gently censured his disciple for having shown more concern about the success of the enterprise than about its expediency or fitness, but opposed no further hinderance to it; and Xenophon, having observed the rites which the oracle had prescribed, embarked for Asia, and found Proxenus at Sardis, with the troops which he had collected for

the pretended expedition against the Pisidians, and on the point of setting out. Proxenus introduced him to Cyrus, and both pressed him to accompany them on their march; the prince assuring him that he should be at liberty to depart as soon as the expedition was ended. We must believe that he was deceived by the professions of Cyrus, since he asserts it himself. He does not inform us when the truth, which had from the beginning been evident to Tissaphernes, first dawned upon his mind. On the arrival of the army in Cilicia, when no further doubt could remain as to the prince's intentions, he was according to his own account one of those whom a sense of honour induced reluctantly to proceed. The expedition was perhaps in no respect more useful to him than in the opportunity it afforded him of studying the character of Cyrus—one of that class which he especially admired—and the time had now come for applying the lessons with which his observations had furnished him.

His dream.

He had spent a part of the night in gloomy reflections, such as occupied the minds of most of his comrades, and having at length dropt into a short slumber, saw a dream such as might naturally occur to a Greek who, like Xenophon, was deeply conversant with the interpretation of omens. According to the rules of divination, as he himself expounds them, it was of an ambiguous aspect, and he seems to think that on this very account the impression which it left upon his mind, when he awoke, proved that it was immediately sent by the god, from whom, according to the Homeric theology, all dreams proceeded.[1] When the consciousness of his condition returned, he began to reflect, that it was one which demanded instant and strenuous exertion. His first thought

[1] Καὶ γάρ τ' ὄναρ ἐκ Διός ἐστι.

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was: *Why do I keep lying here, while the night is wearing away, when the enemy may be expected to fall upon us at daybreak? We are threatened with the most cruel and ignominious death that the revenge of a timid adversary can inflict; and yet no one is making any preparations for resistance. If I wait for another more experienced general to step forward, the season for action will have passed by.*

His resolution was immediately formed; he rose, and called together the officers of Proxenus, and addressed them. After having pointed out the magnitude of the evils which they had to apprehend, unless some provision were made without delay for their defence, he dexterously turned their attention to another more animating view of their situation. *Ever since they had concluded the treaty with Tissaphernes, he had observed with envy and regret the rich possessions of the barbarians, and had lamented that his comrades had subjected themselves to the obligation of abstaining from the good things which they constantly saw within their reach, except so far as they were able to purchase a taste of them at an expense which he had feared would soon exhaust their scanty means. This abstinence they had religiously observed; but the perfidy of their enemies had now released them from the restraint which they had imposed on themselves; and the treasures which they had coveted, but had scrupulously forborne to touch, would henceforth be the fair prizes of their valour. The gods, whom their enemies had provoked by their perjury, would be the arbiters of the contest, for which beside they were better prepared, both in the training of their bodies and the temper of their spirits, than their antagonists.—Perhaps while he spoke, these thoughts had occurred to some of their comrades. He therefore exhorted them not to wait until they were called upon by others, but to take the lead, and aspire to a glorious pre-*

minence among their fellows. For himself, he was eady to follow any leader whom they might appoint; ut he would not plead his age as an excuse for shrink- ng from the foremost post[1]*, if they chose to place him ere.*

His hearers, with one exception, unanimously re- uested him to put himself at their head. The only issentient voice was that of one Apollonides, whose ccent seemed to betoken a Bœotian origin. He said hat it was idle to talk of saving themselves, otherwise han by the King's good pleasure. And he was pro- eeding to expatiate on the difficulties of their position, hen he was interrupted by Xenophon, who indig- antly reminded him, that, when they openly defied he King, he had sued for a truce, but those of their umber who placed themselves at his mercy had been itilessly massacred. A man who could learn nothing om such experience, ought no longer to be admitted mong them; and he advised that they should depose im, as a disgrace to Greece, from his command, and se him as a beast of burden. It was now made nown, by one who had noticed that the ears of pollonides had been pierced after the Lydian fashion, hat he was no more a Greek by birth than in soul; nd he was ignominiously expelled. The rest proceed- d in a body to assemble all the officers of their own r of higher rank in the army. It was near midnight hen they were brought together; their number mounted to about a hundred. The eldest officer of he division of Proxenus, having briefly stated the bject of the meeting, called upon Xenophon to repeat hat he had said. Xenophon reminded the assembly, hat the safety of the whole army entirely depended n the conduct which they might pursue in this

[1] Οὐ προφασίζομαι τὴν ἡλικίαν. On Xenophon's age at the time of the expedi- on the reader may consult a paper in the Philological Museum, I. p. 507. foll.

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eventful crisis.[1] *The eyes of the common soldiers were fixed on them; the influence of their example would be felt throughout the ranks, to infuse either despondency or courage into every bosom. Their superior station, as it conferred peculiar advantages, imposed more arduous duties, and obliged them to watch and labour in behalf of those who were placed under them. Their first care should be to fill up the vacancies which had been made by the massacre. It would then be expedient to assemble their men, and to endeavour to raise their drooping spirits. For this purpose it would be proper to divert their minds from gloomy forebodings to thoughts of action. It was not on numbers, or brute strength, but on the manly spirit of the combatants that victory depended; and he had observed, that in war those who were most chary of their lives seldom survived those who were willing to meet an honourable death.* Cheirisophus seconded this proposal, and they immediately proceeded to the election. Timasion, a native of Dardanus, was chosen in the room of Clearchus, Socrates was succeeded by Xanthicles, an Achæan, Cleanor by Agias, Meno by Philesius, an Achæan. Xenophon himself was elected to supply the place of his friend Proxenus.

Election of new generals.

The election was scarcely over, before day began to dawn; and after the sentinels had been relieved, the men were called to a general assembly. They were first addressed by Cheirisophus, who only spoke of the loss they had suffered in the death of their officers and comrades; of the friendless condition in which they were left by the desertion of Ariæus; of the doom which awaited them if they should fall into the power of their enemies; and hence took occasion to exhort them to make up their minds for victory or a glorious

[1] Μέγιστον ἔχετε καιρόν. Schneider's opinion, that these words refer to the ἐπικαίριοι mentioned Cyrop. III. 3. 12., seems to the last degree improbable.

death. He was followed in a similar strain by Cleanor, who dwelt upon the perfidy of the King and Tissaphernes, and the baseness of Ariæus, as motives which should induce them to place no trust in the faith of the barbarians, but to meet their fate, whatever it might be, with swords in their hands.

Xenophon's speech.

Xenophon rose next. He had equipped himself as gallantly as possible for the occasion, thinking, he says, that, whether he was destined to victory or to death, it became him to meet either event in his fairest array; and no doubt designing to impress the spectators with the same sentiment. His language also breathed hope and confidence. Taking up the topic on which Cleanor had insisted, he observed that they would indeed have cause for despondency, if they thought of entering into any fresh treaties with the barbarians; but if it was their purpose to avenge their murdered friends, and to wage interminable war with the assassins, they had every reason to hope for the happiest issue. His harangue was interrupted at this point by an omen, which a modern historian can scarcely mention with gravity, but which, ever since the time of Homer, had been regarded by all religious Greeks as an intimation of the divine blessing. One of the soldiers chanced to sneeze; his comrades with one accord adored the god, who had sent the auspicious sound; and the speaker dexterously availed himself of the interruption. He proposed that, since in the midst of their consultations on the means of their deliverance, they had been cheered with such an augury — which could only proceed from Zeus the Deliverer — they should join in a vow of a thanksgiving-sacrifice to this god, to be offered as soon as they should arrive on a friendly soil. The vow was solemnly made; a pæan was sung by the whole assembly, and the orator proceeded.

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The hopes of which he had spoken rested mainly on their assurance of the divine favour, which the enemy had forfeited by his impious treachery; next on the trophies which their forefathers had raised over the countless hosts of their barbarian invaders, and of which they had already shown themselves worthy, when they encountered and defeated the multitudes which Artaxerxes arrayed against them at Cunaxa. They were then fighting for Cyrus; they would now reap the fruits of victory for themselves. They then met an untried foe; they had now experience to add confidence to their courage. They had indeed been deserted by Ariæus and his troops; but it was better for them that men capable of such baseness should be found in the enemy's ranks than by their side. It was true, they were deficient in cavalry; but all that this amounted to was, that the enemy was better provided with the means of flight. Hereafter Tissaphernes would no longer be their guide, nor would the King furnish them with a market. But let them consider whether they should not be safer with guides such as they might easily find, who would be answerable to them for their fidelity with their lives, than with one who was continually meditating their destruction; and whether they were not likely to obtain more abundant supplies when they took what they could seize, than when they were obliged to content themselves with what they were able to pay for. It would be a great mistake to suppose that the difficulties of their position were increased, because they had been induced to cross the Tigris, and had thus placed it between them and Greece. As they advanced toward its head, they would find it dwindle to a brook, which they might ford without wetting their knees. But even if they should be hemmed in by impassable rivers, and be left without a guide, there would still be no cause for despondency. They knew how many independent nations, like the

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Mysians, the Pisidians, and the Lycaonians, whose country they had themselves traversed, maintained themselves within the King's dominions, in defiance of his authority, and in the possession of many fair cities. If any of those tribes—as the Mysians, with whom a Greek would not think it honourable to be compared[1]*—were willing to quit the King's territory, he would no doubt gladly furnish them with guides, pave a highway for their retreat, and give them hostages for their safety. And he would assuredly be overjoyed to do as much for the Greeks, if, instead of betraying their anxiety to return home, they intimated an inclination to stay and settle in his empire. Xenophon's only fear was, lest, if they should begin to make the trial, the sweets of ease and plenty, and the charms of the Median and Persian women, like the taste of the lotus, might make them forget their native land. He wished them to return, and make known to their countrymen, that all of them who were struggling with poverty at home might here find ample room and abundant means of subsistence. But first of all they must take such precautions, as would enable them either to march in safety, or to fight with advantage. For this purpose he advised that they should burn their waggons and tents, and should get rid of all that was superfluous in their baggage. But above all he exhorted them to observe the most exact subordination, and to aid their officers to enforce obedience; that the enemy, who had hoped by depriving them of their generals to introduce disorder into their camp, might find that in the room of the one Clearchus whom they had lost, there were ten thousand always on the watch to repress any breach of discipline.* This motion was carried, as was Xenophon's next proposal, for regulating the order of the

[1] The proverbs, Μυσῶν ἴσχατος, Μυσῶν λείη, show in what light the Mysians were viewed by the Greeks.

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march. He suggested that they should move in four divisions, so as to inclose the baggage in a hollow square. The honour of leading the van he proposed to confer on Cheirisophus, as a Spartan; the command of the two flank divisions on the two eldest generals; the rear, as the post of danger, he claimed for Timasion and himself, as the youngest.

The assembly was then dismissed; and the men immediately proceeded to burn the waggons and the tents, and — after they had supplied one another's wants — their superfluous baggage. Before they resumed their march, a Persian named Mithridates, whom they had known as an adherent of Cyrus, rode up with about thirty horse, and having obtained an audience of the generals, represented himself as threatened with great dangers on account of his attachment to Cyrus, and as willing to join them with all his followers, if he found that the course they designed to pursue was one that held out a prospect of safety for him; and he therefore desired them to disclose their plans to him as a friend. After a consultation Cheirisophus was instructed to reply, that if they were not molested, they meant to pass through the country with as little damage to it as possible; but if any one should attempt to impede their progress, he would find them prepared for a contest. Mithridates then endeavoured to convince them, that resistance was hopeless, and thus discovered himself to be an emissary of Tissaphernes, who for greater security had sent one of his confidential servants along with him. Warned by this occurrence, the generals passed a resolution, that so long as they remained in the enemy's territory they would receive no overtures from him. It was time to break off all intercourse with so insidious a foe; for some of the men had already been seduced by his artifices to desert and among

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the rest, Nicarchus, an Arcadian officer[1], went off in the night with twenty soldiers. The army then set out, and crossed the Zabatus without interruption.

Passage of the Zabatus.

The retreat which began from this point was the most memorable and brilliant period in Xenophon's life, and the narrative of it, which he drew up after his return, deserves perhaps to be considered as his greatest literary work. The ability which he displayed in his command is the more remarkable, if, as we have reason to believe, it was the first he had ever held, and before this expedition he had had few opportunities of acquiring any military experience. But the qualities which this occasion drew forth were less those of the soldier and the general, than such as had been cultivated by his intercourse with Socrates. The kind of practical philosophy which he had extracted from his master's discourses was now called into constant exercise, and appears in its most advantageous light. To his presence of mind, his courage, patience, firmness, mildness and evenness of temper, the army was mainly indebted for its safety. In the hour of danger, and the place of difficulty, he was always foremost, ready to share the hardships and toils of the soldiers, and to cheer them by the example of his never-failing alacrity. But it is in his own history of the expedition that the proof and illustration of these remarks must be sought. Our object and limits only permit us to follow the outline of his narrative, and to notice a few passages which appear most important according to the view we have hitherto taken of the subject.

The Greeks attacked by Mithridates.

They had not advanced far beyond the river when Mithridates again appeared, with about 200 cavalry and 400 bowmen and slingers, and, as soon as he had approached sufficiently near, began to assail them

[1] He must have been a different person from the Arcadian of the same name, and probably of the same rank, who was wounded the day before. His wounds, according to Xenophon's description, must have been mortal.

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with a shower of missiles. The Greeks now felt not only their want of cavalry, but the deficiency of their light troops, whose arrows and javelins fell short of the enemy, while they were themselves within his reach. Xenophon was at length induced to charge the assailants with the heavy infantry and the targeteers which he commanded. But he was not able to overtake them, and his troops were both galled by the arrows which the mounted bowmen scattered behind them as they fled, and were still more hotly pressed in their retreat toward the main body. After fighting the whole day the army had advanced little more than three miles, and reached its halting-place tired and dispirited. Xenophon was censured by Cheirisophus and the elder generals for his imprudence in making a hazardous and unavailing charge; and he did not so much endeavour to vindicate his own conduct, as to urge the necessity, which had been so clearly manifested by the events of the day, of immediately forming a body of cavalry and slingers capable of repelling the enemy's assaults. There were a few horses in the camp, some belonging to himself, some which had been left of the squadron of Clearchus, and several which had been taken, and were used for carrying the baggage. He had also learnt that there were some Rhodians in the army, who were for the most part very expert slingers, understood the use of leaden bullets, and could send their missiles twice as far as the Persians. Before morning a troop of about fifty horse was raised and equipt with cavalry armour, and 200 Rhodians had been induced to offer their services as slingers And when Mithridates again appeared with a larger force — 1000 cavalry and 4000 bowmen and slingers — which he had obtained from Tissaphernes on a promise that he would deliver the Greeks into his hands, he was repulsed with considerable loss. The Greeks, knowing the character of the enemy whom

they had to deal with, to heighten the dread of their valour by a false show of cruelty, mutilated the slain. During the rest of the day they pursued their march without molestation, and halted on the banks of the Tigris, near a great decayed city, surrounded by impregnable walls, which Xenophon calls Larissa.[1] Near it was a pyramid, on the top of which a number of peasants from the villages in the plain had taken refuge. The next day they came to another great city, similarly fortified, named Mespila[2], about which, as about Larissa, Xenophon heard a legend, in the style of the Arabian Nights, relating to the times of the Persian conquest; but they saw no enemy. The day after, Tissaphernes came up with a numerous host, composed of his own cavalry and a detachment of the royal army, the troops of Orontes, and those which the King's brother, as we have already mentioned, had brought to join him. He did not however venture to charge the Greeks, but only endeavoured to annoy their rear and flanks with his slingers and bowmen. But the Rhodians, and a few Scythian archers, who had probably belonged to the division of Clearchus, were found sufficient to ward off these insults, and for the rest of the day Tissaphernes kept following the march of the Greeks without doing them any mischief. Several of the long Persian bows, which fell into their hands, supplied the Cretan archers with weapons far superior to their own; and they endeavoured by continual practice to acquire the power of reaching a greater distance.[3]

[1] Resen, or Nimrud. *What remains of these ruins consists chiefly of long mounds of earth as at Nineveh and a hill or mound of a pointed shape, 144 feet in height. The pyramid is steep, and the top very small; but its base measured upwards of 700 feet in circumference.* Ainsworth, p. 138.

[2] Nineveh. *The plinth of the wall is described by the historian as built of polished stone full of shells: and the common building stone of Mosul is highly fossiliferous.* Ainsworth, p. 140.

[3] Ἐμελέτων τοξεύειν ἄνω ἱέντες μακράν. It seems to be to these words that Raleigh alludes, when he says, (Hist. of the World, III. 10. 8.) that Xenophon *trained his archers to shoot compass, who had been accustomed to the point blank.* But this can scarcely have been Xenophon's meaning in this passage.

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The abundance of provisions which they found in the villages where they halted, induced them to rest there the next day. As they pursued their march across the plain, Tissaphernes still hovered on their rear; and though in general he kept at a safe distance, he seems to have found some opportunities of annoying them; for the experience of this day's march taught them that the dispositions which had been adopted on Xenophon's proposal were inconvenient in a retreat, when an enemy was so close behind. Yet Xenophon does not say that any other form was substituted for the hollow square in which they had hitherto been moving, but only that six battalions of 100 men each were detached from the main body, and placed under separate officers, to serve as any emergency might arise, to remedy the irregularity which the various accidents of the road produced from time to time in the flanks of the column, and to preserve order in the fording of streams, and the crossing of bridges, or any other difficult and dangerous passage. In this way they marched four days, continually threatened, but little harmed, by the enemy's cavalry. On the fifth day they were attracted by the prospect of a palace, the residence of a satrap, in the midst of a cluster of villages at the foot of a mountain[1], from which they were parted by several ranges of lower hills.[2] They at first hoped that the inequalities of the ground would relieve them from the assaults of the cavalry. But when they began to descend from the top of the first ridge which they had to cross, they found themselves galled more than ever by the shower of missiles which was poured upon them

[1] *The appearance of Takhu in the present day coincides with what it was described to be in the time of Xenophon: a palace amid villages — a good picture of a baronial castle surrounded by the cottages of serfs and retainers.* Ainsworth, p. 144.

[2] *The first or southerly range is the highest and most difficult. The second, in the interior, is woody and hilly; and the third is a range of rocks — all three cementing to constitute one range previous to reaching the Tigris.* Ainsworth, p. 143.

from above, and which compelled their own archers and slingers to take refuge behind the ranks of the heavy infantry. The enemy indeed was soon dislodged from his vantage-ground by a charge of the heavy-armed. But the troops employed on this service suffered as before when they descended to rejoin the rest, and the annoyance was repeated in the crossing of the next ridge, so that when they reached the top of the third it was thought advisable to halt, and to send a body of targeteers to occupy the higher ground on their right. Their appearance prevented the enemy's approach; and moving on a line with the main body along the skirts of the mountain, they secured it from all further annoyance until it reached its halting-place in the villages near the satrap's palace. Here they rested three days, as well on account of the wounded, for whom eight physicians or surgeons were appointed, as to take advantage of the large store of provisions which had been laid up in the villages for the satrap's use. On the fourth, when they decended into the plain, Tissaphernes overtook them, and harassed them so much, that they halted at the first village they saw. For the number of the wounded was so great that, with the hands which were required to bear them, and to carry the arms of the bearers, it sensibly diminished the disposable force of the army. They were however able easily to repel an attack which the enemy made upon them in their quarters, and by a night march left him so far behind, that they did not see him again for three days. This relief they owed chiefly to the distance—never much less than eight miles—at which the Persians encamped, to avoid a surprise in the night, for which, Xenophon observes, a Persian army, consisting mainly of cavalry, was peculiarly unprepared.[1] But on the fourth day they

March through Media.

[1] The same reason is assigned, nearly in the same terms, in the passage of the Cyropædia referred to in a preceding note (p. 318.), for the practice there men-

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found that Tissaphernes, who had passed them in the night, had occupied a point of the mountain which commanded the road. He was however dislodged from the position by Xenophon, who, with a detachment of the heavy infantry, by dint of great exertions, gained a higher part of the ridge. The Greeks then came down upon a rich plain stretching to the Tigris, studded with villages, in which they found abundant supplies. In the afternoon Tissaphernes, who had taken a different road, suddenly appeared again, and cut off some of their stragglers. And now for the first time he began to try another mode of attack, and set fire to some of the villages. It was a confession, Xenophon said, on the part of the enemy, that the land was not his own, but was in their power. But notwithstanding this encouragement it would seem that not only the army, but the generals, were alarmed by the new attempt, which, as we have seen, had been before threatened by Tissaphernes, but which he seems to have reserved as a last expedient for the time when the Greeks should be inclosed as they now were between the mountains and the river. For at the north end of the plain precipitous cliffs, descending into the bed of the Tigris, stopt their passage[1]; the stream was unfordable, and it became necessary to change the line of march. An ingenious Rhodian proposed to carry the army across the river upon a new kind of raft composed of inflated hides

tioned. The horses in a barbarian camp, Xenophon observes, being shackled at their mangers, are, in case of attack, to be loosened, bridled, and saddled; and then the rider has to arm himself, and, when he is mounted, he can move but slowly through the crowd of the camp.

[1] *This is the point where the lofty mountain-chain, now Jebel Judi, and the same according to Chaldean, Syriac, and Arabian traditions as that on which the ark rested, comes down to the very flood of the Tigris which it incloses in an almost impassable barrier of rock. The spur of the Jebel Judi which here advances upon the river, does not descend in absolute precipices, but has at its upper part a steep wall of rock, succeeded below by steep declivities of detritus with occasional masses of rock or fallen cliff jutting out into the river, so piled together in promontories that it is only during the summer-season that a single file of pedestrians or horsemen can get through by the foot of the pass.* Ainsworth, p. 153.

and skins. But the project was deemed impracticable in the face of the enemy's cavalry, who were seen in great numbers on the opposite bank. They therefore returned, having burnt the villages which they left, to their last quarters, and examined their prisoners as to the road which they were to take. To continue their march northward, without crossing the Tigris, it was necessary that they should enter the mountainous region on their right, which was inhabited by the fierce Carduchians, who had maintained their independence against the Great King, and had once totally destroyed an army of 120,000 men which he had sent to invade their territories. This however appeared to be the only practicable course, and was adopted. Tissaphernes, who had watched their retrograde movement, as if with surprise and curiosity, from a distance, when he saw them strike into the Carduchian mountains, gave up all further pursuit.

Enter the Carduchian territory.

They had crossed the plain to the foot of the hills in the dark, during the last watch of the night, and found the passes unguarded. But the people fled from their villages at their approach, and, though the Greeks at first spared their property as much as possible, could not be induced to listen to any pacific overtures. They perhaps felt both their honour and their safety concerned to preserve their territory inviolate, and having recovered from their first surprise, and collected a part of their forces, fell upon the rear of the Greeks, and with their missiles made some slaughter among the last troops which issued, in the dusk of the evening, from the long and narrow defile. In the night the watchfires of the Carduchians were seen blazing on the peaks of the surrounding hills: signals, which warned the Greeks that they might expect to be attacked by the collected forces of their tribes. They felt that much would depend on the rapidity of their movements, and resolved to leave

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behind them their weaker cattle, and their captives, who retarded their march, consumed their provisions, and employed many hands to keep guard over them. Nevertheless during the next day's march the enemy hung upon their rear, compelling the heavy-armed from time to time to make sallies against them, and had occupied the summit of the only pass which seemed to cross the rugged mountains in front of them. Their situation would have been almost desperate, if Xenophon had not taken two of the natives in an ambush, one of whom, after he had seen his fellow put to death, undertook to guide them to another pass. By this discovery a detachment of volunteers was enabled, after a hard struggle, to dislodge the enemy from his first position. Xenophon still endeavoured by means of his interpreter to negotiate a truce with them, for the purpose of burying the slain. But he soon discovered that they listened only to cover their hostile intentions; and, though the slain were restored in exchange for the guide, the army, during its march through the Carduchian territory, which lasted seven days, was forced to contest every pass. The barbarians were light of foot, so that they could approach securely within a short distance, and they discharged their arrows with such force as to pierce both shield and corslet. The Greeks suffered more from their resistance than from all the efforts which the King and Tissaphernes had made to arrest their progress, and were glad when descending from the mountains they encamped on the banks of the Centrites, which flowed at about a mile from their foot, and divided the land of the Carduchians from Armenia, the satrapy of Orontes.[1]

[1] Mr. Ainsworth identifies the Centrites with the Buhtan-Chai, which, as he ascertained, rises from the mountainous districts of Buhtan, a province of Kurdistan, to the north-east of Sert, p. 167. Ritter, when he assumed the identity of this river with the Bitlis-Chai (Geog. x. p. 23.), was not acquainted with the most recent discoveries. Mr. Ainsworth observes (p. 166.) that the Buhtan-Chai at the present day constitutes a kind of natural barrier between Kurdistan and Armenia.

The opposite bank of the river was lined with hostile troops, infantry and cavalry, which had been collected by Orontes from his own satrapy, and from some of the neighbouring independent tribes, among which the Chaldeans were accounted the most warlike. The Greeks found that the river was too deep to be forded with safety in the face of such an enemy; and, as they saw the Carduchians assembled in great numbers behind them, apparently with the intention of attacking their rear when they began to cross, they felt themselves to be in imminent danger. But in the second night Xenophon had another encouraging dream, and the next morning he received information of a ford about half a mile off, at a place which was not accessible to the enemy's cavalry. They were thus enabled to effect their passage in spite of the threats of the Carduchians, who, though formidable in their mountains, when they came down into the plain, were put to flight by the charge of a small body of the heavy infantry. No enemy now appeared, until, having passed the sources of the Tigris, they came to the river Teleboas, on the frontier of the western Armenia, the satrapy of Teribazus. He himself came up to the Greek camp, attended by a few horsemen and an interpreter, and proposed a truce, on condition that the Greeks, in their passage through his province, should do no unnecessary damage. These terms were accepted; but it was soon discovered that he was watching their movements with an army, and designed to occupy a pass which was their only outlet through the mountains on the western side of Armenia. This intelligence enabled them to disconcert his plans. Leaving a body of troops to guard their camp, they not only secured the pass, but falling suddenly on the camp of Teribazus, dispersed his forces, and made themselves masters of his tent, with all its furniture and a part of his household. They were thus released

March through Armenia.

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from the fear of the enemy; and this was the last show of obstruction opposed to them during their retreat by the power of Persia. But in their march through the Armenian highlands they had to struggle with the inclemency of the season and the climate, which a more active enemy might perhaps have used for their destruction. The snow lay six feet deep on their road, and several of the men perished through the intensity of the cold, which was sometimes sharpened by a fierce north wind.[1] This indeed abated, after a sacrifice to Boreas which the soothsayers prescribed; but the men suffered so much from the frost and the snow, that it was often with great difficulty, and not without violence, that Xenophon could induce them to proceed. Their hardships however were but little aggravated by any attempts of the enemy; for, though they were followed by some hostile bands, it seems to have been only for the sake of plunder, and these marauders were easily checked. So little preparation had been made to arrest their progress, that in some of the villages which they passed through, they made the natives believe that they were in the King's service, and marching to join the satrap. The chief of a village, who was taken by Xenophon, both served them as a guide, and procured a hospitable reception for them in many of the Armenian villages, until a hasty blow, which he received from Cheirisophus, provoked him to make his escape. They however arrived in safety on the banks of a river which Xenophon calls the Phasis[2], and pursued their march without interruption, until they were stopt before a pass which they found guarded by three warlike tribes, the Chalybes, Taochians, and Phasians. After this

[1] When Mr. Ainsworth crossed the Armenian uplands, *in the early part of September, it froze keenly every night, although the mid-day sun was powerful.*

[2] Probably the Aras.

obstacle had been surmounted by a detachment which gained a higher point in the ridge, and drove the enemy from his position, they had to encounter a still more formidable resistance from the Taochians, who defended their almost impregnable fortresses with desperate valour, and in their last retreat flung themselves, with their wives and children, down from the rocks, to avoid falling into the power of the victorious enemy.[1]

It was in like manner, sword in hand, that they forced their way through the land of the Chalybes, the most warlike of all the tribes whose countries they traversed. They were armed nearly after the Greek fashion, and their towns, in which they had collected all their provisions, were so strongly fortified, that the Greeks would have been detained by almost insuperable difficulties, if they had not been able to subsist on the plunder of the Taochians. Among the next people whose land they entered, the Scythinians, they met with no opposition, and even with an appearance of good-will: for the chief sent a guide to them, who promised in the course of five days to lead them to a place within view of the sea. He led them through the territory of a hostile tribe, and invited them to ravage it, and thus disclosed the motive of the chief's friendly behaviour. But he fulfilled his engagement. On the fifth day as the army was ascending mount Theche[2], a lofty ridge distinguished by the name of the Sacred Mountain, Xenophon and the rear-guard observed a stoppage, and an unusual clamour, in the

First view of the sea.

[1] The name of the Taochians has perhaps been preserved in that of *Taochir*, a district of Georgia between the Aras and the Kur. The name *Ṭáôk* in Turkish, the original language of the Georgians and Tatars of the Kur, signifies a bird; and, as Mr. Ainsworth conjectures, may have been descriptive of the mountain-dwellings of the inhabitants, (p. 181.) who were used to *flee as a bird to their mountains.* (Ps. xi. 1.) But this part of the march, in which the Greeks appear to have been led by their guides very far out of the most direct route, is extremely intricate, and still offers a wide field for conjecture.

[2] The Ḳóp Ṭagh.

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foremost ranks, which had reached the summit; and they supposed at first that they saw an enemy before them. But when Xenophon rode up to ascertain the cause, the first shouts that struck his ear were: *The Sea! the Sea!* The glad sound ran quickly till it reached the hindmost, and all pressed forward to enjoy the cheering spectacle. The Euxine spread its waters before their eyes: waters, which rolled on to the shores of Greece, and which washed the walls of many Greek cities on the nearest coast of Asia. Officers and men embraced one another with tears of joy. A pile of stones was reared on the summit of the Sacred Mountain, and crowned with captive arms, and other offerings. Then, having dismissed their guide with suitable presents, they followed the road which he had pointed out to them toward the coast.

It brought them to the confluence of two rivers, one of which divided the Scythinians from the Macrones, who were strongly posted on the opposite bank, and threatened by their hostile gestures and mutual exhortations to dispute the passage. Their shouts struck one of the Greek soldiers as a familiar sound. It was the land of his birth, from which he had been torn in his youth, to live as a slave at Athens. Through his mediation his countrymen were induced to lay aside their hostility, and even to afford the most friendly aid to the Greeks, whom they conducted to the borders of Colchis. After another hard struggle with the barbarians, who were in possession of a difficult pass of their mountains, they descended to the coast, and reached the friendly walls of Trapezus, a colony of Sinope, on Colchian ground, where they were hospitably entertained, and celebrated their deliverance with votive sacrifices and solemn games.

Transactions at Trapezus.

The prevailing desire of the whole army was now to return as soon as possible to Greece. But the

Greek cities on the south coast of the Euxine were interspersed over the territories of many fierce and independent tribes; and after the toils and hardships of the march which they had just ended, having the sea immediately before them, the men were extremely averse to the thought of pursuing their journey by land. They would, as one of them said, have done with the watches and labours and dangers of the camp and the field, and be carried home, like Ulysses, stretched asleep on the deck. Cheirisophus, being acquainted with Anaxibius, who was at this time Admiral of Sparta, and was stationed at Byzantium, was commissioned to obtain transports, to fetch them away from Trapezus. During his absence, Xenophon advised that they should borrow some galleys from the Trapezuntians, and force as many vessels as they could into their service. But Dexippus, a Laconian, who was sent out with a penteconter for this purpose, instead of discharging his commission, sailed away to Byzantium; and Cheirisophus lingered so long that the Greeks—after a dangerous expedition on which they were led by the Trapezuntians against a neighbouring tribe, the Drilæ, one of the most warlike on the Euxine, whose hostile inroads frequently annoyed Trapezus—found themselves compelled by the want of provisions to shift their quarters. The men above forty, with the women—of whom a great number had followed the army—the children and the sick, were embarked in the vessels which had been procured. The rest proceeded by land to Cerasus, also a colony of Sinope in the land of the Colchians. Here they reviewed their forces; and it was found that of about 10,000 men who had set out from Sardis or from Cunaxa, 8600 had survived. The money taken by the sale of the captives was here distributed; and a tenth, which was reserved for Apollo and the Ephesian Artemis, was divided

At Cerasus.

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among the generals, to be laid out at their discretion in honour of those deities.

At Cerasus they remained ten days; and before their departure the generals experienced an alarming proof of the difficulty of maintaining discipline among a body of troops so composed, when they were no longer restrained by the sense of a common danger. A neighbouring tribe of friendly barbarians was treacherously attacked by a party of volunteers, led against them by an officer, who hoped to enrich himself with the booty, but fell with many of his followers in the assault; and their envoys, who came to Cerasus for satisfaction, were stoned to death by some of the survivors. This outrage was perpetrated after the main body had resumed its march; but when the Cerasuntians proceeded to the camp to complain of it, they there witnessed another tumult in which an officer, belonging to what we should call the commissariat[1], was threatened with death by the soldiers.

At Cotyora.

These occurrences seem to have excited alarm at Cotyora, where the army next arrived, after having traversed the territory of the savage Mosynœcians, and the citizens refused either to afford it a market, or to admit the sick within their walls. But the Greeks, having forced their way into the town, compelled them to receive the sick into their houses, and plundered the circumjacent country. Cotyora was a colony of Sinope, planted in the land of the Tibarenes, and both paid tribute to the parent city, and was governed by a Sinopian harmost. The Sinopians were alarmed for their subjects, and sent envoys to expostulate with the Greeks on their hostile proceedings. Xenophon defended them on the plea of necessity, and repelled the threats thrown out by the chief of the embassy—who talked of calling in the aid of

[1] Ἀγορανόμος.

the Paphlagonian king, Corylas, against them—in a manner which induced him to change his tone, and to exert his authority to procure a more hospitable reception for them at Cotyora.

The envoys were next consulted on the best mode of proceeding toward Greece. They described the obstacles which the army would have to encounter, if it attempted to force its way through Paphlagonia, as insuperable; and so strong was their anxiety to get rid of their formidable guests, that they engaged to provide transports for the whole army; and three deputies were sent back with them to Sinope, to fetch the vessels. During their stay at Cotyora, which lasted forty-five days, Xenophon thought he saw a favourable opportunity for executing a project, which he seems to have had for some time in his mind, of planting a new colony on the coast of the Euxine. But the soothsayer Silanus, to whom he communicated the scheme, was desirous of returning home to enjoy the munificent present which he had received from Cyrus, and both prematurely divulged Xenophon's views, and did his utmost to thwart them. And the greater part of the men seemed so averse to them, that Xenophon found it necessary to declare that he had abandoned them. But the rumour of his design enabled Timasion and Thorax, a Bœotian, to work upon the fears of some merchants from Sinope and Heraclea, who were present in Cotyora, and by their reports these two cities were induced to offer to provide pay as well as vessels for the troops, on condition that they should sail away to Greece, and even engaged Timasion by a promise of money to exert his influence for promoting this object. When however it was discovered that Xenophon had dropt or at least disclaimed the purpose attributed to him, and that the men were bent on returning home, the Sinopians and Heracleots no longer thought it neces-

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sary to fulfil these promises, and sent the transports without any money. Timasion who, relying on their assurances, had made large promises to the soldiers, now dreaded the effects of their disappointment, and would have persuaded Xenophon to resume his project, and to join him and the other generals—who with the exception of Neon, the lieutenant of Cheirisophus, were all ready to share the expedition—in an attempt to found a colony on the banks of the Phasis. It is not clear how they could have hoped to succeed in such an enterprise; for when a rumour of it was circulated in the army, and Neon, ignorantly or maliciously, imputed it to Xenophon, who had refused to concur in it, the men seemed to be on the point of breaking out into a mutiny, and Xenophon was again obliged to vindicate himself, and to point out the absurdity of supposing that he meant to accomplish such an object either by artifice or violence against their inclinations. He took this opportunity of relating the scenes which had taken place at Cerasus, which were not generally known, and excited universal indignation, and proposed a solemn lustration to purify the army from the stain of blood. This transaction suggested the thought of a court which was held to receive an account from the generals of their conduct during the expedition. Some charges of peculation and negligence were brought and proved, and sundry penalties inflicted. Xenophon himself did not escape accusation, but the calumnies with which he was assailed not only afforded him an opportunity of clearing himself from the imputation cast on him, of an oppressive exercise of his authority, but revived the recollection of numberless acts of kindness and self-denial, by which he had earned the gratitude of the men under his command, and of the whole army.

They arrive at Sinope.

A sufficient number of transports was at length collected for the embarkation of all the troops, and a

fair wind brought them in the course of two days to Harmene, the port of Sinope, where they were hospitably entertained, and were found by Cheirisophus, who returned with a single galley, but brought a message of congratulation and praise from Anaxibius, and a promise, that when they came out of the Euxine, he would provide employment and pay for them. They had now left almost all obstacles behind them, and all anxiety about their return had been sufficiently removed to make room for other cares. Their main wish now was to carry home some fruit of the long and laborious expedition which was just drawing to its close. For this purpose it seemed advisable that the command should no longer be divided among many generals, but should be lodged in the hands of a single chief. The thirst of plunder had opened their eyes more effectually than all their past dangers to the benefit which might be expected from secrecy of counsel and promptness of action. The unanimous choice of the army fell upon Xenophon; and he was strongly pressed by the inferior officers to accept the supreme command. As he owns that he was powerfully tempted by the offer, we can hardly refuse to believe him when he asserts that it was by the unfavourable aspect of the victims which he consulted that he was induced to decline it, though he himself assigned a much more rational motive for his conduct, —the reflection that such a distinction conferred on an Athenian, when a Lacedæmonian was present, might awaken the jealousy of the Spartans. The command was accordingly bestowed on Cheirisophus, who, while he accepted it, observed that Xenophon had acted prudently in declining it, since Dexippus —the man who had so treacherously deserted his comrades at Trapezus—had already been endeavouring to injure him in the opinion of Anaxibius, to whom he had represented him as a person of dangerous

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ambition, and of views hostile to the interests of Sparta. But Cheirisophus was not aware of all the perils to which he was himself exposed in his new station.

Proceedings at Heraclea.

The army re-embarked, and the wind continuing fair carried it in two days to the port of Heraclea. The Heracleots sent a present of flour, wine, sheep, and oxen, sufficient to supply its wants for two or three days. But this hospitable treatment only served to inflame the cupidity which had been awakened as soon as fear began to subside; and one Lycus, an Achæan, proposed to demand a large subsidy from Heraclea. The motion was carried, and when Cheirisophus and Xenophon, strenuously remonstrating against this injustice, refused to be the bearers of the message, it was intrusted to other envoys who delivered it in threatening language. They were dismissed with an equivocal answer; and the Heracleots immediately made preparations for defending their city. The authors of the iniquitous project vented their disappointment in murmurs against those who had opposed it, and persuaded the Arcadians and Achæans, who formed more than half the army, to separate themselves from the rest, and to try to mend their fortunes under generals of their own. Thus, within six or seven days after his election, Cheirisophus found himself reduced to his former rank, with the loss of all the Arcadians and Achæans who had hitherto served under him. Xenophon was now inclined to throw up his command; but he was induced to retain it, partly, as he says, by the appearance of the sacrifices, and partly by the prospect of embarking under the protection of Cleander, the Spartan harmost of Byzantium, who was expected with a squadron at Port Calpe on the coast of Bithynia.

The army left Heraclea in three divisions. The Arcadians and Achæans—more than 4500 heavy-armed infantry under the command of ten generals

invested with equal powers—eager for the spoil of Bithynia, embarked first, and landed at Port Calpe. Cheirisophus, with 1400 heavy-armed, and 700 Thracian targeteers, marched along the coast toward the same point. Xenophon—who leaves us in great doubt as to his motives for parting from Cheirisophus—sailed as far as the confines of Bithynia, and then struck into the interior. His division consisted of 1700 heavy infantry, about 300 targeteers, and forty cavalry, the only force of that kind in the army. He had perhaps chosen the upper road in the hope of averting or remedying the calamities which he might well augur from the rashness and presumption of the more numerous body, and in fact he came up just in time to rescue them from the Bithynians who had surrounded a hill on which they had taken refuge, but dispersed in the night as soon as they saw the fires which Xenophon had kindled at a distance. The three divisions met in safety at Port Calpe, and, having gained wisdom by the recent disaster, agreed never more to part company.

At Port Calpe.

The army was detained at Calpe several days; at first, when on the point of setting out to march across Bithynia to the Bosphorus, by the unpropitious appearance of the victims—which, Xenophon says, some were bold enough to ascribe to his management—afterwards waiting for the arrival of Cleander. Xenophon's narrative of the transactions of this interval is very mysterious. It is clear from his description of the peninsula of Calpe, that he thought the situation admirably adapted for a colony. It was generally believed in the army that he wished to found one there; and the men were on this account unwilling to encamp in a strong position which might have served as the citadel of a new town, and when at last they were compelled to do so through fear of the Bithynians and Pharnabazus, this encampment

Xenophon's project.

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was universally regarded as the beginning of a settlement. Xenophon however does not inform us how far this opinion was well grounded, but only seems anxious to guard himself from the suspicion of collusion with the soothsayers: a suspicion which it is nevertheless very difficult to suppress, when we find the sacrifices by which the movements of the army were regulated, uniformly tending toward the object which he was supposed to have had in view. Cheirisophus died of a fever at Calpe, and Neon, who succeeded him, having led out 2000 men on a foraging excursion in spite of the adverse omens, was surprised by the cavalry which Pharnabazus had sent to aid the Bithynians, and lost 500 of his troops. After this disaster, the sacrifices no longer forbad an expedition, in which the Greeks revenged themselves by a complete victory over the satrap's forces.

Soon afterwards Cleander arrived; but he brought only two galleys of war, and no transports. He was accompanied by Dexippus, who had laboured to prejudice him against the army and especially against Xenophon, and by his own misconduct provoked a tumult, in which Cleander believed his person to have been threatened. The power of Sparta was at this time so formidable, that Xenophon dreaded the worst consequences from his resentment, and persuaded the army to appease it by the most respectful submission to his pleasure. The Spartan did not want generosity, and being at length convinced that Dexippus had deceived him, admitted Xenophon to his friendship, and took the army under his protection. A march of six days, in the course of which they collected a great booty, brought them through Bithynia to Chrysopolis, over against Byzantium. While they stayed here to dispose of the spoil, they received two invitations from different quarters to cross over to Europe. Pharnabazus feared that they might be

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tempted, both by cupidity and revenge, to invade his satrapy, and by such offers as few Spartans were able to resist engaged Anaxibius to use his influence to draw them out of Asia. Anaxibius accordingly sent for the principal officers to Byzantium, and repeated the promise which he had before made through Cheirisophus, of taking them into pay as soon as they came over. Xenophon announced his intention of quitting the army, but was persuaded by the Spartans to remain with it until it had landed in Europe. It happened that at this time Seuthes, an Odrysian prince, who had inherited a part of the great monarchy of Sitalces, including some of its maritime regions, having been expelled from his dominions, was striving to recover them with a body of troops which had been sent to his assistance by Medocus, who was now reigning over the more inland tribes still subject to the Odrysian empire. Seuthes was desirous of engaging the Cyrean troops, as they began to be called, in his service, and sent a Thracian, named Medosades, to negotiate for this object with Xenophon, who, he promised, should not find him ungrateful for his good offices, if he would induce the army to cross the channel. Xenophon however informed the envoy that this measure was already resolved on, and that when it was executed his own connection with the army would cease.

The Greeks arrive at Byzantium.

Anaxibius, having accomplished his end, when the troops had landed at Byzantium, would immediately have dismissed them without either pay or provisions, to make their way into the Thracian Chersonesus, where, he informed them, they would find employment under the command of Cyniscus, apparently another Spartan officer. This intelligence was communicated to the men just as they had issued from the gates of Byzantium; and it provoked a transport of indignation in which they burst into the city, and

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were only restrained from keeping possession of it, by the remonstrances of Xenophon, whom many of them urged to seize this opportunity of rising to greatness by placing himself at their head. He convinced them of the desperate rashness of braving the power of Sparta, and persuaded them to evacuate the place. He himself adhered to his resolution of quitting the army, and having with some difficulty obtained permission from Anaxibius to re-enter the town for the purpose of embarking, took leave of his comrades. The other generals were divided in their interests and views. The army, while it lay before the walls, was deceived for a day or two by the absurd pretensions of an adventurer named Cœratades,—a character which could not have appeared at an earlier period, and which in its ludicrous extravagance bears the stamp of the national calamities. He was travelling about in search of employment as a general, and, by a promise that he would lead them upon a profitable expedition, and in the mean while would supply them with provisions in abundance, prevailed upon the Cyreans to elect him commander-in-chief. But it was soon found that he had no means of maintaining them even for a single day; and during the interval of suspense which ensued, while the generals were contending each for his own object, many of the men withdrew from the camp, sold their arms, and either sailed away, or took up their abode in Byzantium, and other neighbouring cities.

Cœratades.

Anaxibius heard with pleasure that the army was beginning to dwindle away, as he hoped the sooner to receive the reward of his services from Pharnabazus. But being shortly after superseded by a new Admiral, he found himself neglected by the satrap, who transferred all his attention to Aristarchus, who was come to succeed Cleander as harmost of Byzantium. Anaxibius had met Aristarchus at Cyzicus, and had in-

structed him to sell all the Cyreans whom he found in Byzantium as slaves: an act of cruelty to which Cleander had always refused to consent. But he was now only intent on revenging himself, and, sending for Xenophon, who was at Parium on the Asiatic coast, urged him to sail with all speed to the army, and to induce it to cross over to Asia, and invade the satrap's province. Xenophon, who seems to have been led to resign his command chiefly through fear of Spartan jealousy, gladly executed this commission, and the men as readily embraced this proposal. But the threats of Aristarchus, who was no less venal than Anaxibius, and had become equally devoted to the interests of Pharnabazus, compelled them to desist from this enterprise. Xenophon, who in the mean time had received another message from Seuthes, now entered into treaty with the Thracian prince, and finally engaged the whole army, except a corps of 800 men under Neon, in his service. After a hard winter's campaign, Seuthes found himself restored to his dominions by the aid of the Greeks, and would then have defrauded them of the pay which had become due to them. But Sparta had now herself need of them for a war which she was beginning in Asia, of which we shall speak in the next chapter, and, with the concurrence of the Spartan commissioners, Xenophon constrained Seuthes to satisfy the claims of the troops before they embarked to be incorporated with the other Spartan levies. With their return to Asia the history of the expedition ends.

The Cyreans taken into the Spartan service.

The events which we have been relating soon became known throughout Greece, and they suggested several interesting reflections to a thoughtful observer. From the days of Aristagoras the Greeks, though they had long ceased to view the Persian power with apprehension, had regarded the Great King as inac-

Consequences of the expedition.

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cessible to their attacks in his eastern capitals. But now a Persian prince, thoroughly acquainted with the strength of the empire, had advanced 2000 miles into the interior to dethrone the reigning monarch, with an army in which the only troops on which, according to his public declarations, he placed any reliance were about 10,000 Greek adventurers. The battle of Cunaxa proved that he had not miscalculated his means, and that it was not the want of force, but either of prudence or of fortune, that caused the failure of his enterprise. Even after his death this handful of Greeks had felt themselves able to dispose of the throne of Asia, and the sequel seemed to show that this confidence was not ill grounded. The Persian court had betrayed its weakness and its fears, in all the attempts which it made to cut off their retreat; and their struggles with the independent tribes through which they passed, proved both the great number of nations dwelling within the compass of the King's dominions which defied his power with impunity, and that no region of Asia was impervious to the arms of the Greeks. The practical inference was immediately drawn, though it was not fully demonstrated till near a century later.

Fortunes of Xenophon.

But before we again fall into the main current of Grecian history, it seems due to the celebrated man who fills so conspicuous a place in the latter part of the foregoing narrative, that we should pause a few moments to consider the close of his personal adventures, though it lies at some distance beyond the point of time which we have reached. Xenophon had prudently declined the offers with which Seuthes tempted him to sacrifice his reputation, and the good-will of the army, to temporary gain, or a settlement on the coast of Thrace. He still professed the intention of returning home, but was persuaded by his friends to accompany the army into Asia, and to consign it to

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the Spartan officer under whom it was henceforth to serve. He arrived at Lampsacus with the esteem and gratitude of his comrades heightened by his recent conduct, but with so scanty a provision for his own wants, that he was obliged to sell a favourite horse to supply himself with the means of journeying homeward. But not long after he led the troops on a marauding excursion in Lydia, from which they returned with a large booty; and the portion which they reserved for him, made him, as he says, rich enough to be bountiful to others. He now perhaps expected to return to Athens in affluence and honour; but this was not his lot. He returned to Greece an exile, bearing arms against his fellow-citizens, whom he met in battle on the field of Coronea. We have no sure information as to the cause of his banishment; but the most probable account seems to be that which assigns it to one by which the forebodings of Socrates were realised[1]; and it is not difficult to conceive that the resentment of the Athenians was excited as well by the share he took in the expedition of Cyrus, as by the services which he had rendered to Sparta after his return. But we know too little of his private connections, or his political relations, to be sure that other motives did not at least concur with this to occasion his sentence; and indeed his own narrative, strictly interpreted, would lead us to conclude, that it had not been passed until he had set out with the Spartan king Agesilaus on his expedition against Athens and her allies.

The Spartans rewarded him for his attachment to them, with the title of Proxenus, and with a grant of land and a house near the town of Scillus in Triphylia, in a pleasant valley not far from the plain of Olympia. Here he fixed his abode, and was enabled to consecrate

[1] Paus. v. 6. 5.

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the scene of his retirement by an act of piety. He had carried the portion of the votive tenth which fell to his share in the division of the booty at Cerasus, as far as Ephesus, and, when he was on the point of setting out with Agesilaus, deposited the part due to the Ephesian goddess, with Megabyzus, the guardian of her temple, to be restored to him if he should pass safely through the dangers of the approaching campaign, otherwise to be laid out in an offering to Artemis. After he had settled at Scillus, Megabyzus arrived there on a pilgrimage to Olympia, and restored the deposit, with which Xenophon purchased a tract of land in the vale of Scillus, dedicated it to the goddess, and on it built a small fane after the model of the great temple of Ephesus, in which he placed an image of cypress-wood shaped like the golden Ephesian idol. The temple stood in a grove of fruit trees; the rest of the sacred land consisted chiefly of pastures and woods abounding in game; and a little stream which flowed through it, was named, like one within the precincts of the Ephesian Artemisium, Selinus. A festival was celebrated every year in honour of the goddess, and was attended by a large concourse of worshippers from the neighbouring districts, who were entertained with the produce of the sacred land, according to a solemn obligation recorded on a pillar which stood near the temple, by which the possessor was bound to consume a tenth of its fruits in a yearly sacrifice. In this delightful retreat Xenophon spent many quiet yet active years, dividing his time between his literary occupations, the pleasures of the chase, and the society of his family and friends. It seems however that he did not end his days here, though the causes which led him to quit it are not well ascertained. According to one author he was driven away by an inroad of the Eleans, and took refuge in Corinth,

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where he is said to have died at an advanced age.[1] But according to another statement he was restored to his native city, and by a decree moved by the same orator, Eubulus, who had been the author of his banishment. And since, as we shall see, a time came when to be a friend of Sparta was no longer an offence at Athens, the fact of his recall is by no means improbable[2]; and it would even appear that in his old age he endeavoured to atone for his ancient hostility by a chimerical project for the improvement of the Athenian finances.

[1] Diog. Laert. II. 60.

[2] It would seem indeed to follow from the oration of Dinarchus, mentioned by Diog. La. II. 52., that he resided for some time at Athens.

CHAPTER XXXV.

FROM THE RENEWAL OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN SPARTA AND PERSIA TO THE DEATH OF LYSANDER.

Expedition of Thimbron. — Dercyllidas. — Mania. — Meidias. — Government of Dercyllidas. — Fortification of the Thracian Chersonesus. — Invasion of Caria. — Armistice. — War between Sparta and Elis. — Submission of Elis. — Accession of Agesilaus. — Internal State of Sparta. — The Ephoralty. — Cinadon's Plot. — Expedition of Agesilaus. — He is insulted at Aulis. — Truce with Tissaphernes. — His breach with Lysander. — Military Preparations of Ephesus. — Battle of Sardis. — Death of Tissaphernes. — Mission of Timocrates. — Treaty between Thebes and Athens. — Death of Lysander. — Disgrace of Pausanias. — Projects of Lysander.

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THE motives which induced the Spartan government to declare itself in favour of Cyrus in his contest with his elder brother, were not perhaps without a mixture of personal feelings, but they were certainly not pure gratitude and good-will. It no doubt perceived that it would be conferring a weighty obligation on one of the rivals, who might become a still more powerful and useful ally than he had hitherto been, while its forbearance would be but little prized by the other. The issue of the enterprise of Cyrus could not inspire it with much uneasiness. If he should not fully succeed, there might still be a prospect of dividing or weakening the Persian empire; and if he should utterly fail, it had nothing to dread but a war with Persia: an event to which it had probably begun already to look forward more with hope than with fear. The victory of Artaxerxes soon afforded it an

occasion for manifesting the new spirit which animated its councils. While the Greeks were on their return, Tissaphernes was sent down to the West to receive the reward of his signal services, having been appointed to the government of the provinces which had been before subject to Cyrus, in addition to his own satrapy, and invested with the like superintending authority as had been given to the prince. He now claimed the dominion of the Ionian cities as included within his new province; but he found them very unwilling to submit to him. They had provoked his displeasure by the preference which they had shown for Cyrus; they dreaded his resentment, and they hoped with the aid of Sparta to be able to maintain their independence. Their envoys pressed the Spartan government, as the acknowledged head of the Greek nation, to protect them from the yoke and from the vengeance of the barbarian. The Spartans no longer considered themselves bound by the treaty in which, at a time when they were in need of Persian gold, they had acknowledged the King's title to the whole of Asia; and they seem gladly to have embraced the opportunity thus offered of extending their credit and power. Thimbron was sent, with the title of harmost, to undertake the defence of the Ionians, at the head of an army consisting only of 1000 Neodamodes, and about 4000 Peloponnesian troops, and 300 Athenian cavalry, which he had demanded and offered to maintain, perhaps not without a hint that such a requisition would be welcome. In fact it enabled the Athenians, without any breach of the amnesty, to rid themselves of so many citizens of the equestrian class, who, as they had been among the steadiest supporters of the Thirty, could never be viewed without suspicion.

Expedition of Thimbron.

Thimbron on his arrival in Asia collected reinforce-

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ments to the amount of about 3000 men[1] from the Greek cities, where, as Xenophon observes, the will of a Spartan at this time was law. Still the enemy's superiority in cavalry was so great, that he did not venture at first to descend into the open plain, where he would have been exposed to its attacks, but contented himself with defending the immediate neighbourhood of more tenable positions. The scene of these operations however was not Ionia, but the more northern coast near the satrapy of Pharnabazus, toward which Tissaphernes had marched, perhaps with the view of keeping the war at as great a distance as he could from that part of his province in which his private property lay; and he had been engaged for some time without success in the siege of Cuma.[2] Thimbron's first object was to meet the Cyrean troops, and soon after their arrival at Pergamus he incorporated them with his own, and now felt himself strong enough to face the enemy on any ground. Pergamus, and several other towns in this region, submitted to him. Among them were some which were governed by two remarkable Greek families: by the descendants of the Spartan exile Demaratus, who bore the names of Eurysthenes and Procles, and by Gorgion and Gongylus, who inherited the lordship which had been granted by the Persian king to their ancestor Gongylus, an Eretrian, as the reward of his treason to the cause of Greece.[3] But their national feelings, or their fears, were stronger than their gratitude, and they opened the gates of their towns to their countrymen. Some other places Thimbron took by assault; but before Larissa—that distinguished by the epithet of the

[1] The army, when Dercyllidas took the command, amounted to 8000 men. Xenoph. Hell. III. 1. 28.

[2] Diodor. XIV. 35.

[3] Xenophon says he was the only Eretrian who was exiled on account of his treason. But there were others who shared it. Her. VI. 100. See Vol. II. p. 259.

Egyptian — he was detained so long by the vigorous resistance of the besieged, that he received orders from the ephors to waste no more time there, but to march into Caria, and carry the war to the doors of Tissaphernes.

But nearly at the time that these orders were sent, complaints were laid against him at Sparta by the allies, which induced the government to supersede him before he had completed his year of office. He either neglected to preserve discipline among his troops, or had been compelled by the want of other resources to connive at the depredations they committed in the friendly country through which they passed. At Ephesus he was met by his successor Dercyllidas, to whom he immediately resigned his command. On his return to Sparta he was sentenced to a fine, and was either banished or driven into exile by the heaviness of the penalty. Dercyllidas was a Spartan of Lysander's school, so notorious for his mastery in the arts of stratagem and intrigue, as to have earned the nickname of Sisyphus, the legendary exemplar of cunning. His first measure was one in which he consulted his private passions rather than the public interest, but at the same time gave proof of his dexterity, and revealed the weakness of the Persian system of government. He knew that great jealousy existed between Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes, who, once his equal, had lately been raised to a higher rank by the commission which appointed him successor to Cyrus; and he took advantage of it to divide their forces, and to revenge himself on Pharnabazus, who had once drawn an ignominious military punishment upon him while he commanded as harmost of Abydos under Lysander. He concluded an armistice with Tissaphernes on the condition that he should turn his arms against Pharnabazus; and while Tissaphernes thus showed his indifference to his master's interests, by abandoning a colleague whom

Dercyllidas.

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it was his duty to protect, the Spartan ventured to disregard the orders given to Thimbron, and bent his march northward, toward the midland district called Æolis, from the Æolian towns which peopled it. It included a part of the skirts and of the upper valleys of mount Ida, and was subject to Pharnabazus. On his way he exhibited a strong and advantageous contrast to the laxity of his predecessor's discipline, in the strictness with which he compelled his troops to respect the property of their allies. And on his arrival in Æolis he lighted upon an extraordinary supply, which enabled him with ease and safety to persevere in the same system. It was the result of a train of events on which Xenophon dwells with evident pleasure for the sake of the moral lesson, and with a minuteness which we could have wished him to have reserved for matters of higher historical interest, which he has left in comparative obscurity.

Pharnabazus had committed the government of *his* Æolis, as it was called to distinguish it from the maritime region occupied by the Æolian colonies, to Zenis, a Greek of Dardanus. On the death of Zenis,

Mania.

Mania his widow, an able and enterprising woman, by a timely application to the satrap, accompanied with rich presents both to himself and the principal persons of his court and household, prevailed on him to let her succeed her husband: an appointment much less repugnant to Persian than to Greek ideas of the capacities and functions of her sex. Her administration was active, prudent, and prosperous. She took a body of Greek mercenaries into pay, with which she reduced three of the adjacent maritime towns, Larissa, Hamaxitus, and Colonæ, superintending their operations in person, and rewarding their exertions with discriminating liberality. She attended the satrap on his military expeditions, conciliated his favour by her exactness in the payment of the tribute,

her munificence, and her hospitality, and was admitted to a share in his councils. Within her dominions she exercised absolute authority, and amassed an ample treasure. A son and daughter, the one rising toward manhood, the other married, promised stability and increase to her good fortune. But destruction fell upon her from the quarter to which she looked with the greatest confidence for security. Meidias her son-in-law, instigated both by his own ambition, and by the suggestions of evil counsellors, who taught him to deem himself degraded by subjection to a woman, murdered her and her son, and made himself master of Scepsis and Gergis, the two towns in which, as places of strength, she had lodged the greater part of her treasures. The other towns, which were garrisoned by the Greek mercenaries, refused to receive him, and continued to acknowledge the authority of Pharnabazus. Meidias now sent presents to the satrap, and applied for the government which his crimes had made vacant. But Pharnabazus returned his presents with a threatening message *to keep them, till he should come, and take the gifts with the giver; he would rather die than leave the murder of Mania unavenged.*

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Meidias.

Such was the state of affairs when Dercyllidas arrived. After having received the submission of the three maritime towns which Mania had conquered, he sent to invite those of Æolis to assert their independence, and to enter into alliance with Sparta. His proposals were immediately accepted by three of them, where the garrisons after Mania's death had committed some disorders. Cebren, a strong place, held out four days, during which Dercyllidas professed to be seeking favourable auspices. But the garrison was discontented, and forced its commander to surrender before any attack had been made. He then marched against Scepsis. Meidias, threatened by

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Pharnabazus, and conscious that he was hated by the Scepsians, thought it safest to come to terms with Dercyllidas, and offered to repair in person to the Spartan camp, on receiving hostages for his security. Dercyllidas gave him as many as he would; but when he had him in his power, informed him that he must resign his authority at Scepsis, and Meidias, seeing himself helpless, permitted him to enter the town, turn out the garrison, and proclaim liberty and independence. Meidias begged that he might be allowed to keep Gergis, but he received an evasive answer, and was forced to order his garrison to throw open its gates to the army of Dercyllidas. The Spartan general incorporated the guards of Meidias—as no longer needed for his safety—with his own troops, and then took possession of all the property of Mania, and cheered his men by announcing that it would provide them with regular pay for nearly a year to come. The wretched man, whom he still affected to treat as a guest and a friend, seeing himself stript of all the fruits of his villany, asked where he was to live. *Where*, was the reply, *but in your native town, Scepsis, on your patrimony?* To the fallen tyrant, the unprotected assassin, it was a prospect of misery, shame, and death.

Government of Dercyllidas.

Dercyllidas having thus, within eight days, made himself master of a great part of Æolis, and laid in an ample provision for the maintenance of his troops, was only anxious to preserve his conquests without burdening his allies, by remaining among them during the ensuing winter. He therefore proposed a truce to Pharnabazus, whose superiority in cavalry would have enabled him to give great annoyance to the revolted Greeks in the absence of the Spartan army; and the satrap, who had no less reason to apprehend hostile incursions from Æolis into the heart of his territories, willingly accepted the offer. Dercyllidas

now marched into the country of the Bithynian Thracians, who were nominally subject to Pharnabazus, but were in fact independent and hostile, and during the winter subsisted and enriched his troops, and a body of Odrysians who joined him there, with the plunder of their villages; though not with perfect impunity; for on one occasion the Bithynians surprised the Odrysian camp, recovered the booty, and killed nearly 200 Greeks who had been left to guard it. The Odrysians, after this disaster, encamped with their allies.

In the spring of 399 Dercyllidas quitted Bithynia, and marched southward. At Lampsacus he was joined by three Spartan commissioners, Aracus, Navates, and Antisthenes, who were sent to inspect the state of affairs in Asia, and who announced to him that his command was to be prolonged for another year. While they conferred this mark of approbation on himself, they were charged to communicate to his men the satisfaction which the ephors felt at the amendment which had taken place in their conduct, and to express a hope, that they would persevere in their good behaviour. When these general orders were orally delivered before the assembled army, the commander of the Cyrean troops—probably Xenophon himself—took the opportunity to observe that the praise and the blame rested, not with the soldiers, but with the generals who had been set over them. Dercyllidas escorted the commisisoners as far as Ephesus, and then left them to continue their progress through the Greek cities, which, after having been afflicted with the worst evils of tyranny and faction through Lysander's ambitious policy, had begun to recover their tranquillity and prosperity under a better system. Lysander's creatures had exercised their power in many places perhaps not less oppressively than the Thirty at Athens, and it seems that

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B. C. 398.

the revolution which took place there under Spartan sanction had encouraged the Asiatic Greeks to overthrow their decarchies.[1] Much confusion and bloodshed might have ensued; but the ephors, among whom the influence of Pausanias was for the time predominant, wisely interfered, and directed or consented to the restoration of the ancient form of government. While the commissioners were engaged in observing the beneficial effects of these changes, Dercyllidas was occupied with an undertaking which had been accidentally suggested to him by their conversation. They had informed him that they had left envoys from the Greeks of the Thracian Chersonesus at Sparta, who came to apply for protection from their barbarian neighbours, which, it was thought, might be most effectually provided for by a wall carried across the isthmus; and it was expected that the Spartan government would be induced to send an officer with a body of troops to conduct this work. On this hint Dercyllidas formed his resolution, which however he kept to himself. He renewed the truce with Pharnabazus, and then crossed the Hellespont with his army, and marched to the court of Seuthes, where he was hospitably received. The object of this visit was perhaps connected, though we do not know precisely in what manner, with his subsequent operations. Having come to the isthmus, and inspected and measured the ground, which is a little more than four miles in breadth, he distributed the line of fortification in portions among his men, and quickened their activity and emulation with a promise of rewards. Thus speeded, the wall, which was begun

Fortification of the Thracian Chersonesus.

[1] The supposition that this change was made *after* the Spartan commissioners had witnessed the tranquil and prosperous condition of these cities, is one which was perhaps natural enough for a determined apologist of Lysander, but is in itself so violently improbable, that the awkward fictions devised to support it may safely be left to fall by their own weight. Compare Xenophon, Hell. III. 4. 2. and Plut. Lys. 21.

in the spring, was finished before autumn. It is possible however that he found parts of a wall which had been built by Pericles for the same purpose, still standing, and had only to restore it upon the old foundation. The work, when completed, enabled a comparatively small garrison to protect the whole Chersonesus, which included eleven towns, several fine harbours, and a large tract of highly fruitful country, from the inroads of the ferocious Thracians of the interior.[1] Dercyllidas then returned to Asia, and was detained eight months by the siege of Atarneus, a strong fortress which was held by a body of exiles from Chios, who from this point carried on an incessant predatory warfare against Ionia. Having at length overcome their obstinate resistance, he put a garrison into the place, under the command of Draco, an Achæan of Pellene, and provided it with magazines, for his future sojourn, or for a refuge which might be needed in a less prosperous state of affairs, and then returned to Ephesus.

Invasion of Caria.

Tissaphernes had hitherto remained unmolested; but it would seem that he had not abstained from enforcing his demands on the Greek cities, and they again sent envoys to Sparta for relief. They represented that he might be brought to acknowledge their independence, if he found himself attacked in Caria, where his private possessions lay, and the ephors gave orders, that Dercyllidas should invade Caria by land, while their admiral Pharax acted in concert with him on the coast. The two officers appear to have executed these orders with great alertness, and the Spartan army had crossed the Mæander, while Tissaphernes was on the other side in conference with Pharnabazus,

[1] Xenophon's language, Hell. III. 2. 11., very clearly implies, that the wall was completed before Dercyllidas returned to Asia; and I do not perceive the necessity of supposing with Mr. Clinton, F. H. II. p. 92., that he began the siege of Atarneus, while the rampart was building. If the siege began in the autumn, it seems to allow time for his subsequent operations.

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who had come to obtain his assistance for the purpose of expelling the invaders from the King's dominions. Tissaphernes required his colleague first to accompany him into Caria, and provide for the security of the province, and when they had placed sufficient garrisons in the Carian strongholds, they resolved to carry hostilities into Ionia. Dercyllidas was now apprehensive for the safety of their Ionian allies, and proposed to Pharax to repass the Mæander. The enemy was supposed to be far in advance; but the Greek army, as it marched along the vale of the Mæander, one day found itself unexpectedly in presence of the united forces of the satraps, which consisted of Carians, Greek mercenaries — for both satraps had some in their pay — and a numerous cavalry. Dercyllidas, though taken by surprise, soon put his European troops in order of battle; but the Asiatic Greeks were so much alarmed by the evident superiority of the enemy's numbers, that many of them immediately dropt their arms in the standing corn, and took to flight, and the rest clearly betrayed the same purpose. Pharnabazus was desirous of giving battle; but Tissaphernes shrank from an engagement with troops, whom he believed to be all invincible, like the Cyreans, and sent a message to Dercyllidas, to propose a conference. The wily Spartan gave audience to the envoys in front of a body of picked men, affected to receive their proposals with indifference, and demanded an exchange of pledges. When they were given, the two armies separated, the barbarians to take up their quarters at Tralles, the Greeks at Leucophrys, a famed sanctuary of Artemis in the vale of the Mæander. The next day the chiefs met, and a negotiation was opened. But Dercyllidas demanded independence for the Asiatic Greeks, Tissaphernes that the Lacedæmonians should withdraw their army from the King's territories, and their harmosts from the towns. Neither

had power to accede to the other's terms; but it was agreed to conclude an armistice, until answers should be brought from Sparta and from the Persian court.

B. C. 401. Armistice.

War between Sparta and Elis.

The year 399 in which Dercyllidas took the command in Asia, was the last of a war in which Sparta was engaged during three years at home. While the fate of Asia was suspended on the event of the expedition of Cyrus, the Spartans had determined to revenge themselves for the affronts which they had suffered from Elis during the struggle with Athens, and at the same time to apply their leading maxim of dividing and weakening the Peloponnesian states. According to Diodorus, they demanded a contribution from the Eleans to the expenses of the Peloponnesian war. But Xenophon represents them as coming at once to the point, and requiring Elis to acknowledge the independence of her subject towns. The demand was rejected, with the observation that Elis claimed the towns by the right of conquest, but was ready to resign them as soon as Sparta should set her the example, by restoring her subjects to independence.[1] Agis was immediately ordered to invade the Elean territory. But an earthquake which was felt soon after he had crossed the border, induced him to withdraw and disband his forces.[2] The incident, and the respite, encouraged the Eleans to try if they could rouse some of their neighbours, whom they knew to be ill affected towards Sparta, into active hostility; but the Spartan power seems to have been too generally dreaded to afford any reasonable prospect of forming a coalition against it. In the following year Agis again put himself at the head of an army, to which all the allies of Sparta, except the Bœotians

[1] Paus. III. 8. 3.

[2] Xen. Hell. III. 2. 24. ἅρτι τοῦ στρατεύματος ἐν τῇ πολεμίᾳ ὄντος. Pausanias, III. 8. 4., says that on this occasion Agis had reached Olympia before the earthquake took place.

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and Corinthians, furnished their contingents: Athens among the rest obeyed the call of the ruling state. This time he first directed his march to Triphylia, and he had no sooner crossed the Messenian borders than three of the Triphylian towns, Lepreum, Macistus, and Epitalium, revolted from Elis, and on the other side of the Alpheus he received the submission of three of the towns of Pisatis. He then proceeded to Olympia, where on a former occasion he had been prevented by the Eleans from celebrating a sacrifice which some oracle had enjoined, on the pretence that prayers could not be duly offered there for victory in a war between Greeks. He now performed the rite without interruption[1], and afterwards advanced toward the enemy's capital, ravaging the fertile country through which he passed, and carrying away vast herds of cattle—still as in ancient times the principal wealth of the Eleans—and a multitude of slaves. The scent of this rich booty attracted a number of volunteers from Arcadia and Achaia to his standard; and the campaign, Xenophon remarks, spread abundance over the rest of Peloponnesus. Agis continued his devastations as far as the outskirts of the capital, which were adorned with many fine buildings, and these he did not spare. But he abstained from attacking the city, though it was believed that, being unfortified, it could not have opposed an effectual resistance.[2] He probably calculated on an easier

[1] Xen. III. 2. 26. κωλύειν δὲ οὐδεὶς ἔτι ἐπειρᾶτο. Yet Pausanias (v. 4, 5. v. 20. 4. v. 27. 11.) believed that a trophy which he saw in the Altis had been erected to commemorate a victory gained by the Eleans over Agis within the sacred precinct in this campaign. Sievers (*Geschichte Griechenlands vom Ende des Peloponnesischen Krieges bis zur Schlacht bei Mantinea*, p. 10.) observes, that if this be true Xenophon would have been guilty of an incredibly shameless falsehood. (It might be added that the fact would be inconsistent with the account of Pausanias himself, III. 8. 4.) He therefore supposes that the engagement took place the year before; in which case Xenophon's dishonesty would be equally great, but not quite so glaring. It must however be observed that Pausanias does not profess to have seen the name of Agis on the trophy; and the discovery of the dead body between the roofs of the Heræum of course proves nothing.

[2] According to Diodorus, XIV. 17., who names Pausanias as the commander in this

conquest, with the aid of one of the factions between which Elis was at this time divided, and therefore turned away again, and prosecuted his ravages along the plain as far as the coast.

In the mean while the oligarchical party, headed by Xenias, a man celebrated for his extraordinary wealth, and attached to Agis and to Sparta by ties of private and public hospitality, made a vigorous effort to overpower their adversaries, and to reduce their country under subjection to Sparta. They rushed out armed into the streets, and began to massacre all of the opposite side who fell in their way; and having killed a person whom they mistook for the democratical leader Thrasydæus, they thought their triumph secure. The report spread, and, while it struck his partisans with consternation, swelled the numbers of the insurgents. But the truth was soon discovered, and Thrasydæus, who had been overtaken by sleep after a banquet, putting himself at the head of the commonalty, gained a complete victory over their opponents, who were forced to take refuge in the enemy's camp. Agis however did not think proper to make any attempt upon the city, but retreated across the Alpheus with his booty, and having left a garrison, under Lysippus a Spartan harmost, with the Elean refugees, in Epitalium, which lay near the river, disbanded his forces, and returned home. During the remainder of the year the Elean territory was exposed to incessant inroads from the garrison of Epitalium, which were found so distressing, that in the next summer Thrasydæus was fain to sue for peace. He obtained it only on condition that the Eleans should demolish some fortifications which seem to have been built for the defence of the city

Submission of Elis.

campaign, the suburbs were guarded by a body of Ætolians, who drove back the invading army; but this is clearly at variance with Xenophon's narrative, no less than the statement, that Pausanias, after having fortified some posts in the Elean territory, wintered with his army at Dyme in Achaia.

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after the last invasion[1], and should renounce their sovereignty over almost all their subject towns.[2] They were not even allowed to retain Epeum, though they pleaded that it had come into their possession by a fair purchase; the Spartans alleged that they had dictated the terms of the bargain to the weaker party. The presidency of the temple at Olympia, and of the games, was not taken from them, only because the rustic population of Pisatis, on which it would by right have devolved, was deemed incapable of so august and important a charge.[3] Elis, thus shorn of her power, was admitted among the dependent allies of Sparta.

Not long after the war with Elis was brought to a close, Agis, as he was returning from Delphi, where he had been consecrating a tenth of the spoil, fell sick at Heræa in Arcadia, but was carried to Sparta and died there in the course of a few days. When the solemn mourning was ended, a question arose as to

[1] Xen. Hell. III. 2. 30. *τὸ τεῖχος περιελεῖν.* Yet the city is said to have been the year before *ἀτείχιστος*, which has therefore been interpreted to mean *ill fortified*. On the other hand Schneider supposes that *τεῖχος* ought to be written as a proper name, and that it means the castle called *τὸ Τεῖχος*, which stood near Araxus on the Achæan side of the border. But this place appears from Polybius, IV. 59., to have belonged from time immemorial to the Achæans; and if the Eleans had wrested it from them, they would probably have been compelled not to destroy but to restore it. Pausanias, III. 8. 5., likewise mentions the demolition of the city wall as one of the conditions of peace. Sievers (*Gesch. Griech.* p. 13.) also conjectures that the Eleans had begun to fortify the city after the retreat of Agis.

[2] Pausanias, III. 8. 5., makes no exception: *μήτε τῶν περιοίκων ἔτι ἄρχειν.* This would indeed be very wide of the truth, if they retained all their subject towns except those mentioned by Xenophon, III. 2. 30., who says that they gave up Cyllene and the Triphylian cities, Phrixa, and Epitalium, and Letrina, and Amphidoli, and Margana; and moreover Acrorii and Lasion, and even Epeum. But it seems clear that there is some mistake about this enumeration. It is impossible to suppose that they were allowed to retain Lepreum and Macistus. And, as Mueller observes (Orchom. p. 362.), the three towns north of the Alpheus were not commonly considered as belonging to Triphylia; nor was Epitalium usually numbered among the Triphylian towns. Perhaps Phrixa was sometimes omitted, and a *καί* has dropt out before its name in Xenophon's list. Sievers also (u. s. p. 13.) is struck with the small number of the Triphylian towns mentioned by Xenophon, but thinks he omitted Lepreum because the Spartan government never recognised it as belonging to Elis. But he cannot account for the omission of Macistus.

[3] Xen. III. 2. 31. *νομίζοντες τοὺς ἀντιτιμουμένους χωρίτας εἶναι, καὶ οὐχ ἱκανοὺς προεστάναι.* Sievers (*Gesch. Griech.* p. 14.) finds in this remark a covert reflection on the anti-Laconian party which afterwards endeavoured to transfer the presidency to Pisa.

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the succession. The throne was claimed according to the law of descent by Leotychides, who had hitherto passed for the only son of the deceased king. But Agis, at the birth of the prince, had publicly declared that he did not believe him to be his child, and though he owned him on his deathbed, this tardy recognition did not stifle the suspicion before excited, as well by his own language, as by the prevailing report of his queen's infidelity. The title of Leotychides was now disputed on this ground by Agesilaus, the younger son of Archidamus, and half-brother of Agis, who was next in succession to the throne. He had already shown indications of the great qualities which he afterwards displayed, had passed through all the steps of the Spartan training with exemplary propriety, and had won the general favour of his fellow-citizens. Perhaps the prospect of the elevation to which he aspired had urged him the more assiduously to cultivate their good-will, on which he was conscious his success would mainly depend. But he had been especially fortunate in contracting an early intimacy with Lysander, who warmly espoused his cause. Evidence was offered which confirmed the first declaration of Agis as to Leotychides, whose partisans seem to have been reduced to the necessity of seeking for some flaw in his competitor's better title. The aid of religion was called in for this purpose; and Diopeithes, a man of eminent learning in the science of divination, cited an oracle which warned Sparta against *a halting royalty*. This he applied to Agesilaus, who was lame in one foot. But Lysander ingeniously turned it against Leotychides, remarking, that the defect which they were cautioned against, lay not in the person but in the blood of their kings, who must be all genuine descendants of Hercules. This reasoning or authority prevailed, and Agesilaus was raised to the throne.

Accession of Agesilaus.

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Internal state of Sparta.

A year had not elapsed from his accession, when a conspiracy was detected at Sparta, which brought the state to the verge of a bloody revolution, and though crushed in the shell, gave an alarming indication of the unsoundness of the whole political system. To explain its origin we must take a view of some changes which had crept into the Spartan constitution after the conquest of Messenia. We have already seen reason to believe that one effect of the long and perilous struggle with Messenia was a communication of a limited franchise to a numerous body of new citizens; and we were disposed to conjecture that this event was closely connected with the great enlargement of the authority of the ephors, which appears to have taken place in the same period.[1] They rose, as we conceived, to a new stage of power, chiefly as representatives of the whole commonalty, which included both the new and the old citizens. But before the epoch at which we have now arrived, both the internal condition of the commonalty, and the position of the ephors with regard to it, underwent several important changes. It is possible that the distinction between the two classes of citizens, which, as appears from the legends concerning the founding of Tarentum, and from other evidence, excited much discontent at the time it was introduced, may have been removed in a subsequent generation. But other causes afterwards produced similar effects. The earthquake which gave occasion to the third Messenian war appears to have inflicted a wound on the population of Sparta from which it never recovered. Its numbers were continually reduced by the struggles of the ensuing period, and the deep impression made at Sparta by the events of Sphacteria proves how much the value of a Spartan life had

[1] Vol. I. p. 405.

then risen. It was not however by war only that this part of the population had been thinned. During the same period the growing inequality of private fortunes was contributing to the same effect. The highest political privileges belonged only to those citizens whose means permitted them to associate at the public tables.[1] All who were unable to defray this expense, were it seems by the very fact, and without any fault but their indigence, degraded into a lower class, from the rank of Peers to that of Inferiors, or Commoners. But while some sank into this lower sphere through a blameless poverty, others rose into it from a humbler station by their merits. The services of the helots and the provincials were frequently rewarded with emancipation and a share of the franchise, so qualified as to keep them below the ancient citizens, and, it would appear, still separate from one another, as they were distinguished by peculiar titles. Another addition to this inferior body was made through marriages contracted by Spartan freemen with women of inferior condition. Gylippus, Callicratidas, and Lysander were probably among the offspring of such marriages, and notwithstanding the high military stations which they filled, were never accounted equal in civil rank to their fathers. They were perhaps originally in legal estimation on a level with the favoured helot children, who were often reared in their master's family together with his sons, under the appellation of Mothones or Mothaces; and they are therefore described in loose language as belonging to that class.

In proportion as the numbers of the ancient freemen decreased the dignity and advantages of their position were augmented, and they were consequently more and more unwilling to share them with others.

[1] Aristot. Pol. II. 6. p. 59. Goettl. *ὅρος τῆς πολιτείας οὗτός ἐστιν αὐτοῖς ὁ πάτριος, τὸν μὴ δυνάμενον τοῦτο τὸ τέλος φέρειν μὴ μετέχειν αὐτοῖς.*

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They had cause to fear, not only the loss of their power and political privileges, but also the introduction of an agrarian law, to restore the equality of property which Lycurgus was believed to have established; on the other hand the inferior citizens, without any view to these objects, when they considered their numbers and the merit and services of many among them, could not be satisfied with a condition which, in such a community as Sparta, where honour was accounted the highest good, exposed them to continual humiliation. This feeling was perhaps rather irritated than soothed by the high employments to which those whose talents and character fitted them for such promotion were frequently advanced.[1] The distinction itself was galling, even where it involved no injurious consequences; and it was the more keenly felt the more clearly it was seen not to correspond to any real difference in worth or desert.

Under these circumstances it becomes interesting to inquire by what means the higher class, notwithstanding its inferiority in physical force, and the universal discontent which prevailed among its subjects, still maintained its ground. Some weight must undoubtedly be attributed to the general reverence for the ancient institutions, which continued to guard them, even after they had degenerated, and no longer answered the end for which they were designed. But there were safeguards of another kind which perhaps contributed still more to secure their stability. The great variety of conditions and interests which distinguished the inferior classes from each other, served as a barrier to prevent their union, and to shelter the higher class from the danger which it would have had to apprehend, if they could have been brought to act in concert with each other. Not

[1] So the Theban orator in Xenophon, Hell. III. 5. 12., says: τοὺς εἵλωτας ὁμοστὰς καθιστάναι ἀξιοῦσι.

only were the helots and the provincials thus disunited, but it is probable there was a like want of unanimity among the lower orders of the freemen themselves. And there may be ground to suspect that it was a leading object of state policy, to nourish their mutual jealousy, and that the names and other distinctions by which they were kept apart, were contrived for this end. They had no common organ, nor any legitimate opportunities of united action. For the assembly in which they met as one commonalty was so much under the control of the presiding magistrates, as to be scarcely a deliberative body. — On the other hand the main strength of the government lay in the all-pervading authority of the ephors, which was nearly absolute, and, whatever might be the difference of their views on certain points of foreign and domestic policy, was uniformly exerted to promote the interests of the oligarchy. The advantage derived from the unity of purpose, secrecy of deliberation, and rapidity of action, which resulted from such a concentration of power in a few devoted hands, may be easily conceived, and will be illustrated by the history of the conspiracy which we are about to relate. But it may be useful here to observe, that the more insecure the dominion of the oligarchy became, the more was the control of the ephors needed to guard against revolutionary projects of the kings. The kings had perhaps as much reason as any of their subjects to be dissatisfied with the existing state of things. According to the universally received tradition they were much more closely connected by blood with the ancient inhabitants of the country than with the Spartans. They were the natural protectors of the whole people, and had no interests in common with the ruling caste. As their authority had been originally abridged by the encroachments of the ephors, so they were subject to

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the constant superintendence of the rival magistracy, which not only restricted them in the exercise of all the functions of royalty, but interfered with the most private concerns and relations of their domestic life. This dependence was the more galling from its contrast with their nominal greatness, and they could scarcely fail to perceive, that a change which should deprive the ruling body of its exclusive privileges might operate in their favour, release them from many irksome restraints, and enable them to exchange their empty honours for the real dignity of chiefs of the nation. Such a project had been formed by Pausanias[1]; it might again be conceived, and with fairer prospects of success, by a man of enterprising spirit. This seems to have been the true ground of the jealousy with which the kings were certainly viewed by the Peers. But the hereditary rivalry between the two royal families offered one security against their ambition, if directed toward this object; and it was therefore studiously cherished. Another was supplied by the unremitting vigilance of the ephors, kept alert by their zeal for the maintenance and extension of their own authority.

The ephorality.

So far all seems sufficiently clear; but there is one interesting point connected with this subject which is involved in great obscurity. The power of the ephors appears indeed to have risen to the height at which we find it in the later times at the expense of the royal dignity; but, according to the view we have taken of their elevation, they were considered as representatives of the whole commonalty, and at least quite as much of the lower as of the higher class. Even however if that view should be wholly rejected, the account which Aristotle gives of the mode of their election would have prepared us to expect that, instead of being uniformly subservient

[1] See Vol. II. p. 418.

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to the will of the privileged class, they would be found as often acting the part of demagogues, and that they would have been disposed rather to take the lead in a revolution, than steadily to uphold the established order of things. Aristotle contrasts the qualifications required for the ephoralty with those required for the senate, and describes the class out of which the ephors were elected in terms which apparently include the whole commonalty, or all who were admissible to the great assembly. He says that they were chosen without any regard to eminent merit, and were often extremely poor, and therefore venal. The difficulty of reconciling these statements with the policy invariably pursued by the ephors, as opponents of all innovations tending to encroach on oligarchical privileges, has induced some writers to interpret Aristotle's words, in a sense which they seem scarcely to bear; so that they may represent the ephors as elected exclusively from the Peers.[1] But there appear to be two ways in which it may be possible to solve the difficulty, without resorting to this expedient. All that we know of the assembly at Sparta is consistent with the supposition, that the ruling Spartans possessed a sufficient influence over the elections to secure a majority at least in the ephoral college, and so long as this could be done, there was a manifest advantage in keeping up the illusion that they were representatives of the commonalty, which, as Aristotle observes[2], was kept quiet by the share it had—or seemed to have—in the highest office in the state. But it may also be observed that the attractions of the office itself, which grew with the enlargement of the Spartan power, the plenitude of authority over kings, subjects, and allies, which it conferred, would, with ordinary minds and

[1] Wachsmuth, I. 2. p. 214.

[2] Pol. II. 6. 15.

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most of all with persons of the lowest condition, be sufficient pledges for their willingness to maintain its privileges, and consequently the whole system on which they depended, unimpaired. To this it may be added that the ephors in the midst of their high functions were surrounded by watchful eyes, and by hands which would not have remained long inactive, if they had ever been suspected of harbouring designs hostile to the interests of the Peers; and they seem for many purposes to have been subject to the control of the smaller assembly, which, however it may have been composed, was undoubtedly devoted to those interests with perfect unanimity.

Cinadon's plot.

Such seems to have been the internal condition of Sparta at the accession of Agesilaus; and the history of the conspiracy which threatened the constitution in the first year of his reign, though related by an author deeply prejudiced in favour of the prevailing party, throws a strong light on the state of public feeling among the inferior classes, and on the spirit and resources of the government. The first intimation of the danger, according to Xenophon, was given to Agesilaus himself, as he was engaged in a public sacrifice, by the attendant soothsayer, who professed to read evidence of a most formidable plot in the aspect of the victims. He had perhaps received some private information on the subject; and his public warning, by the alarm it occasioned among the conspirators, may have hastened the discovery which followed. Five days after, the whole affair was revealed to the ephors by an accomplice. He charged a young man named Cinadon — a person, Xenophon observes, of high courage, but not one of the Peers — as the author of the conspiracy, and in answer to the questions of the ephors gave the following account of it. Cinadon, he said, having met him one day in the agora, at an hour when it was thronged with people, drew him aside into a corner,

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and bad him count the Spartans that were to be seen there. He could observe no more than the official persons who were transacting business there, one of the kings, the senators, ephors, and other magistrates, in all about forty. These, said Cinadon, you have to consider as your enemies; the rest of the multitude assembled here, whose numbers must exceed theirs a hundred fold[1], are all allied with you against them. Cinadon then bad him notice the passengers in the streets, where he would find a like proportion between the numbers of his enemies and his friends, and reminded him that the case was the same throughout the country, where each Spartan landowner lived surrounded by a host of aliens. He then informed him that a plot had been concerted for the destruction of their oppressors. Only a few trusty persons indeed were in the secret; but they, Cinadon emphatically remarked, were in the secret of the whole subject population of Laconia. For with regard to the Spartans the language of all classes—helots, neodamodes, provincials, citizens of the lower order—wherever they ventured to speak freely, was the same; they did not disguise the bitterness of their hatred, which, according to Cinadon's phrase, was such that *they were ready to eat their flesh raw.* The conspirators, he said, had regular arms of their own, and as to the multitude, he had shown the informer how they might find weapons, by leading him into the iron-market, and pointing out to him, beside knives and swords, a variety of implements of husbandry, and other tools, which might all be applied to that use; and indeed there was scarcely any handicraft which could not arm the workmen with weapons sufficient for the purpose of an insurrection, especially as they should surprise their enemies unarmed. Finally the

[1] According to an addition in the margin of Xenophon, Hell. III. 3. 5., πλέον ἢ τετρακισχιλίους ὄντας τοὺς ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ.

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informer added that a day was fixed for the execution of the plot.

The ephors, convinced of its reality, and of the urgency of the danger, took their measures with the promptitude and secrecy which the occasion required. They did not even convene the smaller assembly, but privately called the senators together, and deliberated with them on the course to be pursued. The object was both to arrest Cinadon in the quietest manner, and to secure his accomplices. He had often been employed by the ephors in commissions which demanded energy and address. They now sent him to Aulon, on the northern frontier of Messenia, with instructions to apprehend some of the inhabitants, and certain helots, who were described in the scytale. Among the persons to be arrested was a woman of Aulon, of uncommon beauty[1], who, it seems, had been charged with corrupting the Spartan citizens who passed through the town. The more effectually to blind him to the real object of his mission, he was directed to apply to the commander of the royal guard for a small party of soldiers to serve under him, and was told that waggons should be sent for the prisoners. But such instructions were given to his attendants, that on his arrival at Aulon he was taken into custody; and for greater security a troop of horse was sent to support them. He was then put to the torture, and the names of his accomplices, as soon as they were wrung from him, were taken down, and transmitted by express to Sparta. It is remarkable that the list included the soothsayer Tisamenus, a descendant of the Elean of the same name, who had received the Spartan franchise as the price of his services in the

[1] It seems not improbable that this may have been one of the persons mentioned by Theopompus, in a passage of the fifty-sixth book of his Histories cited by Athenæus, XIII. p. 609. b. *Theopompus relates that Xenopithea, the mother of Lysandridas, excelled all the women of Peloponnesus in beauty. She was put to death by the Lacedæmonians, with her sister Chryse, at the time when king Agesilaus, through his intrigues* (καταστασιάσας), *caused Lysandridas who was his enemy to be banished.*

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B. C. 396.

Persian war.[1] Nothing more clearly marks the extent of the danger to which the government was exposed; for the Elean Tisamenus, as Herodotus informs us, had expressly stipulated for the full franchise[2]; so that his descendant must have enjoyed all the privileges of the highest class of citizens. But possibly they were embittered by the consciousness, that the genuine Spartan still looked down upon him as an alien. He and the others were arrested, and then Cinadon himself was brought to Sparta and examined. When he had confessed the whole plot, and confirmed his first information against his accomplices, he was asked what had been his object. *Not to be inferior*, was his reply, *to any man in Lacedæmon.* It only remained to punish the prisoners; and the government, conscious that it could only maintain itself by terror, determined to make their fate a warning to the disaffected. They were first ignominiously led through the city, and publicly goaded and scourged, and were then put to death. So, Xenophon calmly observes, they met with their deserts. As a warm admirer of the institutions which the conspiracy was designed to overthrow, and as a pensioner of the Spartan government, he could not perhaps make a less severe remark on the defeated party; as a historian, he could scarcely have subjoined a more frivolous and unseasonable reflection on such a train of occurrences.

Expedition of Agesilaus.

Not long after this event news was brought to Sparta by a Syracusan named Herodes, who had just returned from Phœnicia, of preparations which he had witnessed in the Phœnician ports for a great armament, which he had learnt was to consist of 300 galleys. He had not been able to ascertain its object, but it had induced him to quicken his departure, that he might bear the tidings to Greece. The Spartan government

[1] Vol. II. p. 376.

[2] IX. 33. ἦν μὲν πολίτην σφέτερον ποιήσωνται τῶν πάντων μεταδιδόντες.

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was alarmed, and called a congress of the allies to deliberate on preventive measures. But to Lysander the intelligence afforded a highly welcome opportunity of resuming his ambitious plans, and recovering his influence among the Asiatic Greeks. He seems however to have been aware that he was himself viewed with jealousy at home, and that a proposal coming directly from himself, and immediately tending to his own aggrandisement, would probably be ill received. He resolved therefore to make use of his friend Agesilaus to accomplish his purpose, and easily prevailed on him to undertake, with a small force, to give such employment to the Persian arms in Asia, as would secure Greece from the threatened invasion. Agesilaus, who was in the prime of life, was no less eager to display his military talents in such a brilliant field, than Lysander to renew his intrigues, and to replace his creatures in the posts from which they had been dislodged. He therefore offered to take the command of an expedition to Asia, for which he required no more than 2000 neodamode troops, and 6000 of the allies, and desired to be accompanied by a council of thirty Spartans—which he probably knew would according to usage be forced upon him—and by Lysander among them. His offer was accepted, and all his requests granted, with the addition of six months' pay for the army. Corinth, Thebes, and Athens, were called upon to contribute their forces, but they all refused.[1] The Corinthians pleaded the damage which had lately befallen one of their temples through the effects of an earthquake, as an omen which deterred them from taking part in the war.[2] The Athenians alleged their weakness as an excuse.[3] The Thebans, though

[1] Paus. III. 9. 2.

[2] Pausanias represents them as refusing with great reluctance; but the sequel of the history renders this very doubtful.

[3] Pausanias says that they pleaded the Peloponnesian war and the pestilence (?), but that their real motive was the intelligence they had received of Conon's journey to the Persian court.

they were solicited by Aristomenidas, the grandfather of Agesilaus, who having been one of the five judges who passed sentence on the Platæans was considered as their benefactor, seem not to have condescended to cover their refusal with any pretext. In the spring of 397, having fixed the contingents of the other allies, and appointed the place of rendezvous for their troops, and having celebrated the usual sacrifices for a foreign expedition, he set sail for Aulis in Bœotia.

He is insulted at Aulis.

It was the first time since the expedition of Menelaus that a king of Sparta had undertaken to invade Asia; and Agesilaus, partly perhaps for the sake of the omen, and partly for the sake of his own renown, was willing to associate his enterprise with the recollection of that heroic adventure. He therefore stopt at Aulis, to sacrifice there after the example of Agamemnon. But before he had completed the rite, the Bœotarchs sent a party of horse to enjoin him to desist, and the men did not merely deliver the message, but scattered the parts of the victim which they found on the altar. Plutarch, who seems willing to extenuate the insult which his countrymen offered to his hero, represents Agesilaus as having infringed the established usage, by employing a soothsayer of his own on this occasion, instead of the Bœotian to whom the superintendence of the ceremony properly belonged. But Xenophon leaves us to conclude, that the interruption was a simple indication of the hostile spirit with which the expedition was viewed by the Bœotian government; and if Agesilaus saw it in this light, he had reason to dread the omen. He however stifled his resentment, and embarked again for Geræstus, where he found the bulk of his armament assembled, and sailed with it to Ephesus.

Truce with Tissaphernes.

Soon after his arrival he received a message from Tissaphernes, calling on him to explain the design

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of his coming. Agesilaus replied, that his object was to restore the Asiatic Greeks to the independence which their brethren enjoyed on the other side of the Ægean. The satrap on this proposed a truce until the King's pleasure could be taken on this demand; he engaged himself to support it with all the credit he possessed, and professed to believe that the court would comply with it. Agesilaus consented to the proposal, only requiring security for the observance of the engagement, and even this security was no more than the oath of Tissaphernes, which he pledged with due solemnity to Dercyllidas, and two other Spartan commissioners, who were sent to ratify the convention. Nothing however was farther from the mind of either party than the thought of peace. Tissaphernes, as soon as he had taken the oath, sent to the King for a reinforcement to enable him to take the field; and Agesilaus, who was well aware of his intentions, and probably would not otherwise have granted the truce, though he observed it with strict fidelity, undoubtedly did not suffer the time to be lost with regard to the progress of his own preparations.

His breach with Lysander.

During this interval a breach, which the characters and views of the two men rendered almost inevitable, rose between him and Lysander. The rumour of the expedition, and of the part which Lysander was to take in it, seems to have rekindled the flames of discord in the Asiatic cities, which after the expulsion of his creatures had for a time been kept tranquil by the wise forbearance of the ephors and the prudent administration of Dercyllidas. When he came to Ephesus, his door was immediately besieged by a crowd of petitioners, who desired a licence to oppress their countrymen under his patronage. After the victory of Ægos-potami Lysander, as the man who for the time wielded the irresistible power of Sparta, had been courted with extravagant servility by the

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Asiatic Greeks. They did not content themselves with the ordinary honours of golden crowns and statues, but raised altars and offered sacrifices, and sang pæans, and consecrated festivals to him as a god[1]: the first example of that grossest kind of adulation, which afterwards became common among the Greeks, and was reduced to a system by the Romans. When he now appeared again in Asia, though in the train of a Spartan king, it was still supposed that the substance of power resided with him, and that he would direct the exercise of the royal authority, as he thought fit. He did not discountenance this persuasion, for he shared it himself. He had calculated on the subserviency of Agesilaus, whom he considered as mainly indebted to his friendship, first for the throne, and then—an obligation little inferior—for the command in Asia. But his colleagues, the rest of the Thirty, felt that the homage paid to him by the allies was derogatory, not only to the royal dignity, but to their own; and they complained to Agesilaus of his presumption. The king himself had been hurt by it, and resolved to check it, not by a friendly remonstrance, but in a way the most grating to Lysander's feelings. He rejected all applications which were made to him in reliance on Lysander's interest; and his purpose at length became so evident, that Lysander was obliged to inform his clients, that his intercession, instead of furthering, would only obstruct their suits. He had however sufficient self-command to stifle or disguise his resentment; and, after a very mild expostulation with Agesilaus on the harshness of his conduct, requested to be removed from the scene of his humiliation to some other place, where he might still be employed in the public service. The king very willingly complied, and sent him to

[1] Plut. Lys. 18.

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the Hellespont, where not long after he achieved an acquisition of some moment to the Spartan arms. He prevailed on a Persian of high rank, named Spithridates, who had been offended by Pharnabazus, to revolt, and come with his family, his treasures, and 200 horse, to Cyzicus, and thence sailed with him and his son to Ephesus, and presented them to Agesilaus, who received them with great pleasure, and took this opportunity of gaining information about the state of Pharnabazus. This incident produced an apparent reconciliation between him and Lysander; but we shall see reason to suspect that on one side, at least, it was not sincere.

Tissaphernes had no sooner received such an addition to his forces, as appeared to him sufficient to overpower Agesilaus, than he threw aside the mask, and sent a message to the Spartan king, bidding him immediately quit Asia, or prepare for war. The council and the allies were somewhat daunted by his arrogant tone, and apparent strength; but Agesilaus, who had expected this result, and desired no other, told the envoys to carry back his thanks to their master, for the advantage he had given the Greeks by his perjury. He then ordered his troops to put themselves in readiness for a long march, sent word to the towns which lay on the road to Caria to lay in provisions for the use of his army, and called on the cities of Ionia, Æolis, and the Hellespont, for their contingents. Tissaphernes thought he had the more reason to fear that the threat implied in these preparations would be verified, as Caria, beside that it contained the principal source of his private revenues, was a country ill suited for the operations of cavalry, in which his own strength lay, and Agesilaus was extremely deficient.[1] He therefore concentrated all

[1] Xenophon says, ἱππικὸν οὐκ εἶχεν. But immediately after (III. 4. 13.) we find that he had some.

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his forces there, and occupied the vale of the Mæander with his cavalry, to prevent the enemy reaching the passes which led into the heart of the province. Agesilaus had reckoned upon this effect of the satrap's selfish fears, and, instead of seeking him in Caria, marched in the opposite direction toward the residence of Pharnabazus. As this invasion was quite unexpected, he found the towns on his road unprepared for resistance, and collected an immense booty. He penetrated nearly to Dascylium without encountering an enemy. But in that neighbourhood he fell in with a body of Persian horse, and, by the issue of a skirmish which ensued, was made to feel its superiority in equipments and training over his own. The next day when he sacrificed, observes Xenophon—as if he was relating a providential warning, not a human contrivance—the victims were found imperfect; and Agesilaus advanced no further, but retreated towards Ephesus. There he spent the winter in preparations for the next campaign, and more particularly applied himself to the raising of a body of cavalry, which he perceived would be indispensable to the success and the safety of his future operations. For this purpose he made a list of the most opulent men in the Greek cities, and compelled each of them, as the condition of his exemption from personal service, to furnish a trooper. In the spring he collected his forces at Ephesus, and put them into an active course of training, rousing their emulation by the prizes which he proposed for the most gallant show, and the highest degree of expertness, in every department of the service. Xenophon, as an old soldier, is delighted with the recollection of the military bustle which prevailed during this season at Ephesus; where the wrestling-schools and the hippodrome were constantly enlivened by the exercises of the men, the market was abundantly supplied with horses, and arms of every

Military preparations at Ephesus.

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kind, and all the trades subservient to war were kept in full employment. Among other devices for raising the spirits of his troops, Agesilaus borrowed a hint, it would seem, from one of Cimon's stratagems[1], and ordered his Persian prisoners to be exposed to sale naked, that the Greeks might contrast the delicacy of their persons with the robustness of frames hardened by the exercises of the palæstra.

Before he took the field again, a year having now elapsed from the commencement of his expedition, Lysander and his colleagues were superseded by a new body of councillors, and returned home. Herippidas seems to have been considered the chief of the new council, as Lysander had been of the last, and was appointed by Agesilaus to the command of the Cyreans; and some of his colleagues were placed at the head of the principal divisions of the army. Agesilaus then gave public notice, that he meant to take the shortest road into the richest part of the enemy's country. The notice was designed not more for the preparation of his own troops, than for Tissaphernes, who concluded that if this had been the intention of Agesilaus, he would not have disclosed it, and that now Caria was certainly his real mark. He therefore repeated the dispositions of the preceding summer. But while he waited for the enemy with his cavalry in the vale of the Mæander, Agesilaus directed his march towards the plains of Sardis, the richest of western Asia. During three days he traversed them without seeing an enemy; but on the fourth the Persian cavalry, which Tissaphernes seems to have sent forward as soon as he heard of the movements

[1] Plut. Cim. 9. So, according to Agatharchides in Athenæus, XII. 74., the object of Agesilaus, as related in a speech of Lysander at Sparta, appears to have been to point out the contrast between the unwarlike frames, and the rich garments of the Asiatics: *ὅπως οἱ σύμμαχοι γιγνώσκοντες διότι πρὸς μὲν ἄθλα μεγάλα, πρὸς δ' ἄνδρας εὐτελεῖς ὁ ἀγὼν συνέστηκε, προθυμότερον ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὁρμῶσιν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐναντίους.*

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B. C. 395. Battle of Sardis.

of Agesilaus, suddenly came up, and cut off many of the followers of the camp, as they were ranging over the country in quest of plunder. According to Xenophon, an engagement immediately ensued, in which the Persian horse, notwithstanding their great superiority in numbers—Diodorus makes them amount to 10,000—were defeated by the Greeks, who were supported by their infantry. The victors followed up their advantage, and made themselves masters of the enemy's camp, where they found a booty which yielded upwards of seventy talents. Some of the camels taken on this occasion were reserved by Agesilaus to be carried, as a rarity, to Greece.

Tissaphernes had already arrived at Sardis; and his countrymen, many of whom had probably suffered considerable loss from the invasion, bitterly censured him for leaving them unprotected, and even it seems charged him with treachery, though none of them could have lost more by it than himself, if, as Diodorus relates, a magnificent park and pleasure-grounds, which he possessed in the neighbourhood of Sardis, were spoiled by the invaders. Still his conduct afforded some pretext for such an accusation; and the complaints it excited were carried up to the court, where he had one implacable and powerful enemy in the fiendish Parysatis, who thirsted to revenge herself on him for his enmity to her favourite son. She had already found that Artaxerxes was weak enough to sacrifice his most faithful servants to her resentment, even when he knew that it was inflamed by the very services which they had rendered to himself; and according to the most probable account, it was in compliance with her request that he now ordered Tissaphernes to be put to death.[1] He consented perhaps with the less reluctance, not only

[1] Diodorus, XIV. 80. Polyænus, VII. 16. 1. According to Xenophon (see above p. 337.) he had provoked her resentment by a wanton insult.

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Death of Tissaphernes.

because he was persuaded that it was a just punishment, but because he had been led to believe that Tissaphernes was the main obstacle in the way of peace, and that his death would free his dominions from the presence of a formidable enemy. The execution of the sentence was committed to Tithraustes, who was appointed to succeed Tissaphernes in his satrapy, and was instructed to open a negotiation with Agesilaus. Accordingly, after executing the first part of his commission, which he did in the Turkish style by the hands of an underling, who surprised Tissaphernes in his bath[1], Tithraustes sent envoys to treat with the Spartan king. He affected to consider Tissaphernes as the author of the quarrel between his master and the Greeks, and, as if the end of their expedition was now answered by their enemy's death, proposed that Agesilaus should return home. As to the Asiatic Greeks, Artaxerxes was willing to acknowledge their independence, on condition that they would pay their ancient tribute. Agesilaus replied, that he had no authority to conclude peace without the sanction of the government at home, but he would transmit the Persian overtures to Sparta. In the mean while Tithraustes was very anxious that hostilities should be suspended in his province, and, pleading his own merits in the execution of Tissaphernes, begged Agesilaus, while he waited for an answer to the terms proposed, to turn his arms against the satrapy of Pharnabazus. To this Agesilaus consented, on condition that Tithraustes would defray the expense of the march; and he received thirty talents on that score. This was a step beyond former precedents; for even Tissaphernes,

[1] Diodorus, u. s. *συνέλαβε Τισσαφέρνην διά τινος Λαρισσαίου σατράπου λουόμενον.* Polyænus, VII. 16. 1., calls him Ariæus; but the words of Diodorus seem hardly to admit of Palmer's correction *Ἀριαίου* for *Λαρισσαίου*, and perhaps do not require any; unless this is the Ariæus of the Anabasis and the Hellenics, IV. 1. 27.

though he had not scrupled to conclude a separate truce, had not paid the enemy a subsidy for invading another part of his master's dominions.

On his march toward the territories of Pharnabazus, Agesilaus received a flattering testimony of the approbation with which his proceedings were viewed at Sparta, and of the disposition which prevailed there to support him in the prosecution of the war. By a despatch which reached him as he lay near Cuma, he learnt that he had been invested with the administration of naval affairs, that he was empowered to appoint whom he would to the office of Admiral, and still to regulate the operations of the fleet at his discretion. Thus to unite the supreme command of the army and of the navy in one person, was an unexampled mark of confidence, and a striking indication of the new energy which ambition had infused into the Spartan counsels. Agesilaus immediately took measures for raising a fleet, and by a judicious distribution of the burden among the maritime allies, and his influence with wealthy individuals, collected 120 new galleys. But he was less prudent and fortunate in the choice of an Admiral, and instead of seeking the highest qualifications, consulted his private affection in the appointment of his wife's brother Pisander. When this business was despatched, he continued his march to the satrapy of Pharnabazus.

These preparations, combined perhaps with other tokens, convinced Tithraustes that Agesilaus had no intention of withdrawing from Asia, but was inclined rather to extend than contract his views, and cherished strong hopes of effecting the conquest of the empire. He perceived that he had only purchased a temporary relief, and bethought himself how he might employ the gold, which was his last remaining stay, to greater advantage. The history of the contest between Greece and Persia afforded several instructive lessons, which

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were now peculiarly applicable. At the time when the first Artaxerxes was embarrassed by the success of the Athenians in Egypt, he sent an agent, as we have seen[1], with bribes to Sparta, to procure a diversion in his favour. Tithraustes now resorted to a similar expedient. He sent a Rhodian named Timocrates to Greece, with a sum of fifty talents, which he was charged to distribute, with proper precautions, among the leading persons in the states which might be most easily induced to interrupt the progress of Agesilaus by kindling a war against Sparta at home. Not only was this mission itself a notorious and unquestionable fact; but Xenophon professes an equal degree of certainty as to the names of the persons who received the money. It was in Thebes, Corinth, and Argos, that Timocrates is said to have executed his commission. At Thebes he purchased the services of Androclidas, Ismenias, and Galaxidorus; at Corinth those of Timolaus and Polyanthes; at Argos those of Cyclon and his friends. Unless we suppose Xenophon to have placed too much reliance on a mere party rumour, it may perhaps be inferred from the notoriety of the transaction that the persons he mentions made no secret of their share in it, and considered the Persian gold as a subsidy granted for the support of a just and patriotic cause. We may at least venture to believe that, though it may have roused them to greater activity, it produced no change in their political sentiments; and we even doubt whether it gave rise to any events which would not have occurred nearly as soon without it. It was indeed natural enough for Agesilaus and his friends to attribute the disappointment of his hopes to the venality of their adversaries. But Xenophon himself observes that the Athenians, though they did not

Mission of Timocrates.

[1] Vol. II. p. 463.

receive any share of the gold, were eager for war in the hope of recovering their independence. And it is clear from his own narrative that similar feelings of jealousy or resentment toward Sparta already prevailed at Thebes, Corinth, and Argos, and were only waiting for an opportunity of displaying themselves in open hostility, but needed no corrupt influence to excite them.

The anti-Laconian party at Thebes—the same no doubt which had sheltered the Athenian exiles, and had contrived the affront offered to Agesilaus at Aulis, and which had therefore reason to dread his resentment if he should ever return to Europe as the conqueror of Asia—set the first springs of hostility in motion. The disposition to war they found already existing; a pretext only was wanting, and this they easily devised. Means were found to induce the Locrians of Opus to make an inroad upon a tract of land which had been long the subject of contention between them and their neighbours the Phocians. The Phocians retaliated by the invasion of the Opuntian Locris, and the Thebans were soon persuaded to take part with the Locrians, and invade Phocis. The Phocians, as was foreseen, applied for succour to Sparta, where, as Xenophon admits, there was the utmost readiness to lay hold on any pretence for a war with Thebes; and the present season of prosperity seemed to the Spartan government the most favourable for humbling a power which had given so many proofs of ill-will toward it. War therefore was decreed; and Lysander was sent into Phocis with instructions to collect all the forces he could raise there, and among the tribes seated about Mount Œta, and to march with them to Haliartus in Bœotia, where Pausanias, with the Peloponnesian troops, was to join him on an appointed day. Lysander discharged his commission with his usual activity, and beside succeeded in in-

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ducing Orchomenus, which was subject to Thebes, to assert its independence. Pausanias, having crossed the Laconian border, waited at Tegea for the contingents which he had demanded from the allies. They seem to have come in slowly, and Corinth refused to take any part in the expedition. The Thebans, seeing themselves threatened with invasion, sent an embassy to prevail on the Athenians to make common cause with them against Sparta. There were many feelings to be overcome at Athens, before this resolution could be adopted: recollections of a long hereditary grudge, of the animosity displayed by Thebes during the last war, and especially at its close; the sense of weakness, and the dread of provoking a power, by which Athens had so lately been brought to the brink of destruction. The Theban orator thought it necessary in the name of his countrymen to disavow the vote which Erianthes had given, in the congress which decided the fate of the Athenians, as the unauthorised proposition of a private individual. On the other hand, he urged the important service which the Thebans had more recently rendered to Athens in her greatest need, and by which they had incurred the resentment of Sparta, and were now driven to seek protection from Athenian generosity. *They had shown themselves the real friends of both the Athenian parties; while the Spartans had as little claim to the gratitude of that which they had abandoned to its magnanimous adversaries, as to the goodwill of that which they had helped to oppress.* But it was chiefly to the hopes and fears of his hearers that the speaker addressed himself. *The Athenians desired to recover their pre-eminence in Greece, and their readiest way to that end was to declare themselves the protectors of all who suffered under Spartan tyranny. If they were inclined to dread the enemy's power, they had only to reflect by what means their own had been overthrown. Sparta likewise now ruled over unwilling subjects, and*

Treaty between Thebes and Athens.

offended allies, who only wanted a leader to encourage them to revolt from her. Indeed she had not one sincere friend left. Argos had always been hostile; Elis had just been deeply wronged. Corinth, Arcadia, and Achaia saw the services which they had rendered in the war requited with insolent ingratitude, and were subject to the control of harmosts, who were not even citizens of Sparta, but helots: bondmen at home, masters abroad. The cities once subject to Athens, which had been tempted to revolt by the prospect of liberty, found themselves cheated of their hopes, and groaned under the double yoke of a foreign governor, and a domestic oligarchy. The Persian king, to whom Sparta mainly owed her victory, she had immediately afterwards treated as an enemy. Athens might now place herself at the head of a confederacy much more powerful than the empire which she had lost; and the Spartan dominion would be more easily overthrown than the Athenian had been, in proportion as the allies of Sparta were stronger than the subjects of Athens.

These arguments found a willing audience; they were seconded by many voices, and the assembly was unanimous in favour of the alliance with Thebes. Thrasybulus, who moved the decree, reminded the Thebans that Athens was about to repay the obligation which they had laid on her when they refused to concur in rivetting her chains, by active exertions, and at a great risk. For she would have to face the enmity of Sparta, while Piræus remained still unfortified. Both states prepared for war. Pausanias found an account, that the Athenians sent envoys to Sparta, with a request that she would abstain from hostilities against Thebes, and would submit their differences to arbitration; he adds that the embassy was indignantly dismissed[1]; it can scarcely have been sent with any other view than to gain time.

[1] III. 9. 11.

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Lysander, having collected all the forces he could raise in the north, marched to Haliartus; but he found that Pausanias had not yet arrived there. It was not in his character to remain any where inactive, and he was desirous of making himself master of the town. He first tried negotiation to engage it to revolt. But there were some Theban and Athenian troops in the place, whose presence overawed the disaffected; and he then resolved to venture on an assault. In the mean while his movements were known at Thebes, according to Plutarch by means of an intercepted letter, which he had addressed to Pausanias, who was at this time at Platæa. Plutarch also relates, that an Athenian army had already reached Thebes, and that it was intrusted by the Thebans with the guard of the city, while they marched to Haliartus, where they arrived before Lysander, introduced a small detachment into the town, and encamped the rest without. But Xenophon represents the Theban forces as arriving after Lysander, though he owns that he could not ascertain whether they fell upon him by surprise, or he was aware of their approach; it was only certain that a battle took place close to the walls, in which Lysander was slain. It seems clear however, from a comparison of all accounts, that he was intercepted between the main body of the Thebans and the garrison, which made a sally; and he was known to have fallen by the hand of a citizen of Haliartus. His troops were put to flight, and betook themselves to the hills—a branch of the range of Helicon—which rise at no great distance behind the town. The conquerors pursued with great vigour, and incautiously pressed forward up the rising ground, until the difficulties of the ground brought them to a stand, and the fugitives, perceiving their perplexity, turned upon them, assailed them with a shower of missiles, rolled down masses of rock on their heads, and finally drove

Death of Lysander.

them in disorder, with the loss of more than 200 men, into the plain. The dejection caused by this disaster was relieved the next day by the discovery that the remains of Lysander's army had dispersed during the night. But the exultation of the Thebans at this fruit of their victory was damped in the course of a few hours by the appearance of Pausanias, who had received the news of the battle on the road from Platæa to Thespiæ, and had hastened his march to Haliartus. Yet, according to Diodorus, he brought with him no more than 6000 men; but so small a force could scarcely have produced the alarm described by Xenophon, who, with a slight touch of humour, exhibits the Theban camp as fluctuating between the extremes of presumption and despondency. For the next day their spirits were again raised by the arrival of Thrasybulus and an Athenian army; and their confidence was heightened when they perceived that Pausanias showed no disposition to seek an engagement. His situation was extremely embarrassing. According to Greek usage it was absolutely necessary for him to recover the bodies of the slain, who are said to have amounted to a thousand, either by force or by consent of the victors. The greater part lay so near to the town walls that the attempt to carry them away by force would be one of great difficulty and danger, even if he should gain a victory; and the enemy was so strong in cavalry, that the event of a battle would be very uncertain, especially as his own troops had engaged in the expedition with reluctance. He therefore held a council of war; and after mature deliberation the majority came to the decision—if indeed it was not unanimous—to apply for permission to carry away the dead. The Thebans however were not satisfied with this confession of their superiority, and refused to grant a truce, except on condition that the invaders should withdraw from Bœotia.

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These terms were gladly accepted by Pausanias and his council, though they were felt by the troops as a degradation, such as a Lacedæmonian army had never before experienced. The general dejection and ill-humour which prevailed in the retreat were heightened by the insulting demeanour of the Thebans, who accompanied them on their march through Bœotia, and drove back all who deviated in the least from the line, with blows, into the road.

The conduct of Pausanias appears to have been in the whole of this affair perfectly blameless. He had failed indeed to reach Haliartus by the preconcerted day, but he arrived the day after; and when it is considered that he had to collect his army from many quarters, and that the allies were generally averse to the expedition, he may seem rather to have deserved praise, for bringing it up so nearly within the appointed time. The disastrous issue could only be attributed to Lysander's imprudence; and the decision of the council of war with regard to the recovery of the slain, even if it was not clearly required by the circumstances of the case, could not reasonably be imputed as a crime to Pausanias. Yet on his return to Sparta he was capitally impeached; and the nature of the charges brought against him showed that he could not expect a fair trial, but was foredoomed to be sacrificed to public prejudice or to private passion; for the accusation embraced not merely his conduct in his last expedition, but the indulgence which he had granted to the Athenian refugees in Piræus; though his measures on that occasion seem to have been viewed with general approbation at the time, and had only been proved to be impolitic by the event. But under the irritation produced by the recent shame and disappointment, the Spartan senate was no more capable of listening to reason and justice, than the Athenian assembly on some similar occa-

sions; and it is probable that Lysander's friends did the utmost to inflame the public feelings against his old adversary. Pausanias did not appear at the trial; he was condemned to death, and was obliged to seek shelter in the venerated sanctuary of Athena Alea at Tegea, where he ended his days. His son Agesipolis succeeded to the throne.

Disgrace of Pausanias.

Lysander left his family in a state of poverty, which proved that his ambition was quite pure from all sordid ingredients. But, if we may believe a story which became current after his death, and is related upon such authority, that we can scarcely suppose it to have been without foundation, he was not satisfied either with fame, or with the substance of power. He is said to have conceived the project of levelling the privileges of the two royal houses, and of making the kingly office elective, and open to all Spartans, no doubt with the hope of obtaining it for himself. But the plan which he is said to have devised to compass this end, notwithstanding the superstition of his countrymen which it was meant to work upon, sounds so marvellous, that we do not venture to give it a place here, but only to mention its leading features in a note.[1] It is only a little less strange, that he should have employed the pen of an Asiatic rhetorician — one Cleon of Halicarnassus — to compose an oration, which he once meant to deliver, in recommendation of the measure; as if it was one that could ever have been carried by force of argument. Agesilaus, it is said, having occasion to search Lysander's house, after his death, for some public document, lighted upon Cleon's harangue, and was about to publish it, till he was persuaded by a more discreet friend to suppress so dangerous a piece. This only makes the story the more suspicious. Yet the main fact accords well enough

Projects of Lysander.

[1] See the Appendix.

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with the enterprising and intriguing character of Lysander; and his quarrel with Pausanias and Agesilaus may be thought to have suggested such a mode of revenge. We might indeed have been disposed to consider this plan as the beginning of a series of liberal measures for a reformation, which Cinadon's plot proved to be so urgently needed; if the manner in which he regulated the government of other states did not render it doubtful whether he was capable of such enlarged and enlightened patriotism.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

FROM THE DEATH OF LYSANDER TO THE PEACE OF ANTALCIDAS.

Successes of Agesilaus. — His Interview with Pharnabazus. — His Recall. — Congress at Corinth. — Battle of Corinth. — Agesilaus in Thessaly. — Conon. — Battle of Cnidus. — Battle of Coronea. — Massacre at Corinth. — Attempt of Praxitas. — Iphicrates. — Capture of Piræum. — Victory of Iphicrates over the Mora. — Negotiations for Peace. — Andocides. — Invasion of Acarnania. — Invasion of Argolis. — Conon and Pharnabazus on the Coast of Laconia. — Restoration of the Long Walls of Athens. — Embassy of Antalcidas. — Thimbron. — Death of Thrasybulus. — Defeat and Death of Anaxibius. — Athens annoyed by Ægina. — Stratagem and Death of Gorgopas. — Teleutias surprises Piræus. — Peace of Antalcidas.

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Successes of Agesilaus.

WHILE these movements were taking place in Greece, Agesilaus was carrying on the war in Asia, with an activity and success which might well have alarmed the Persian court, and proved the wisdom of the precautions adopted by Tithraustes. On his march into the province of Pharnabazus, he was accompanied by Spithridates, who urged him to advance into Paphlagonia, and undertook to make Cotys, the king of that country, his ally. Cotys, who is elsewhere named Corylas[1], was one of those powerful hereditary vassals of the Persian king, whose subjection had become merely nominal, and he had lately renounced even the appearance of submission. Artaxerxes, imprudently or insidiously, had put his obedience to the test, by summoning or inviting him to court. But the Paphla-

[1] In the Anabasis, VII. 8. 25.

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gonian prince was too wary, and knew the character of the Persian government too well, to trust himself in its power, and he had openly refused to obey the royal command. It would add nothing to his offence, though something to his security, to treat with the enemies of Artaxerxes. Nothing could be more agreeable to Agesilaus than the opportunity of gaining so powerful an ally; he gladly accepted the mediation of Spithridates, who not only fulfilled his promise, and engaged Cotys to come to the Greek camp, and conclude an alliance with Sparta in person, but prevailed on him, before his departure, to leave a reinforcement of 1000 cavalry, and 2000 targeteers, with the army of Agesilaus.

To reward Spithridates for this important service, in a manner which would strengthen the Greek interest in Asia, Agesilaus, with great address, negotiated a match between Cotys and the daughter of Spithridates, so as to lead each party to consider himself as under obligations to the other, and both to look upon him as their benefactor. As the season was too far advanced for a journey by land across the Paphlagonian mountains, the young lady was sent by sea, under the charge of a Spartan officer, to the dominions of her intended consort; and Agesilaus returned to take up his winter quarters in the territories of Pharnabazus, and in the satrap's own residence of Dascylium. Here were parks, chases, and forests abounding in game of every kind, and round about were many large villages plentifully stocked with provisions for the ordinary supply of the princely household. The domain was skirted by the windings of a river, full of various kinds of fish. Here therefore the Greek army passed the winter in ease and plenty, making excursions, as occasion invited, into the surrounding country far and wide, while Pharnabazus was forced to range

over it as a houseless fugitive, carrying with him his family and his treasures, for which he could find no place of permanent shelter, and, even in this Scythian mode of life, never free from apprehensions for his personal safety. Sometimes however he hovered in the neighbourhood of the Greeks, and once surprised them in one of their marauding excursions; and though he had with him only two scythe-chariots, and about 400 cavalry, he dispersed a body of 700 Greek horse with his chariots, and drove them, with the loss of 100 men, to seek shelter from their heavy infantry. A few days after this skirmish Spithridates learnt that the satrap was encamped in the village of Cava, about twenty miles off, and communicated the discovery to Herippidas. Herippidas, who loved a brilliant enterprise, was immediately fired with the hope of making himself master of the satrap's camp and person, and requested Agesilaus to grant him, for this purpose, 2000 heavy infantry, as many targeteers, the Paphlagonian cavalry, and those of Spithridates, and as many of the Greek horse as might be willing to take part in the adventure. He obtained all he asked; but at night, at the hour of departure, he found that not half of his volunteers appeared at the appointed place. Nevertheless, fearing the raillery of his colleagues, if he should desist, he persevered in his undertaking, and after marching all night, arrived at daybreak at the encampment of Pharnabazus. He overpowered a body of Mysians at the outpost; but their resistance afforded time for the escape of Pharnabazus and his family, who however left the camp, with a great treasure of drinking-vessels and costly furniture, in the possession of the assailants. But Herippidas, being anxious, for the sake of his own honour, to deliver the whole booty into the hands of the officers who in the Spar-

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tan army answered to the Roman quæstors[1], took precautions to exclude his allies from all share in it; and he thus deprived the Spartan arms of an advantage much more important than the value of the spoil. For Spithridates and the Paphlagonians, indignant at this treatment, deserted the camp the next night, and repairing to Sardis entered the service of Ariæus, who had again revolted, and was at war with the King. Agesilaus was more deeply affected by this loss than by any mischance that he met with in the course of his expedition; and he seems to have regretted it still more on private than on public grounds.

His interview with Pharnabazus.

Not long after, a prospect seemed to be opened to him of gaining a much more valuable ally. A Greek of Cyzicus, who was connected by ties of hospitality with Pharnabazus, and had recently entered into the same relation with Agesilaus, proposed to him to bring about an interview between him and the satrap. The preliminaries were arranged, and a place of meeting appointed in the open air, to which Agesilaus came accompanied by the Thirty, and they seated themselves on the grass to wait for Pharnabazus. He came attended by a train of servants, who, according to the Persian fashion, proceeded to lay down a carpet and cushions for their master. But the intelligent Persian, struck by the contrast of the Spartan simplicity, in a fortune at present so much more prosperous than his own, ordered these instruments of luxury to be removed, and, in his splendid attire, took his seat without ceremony on the green sward by the side of Agesilaus. After the forms of a friendly greeting had been interchanged, Pharnabazus opened the conference with an expostulation on the hard treatment which he had suffered. He reminded his hearers of the zeal and constancy with which he had espoused the cause of Sparta in the war with

[1] Λαφυροπῶλαι.

Athens: that he had spared no expense, and shrunk from no risk, not even from that of his life, in her behalf, and that he had never, in any of their transactions, subjected himself, like Tissaphernes, to the reproach of double-dealing. Nevertheless Spartan hostility had now reduced him to such a condition that even in his own territory he did not know how to find a meal, except such as he could collect, like a dog, from the orts and leavings of their rapine; while his fair patrimonial mansions, his pleasant woods and parks, had been all burnt, and felled, and spoiled. If, he concluded, it was his ignorance that made him unable to reconcile such conduct with the obligations of justice and gratitude, he desired that the Spartans would enlighten him. This address, Xenophon says, struck the Thirty with shame, and it was some time before Agesilaus broke the silence that ensued. Yet the complaint, as Xenophon reports it, falls very far short of the real hardship of the case: for Pharnabazus might have observed, not only that he had not been exempted by his old allies from any of the evils of war, as his former services might have entitled him to expect, but that their hostility had been directed with a special preference against him, and that Agesilaus himself had spared the faithless Tissaphernes, stained as he was with Grecian blood, in order to fall upon the ancient and tried ally of Sparta. Such a charge Agesilaus might have found it difficult to answer. But for that which Xenophon attributes to Pharnabazus he had a ready and fair reply. *Private friendship must always give way to reasons of state. The Spartans, being at war with the King of Persia, were compelled to treat all his subjects as their enemies; and Pharnabazus among the rest, however glad they might be to gain him for their friend. And what they had now to propose was not that he should exchange one master for another, but that he should at once become their ally, and inde-*

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pendent of every superior. Nor was it a poor or barren independence that they held out to him, but a rich addition to his hereditary possessions, which their aid would enable him to make at the expense of his fellow-subjects, who would then be forced to own him as their master. Pharnabazus, in answer to these overtures, said, that he would frankly declare his mind to them. If the King should attempt to place any other general in authority over him, he would renounce his allegiance, and ally himself to Sparta; but if his master intrusted him with the supreme command in that part of his dominions, he would do his best to defend them. Agesilaus grasped his hand, and assured him of his warmest regard, and, under the excitement of a generous feeling, forgetting the excuse he had just before made for his past conduct, promised to withdraw immediately from his territories, and, though they should continue at war, to abstain from invading them, as long as there was any other quarter in which he could employ his forces.

So the interview ended. It was followed by a little scene which Xenophon seems to have described in order to show the prepossessing effect produced by the demeanour of Agesilaus on the by-standers. A young son of Pharnabazus, when his father rode away, lingered behind, and running up to Agesilaus, proposed to become his guest. Agesilaus, accepted the offer, and the engagement was immediately sealed by an interchange of presents. The youth gave a javelin of beautiful workmanship, and in return received the rich caparisons of a horse on which one of the king's officers rode. He then set off to overtake his father. The friendship of Agesilaus was afterwards useful to him when he was driven out of his father's dominions by one of his brothers, and was forced to take refuge in Greece.

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Agesilaus kept his word, and withdrew his forces from the satrapy of Pharnabazus, where indeed it is probable he would not otherwise have staid much longer, as the spring was coming on, and he was meditating a new expedition, in which he meant to advance as far as he could into the interior. By this movement, if he gained no more decisive advantage, he expected that he should at least separate all the provinces which he left behind him from the Persian empire. With this design he proceeded to the plain of Thebe, where he encamped, and began to collect all the forces he could raise from the allied cities. He was in the midst of these preparations, when he received a message from the ephors, which was brought by a Spartan named Epicydidas, who apprised him of the new turn which affairs had taken in Greece, and summoned him to march with the utmost speed for the defence of his country. Agesilaus received this intelligence with fortitude, though it stopt him at the outset of the most brilliant career that had ever yet been opened by a Greek, and obeyed the command of the ephors with as much promptness, as if he had been present in their council-room at Sparta. But he first called an assembly of the allies, and announced his approaching departure to them; adding however a promise, that he would not forget them, but as soon as he should have despatched the business which called him away, would return to protect them. The assembly received these tidings with marks of deep concern, but unanimously determined to send their forces with him to Greece, that, if affairs there should come to a prosperous issue, they might escort him back to Asia. But it seems that the spirit in which this vote was passed by the assembly was not that which prevailed among the troops, who were generally averse to the expedition; and Agesilaus, having appointed Euxenus, with 4000 men, to guard the Greek

B.C. 394.

His recall.

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cities, thought it necessary to rouse their emulation, and that of the principal officers, by prizes proportioned to the numbers and condition of the forces which should follow him to Greece. The more effectually to secure the result of their competition, he appointed a place on the European side of the Hellespont for the review of the army, and the distribution of the prizes, which consisted of ornamented armour and weapons, and golden crowns, to the value, in the whole, of not less than four talents. A small sum, as Xenophon observes, in comparison with those which the competitors laid out upon their various equipments for the sake of the reward. The prizes were awarded by a tribunal composed of three Spartan judges, and one from each of the allied cities. Agesilaus then set forward on his march, along the road which Xerxes had taken on his expedition to Greece.

Congress at Corinth.

But in the mean while the Spartan government found itself compelled to take active measures for counteracting the movements of the hostile confederacy. About the same time that Agesilaus received the order which recalled him from Asia, a congress was held at Corinth by the states leagued against Sparta[1], to deliberate on the plan of the next campaign; and Timolaus, a Corinthian deputy, reminding the assembly, that a stream was weakest near its source, advised that they should carry their arms at once to the border of Laconia, and meet the enemy before he had swelled his forces with the contingents of the tributary cities of Peloponnesus: *it would be easiest and safest to stifle the hornets in their nest.* This advice was adopted; but its execution was prevented by the causes which usually retard the operations of confederate armies, where there is no supreme authority. While the allies were debating on the mode of

[1] Diodor. xiv. 82.

sharing the command among them, and on their order of battle, the Lacedæmonian army, under Aristodemus, the guardian of the young king Agesipolis, had crossed the frontier, had been strengthened by the forces of Tegea and Mantinea, and reached the territory of Sicyon without opposition. It seems that on the first intelligence of their approach, the allies had advanced toward Nemea, but finding that this movement had been made too late, returned, and fell in with the enemy at a place called Epieicea, near the opening of the valley which runs up to Nemea; and here, having the advantage of the ground, their light troops gave such annoyance to the Lacedæmonian army, that Aristodemus was induced to change his line of march, and descend into the maritime plain, which he ravaged with fire and sword, and finally encamped at the distance of little more than a mile from the enemy, who had taken up a position behind the bed of the torrent or rivulet called the Nemea.[1]

Battle of Corinth.

In numbers the northern allies were considerably superior; for they had brought 24,000 heavy-armed into the field, while on the other side the regular infantry amounted only to 13,500. Their cavalry also was more than twice as numerous as the enemy's. Sparta and Athens, we may observe, contributed each precisely the same number of foot and horse — 6000 infantry, and 600 cavalry. Argos appears as the most powerful, or the most zealous in the anti-Laconian cause: she furnished 7000 heavy infantry, while the Thebans, weakened by the revolt of Orchomenus, sent but 5000, and Corinth no more than 3000. But the want of union, or of an efficient control, was felt no less in the field than it had been in the council.

[1] See Leake, *Moren*, III. p. 374., who speaks as if Epieicea had been fortified at the time of the battle; but this seems to have been first done by Praxitas, Hell. IV. 4. 13.

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The Thebans were not so desirous of victory, as they were concerned for their own safety; and to secure this, did not scruple to sacrifice their allies, and to endanger the common cause. Xenophon at least —whose prejudices however render his testimony still more suspicious against them than against his own countrymen—sarcastically charges them with having delayed to engage so long as they occupied the left wing, which faced the Lacedæmonians; and he intimates that they alleged the sinister aspect of the victims as a pretext to cloak their timidity; but when—either by means of some manœuvre or according to an established order—the Athenians succeeded to the left wing, and they found themselves in the other, and opposed to the Achæans, then, says the historian, they immediately announced that the sacrifices were propitious, and issued orders to prepare for battle. Yet, even in their dispositions for the action, they neglected the regulations which had been previously adopted by common consent, according to which the line of battle was to have been uniformly sixteen deep, and, adhering to their own practice, gave a much greater depth to their phalanx: probably not less than five and twenty, as at Delium.[1] But, beside thus contracting the length of their line, as they advanced toward the enemy, they leaned more and more to the right—the constant usage, as we have seen, in the ancient battles[2]—while the Lacedæmonians, with the like object, inclined no less in the opposite direction. The result was that, when the engagement began, the Athenians found four out of their ten divisions, answering to the tribes, in front of the Tegeans, while the remaining six were left to sustain the whole force of the Lacedæmonians. In every other part of the line victory was at first on the side

[1] Vol. III. p. 260.

[2] Vol. III. p. 339.

of the northern allies, who broke and pursued the enemy; but the Lacedæmonians outflanked, and easily overpowered the Athenians opposed to them, who were little more than half as numerous, and, at the expense of a very few lives on their own side, made a great slaughter. Having driven their immediate antagonists off the field with so little effort and loss, they advanced, untired, and in good order, to meet the other divisions of the enemy, as they returned from the pursuit of their defeated opponents, and falling in with them separately, before they had recovered from their disorder, overcame them, nearly as the surviving Horatius, in the Roman legend, vanquishes the victorious Curiatii. The four Athenian tribes, which had routed the Tegeans, were alone fortunate enough to escape. The fugitives sought shelter in Corinth, but found the gates closed against them through a temporary ascendency of the Laconian party.[1] They then returned to the position, which they had left in the morning, on the Nemea. This victory cost the Lacedæmonians only eight lives, though their allies lost 1100, the enemy 2800.[2] It seems as if the terror of their name stifled all resistance.

The news of the battle of Corinth reached Agesilaus on his march homeward, at Amphipolis, where he had arrived after having made his way, partly by threats, partly by force, through the Thracian tribes.[3] Dercyllidas was the bearer, and, at the request of Agesilaus, undertook to convey it to the Greek cities in Asia, with a renewal of the promise which he had made to them at parting, to return as soon as the state of affairs in Greece should permit. Agesilaus then continued his march through Macedonia, where his bold countenance overawed all opposition, as it

[1] Demosthenes Leptin, p. 473., speaks of the struggle of the parties, but describes the result very differently. According to him the fugitives were admitted.
[2] Diodor. xiv. 83. [3] Ibid. xiv. 83. Plut. Ages. 16.

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Agesilaus in Thessaly.

had done in Thrace. But when he arrived in Thessaly he found the Thessalians, who, as the hereditary enemies of the Phocians, were all in alliance with the Bœotians, bent on obstructing his passage. He had formed his infantry in a hollow square, and placed half of his cavalry in front, and half in the rear. The charges of the Thessalian horse, which hovered on his rear, grew more and more annoying; and he was at length induced to send the foremost division of his cavalry, all but those who guarded his own person, to protect the rear. Here they drew up as for a regular action; but the enemy, seeing them supported by the infantry, did not choose to risk a battle, and, wheeling round, began slowly to retreat, and were followed by them at an equally gentle pace. Agesilaus saw at once the error which the enemy had committed, and the opportunity which his own men were flinging away, and despatched the troop of horse which remained with him to give the word for a vigorous pursuit, and to set the example themselves. The Thessalians were now so warmly pressed that they had no time to wheel round and face the enemy. Many did not attempt it, and sought safety only in flight. But those who made the attempt, and among them their commander Polymachus, were taken in flank before they could complete their evolution, and were most of them slain. The flight became a mere rout, and did not cease until the fugitives had reached mount Narthacium, part of the range of hills which skirts the gulf of Pagasæ. Agesilaus pursued his march without further interruption, well pleased with the victory he had gained over the most renowned cavalry of Greece with squadrons formed entirely by his own training. His success indeed was owing less to their skill and courage than to the enemy's oversight. But the impression which the report would produce might not be the less favourable. The next

day he crossed the chain of Othrys, and had a friendly country to traverse as far as the borders of Bœotia. CHAP. XXXVI.

He here received intelligence of an event which deeply affected him, both as a private and a public calamity, and, while it wounded his domestic feelings, threatened ruin to the most cherished of his ambitious projects. This was the defeat and death of his brother-in-law, Pisander, whom, as we have seen, he had intrusted with the command of the fleet. Xenophon —occupied with the exploits of Agesilaus—passes over the steps that led to this event, which produced a most important change in the whole aspect of affairs both in Asia and Europe, in total silence; though the successful endeavours of one of his most illustrious countrymen, to restore the independence and power of Athens, might have seemed not less interesting than the marauding adventures of his Spartan hero. Conon, after his escape from Ægos- Conon. potami, had been hospitably welcomed at Cyprus by Evagoras, who had taken advantage of a revolution which overthrew a preceding dynasty at Salamis, and had raised himself by his courage and prudence to the throne, which, as a descendant of Teucer, he might claim with some show of a legitimate title. Here Conon continued, it seems, for some years to watch the progress of events, waiting for an opportunity of rendering such service to his country as might enable him to return to it as its benefactor. The war in which Sparta soon afterwards engaged with the power which had enabled her to triumph over Athens, opened a fairer prospect; and it is clear that he actively availed himself of it for the accomplishment of his main end. But the confused and contradictory statements of the later writers render it difficult to fill up the blank which Xenophon has left. Many of them mention a journey made by Conon to the Persian court, and some in such a manner that

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it seems as if it could only be referred to the period preceding the death of Tissaphernes.[1] It appears indeed to have been one of Conon's objects to counteract the policy of Tissaphernes, and to induce Artaxerxes to withdraw his confidence from him, and to transfer it to Pharnabazus, with whom he seems to have connected himself as soon as the satrap's friendly relations to Sparta had ceased. And we should be inclined to believe, that one result of this journey, if it took place in this period, was to urge those naval preparations of the Persian court, which gave occasion to the expedition of Agesilaus; and that the extraordinary commission by which Agesilaus was invested with the supreme command of the navy, was an effect of the alarm excited at Sparta by Conon's machinations.

Still it must be owned that it is not easy to reconcile these accounts with the more authentic narrative of Ctesias, who, in the meagre epitome of his Persian History now extant, appears to represent Conon as for the first time opening a correspondence with Artaxerxes, while he remained at Salamis.[2] Ctesias himself was intrusted with a share in the management of the negotiation, and he is said to have forged an addition to Conon's letter, by which the King was requested to send down his physician, as a man who might be useful in his naval affairs.[3] But according to his own account[4], Artaxerxes of his own accord employed him to bear a letter to Conon, and he was probably chosen for this purpose to give Conon the stronger assurance of the King's favour and confidence. The letter seems to have contained a commission empowering Conon to raise a fleet at the

[1] Paus. III. 9. 2. Nepos, Conon, 3. Wesseling, on Diodorus, XIV. 81., censures his author for referring Conon's journey to a later period, in contradiction to these statements, of which he says: *omnibus aperta atque explorata sunt.*

[2] This appears also to have been Plutarch's impression, Artax. 21.

[3] Plut. l. c.

[4] Pers. 63. Plut. l. c.

expense of the Persian treasury, and to act as admiral in the King's service under Pharnabazus. Ctesias was also charged with a letter, the contents of which cannot be so easily divined, to the Spartan government, and he ran some risk in carrying it; for he was put upon his trial, perhaps on the charge of conspiring with Conon against the Spartan interest, but was acquitted.

It appears from the narrative of Diodorus[1], compared with that of Xenophon[2], that Conon must have entered the Persian service before Agesilaus took the command in Asia. For we find that Pharax, the Spartan admiral, in the course of the expedition which he made in conjunction with Dercyllidas against Caria, laid siege to Caunus, where Conon was then lying with forty galleys, but was forced to retire by Tissaphernes[3] and Pharnabazus, who marched with a strong force to its relief. It seems to have been not long after that Conon, having increased his fleet to eighty galleys, sailed to the Lycian Chersonesus, to take advantage of some movements which he had himself excited in Rhodes. The democratical Rhodians, animated by the assurance of his support, notwithstanding the presence of the Peloponnesian armament under Pharax, revolted from Sparta, expelled their political adversaries, compelled Pharax to withdraw, and received Conon and his fleet into their harbour. This important acquisition was attended by another of considerable value. The Spartans had concluded an alliance with Nephereus, or Nepherites, who at this time held Egypt in revolt against the Persian king; and he had sent them a present of rigging for a hundred galleys and a large quantity of corn. The

[1] XIV. 79.

[2] Hell. III. 2.

[3] Diodorus, XIV. 79., has the name of Artaphernes. But when it is considered that Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus were at this time acting together in Caria, it can scarcely be doubted, that either Diodorus has made one of his usual mistakes about the name, or that his text is corrupt.

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Egyptian convoy was on its passage to Greece when the revolution took place at Rhodes, and, sailing, in ignorance of the event, along the coast of the island, was intercepted by Conon. We have already had occasion to notice the manner in which the revolt of Rhodes appears to have been connected with the fate of Dorieus.[1]

It was perhaps not before the following spring — that of 396, in which Agesilaus began his expedition to Asia — that Conon was reinforced by an armament of ten Cilician, and eighty Phœnician galleys, commanded by a prince of Sidon. But we do not learn that he made any use of his powerful navy during the campaigns of Agesilaus; and we are informed that the want of money kept him for a time inactive.[2] It seems most probable that he now made a journey to the Persian court for the purpose of obtaining supplies. Diodorus distinctly relates that he left the fleet in the care of two Athenians, named Hieronymus and Nicodemus[3], while he himself went up to Babylon, where he had an interview with Artaxerxes, who granted all his requests, and, at his own desire, appointed Pharnabazus his colleague. Pharnabazus appears to have taken the command of the Phœnician galleys; the Greek squadron remained under the immediate orders of Conon. As they sailed westward along the coast of Syria, Conon's squadron being some way ahead, they fell in with Pisander coming from Cnidus. According to Diodorus his fleet consisted of eighty-five galleys, and that of the enemy amounted altogether to no more than ninety. But Xenophon

Battle of Cnidus.

[1] Above, p. 96.

[2] Isocr. Paneg. p. 70. says that, for three years preceding the battle of Cnidus, Artaxerxes suffered his navy to be blockaded by a fleet of no more than 100 galleys, and kept his troops fifteen months without their pay; and that the armament under Conon was frequently on the point of being broken up (πολλάκις ἂν διελύθησαν).

[3] Perhaps the Nicophemus who will afterwards be mentioned as Conon's intimate friend.

informs us that Conon's squadron alone was so much stronger than Pisander's fleet, as to spread dismay among the enemy, and that on his approach many of the allies in the left wing of the Peloponnesians immediately took to flight.[1] The rest were driven on shore, where Pisander, remaining with his ship to the last, fell, Spartan-like, sword in hand.

Agesilaus thought it necessary to guard by a stratagem against the effect which the tidings of this disaster might have produced on his Asiatic troops, who had followed him with reluctance, and had now cause to be disheartened and uneasy for the safety of their homes. He therefore announced, that, though Pisander himself had been slain, his fleet had been victorious; and he proceeded to offer a thanksgiving sacrifice for this joyful news. The success of this artifice, Xenophon says, was visible in the first skirmish that took place between his men and the enemy.

Battle of Coronea.

He found the whole force of the hostile confederacy — perhaps not inferior in numbers to the army which had been defeated near Corinth — assembled in the plain of Coronea. He had collected some reinforcements from the Greek cities that lay on his road; and he was now joined by the forces of Phocis and Orchomenus, and received the still more welcome addition of a Lacedæmonian mora, from Corinth, and of half a one which had been in garrison at Orchomenus. Xenophon however does not venture to determine the proportion which his heavy infantry bore to those of the enemy, but observes, that in light troops he was far superior, and that the numbers of the cavalry on both sides were about equal. Agesilaus himself commanded the right wing, which was opposed to the Argives.

[1] Diodorus, xiv. 83., may have mistaken the number of Conon's Greek squadron for that of the whole united Græco-Phœnician fleet. It is however also possible that Xenophon adopted the Spartan official account of the battle, without investigating the details. Indeed a difference of five would hardly satisfy his πολὺ διαττόνων.

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The Orchomenian troops in his extreme left fronted the Thebans. The two armies advanced toward each other in deep silence, until they were about a furlong apart. The Thebans then raised the war-shout, and ran forward to the charge; and at a shorter interval the Asiatic troops of Agesilaus likewise rushed out from the body of the phalanx to meet the enemy. Their onset, as well as that of the Thebans, broke through the opposite part of the hostile line. But the Argives did not even wait to receive the charge of Agesilaus, but fled toward Helicon, leaving him master of the field, and some of his followers were on the point of crowning him as victor, when he was informed that the Thebans, having dispersed the Orchomenians, had fallen upon his baggage. He immediately marched against them; and the Thebans, seeing the battle lost, were only anxious to join their allies, who had taken refuge in the hills, and for this purpose consolidated their ranks in the hopes of breaking through his line. He would have acted, Xenophon thinks, more like a prudent general, if he had opened a passage for them, and then cut them down as they fled. He was perhaps swayed by personal resentment, and in the hope of a more complete, though a less cheap and easy victory, stopt their retreat. An obstinate conflict ensued, in which he received some severe wounds, but defeated the enemy, and scattered them in all directions. He had just been carried back to his camp, when he was informed that some eighty of the fugitives had taken shelter in the neighbouring sanctuary of the Itonian Athene. Xenophon considers it as a memorable triumph of piety over revenge, that he respected the asylum and dismissed the suppliants in safety. Though the victory was clear, the enemy still remained at hand in sufficient force to have renewed the combat. The next day therefore Agesilaus ordered Gylis, the officer next in

command, to draw up the army in battle array, wearing their crowns in token of victory, and to erect the trophy to martial music. But the Thebans were not disposed to contest his triumph, and applied for a truce to bury their slain. Agesilaus then proceeded with a few followers to Delphi, to consecrate a tenth of the spoil which he had collected in the course of his Asiatic expedition. It amounted to not less than 100 talents. Gylis was ordered to invade Locris, which had given the first occasion or pretext of the war. But after a day's plunder, the Lacedæmonian troops returning last to their camp, were attacked by the Locrians, and having to make their way in the dark, over difficult and unknown ground, suffered some loss; Gylis himself was slain with many of his officers, and it was only by the timely succour of their allies that they were saved from a more serious disaster. The army was then disbanded, and Agesilaus returned home by sea. The reputation which he had gained by his victories was heightened, when it was observed that they had wrought no change in his habits, and that he conformed to the laws and fashions of Sparta with as much simplicity, as if he had never been in a foreign land.

Massacre at Corinth.

But Corinth still continued to be the theatre of war. A Lacedæmonian garrison occupied Sicyon, and made frequent inroads into the Corinthian territory. The allies of Corinth were well pleased to see themselves thus exempt from the calamities of war at her expense. But the party among the Corinthians which, on political grounds, desired to renew their connection with Sparta, derived new motives from this state of things to encourage them in their designs; and they began to hold private meetings to concert measures for restoring peace. Their movements were observed by their adversaries, who determined to counteract them by one of those atro-

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cious massacres which so frequently disfigure the pages of Greek history. We do not know what credit may be due to Xenophon, when he intimates that all the principal allies of Corinth, the Argives, and Bœotians, and Athenians, had an equal share in the conspiracy, or whether he is only speaking of the foreign garrison. His horror is chiefly excited by the impiety of the murderers, who selected a holiday for the deed, that they might be the more likely to find their enemies out of doors, and in the execution of their purpose paid no regard to the most sacred things and places, but stained even the altars and images of the gods with the blood of their victims. Unhappily this was no new excess of party rage; but perhaps few scenes of this kind had been planned with more ferocious coolness, or accompanied with a greater number of shocking circumstances; though it must not be forgotten that it is Xenophon who describes it. Suspicions however had been previously entertained of the plot by Pasimelus, one of the persecuted party, and at the time of the tumult a body of the younger citizens was assembled with him in a place of exercise outside the walls. They immediately ran up to seize the Acrocorinthus, where they maintained themselves for a time against the attacks of their enemies. But an unpropitious omen, probably strengthening the consciousness of their weakness, made them resolve to withdraw, and to seek safety in exile. Yet, notwithstanding the impious treachery of their enemies, they were induced by the persuasions of their friends and relatives, and by the oaths of the leading men of the opposite party, to abandon this intention, and return to their homes.

But their fears for their personal safety had no sooner subsided, than the state of public affairs again began to appear insupportable, and they were ready to run any risk for the sake of a change. The

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opposite party had gone so far in their enmity to Sparta, or in their zeal for democracy, as to do their utmost toward establishing a complete unity, both of civil rights and of territory, between Corinth and Argos. The landmarks which separated the two states had been removed; so that the name either of Corinth or of Argos might be applied to the whole. But since it was Argive influence that had brought about this union, since the Argive institutions had been adopted, and the Argive franchise communicated to the Corinthians, the discontented had some reason to complain, that Corinth had lost her independence and dignity, while Argos had gained an increase of territory by the transaction. But what they bore still more impatiently, was the loss of their own rank and influence, which were totally extinguished by the union: they no longer enjoyed any exclusive privileges, any rights which they did not share with the whole Argive-Corinthian commonalty; and this was a franchise which they valued no more than the condition of an alien. They therefore resolved on a desperate effort for restoring Corinth to her former station in Greece, and for recovering their own station in Corinth.

Attempt of Praxitas.

Pasimelus and Alcimenes took the lead in this enterprise. They obtained a secret interview with Praxitas, the Spartan commander at Sicyon, and proposed to admit him and his troops within the walls that joined Corinth with Lechæum, her port on the western gulf. He knew the men, and embraced their offer; and at an appointed hour of night came with a mora of Lacedæmonians, and a body of Sicyonians and of Corinthian exiles, to a gate where the conspirators had contrived to get themselves placed on duty. He was introduced without any opposition; but as the space between the walls was large, and he had brought but a small force with him, he threw up

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a slight intrenchment, to secure himself until the succours which he expected should arrive. During the next day he remained quiet, and was not attacked; though, beside the garrison of the city, there was a body of Bœotians behind him at Lechæum. But aid had been summoned from Argos, and on the day following the Argive forces arrived, and, confident in their numbers, immediately sought the enemy. They were supported by their Corinthian partisans, and by a body of mercenaries commanded by Iphicrates, an Athenian general, who in this war laid the foundation of his military renown. The superiority of the Lacedæmonian troops over the other Greeks, and the terror they inspired even when they were greatly outnumbered, was again strikingly manifested in the engagement which ensued. The Argives forced their way through the intrenchment, and drove the handful of Sicyonians before them down to the sea. But when the Lacedæmonians came up, they took to flight, without offering any resistance, and made for the city. But, meeting with the Corinthian exiles, who had defeated the mercenaries, and were returning from the pursuit, they were driven back, and those who did not make their escape by ladders over the wall[1], were slaughtered by the Lacedæmonians like a flock of sheep. Lechæum was taken, and the Bœotian garrison put to the sword. After his victory Praxitas was joined by the expected contingents of the allies, and he made use of them first to demolish the Long Walls, for a space sufficient to afford a passage

[1] Xenophon with his usual brevity omits to explain how these ladders were procured, as he frequently neglects minute circumstances necessary to the clearness of his narrative: for instance, IV. 4, 5., τοῦ κίονος — where Schneider's remark, that there were many pillars in the Acrocorinthus, does not account for the article — and III. 3. 8., τὴν γυναῖκα. But it is quite clear that these ladders were not let down by the Corinthians in the city from the city walls. The wall (τὸ τεῖχος) which the Argives scaled is plainly distinguished from the city wall (ὁ περὶ τὸ ἄστυ κύκλος), nor was there any reason why they should have killed themselves by jumping down the city wall, which was guarded by their friends.

for an army. Next, crossing the Isthmus, he took and garrisoned the towns of Sidus and Crommyon. On his return he fortified the heights of Epieicea, which commanded one of the most important passes, and then disbanded his army, and returned to Sparta.

Two battles had now been fought, in which almost the whole force of Greece had been engaged; much blood had been shed, yet the war had not been brought a step nearer to an issue; and the only important object hitherto attained was the recall of Agesilaus. The belligerents were growing weary, and yet were not willing to withdraw from the contest. But, instead of putting forth their whole strength in joint expeditions, and running the risk of general actions, they contented themselves with an easier and safer, though a wasteful and bootless kind of warfare. Two important consequences of the long series of hostilities in which all the Greek states had been engaged now became apparent. The number of persons who were thrown upon war as a means of subsistence had so much increased, that the contending powers were able to carry on the struggle with mercenary troops. Another result of the long practice of war was, that it had begun to be more and more studied as an art, and cultivated with new refinements. Thus Iphicrates had been led to devote his attention to the improvement of a branch of the light infantry, which had hitherto been accounted of little moment in the Greek military system. He had formed a new body of targeteers, which in some degree combined the peculiar advantages of the heavy and light troops, and was equally adapted for combat and pursuit. To attain these objects, he had substituted a linen corslet for the ancient coat of mail, and had reduced the size of the shield, while he doubled the length of the spear and the sword. At the head of this corps he made frequent inroads into

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Peloponnesus, and in the territory of Phlius he surprised the forces of the little state in an ambuscade, and made so great a slaughter of them that the Phliasians were obliged to admit a Lacedæmonian garrison into their town. They had before shrunk from this mode of securing themselves, through fear that their allies might abuse their confidence, and might compel them to receive their exiles, who professed a more zealous attachment to the Lacedæmonian interest. The Spartans however acted on this occasion with perfect honour and good faith: they abstained from interfering in favour of their partisans, and finally, when their protection was no longer needed, left the town, with its institutions unaltered, in the possession of the party which had intrusted them with it. But in Arcadia, such was the terror inspired by the troops of Iphicrates, that they were suffered to plunder the country with impunity, and the Arcadians did not venture to meet them in the field. On the other hand they were themselves no less in dread of the Lacedæmonians, who had taught them to keep aloof, in a manner which proved the peculiar excellence of the Spartan military training. They had found by experience that they were not safe within a javelin's throw of the Lacedæmonian heavy infantry; for even at that distance they had on one occasion been overtaken by some of the younger soldiers. The Spartans even ventured to laugh at the fears of their allies, which they probably observed with complacency, as evidence of their own superiority. A Lacedæmonian mora, stationed at Lechæum, accompanied by the Corinthian exiles, ranged the country round about Corinth without interruption. Yet it was not able to prevent the Athenians from repairing the breach which Praxitas had made in the Long Walls, which they regarded as a barrier that screened Attica from invasion. The

whole serviceable population of Athens, with a company of carpenters and masons, sallied forth to the Isthmus, and having restored the western wall in a few days, completed the other at their leisure. Their work however was destroyed, in the course of the same summer, by Agesilaus, on his return from an expedition which he had made into Argolis, for the purpose of letting the Argives taste the fruits of the war which they had helped to stir, and were most forward to keep up. After having carried his ravages into every part of their territory, he marched to Corinth, stormed the newly repaired walls, and recovered Lechæum. Here he met his brother Teleutias, who, through his influence[1], which in this case was better exerted than in that of Pisander, had been appointed to the command of the fleet, and having come with a small squadron to support his operations, made some prizes in the harbour and the docks.

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But the appearance of Teleutias in the Corinthian gulf was connected with other events, more important than any which took place in Peloponnesus after the return of Agesilaus from Asia. That we may exhibit them in an uninterrupted series, together with their consequences, we shall follow Xenophon's order, and return to them after having briefly related how the war was carried on in Greece, in the campaigns which ensued down to its close.

Capture of Piræum.

In the spring of 392, Agesilaus made a fresh expedition for the purpose of bringing the Corinthians to terms, by cutting off one of their chief resources. The fortress of Piræum, at the foot of mount Geranea on the western gulf[2], afforded shelter for the flocks

[1] Plut. Ages. 21.

[2] To be carefully distinguished from the desert harbour of Piræus, at the other extremity of the Corinthian territory on the Saronic Gulf, which we have had occasion to mention, Vol. III. p. 471. It is strange that Schneider should intimate a doubt on this subject.

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and herds which were transported into its precincts from other parts of the Corinthian territory, and maintained a numerous garrison, and the whole surrounding district had hitherto been exempt from the ravages of war. There was a prospect of at once gaining a rich booty, and striking a blow which would reduce the enemy to great distress; more especially as this was the easiest road by which the Bœotians could send their succours to Corinth. Agesilaus, perhaps by design, arrived at the Isthmus at the season of the Isthmian games, which the Argives were celebrating in the name of Corinth, the legitimate president. They were in the midst of the sacrifice, when the Lacedæmonian army appeared, and immediately abandoning all their preparations for the festival, fled to the city. Agesilaus remained encamped on the Isthmus, while the Corinthian exiles completed the sacrifice, and presided over the games, and then marched toward Piræum. After his departure the Argives celebrated the games afresh, in which it was observed that many of the late competitors returned to the contest, and that some were again successful. Agesilaus found Piræum so strongly garrisoned, that he did not venture to attack it, until, by feigning an intention of marching upon Corinth, so as to raise a suspicion of a secret understanding with a party in the city, he had drawn away most of the garrison, and among the rest the greater part of the corps of Iphicrates. As soon as they had passed his camp—and though it was night he perceived their movements—he only waited for daybreak to return toward Piræum, and the following evening detached a mora to occupy the heights which commanded it, while he encamped with the rest of his troops below. In the morning the garrison of Piræum, seeing the enemy above them, considered resistance as hopeless, and evacuated the fortress with the women, slaves, and all

the property that had been sheltered there, and took refuge in a neighbouring sanctuary of Here, which lay nearer to the seaside. But after the troops on the heights above Piræum had descended and taken the fortress of Œnoe on the north, and Agesilaus had come up from the opposite side, the fugitives in the Heræum surrendered to him unconditionally. Among them were some of the persons implicated in the massacre at Corinth. These he gave up to the vengeance of the exiles; the rest with all their property he exposed to sale.

The captures and the booty were brought out, and passed in review before Agesilaus, as he sat in an adjacent building on the margin of a small lake. His triumph was heightened by the presence of envoys from various states, among the rest from Thebes, where the party which desired peace had succeeded in procuring an embassy to be sent for the purpose of ascertaining the terms which Sparta would grant. Agesilaus, the more fully to enjoy their humiliation, affected to take no notice of their presence, while Pharax, their proxenus, stood by him, waiting for an opportunity to present them. Just at this juncture a horseman came up, his horse covered with foam, and informed the king of a disaster which had just befallen the garrison of Lechæum, the loss of almost a whole mora, which had been intercepted and cut off by Iphicrates and his targeteers. The action was in itself so trifling, that it would scarcely have deserved mention, but for the importance attached to it at the time, and the celebrity which it retained for many generations. The occasion however was remarkable on another account. The inhabitants of the Laconian canton of Amyclæ never permitted any engagement, civil or miliary, to prevent them from attending the Hyacinthian festival. As this festival was approaching at the time when Agesilaus was on his march against Piræum,

Victory of Iphicrates over the mora.

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he had left all the Amyclæans in his army at Lechæum, to be sent home; and the commander of the garrison had escorted them with a mora of infantry and a troop of cavalry on their way through the enemy's territory. But deeming himself secure from attack, he had permitted the cavalry to accompany them a little further than he went himself, while he returned toward Lechæum with the infantry. The movements of this little band were observed from Corinth, where, in addition to the ordinary force of the place, there was a body of Athenian heavy infantry, under Callias, son of Hipponicus, and Iphicrates had arrived with his targeteers. Callias and Iphicrates undertook to cut off the enemy's retreat. The infantry was drawn up not far from the city; the active service fell upon Iphicrates. Notwithstanding the terror with which, according to Xenophon, the Lacedæmonians had inspired his men, they did not now fear to venture within a javelin's throw of the enemy, and the Lacedæmonians, when galled by their missiles, were no longer able to overtake them, but only exposed themselves to increasing loss, while they spent their strength in repeated attempts for that purpose. An exhausted remnant of the mora at length reached a rising ground, about two miles from Lechæum, and two furlongs from the sea, and boats were sent out which afforded some of them means of escape[1]; and a few more were rescued by their cavalry, which came up about the same time.

After all, the whole loss of the Lacedæmonians amounted to no more than 250 men.[2] Yet it produced

[1] Schneider's supposition, that the men in the boats, who are expressly said to have come from Lechæum, were nevertheless the heavy infantry of Callias, needs no refutation, and can only excite astonishment. He ought not *here* to have complained of Xenophon's negligence and obscurity, well founded as the censure is in a more general application.

[2] As the mora consisted in general of about 600 men, it would seem that the disaster was magnified in the first report brought of it to Agesilaus.

a degree of consternation and dejection on the one side, and of exultation on the other, which is significant in the same proportion that the disaster appears to us slight, and the exploit inconsiderable. Nothing more clearly shows the weakness of Sparta and the power of her name, than the importance attributed both by herself and by her enemies to this petty affair. As soon as Agesilaus heard the news, he set off, without a moment's delay, accompanied by his principal officers toward the scene of action, ordering the troops to follow after snatching a hasty meal. But before he reached Lechæum, he was met by some horsemen who informed him that the slain had already been taken up, and he therefore returned to the Heræum, and the next day proceeded with the sale of the booty and the captives. The Bœotian envoys were now called in to discharge their commission; but they too had heard of the enemy's recent calamity, and thought it made such an alteration in the posture of affairs, that they forbore even to mention the business on which they had been sent, and merely requested leave to visit their troops who were quartered at Corinth. Agesilaus saw through their motives, and promised that he would take them along with him, and give them means of judging what their friends had gained by their victory. Accordingly he marched the next day toward Corinth, and having most searchingly ravaged the surrounding country, without encountering an enemy, sent the envoys by sea to Creusis. Yet even this proof of their superiority could not allay the grief of the army, where, says Xenophon, the only cheerful faces were those of the relatives of the slain who had fallen in the late action at their post. Agesilaus, having accomplished the object of his expedition, now set out homeward. He took with him the remnant of the defeated mora, leaving another in its room at Lechæum. But his march through

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Peloponnesus was like that of the Roman army on its return from the Caudine Forks. He would only enter the towns, where he was forced to rest, as late as he could in the evening, and left them again at break of day. At Mantinea, though it was dark when he reached it, he would not stop at all, that his men might not have to endure the insulting joy of their ill-affected allies. On the other hand Iphicrates was emboldened by his success to aim at fresh advantages; and he recovered Sidus, Crommyon, and Œnoe, where Agesilaus had left a garrison. His achievement struck such terror into the Corinthian exiles at Sicyon, that they no longer ventured to repeat their marauding excursions by land, but crossed over the gulf, and landed near Corinth, when they saw opportunity of giving annoyance. Even in later times the destruction of the Lacedæmonian mora—two hundred and fifty men—continued to be mentioned as the great military action of his life[1], and was not thought unworthy to be named in the same page with Marathon and Platæa.

Negotiations for peace.

It is not improbable that this victory of Iphicrates was attended with another result, which Xenophon has not thought fit to notice. It seems not only to have prevented the Theban envoys from discharging their commission, but to have put a stop to a negotiation which was proceeding at the same time between Athens and Sparta, after it had reached a very advanced stage. From an extant oration of Andocides, which certainly belongs to this year[2], we learn, that the orator had been sent on an embassy to Sparta, with full powers to conclude a peace, but that though the terms proposed by the Spartans satisfied him and his colleagues, they chose to lay them before the

[1] Nepos, Iph. 2. *Moram Lacedæmoniorum intercepit: quod maxime tota celebratum est Græcia.*

[2] See Mr. Clinton, F. H. II. p. 99.

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Athenian assembly, and returned to Athens accompanied by Spartan plenipotentiaries, to whom forty days were allowed for the negotiation. They were met by ministers from Corinth and Argos, who came to urge their ally to continue the war. The conditions proposed were such as, before Conon's victory, would have been deemed highly advantageous to the Athenians. They were not only released from all restrictions as to the fortifications of their city and their marine, but were permitted to resume possession of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros. According to the orator's statement there were persons at Athens who thought these proposals so inviting, that they complained of the delay which had been created by the timidity of their envoys. On the other hand he intimates, that there were others who looked for much more: who hoped to recover the Thracian Chersonesus, the colonies, and even the estates and the debts, which might be claimed by Athenian citizens in foreign lands: demands, which, as Andocides observes, not only their enemies, but their allies, would certainly have resisted. But the success of Iphicrates, and the impression which it was reported to have left on the Spartans, may have caused these expectations to seem less extravagant, and have contributed at least to the breaking off of the negotiation. One trace of a sudden and violent re-action seems to be, that Andocides was banished on account of the share he had taken in it.[1]

Andocides.

Minute as these occurrences are, they are perhaps, both in themselves and for the impression they produced, the most momentous that took place in Greece before the end of the war. We should have been glad indeed to know a little more of the causes which withdrew Iphicrates from the scene of action shortly after his victory; for they would perhaps have thrown

[1] Pseudo-Plut. Vit. x. Orat. Andocides.

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some light on the internal state of Corinth. But Xenophon only informs us that he was dismissed by the Argives, after he had put to death some Corinthians of their party; from what motive and on what pretext, we do not learn; nor does it appear whether this transaction had any influence on the relations between Athens and Argos.

Invasion of Acarnania.

In the year following no military operations seem to have taken place in Peloponnesus, except the petty combats or alternate inroads between Sicyon and Corinth, which Xenophon himself does not think worth more than a general notice. But the arms of Agesilaus were turned against Acarnania, where he displayed his usual ability, and established the Spartan supremacy almost without bloodshed. The Ætolian town of Calydon seems to have found itself in need of protection against the hostility of the Acarnanians, and thus to have been induced to attach itself to the Achæan body, which, with its usual liberality, admitted it to the enjoyment of equal rights, and sent a body of troops to garrison the town. But after this event the Acarnanians continued their aggressions, and being supported by Athenian and Bœotian auxiliaries, pressed the town so closely, that the Achæans were at length compelled to demand aid from Sparta. Agesilaus marched to overawe or chastise the Acarnanians. Before he crossed their frontier, he sent a message to the national congress at Stratus, threatening to lay waste the whole country unless they immediately renounced their alliance with Athens and Thebes, and joined the Spartan confederacy. When they refused to submit, he began to put his threat into execution, and ravaged the district which he first entered with such unsparing diligence, as to advance no more than about a mile and a half in the day. The extreme slowness of his progress, which was attributed to the resolution which he had ex-

pressed, encouraged the Acarnanians, who at first had removed their flocks and herds to the mountains for safety, to bring them down again into the plains, and to continue their rural labours. But Agesilaus, after having lingered for a fortnight near the border, to lull them into complete security, made a forced march of twenty miles, which in the course of one day brought him to a plain on the margin of a lake, where almost all the cattle were collected for pasture, and thus made himself master of a great part of the wealth of Acarnania. He was afterwards attacked by the Acarnanian targeteers, as he issued from the plain, in a narrow pass, between the mountains and the edge of the lake, but dislodged them from the heights by a vigorous charge, and killed about 300. During the rest of the summer he ranged over the country, and at the request of the Achæans attacked some of the towns, but without success. When he was preparing to withdraw, the Achæans expressed a wish, that he should stay to the end of the seed-time, and destroy the hopes of the next harvest. But he observed that this would be to deprive himself of the only hold he had on the fears of the Acarnanians, by which in another year he might bring them to sue for peace. An Athenian squadron was lying at Œniadæ, to intercept him, if, as was expected, he should attempt to cross the gulf from any part of the coast immediately below Calydon. To avoid it he marched to Rhium through the heart of Ætolia, by roads along which, Xenophon observes, no army, great or small, could have passed without the consent of the Ætolians. They permitted his passage, because they hoped to be aided by his influence in recovering Naupactus. At Rhium he crossed the straits, and returned home.

The event proved the policy of the moderation which he had shown against the wish of his allies.

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The next spring, as he was preparing for a second invasion of Acarnania, the Acarnanians, alarmed by the prospect of again losing a harvest, on which the subsistence of the people, who were but little conversant with arts or commerce, mainly depended, sent envoys to Sparta to treat for peace, and submitted to the terms which Agesilaus had dictated.

Invasion of Argolis.

The same year his young colleague Agesipolis, who had now reached his majority, was intrusted with the command of an expedition against Argos. He had reason to expect that the Argives would avail themselves of the presidency which they claimed in the name of Corinth over the Isthmian games, to stop his march under a religious pretext, which, though he might disregard it himself, might exert some influence on the superstition of a Lacedæmonian army. He therefore thought it proper first to consult the ministers of the Olympic god, whether he might invade Argolis without impiety, even if the Argives should claim the protection of the holy season, which it belonged to the presidents of the games publicly to announce. The god was made to answer that piety did not require him to admit a fraudulent plea, such as that of the Argives would be, if they should alter the time of the festival to suit their own interest, even should their title to the presidency be acknowledged.[1] Agesipolis then put the same question to

[1] I have adopted this conjecture of Dodwell's as to the nature of the pretence set up by the Argives, because I do not know of any that does not raise still greater difficulties. Yet, if Xenophon's history did not abound in seeming inconsistencies, we might have thought it incredible that he should have related the scruples of Agesipolis, without throwing out some hint to reconcile them with the conduct of Agesilaus, who, at the preceding Isthmian festival, had treated the Argives as intruders. One would have thought that after this the Argives could not have dreamt of stopping a Spartan army by such an expedient. Another difficulty is raised by Xenophon's remark, that this had been their usual practice (ὅσπερ εἰώθεσαν). What opportunity had they ever had before, since the beginning of their union with Corinth, on which they founded their title to the presidency of the Isthmian games, to avail themselves of it in this manner? Dodwell presumes, without any authority, that they had tried to stop Agesilaus by the same artifice. But this is the more improbable, as his invasion did not take place in an Isthmian year. Possibly however the Argives may have abused their presidency of the

the Delphic oracle, under a form which sounds to us somewhat ludicrous: *whether Apollo was of the same mind as his father;* and he received an equally encouraging reply. He then proceeded to Phlius, which he had appointed as the place of rendezvous, and led his army toward Argolis. The Argives, as had been their practice on former occasions, sent two heralds to meet him at the border, and announce the commencement of the sacred truce, during which they pretended to the same exemption from hostile inroads as the Eleans enjoyed for the celebration of the Olympic festival.[1] But Agesipolis answered that the gods had decided against their plea, and continued his march, spreading terror as he advanced, toward the capital. It happened that on the same day the shock of an earthquake was felt in the Spartan camp. The king and his principal attendants, who were at supper, immediately raised a pæan to Posidon, the earth-shaking god; and their example was followed by the Lacedæmonian troops. But a murmur arose among the allies, that the earthquake was a warning to retreat, as Agis had done from Elis, on a similar occasion. Agesipolis however, with great presence of mind, interpreted the omen as an encouragement, because it had occurred after he had crossed the border. Yet after he had ravaged the country, even beyond the extreme points which Agesilaus—whom

Nemean festival for such purposes. I need say nothing to expose the extravagant absurdity of the supposition, that the subject on which Agesipolis consulted the two oracles was a mere ordinary *proposal of truce;* and that Xenophon could have used such a phrase as *ὑποφέρειν τοὺς μῆνας* to express such a meaning, even if the words *ὁπότε καθήκοι ὁ χρόνος*, had not occurred in the same sentence.

[1] But the ground of this pretension is extremely obscure. Schneider observes that he does not know of any passage in any Greek author that made mention of an Isthmian truce. And perhaps this ought to be considered as one of the circumstances which point rather to some local or Dorian festival (of which Pausanias seems to speak, III. 5. 8., *πέμπουσι κήρυκα οἱ Ἀργεῖοι σπεισόμενον πρὸς Ἀγησίπολιν σφίσι πατρῴους δή τινας σπονδὰς ἐκ παλαιοῦ καθεστώσας τοῖς Δωρ εῦσι πρὸς ἀλλήλους*) than to the Isthmian games. This would be consistent enough with Xenophon's language; but it does not appear how the Argives could have claimed the right of fixing the time for the celebration of such a common festival; and it seems certain that they never possessed it with regard to the Carnea.

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he affected to outdo—had reached, in his invasion[1], and had driven the enemy within their walls, he suffered himself to be deterred by the aspect of the victims from fortifying a post on the border, which might have been as annoying to Argos as Decelea had been to Athens. As it was, the expedition yielded no fruit but the plunder, with which he returned to Sparta.

In the mean while, through the ambition of Sparta and the patriotic efforts of Conon, Athens had been enabled to take some great steps toward securing her independence, and recovering a part at least of her ancient power. After the sea-fight of Cnidus, Pharnabazus and Conon had cruised about the Ægean, had expelled the Lacedæmonian harmosts from most of the maritime cities, and had won the inhabitants by the assurance which the satrap was induced by his Athenian counsellor to hold out to them, that their citadels should not be occupied by foreign garrisons, and that they should be left in the unrestrained enjoyment of domestic liberty. It was one of the rare happy junctures in their history, when a struggle between the greater powers gave a temporary importance to their preference. Pharnabazus afterwards landed at Ephesus, where he left the greater part of the fleet, and ordering Conon to meet him at Sestus with forty galleys, proceeded by land to his own satrapy. But before he and Conon met in the Hellespont, Dercyllidas, who, having been sent forward, as we have seen, by Agesilaus, happened to be at Abydus, when he received the tidings of Pisander's defeat, both secured the fidelity of Abydus by an appeal to its fears and

[1] To any one not used to Xenophon's manner, it must seem surprising that, after having related, iv. 4. 19., that Agesilaus had ravaged the whole of Argolis (δηώσας πᾶσαν αὐτῶν τὴν χώραν) he should now say that Agesipolis did not lead his army far into the country (ἡγεῖτο οὐ πόρρω εἰς τὴν χώραν) but only, having learnt from his soldiers who had served under Agesilaus in Argolis, how far he had extended his ravages, endeavoured to go beyond him.

hopes from the Spartan power—which, he argued, was not shaken by the event of the sea-fight—and induced the people of Sestus to give shelter to several of the ejected harmosts, and to other friends of the Spartan interest, whom he collected there from other parts of the Chersonesus, and to defy the attacks of the Persian armament. Pharnabazus, when he arrived at the Hellespont, endeavoured to detach these two cities from the Spartan alliance by threats; but in vain; nor could he make any impression on Abydus, though he ravaged its territory, while Conon blockaded it by sea. But in the course of the winter Conon drew contributions from the other cities on the Hellespont, for the armament with which Pharnabazus designed to retaliate upon Sparta for the injuries he had suffered.

Conon and Pharnabazus on the coast of Laconia.

In the following spring, 393, having collected a great fleet, and raised a strong body of mercenaries, Pharnabazus himself again embarked with Conon, and sailing to the coast of Laconia, entered the Messenian gulf, where they ravaged the rich vale of the Pamisus about Pheræ, and, making descents at many other points, inflicted all the damage in their power. When it seemed no longer prudent to remain on a hostile and harbourless coast, and their provisions were growing scarce, they made for Cythera. The inhabitants of the town of Cythera, whose walls were in bad condition, capitulated and were allowed to withdraw to Laconia. The fortifications were repaired, and Nicophemus, an Athenian, an intimate friend of Conon's[1], was left there with a garrison as harmost. They then sailed to the Isthmus, and Pharnabazus, after exhorting the deputies of the allied states whom he found there, to carry on the war with vigour, and to abide by their engagements to his master, and

[1] Lysias Pro Bon. Aristoph. p. 153. See above, p. 255.

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leaving them a subsidy as large as he could spare, prepared to return home. But Conon now requested that the fleet might be placed at his disposal, promising to maintain it at the expense of the islanders of the Ægean without any further demand on the Persian treasury. And he proposed in the first instance to employ it in a work, which, as he represented to the satrap, would be felt by Sparta as one of the deepest wounds she could suffer. It was to restore the Long Walls of Athens, and the fortifications of Piræus, and thus to undo what it had cost the Spartans the efforts of many years to accomplish. He would thus, while he conferred an inestimable obligation on the Athenians, most effectually revenge himself. Pharnabazus eagerly adopted so easy a mode of gratifying his resentment, and not only granted Conon's request, but furnished him with money for his undertaking. Conon immediately sailed to Athens, and restored a great part of the walls with the labour of his crews, and of workmen hired with the Persian gold. The rest was completed by the Athenians themselves, with the aid of their allies, more especially the Thebans, who a few years before had done their utmost to level the whole city with the ground. While this work was proceeding, the Corinthians, with the subsidy they had received, fitted out a squadron, with which their admiral Agathinus scoured the Corinthian gulf. The Spartans sent Polemarchus with some galleys to oppose him; but their commander was soon after slain, and Pollis, who took his place, was compelled by a wound which he received in another engagement, to resign it to Herippidas. Herippidas seems to have driven the Corinthians from their station at Rhium; and Teleutias, who succeeded him, recovered the complete mastery of the gulf, and was thus enabled, as we have seen[1], to co-operate with Agesilaus at Lechæum.

Restoration of the Long Walls of Athens.

[1] Above, p. 451.

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But this partial success did not diminish the alarm with which the Spartan government viewed the operations of Conon, who was proceeding to restore the Athenian dominion on the coasts and in the islands of the Ægean. It perceived that it was necessary to change its policy with regard to the court of Persia, and for the present at least to drop the design of conquest in Asia, and to confine itself to the object of counteracting the efforts of the Athenians, and establishing its own supremacy among the European Greeks. And it did not despair of making the Persian court subservient to these ends. For this purpose Antalcidas, a dexterous politician of Lysander's school, was sent to Tiribazus, who was now occupying the place of Tithraustes in Western Asia, to negotiate a peace. His mission awakened the apprehensions of the hostile confederacy; and envoys were sent from Athens, Bœotia, Corinth, and Argos, to defeat his attempts, and to support the interests of the allies at the satrap's court. Antalcidas however made proposals highly agreeable to Tiribazus, and accompanied them with arguments which convinced the satrap that his master's interest perfectly coincided with that of Sparta. He renounced all claim on the part of his government to the Greek cities in Asia, and was willing that they should remain subject to the King's authority. For the islands, and the other towns, he asked nothing but independence. Thus, he observed, no motive for war between Greece and Persia would be left. The King could gain nothing by it, and would have no reason to fear either Athens or Sparta, so long as the other Greek states remained independent. Tiribazus was perfectly satisfied, but had not authority to close with these overtures, at least against the will of the states which were at present in alliance with his master; and they refused to accede to a treaty on these terms. We should have wished to know

Embassy of Antalcidas.

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what objections they alleged; but Xenophon has only mentioned the grounds on which they were averse to it. The Athenians feared that by assenting to the principle which was proposed as the basis of the treaty, they should forfeit their claim, not only to maritime dominion, but even to the islands of Lemnos, Imbrus, and Scyrus, which they were accustomed to consider as parts of their own territory. The Thebans dreaded the loss of their sovereignty in Bœotia; the Argives that they should be compelled to abandon their hold upon Corinth. They probably grounded their opposition on very different arguments; and though they did not convince Tiribazus, they succeeded in putting an end to the public negotiation.

But, though the satrap did not venture openly to enter into alliance with Sparta without his master's consent, he did not scruple privately to supply Antalcidas with money for the purpose of raising a navy to carry on the war with the states which were still acknowledged as allies of Persia; and having drawn Conon to Sardis, he threw him into prison, on the pretext that he had abused his trust, and had employed the King's forces for the aggrandisement of Athens. He then repaired to court to report his proceedings and to consult the royal pleasure. It was perhaps rather through some court intrigue, or vague suspicion, than a deliberate purpose of adopting a line of policy opposite to that of Tiribazus, that Artaxerxes detained him at court, and sent Struthas down to fill his place. Struthas had perhaps witnessed the Asiatic campaigns of Agesilaus, and could not all at once get rid of the impression, that the Spartans were his master's most formidable enemies. He therefore immediately made known his intention of siding with the Athenians and their allies. The Spartan government, perhaps too hastily, concluding that their prospect of amicable dealings with Persia was now quite closed, determined

to renew hostilities in Asia, and sent Thimbron—apparently the same officer whom we have already seen commanding there, and who had been fined on his return to Sparta for his misconduct—to invade the King's territory. Thimbron, if it is the same person, had not learnt wisdom from experience. He was addicted to the pleasures of the table, careless, and improvident in the discharge of his duties. In the inroads which he made from Ephesus, and from the lower vale of the Mæander, into the satrapy of Struthas, while he suffered his troops to range over the country for plunder, he paid little attention to their safety, and, when they were attacked, would succour them in as negligent and disorderly a manner as if he thought his presence alone was sufficient to scare the enemy away. Struthas took advantage of his failings, and, one day that he had gone out at the head of a small party to attack some of the Persian cavalry who had been purposely thrown in his way, suddenly appeared with a superior force, slew him, and a flute-player named Thersander, the favourite companion of his convivial hours, and defeated the rest of his army, as it came up after him, with great slaughter.

Diphridas was sent from Sparta to collect the scattered remains of his army, and to raise fresh troops, to defend the allied cities, and carry on the war with Struthas; and, as he was much superior to Thimbron in energy and self-command, he soon repaired the consequences of his predecessor's misconduct, and, among other advantages, captured Tigranes, the son-in-law of Struthas, with his wife, as they were on their way to Sardis. Their ransom afforded an ample supply for the payment of his troops. He was brought over by a squadron of eight galleys which the Spartan government sent under the command of Ecdicus at the request of their Rhodian partisans, to wrest Rhodes from the sway of the democratical party and

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the Athenians. But Ecdicus, on his arrival at Cnidus, found that the democratical Rhodians were superior to their adversaries both by sea and land, and that their naval force doubled his own; so that he was forced to remain inactive at Cnidus. When his situation became known at Sparta, Teleutias was ordered to sail to Asia with the twelve galleys which he had with him in the Corinthian gulf, to supersede Ecdicus, and to prosecute the war, in Rhodes or elsewhere, as he found opportunity. His first adventure, after he had taken the command at Cnidus, illustrates the complicated relations and the unsettled state of Greek politics at this period. Teleutias, whose force had been raised, by some additions which it received at Samos, to seven and twenty galleys, on his way from Cnidus to Rhodes, fell in with a squadron of ten, sent by the Athenians to aid Evagoras, who had revolted from the King of Persia, their ally, and the enemy of Sparta, whose admiral nevertheless destroyed or captured the whole.

The Athenians now thought it necessary to interpose in defence of their Rhodian friends, and sent Thrasybulus—the hero of Phyle—with forty galleys to check the operations of Teleutias. But Thrasybulus, on his arrival at Rhodes, found that the democratical party did not need protection, while their adversaries were in possession of a stronghold, from which — especially as Teleutias was at hand — he could not hope to dislodge them. He therefore thought that he might render more important services to the commonwealth in the north of the Ægean, and the Hellespont, where he would have no enemy to encounter on the sea. Sailing therefore first to the coast of Thrace, he composed the feud of the two Odrysian princes, Amadocus and Seuthes, and engaged them both in a treaty of alliance with Athens: a step toward the revival of the Athenian influence in

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B. C. 339.

the Greek cities on the coast of their dominions. Seuthes, it appears, was willing to have given him his daughter in marriage. But he proceeded to Byzantium, and, throwing his weight into the scale of the democratical party, established its predominance, and with it that of the Athenian interest; and he was thus enabled to restore a main source of the Athenian revenue, the duty of a tenth on vessels coming out of the Euxine. Before he quitted the Bosphorus, he also brought over Chalcedon to the Athenian alliance. On his return he stopt at Mitylene, the only town in Lesbos in which the Spartan influence was not predominant. Here he formed a little army, with about 400 of his own men, some exiles who had taken refuge in Mitylene from various parts of the island, and a body of Mitylenæan volunteers, and led them against Methymna, which was held by the Lacedæmonian harmost Therimachus, who met him on the frontier with a small force similarly composed of soldiers from his own galleys, Methymnæans, and Mitylenæan exiles. An engagement followed, in which Therimachus was defeated and slain; and Thrasybulus now reduced several of the Lesbian towns, and collected much plunder from the lands of those which refused to submit. He then prepared to return to Rhodes, but first sailed eastward to levy contributions on the southern coast of Asia. Here his career was abruptly terminated. He anchored in the Eurymedon near Aspendus, where he obtained a supply of money. But the Aspendians, exasperated by some trespass which his men had committed on their lands, fell upon him by night, and killed him in his tent. Xenophon's remark, that he died with the reputation of a very good man, may be admitted as sufficient proof that the great services he had rendered to his country were not his only claim to the esteem of his contemporaries,

Death of Thrasybulus.

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and that the suspicions excited against him were wholly unfounded.[1]

B. C. 388.

The flourishing condition to which Thrasybulus had restored the affairs of Athens in the Hellespont excited uneasiness at Sparta; and though Dercyllidas had done all that was expected from him, the government readily listened to the proposals of Anaxibius, who had some private friends in the college of ephors, and wished to obtain the command at Abydus. He undertook, with a few ships, and a small supply of money, to check the progress of the Athenian arms in that quarter, and obtained three galleys, and a grant of money sufficient to raise 1000 mercenaries. On his arrival in the Hellespont he fulfilled his promise, waged a successful war with the neighbouring towns, subject to Pharnabazus, or allied to Athens, and having fitted out three more galleys at Abydus, did much damage to the Athenian commerce. The Athenians were at length induced to send Iphicrates, with eight galleys and about 1200 targeteers, mostly those who had served under him at Corinth, to counteract the movements of Anaxibius. Iphicrates took a position in the Chersonesus opposite Abydus, and some time was spent in a desultory warfare, carried on by small parties, which were sent over on marauding adventures. At length Iphicrates obtained information that Anaxibius had crossed the mountains with his mercenaries, a few Lacedæmonian troops, and 200 heavy-armed Abydenians, to Antandrus, which had consented to receive him. Iphicrates expected that, after leaving a garrison there, he would return by the same road. He therefore crossed over in the night to a lone part of the opposite coast, and laid an ambush near the mountain road by which Anaxibius was to pass, while, by his orders, the gal-

Defeat and death of Anaxibius.

[1] See above, p. 252.

leys which brought him across sailed up the straits, as if on one of his usual excursions for gathering money. Anaxibius, who heard of this movement, pursued his march toward Abydus with the greater confidence, and was surprised by the ambush, as he was descending the mountain with his Lacedæmonian troops, after the Abydenians had already reached the plain. Anaxibius, as soon as he saw the enemy, perceived that resistance was hopeless; for his column could not have formed until it had descended to the plain, and then would have had to charge up the side of a steep hill. He therefore bad his men seek their safety in flight; for himself, he said, his part was to die there; and, calling for his shield, fought until he fell, with a few of his Spartan companions. The rest fled in disorder to Abydus with the loss of about 250 men.

Athens annoyed by Ægina.

Notwithstanding the successes of the Athenians in the Hellespont the enemy found means of annoying and threatening them at home. They had hitherto maintained a peaceful intercourse with Ægina; but the Spartans now resolved to make use of the island for the purpose of infesting the coasts of Attica. The Æginetans only wanted permission to vent their hereditary animosity against their ancient enemy, and at the instigation of Eteonicus, who was now in command there, began a series of hostile inroads, which compelled the Athenians to send a body of heavy-armed infantry under Pamphilus, who occupied a fortified post in the island, while a squadron of ten galleys blockaded the coast. But Teleutias, who happened at the same time to be cruising among the islands of the Ægean, levying contributions, hearing of the distress of the Æginetans, came to their relief, and drove off the blockading squadron, though Pamphilus kept possession of the fort. Teleutias was soon after superseded by Hierax, the new Spartan admiral, and

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returned home. At his embarkation, he received testimonies of esteem and affection from his men, which proved that he possessed at least one quality of a great commander. Hierax sailed to Rhodes, leaving Gorgopas, his vice-admiral, with twelve galleys at Ægina. The Athenians in the fort were soon reduced to greater straits than the Æginetans in the city; and, in the fifth month after their arrival, a strong squadron was sent out from Athens to carry them home. The excursions of the Æginetan privateers, who were supported by Gorgopas, were now renewed, and the Athenians appointed Eunomus with thirteen galleys, to repress them. In the mean while the Spartan government had resumed its project of attaining its object by means of negotiation, and once more sent out Antalcidas, as the person whose influence with Tiribazus would open the readiest access to the Persian court, as Admiral in the room of Hierax. Antalcidas was escorted to Ephesus by Gorgopas and his squadron, and on his arrival sent Gorgopas with ten galleys back to Ægina. The remainder of the fleet which joined him at Ephesus, he placed under the command of his lieutenant Nicolochus, while he himself proceeded on more important business to the court of Artaxerxes.

Stratagem and death of Gorgopas.

Gorgopas on his return fell in with the Athenian squadron under Eunomus, and was chased by him into the port of Ægina, where he arrived a little before sunset. Eunomus sailed away soon after dark, with a light in the stern of his galley, to keep his squadron together. Gorgopas, whose men in the mean while had landed and refreshed themselves, now embarked again, and pushed across the gulf in the enemy's wake, guided by his light, with every precaution for suppressing or weakening the usual sounds of galleys in motion. At Cape Zoster, as the Athenians were landing, the silence of the night was broken

by the sound of the trumpet, and after a short engagement by moonlight, Gorgopas captured four of their galleys; the rest made their escape into Piræus. But not long after, Chabrias, having been sent with a squadron of ten galleys and 800 targeteers to the aid of Evagoras, landed by night on Ægina, and posted his targeteers in an ambush. The next day according to a preconcerted plan, a body of heavy-armed infantry which had come over with him under the command of Deimænetus, advanced into the interior of the island. Gorgopas marched to meet them with all the forces he could muster, and passing by the ambuscade was routed and fell in the action, with some other Spartans and between three and four hundred of the other troops. By this victory the Attic commerce was for a time freed from annoyance; for though Eteonicus still remained in Ægina, he had no money to pay the seamen, and therefore could exert no authority.

In this emergency Teleutias was sent to take the command. His arrival was hailed with delight by the men, who had already served under him, and expected an immediate supply of pay. He however called them together, and informed them that he had brought no money with him, and that they had no resource to look to for the relief of their necessities, but their own activity and courage. It was best that they should not depend for subsistence upon the favour either of Greek or barbarian, but should provide for themselves at the enemy's expense. The men expressed entire confidence in his guidance, and promised to obey all his commands. That very night, after they had ended their evening meal, he ordered them to embark with a day's provision, and with twelve galleys crossed the gulf toward Piræus. When they were within about half a mile of the harbour, they rested till daybreak, and then sailed in.

Teleutias surprises Piræus.

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Xenophon thinks it necessary to vindicate Teleutias from the charge of rashness, for having undertaken such an adventure with so small a force. But the event itself seems sufficient to exculpate him. He had no object but plunder in view, and might safely calculate on overpowering all the resistance that could be opposed to such an unexpected attack. He gave orders to strike none but the ships of war which might be lying in the harbour, to capture as many merchant vessels as could be conveniently taken in tow, and to carry away as many prisoners as could be taken from the rest. Not only were these orders executed with alacrity and success, but some of his men, landing on the quay, seized some of the merchants and shipowners who were assembled there, and hurried them on board. While the military force of Athens marched down to the relief of Piræus, which was supposed to have been taken, he made his retreat from the harbour, sent three or four of his galleys with the prizes to Ægina, and with the rest proceeded along the coast as far as Sunium. He made the more captures on his way, as his squadron, having been seen to issue from the port of Athens, was believed to be friendly. At Sunium he found a number of vessels laden with corn, and other valuable cargoes, with which he sailed away to Ægina. The produce of this adventure yielded a month's pay to the men, raised their spirits, and increased their devotion for their commander, who continued to employ them in this predatory warfare: the only kind to which his small force was adequate.

The Athenians however still retained the ascendency in the Hellespont, where Nicolochus, who after the departure of Antalcidas had sailed northward with five and twenty galleys, was blockaded at Abydus by an Athenian squadron of two and thirty, which was stationed on the opposite coast of the

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Chersonesus, under the command of Diotimus and Iphicrates. But the aspect of affairs was completely changed by the arrival of Antalcidas, who returned in 387 with Tiribazus from the Persian court, where he had been treated with marks of distinguished favour by Artaxerxes, and had fully succeeded in the main object of his mission, having prevailed on the King to aid Sparta in carrying on the war, until the Athenians and their allies should accept a peace to be dictated in the King's name on terms previously arranged between him and the Spartan ambassador. Being informed of the situation of Nicolochus, he proceeded by land to Abydus, and took the command of the blockaded squadron, with which he sailed out in the night, after having deceived the enemy by a report, that he had received an invitation from Chalcedon, and was going to make himself master of it. He was pursued by the Athenians toward the north, but stopt at Percope until they had passed, and then returned to Abydus, where he expected to be joined by a squadron of twenty galleys which was on its way from Sicily and Italy. But before it arrived he received intelligence of the approach of eight Athenian galleys, which Thrasybulus (of Colyttus) was bringing from Thrace to the Hellespont. Having put to sea with twelve of his fastest vessels, he lay in wait in a retired situation until the enemy had sailed by. He then issued from his lurking place, overtook, and captured the whole squadron. Soon afterwards he was reinforced, not only by the Syracusan and Italian galleys, but by others from Ionia, and from the satrapy of Pharnabazus, who had gone up to court to marry the King's daughter Apama, and had left his government under the charge of Ariobarzanes, who was connected with Antalcidas by an ancient bond of hospitality. These additions raised his fleet to eighty sail, and gave him

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Peace of Antalcidas.

the complete command of the sea, so that he was enabled to divert the commerce of the Euxine from Athens into the ports of the allies of Sparta.

The Athenians now saw themselves not only exposed to constant annoyance from Ægina, but in danger of falling again under the power of the enemy, and losing all the benefit of Conon's victory. They were therefore heartily desirous of an honourable peace. But the Spartans, who had to maintain a garrison at Orchomenus, and another at Lechæum, and were kept in continual anxiety by their allies, to protect the weak, and to guard themselves against the disaffected, were no less tired of the war. The Argives also, seeing that their subterfuges would in future be of no avail, but that they must reckon on bearing their share of the evils of war, no longer wished to protract it. Most of the other states were probably still more anxious for the termination of a contest from which they could expect no advantage. When therefore Tiribazus, in his master's name, summoned a congress of deputies to listen to the proposals which he was commissioned to announce, all the belligerents readily sent their ministers to attend it. In the presence of this assembly Tiribazus, having shown the royal seal, read his master's decree, which ran in the following imperial style:

King Artaxerxes thinks it right that the Greek cities in Asia, and the islands of Clazomenæ and Cyprus, should belong to himself; but that all the other Greek cities, both small and great, should be left independent, with the exception of Lemnos, Imbrus, and Scyrus, and that these should as of old belong to the Athenians. If any state refuse to accept this peace, I will make war against it, with those who consent to these terms, by land and by sea, with ships and with money.

The treaty founded on these conditions was ratified by all the parties almost without opposition. A little

delay arose from the Thebans, who were reluctant to part with the sovereignty they had hitherto exercised over many of the Bœotian towns, and wished, for the sake of at least retaining their pretensions, to ratify in the name of all the other Bœotians. But Agesilaus, who was charged to receive the oath of their ministers, refused to accept it in this form, and required them strictly to conform to the Persian ordinance, and expressly to acknowledge the independence of all other states; and when the envoys alleged that they were not authorised to comply with this demand, he bad them return home for fresh instructions, and inform their fellow-citizens that, if they resisted, they would be excluded from the benefit of the treaty. But, instead of waiting for their answer, he prevailed on the ephors to let him immediately enforce compliance with the sword, and proceeding to Tegea, began to make active preparations for the invasion of Bœotia. The effect of these hostile demonstrations perhaps disappointed his secret wishes; for before his forces were collected, the Theban envoys returned, and reported the submission of Thebes. One impediment to the general peace still remained. The governments of Corinth and Argos did not consider themselves bound by the treaty to alter the relations which had hitherto subsisted between them; and it was only when Agesilaus threatened them with war, that they consented, the one to dismiss, and the other to withdraw, the Argive garrison from Corinth. Its departure was attended by an immediate re-action in the state of the Corinthian parties. The authors of the massacre, knowing themselves to be generally odious to their fellow-citizens, thought themselves no longer safe at home, and left the city. Most of them found refuge at Athens, where they met with a much more honourable reception than they deserved. The exiles of the opposite faction were recalled; and their return

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dissolved the union with Argos, and restored the influence of Sparta, and the oligarchical institutions.

This treaty, which was long celebrated under the name of the Peace of Antalcidas, was undoubtedly a masterpiece of policy, nor does it appear to deserve the censure which it incurred from the Attic orators and from Plutarch, and which has been repeated by some modern writers, as a breach of political morality. Sparta, in her transactions with Persia during the Peloponnesian War, had more than once acknowledged the title of the Persian king to the dominion of the Asiatic Greeks; she had never pledged herself to maintain their independence; and even if she had done so, the revival of the maritime power of Athens, and its union with that of Persia, would have afforded a fair plea for receding from an engagement which she was no longer able to fulfil. The clause in favour of Athens was perhaps only designed to excite jealousy and discord between Athens and the hated Bœotians. It has been attributed to a deeper policy; it has been considered as a device, by which Sparta reserved a pretext for eluding the conditions of the treaty which she rigorously enforced in the case of other states.[1] But it is doubtful whether the exception expressly made concerning the three islands which Athens was allowed to retain could have been needed, or if needful could have availed, as a colour under which Sparta, while she stript Thebes of her sovereignty in Bœotia, might keep possession of Messenia and the subject districts of Laconia. Sparta did not permit a question to be raised on this point. She was constituted the interpreter of the treaty; she expounded it by the rule, not of reason, but of might, with the sword in hand, and the power of Persia at her back. And thus the peace of Antalcidas, which professed to

[1] By Manso, *Sparta*, III. 1. p. 105.

establish the independence of the Greek states, subjected them more than ever to the will of one. It was not in this respect only that appearances were contrary to the real state of things. The position of Sparta, though seemingly strong, was artificial and precarious; while the majestic attitude in which the Persian king dictated terms to Greece disguised a profound consciousness, that his throne subsisted only by sufferance, and that its best security was the disunion of the people with whom he assumed so lordly an air.

APPENDIX I.

ON THE POLITICAL ASSOCIATIONS OF ATHENS.

APPENDIX I.

SINCE the publication of the first edition of this History, the political associations of Athens have been made the subject of a little work, bearing the title, *Geschichte der politischen Hetaerieen in Athen;* i.e. *A History of the political Hetæries of Athens from the Time of Cylon's Conspiracy to the Expulsion of the Thirty, with special reference to the political Character of the Statesmen who employed them;* by Dr. Hermann Büttner, Leipsic, 1840. It is a learned and thoughtful essay, containing several discussions which may be read with interest and profit; but yet the author's view of the subject appears to me erroneous in some fundamental points which deserve to be considered.

The author begins with some criticism on various definitions or descriptions of his subject which had been proposed by preceding writers: as by Droysen, who had observed that the Hetæries were not so much parties as coteries; by Huellmann, who considers them as societies formed merely for the purpose of bribery; C. F. Hermann, who looks upon them as oligarchical clubs; Wachsmuth, who in like manner describes them as revolutionary, anti-democratical associations, leagued against the commonweal — a view in which he is without any material difference followed by Schoemann; while other writers, as Krueger and Vischer, lay more stress on the origin of these associations, which they conceive to have been the need of mutual protection against the oppression of a dominant party. Büttner himself declines offering a complete definition of his subject, on the ground that it is one which has a history, and therefore can only be fully understood by means of its history. And it is very true that when the name of the thing which is to be the subject of the history is unequivocal, and may be presumed to be familiar to the reader, it is unnecessary to premise a formal definition. But it is extremely important that the author himself should have a precise notion of his subject, so as to be secure from the danger of confounding it with others, and either omitting anything which essentially belongs to it, or including things heterogeneous among its elements. Now into this mistake Büttner seems to me to have fallen. He professes to give the history of a social phenomenon during a certain

period; assuming of course that his subject remains one and the same from the beginning to the end, only passing through successive stages or phases, which it is his business to describe; whereas a closer inspection would, as I believe, have led him to observe, that the subject was not one but two, distinct from each other, having little more than the name in common, and — which is the main point—not connected together by a proper historical filiation, so that though each might afford matter for some interesting inquiries, there was hardly any thing deserving the name of a *history* to write about either. It is a little surprising that Büttner should have felt no misgivings on this head, and should not have thought it worth while to clear his ground from such an objection, as in a work with which he must have been well acquainted, *Introduction to Translation of the Knights*, p. 292. Droysen had made a remark which might have suggested it to him. Speaking of Cleon's ascendency and of the opposition which it roused in the oligarchical party, Droysen says: *Then began those hetæries, those secret societies for mutual support in elections and law-proceedings.* What then were those combinations which had existed before this epoch under the same name, and to which the earlier part of Büttner's *History*, including the whole period between Cylon's conspiracy and the Peloponnesian War, exclusively relates? They were composed of the adherents whom the most eminent statesmen of that period attached to themselves, and employed to serve their political ends. It must be observed however, that the first of these classes of hetæries did not cease to make way for, or to be merged in the second; but until the end of the Peloponnesian War the two existed simultaneously. Now, if we compare them together, we shall see that they differed from one another in several very important particulars. The class which was peculiar to the later period sprang up spontaneously: it did not depend either for its origin or its continuance on the influence of individual leaders or central personalities: it arose out of the disorders and calamities of the age; and as it was a very remarkable sign of the times, so it exerted a very powerful influence on the fortunes of the state, while on the other hand its own character was deeply affected by the changes which that of the whole body politic underwent at the same time, and which it had itself mainly contributed to produce. In proportion as public spirit declined, the objects of these societies grew more and more narrow, personal, and selfish, and were less determined by political opinions, or even by honest prejudices; and they seem mostly to have degenerated into mere conspiracies for ends which were at once illegal, iniquitous, and base. So much seems on the whole tolerably clear; and if our materials enabled us to mark the successive steps of this process of corruption with any degree of

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exactness, they might have furnished a fit and a sufficiently ample subject for a separate history. But none of these remarks will hold with regard to the associations of the other class. The earlier hetæry had no separate existence, no distinct character, or independent action. It was a group of partizans, gathered round a political chief, by personal attachment, as well as by common principles and aims. It indicated nothing extraordinary or abnormal in the state of society, and it exerted no influence on the course of events otherwise than as an instrument in the hands of its leader, with whom therefore it must be identified; and to talk of writing the *history of such associations with special reference to the statesmen who employed them*, seems as singular as if an author who undertook to relate the operations of an army, should in the title-page announce his intention not to overlook its generals. And even if there had not been so wide a difference between the two classes, it would have been necessary for the justification of the plan of the work to establish a real connection between them, which Büttner has not attempted to do; certainly not because the connection was clear and notorious.

Nevertheless, it seems evident that the earlier part of his work is that on which he has bestowed most pains, and in which he believes himself to have arrived at the most important results. He has indeed there broached a theory, which has an air of novelty, and which it is the main object of his narrative to illustrate and confirm. And it may be worth considering how far he has succeeded in this attempt.

The phenomenon itself — the formation of such groups or knots of partizans, personally as well as politically attached to their leader — is perfectly simple and familiar. In some form, and under some name or other, we are sure it must have existed in every state where there was a sufficient degree of freedom for the citizens to be divided into political parties. In every great party there must be gradations, more or less distinctly marked, of intimacy and confidence between the members and their head. If there had been any reason to suppose that there was no such thing at Athens, though it had been no more than the absence of all notice of it in extant authors — this would indeed have been a mystery which would have required explanation. Now the mystery, according to Büttner, is of a totally different kind: the thing existed at Athens, and was as common there as might have been expected; but it existed under conditions of a peculiar nature, and probably without a parallel in history ancient or modern, and therefore well deserving a close investigation. The proposition from which he sets out is this: though the relation of individuals to the state at Athens passed through every stage, from simple obedience to unbridled licence, still, during the whole of this development, it

remained in theory unaltered: in contemplation of law and public opinion it was one of absolute subjection, and yet all the changes which took place in the constitution were the work of persons who were most energetically conscious of their individual freedom, and through this very consciousness pre-eminent above their fellow-citizens. But as this pre-eminence was looked upon as an infringement of the universally recognised principle of passive obedience, the individual agency of men of this character could never be altogether public: whatever might be their political objects, it was necessary that their measures should be concerted in secret. Such secrecy could only be insured by means of the hetæries, which thus became a necessary supplement to those political institutions which were not in accordance with the spirit of the age; and hence their extraordinary prominence at Athens (pp. 4, 5.).

The singularity of the state of things here described is this: that a maxim which belongs to an Oriental despotism or theocracy, is represented as prevailing in the plenitude of Greek freedom, and even in the wildest excess of Athenian ochlocracy, and not only so, but as carried to a length which its practical application can hardly be believed to have reached on the banks of the Nile or the Ganges. For, according to Büttner, the Greek notion of passive obedience was so rigid, that it did not allow any individual political agency (*das subjective Handeln für den Staat*, p. 5.) to be more than simply ministerial and subordinate. No citizen might take the lead, and attempt to modify the institutions of the state according to his own judgement. Even when the measures which he wished to carry were in perfect accordance with the spirit of the age, and the views and feelings of the community at large, still he might only bring them forward in some indirect and underhand way. And yet the political agency of individuals was what produced the whole history of Athens. *Now these active individuals*, Büttner proceeds to observe, *with the necessary exceptions which appear in the course of the inquiry, found, in the organisation of the state, no means of exerting that influence which they felt to be their proper mission. Hence associations which were by no means recognised by the state, though it did not expressly forbid them, became the instrument by which as well the admired directors of public affairs, as the enemies of the subsisting order of things, whether they were honest or selfish in their opposition, carried their plans into execution.* No proof whatever is offered of this assertion, which is the fundamental position of the work, except such as may, or may not, be contained in the subsequent review of Athenian history; and yet it is so far from being self-evident, that to me it seems at least a very startling paradox, if not manifestly groundless and erroneous. How can it be maintained that at Athens there were no

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means to be found in the organisation of the state by which a statesman who enjoyed the respect and confidence, not to say the admiration, of his fellow-citizens might exert a most powerful and yet perfectly legitimate and constitutional influence on the public mind and will? For what other purpose were assemblies, deliberative and legislative, held there, but to afford an opportunity to every one of proposing such measures as he might deem most conducive to the public good? Why else was a provision made for an annual revision and amendment of the laws? How could any one come forward as the adviser of the people, without virtually claiming credit for superior intelligence, and without distinctly expressing his desire that they should be guided by his judgement? Or, if this was not allowable, how could a secret society, or a body of private adherents, enable a statesman to carry his measures, since they must ultimately be proposed by somebody or other before they could be adopted? It only remains therefore to see how far Büttner's view of the subject is confirmed by its history, as he himself has related it. And indeed it would hardly be possible otherwise to feel quite sure that one has not misunderstood his meaning. And yet, with every disposition to exercise perfect impartiality, we cannot anticipate any completely satisfactory result from this inquiry, in favour of the author's position, as we cannot help foreseeing a difficulty which must create great perplexity. It may perhaps appear that the most popular, patriotic, and enlightened Athenian statesmen were nevertheless forced to employ the aid of private associates to carry their plans into execution; but how, among the various causes which may have produced this necessity, it can be clearly traced to that which Büttner supposes, seems beforehand inconceivable. Let us however consider the examples which he adduces.

The history begins with Cylon's conspiracy; because this is the first occasion on which the term which is the subject of the discussion, occurs in what may be called a political sense. Cylon was aided in his attempt to overthrow the old aristocratical constitution, and to establish his own power on its ruins, by partizans whom Herodotus describes as a *hetæry* (προσποιησάμενος ἑταιρηίην τῶν ἡλικιωτέων, v. 71.); Thucydides simply as his *friends* (τοὺς φίλους ἀναπείσας, i. 126.). It seems clear however that this transaction can throw no light on the question. It would have been strange if Cylon had engaged in such an undertaking without endeavouring to secure such support. But it was rendered necessary by the opposition which he had to expect from the Eupatrids, not, so far as history affords any hint, by the prevalence of a notion common to them and to the people at large, that no citizen was allowed to direct the course of public affairs according to his own judgement, or to introduce changes devised by himself, however welcome to

the bulk of the community in political institutions. Nor would it be correct to say, that even at this early period no means were to be found in the organisation of the state, by which a private citizen of eminent ability might exert a great, recognised, and legitimate influence on the commonwealth, and become the author of most important legislative and organic innovations. Only hitherto such measures, like Draco's legislation, had been all, at least apparently and avowedly, in the interest of the aristocracy, as they were afterwards in that of the democracy. But so far as they were the work of individuals—which we only know indeed with certainty as to those of Draco, but which is equally probable with regard to the earlier period—this difference is evidently immaterial.

From Cylon we pass (p. 7.) to Solon, of whom Büttner remarks, that he owed his reputation, not merely to his pre-eminent capacity, but to the courage with which, in his famous stratagem for bringing about the expedition for the recovery of Salamis, he had made his own superior intelligence prevail over the declared will of the highest authority in the state. But for this end—as he was not at liberty openly to propose the measure which he wished to see adopted—he was constrained to resort to secret manœuvres for which he required the aid of his private partizans. (Plut. Sol. 8.) Büttner seems to consider this fact as an illustration of his view as to the conditions which called a hetæry into action. Yet it is plainly irrelevant, or rather leads to the very opposite conclusion. If it was to supply an argument in favour of Büttner's theory, he should have shown that public opinion, with regard to the absolute submission due from individuals to the state, precluded Solon from openly moving the repeal of the law which had been passed to perpetuate what he thought a pernicious policy. But we are not informed that there was any thing to prevent him from doing this, except the hopelessness of the attempt; whereas an extraordinary appeal to popular feeling, though attended with greater risk, might seem to hold out a better prospect of success. Unless this was the case, it must be supposed that the penalty of death had been enacted, not only against all who should propose the obnoxious measure, but against all who should move for the repeal of the law. But this, it is clear, would have been an exceptional provision, proving—if it could have been doubted—that no such restriction was known in the ordinary state of things. On the other hand, when, with the unanimous consent of all parties, Solon undertook the office of legislator, there was little room left for any private combinations or underhand proceedings. It is not so correct to say with Büttner, that they were now inadmissible, as that they had become almost wholly superfluous. But even now Solon took counsel with his private friends, as to the best mode of accomplishing his object, and they abused his confidence for their own profit.

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Büttner calls this an immaterial deviation from the ordinary publicity of Solon's proceedings, in his legislatorial character. But still it seems sufficient to show the worthlessness of the assertion, that the agency of a hetæry implied some opposition between the will of the individual who employed it, and the mind or law of the state. It is evident that a statesman in Solon's situation, though enjoying public favour and confidence in the highest degree, might have occasion for the aid, as well as the counsels of his partizans, to remove obstacles out of his way. But how the functions entrusted to Solon are to be reconciled with the doctrine, that according to Greek notions a citizen was only to act ministerially on behalf of the state, and never as carrying out his own views; or, if the doctrine is consistent with such an exercise of private judgement, what it means or amounts to — this Büttner has neglected to explain. He observes indeed that Solon kept aloof from all parties, and had so little united his friends in a compact political hetæry, that, when he set his face against Pisistratus, they did not scruple to abandon him, only advising him to make his escape. But Plutarch's language (Sol. 30.) does not warrant this construction: it only implies that Solon, who was then of a very advanced age, was not sufficiently supported to offer any effectual resistance to Pisistratus, and having vainly endeavoured to rouse the people against him, retired into privacy. There is no intimation that he was abandoned by his friends; and they might have formed a compact body, though not strong enough to maintain a struggle against the power of Pisistratus.

The struggle which had been momentarily compromised through Solon's mediation, was renewed by the parties of Lycurgus, Megacles, and Pisistratus. In this struggle however, Büttner observes, we find no trace at all important of the influence of political hetæries. And this, he thinks, is just as might have been expected: for the cases in which these associations come into play, are only those in which the object is that the community should be brought to adopt and realise certain ideas which have hitherto been confined to the minds of individuals, whether they be subservient to the interests of those individuals, or to those of the state. But in a conflict of real parties, and not factions, the general principles and interests of the state, which have been already recognised, though not yet reconciled, come into open opposition to one another. Adherents are attracted to the heads of parties, not by their personal relations and qualities, but simply by the cause which they maintain, and the chiefs obtain the ascendency only by leading their parties to a decided victory. This however, we are reminded, does not exclude the possibility, that a political leader might have need of the aid of private friends to establish his ascendency within his own party; as was the case when

Pisistratus procured himself a body-guard, and got possession of the Acropolis. But Pisistratus himself found at last that, to fix his authority on a solid basis, he must discard such expedients and connections; as his brief coalition with Megacles had only weakened his position, so that on their quarrel he at once withdrew from the city; and when he finally prevailed, this was simply by the strength of his principles and his party; for when Herodotus (I. 62.) says that he was supported by those who preferred despotism to liberty, we may translate this into more correct language, and gather from it that his followers were those who preferred the legal rule of one man to a mock freedom under the yoke of the Eupatrids. And accordingly in fact Pisistratus reigned as the minister of the laws.

Now in this statement there are some parts which cannot be disputed, and others which, to say the least, are very doubtful; and unfortunately for Büttner, whatever in it is clearly true is of no use to his argument, while all that may seem to favour it is almost entirely arbitrary and precarious. Lycurgus, Megacles, and Pisistratus might all be leaders of parties, and not of mere factions; each might represent a set of political principles and public interests; and yet it would not be at all the less probable that each of them, as well as Pisistratus, had some private ends in view, and that each, no less than Pisistratus, was supported by personal adherents, without whose aid he could not have hoped to accomplish either his private or his public objects. To talk of the stratagem by which Pisistratus first became master of Athens, as simply a movement *within his own party*, and again to assert that his coalition with Megacles was what rendered him unable to maintain his footing after their quarrel, is a mere arbitrary accommodation of history to theory. It is true that, when restored to power, he ruled like Augustus, having the wisdom to identify his government with the cause of law, justice, and order, and so perhaps could dispense with the help of secret machinations, and was in a great measure independent of personal attachments; but there is nothing to prove that he was not to the last surrounded by devoted partizans, always ready, when occasion required it, to aid him with their counsels and their efforts. How indeed could it be otherwise, when he was obliged to keep a strong body of mercenaries in his pay? This may have been needed, not to supply the want of popularity, but, as Büttner says, to protect the real interests of the state against the attacks of the hostile party. But whatever the cause was that rendered this necessary, it would create a like need for the support of confidential friends, though it might happen that neither they nor his troops were ever called into action.

Indeed Büttner himself conceives, and not without probability,

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that even before the death of Pisistratus, the people, satiated with long tranquillity, had become impatient of this paternal sway, and had begun again to long for republican institutions; though the force of habit, and respect for their ruler's personal character, concurred, with their fear of his power, to keep this spirit from breaking out into act. Toward his successor they felt no such reverence or attachment, and it is probable enough, and seems to be intimated by the language of Thucydides (vi. 59.) διὰ φόβου ἤδη μᾶλλον ὤν, that even before the murder of Hipparchus, Hippias reigned more by terror than by the choice of the people. After that event, the dislike to his government, no doubt, became universal, except among his partizans, whose private interests were promoted by it; and these retainers, as was to be expected, stand out more prominently in the history of Hippias than in his father's; but so they would have done though they had been equally numerous and devoted in the one period and in the other, and even though they had consisted mainly of the same persons in both, which is quite as likely as that they were first collected, as Büttner asserts without proof, by the Pisistratids. On the other hand, when he states that the hetæry of the Pisistratids was opposed by another, consisting of persons who, without any fixed form or plan for their association, were, in the first instance, kept together only by the prevailing sentiment of aversion to the tyranny—which, by the way, adopting the least probable interpretation, he supposes to be intimated by the words of Thucydides (vi. 54.), ὡς ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπαρχούσης ἀξιώσεως — the only real foundation for this statement seems to be, that the general dissatisfaction was, as must always be the case, felt more intensely by some than by others; and those who thus felt were, of course, the foremost to engage in the conspiracy of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, and afterwards to co-operate with the Alcmæonids for the expulsion of the ruling dynasty.

Hitherto we have found our author endeavouring to adhere to his theory, and have only had to complain that he seemed too much inclined to shape his narrative to fit it; but in the epoch which now follows he appears to waver in his theory, and to shift his fundamental position. He takes great pains to vindicate the character of Cleisthenes, as a liberal and enlightened statesman, and to show that if he had aims of personal ambition, they were subordinate to his view of the public good. He was the chief, not of a faction, but, in the largest sense, of a party. He was the man of the people; he comprehended the wants and the spirit of his age; he made himself their interpreter and organ; in his legislation they found a distinct expression and a definite form. But yet it cannot be contended that his political agency was merely ministerial. He was decidedly in advance of his age,

though moving in the same direction. He was the author of several very important innovations in the Athenian constitution; and they evidently cannot be considered simply as a stage in its natural development. They were his work, and bear the stamp of his individual mind. Now, according to Büttner's theory, this was not consistent with the Greek notion of the relation which ought to subsist between the individual and the state. Cleisthenes, when he undertook to mould the institutions of his country, though in accordance with the general wish of the community, was stepping out of his legitimate sphere, and assuming a superiority which violated the principle of simple obedience, and inverted the rightful order of things. Here then is a case which apparently fulfils the conditions under which according to Büttner, a hetæry could not fail to be formed. But, as we have seen, these same conditions had been realised in the case of Solon, and some of them perhaps in a still higher degree; yet in that case Büttner hardly admits that a hetæry existed, and contends that Solon could not have made use of one without damaging his influence and defeating his object. What then are we to conclude as to Cleisthenes? The historical evidence, Büttner thinks, leaves it doubtful whether he was at the head of a hetæry, or not; for though Plutarch (Ar. 2.) says that Aristides was his partizan (Κλεισθένους ἑταῖρος), this would scarcely warrant such an inference. Still our author is willing to allow that it may have been the case, and that Cleisthenes, notwithstanding his popularity and the democratical tendency of his measures, may have found it expedient to avail himself of the aid of his more intimate associates. *Supposing*, he says, *that Cleisthenes did this in order to the execution of his plans, though they were not plans of selfish ambition, but entirely in the interest of the people, at least we must refer such a hetæry to that class which we shall become better acquainted with in the case of Themistocles, and consider it as one which acted in substance for the attainment of public ends* (*objective Zwecke*, p. 16.). Now this may be very true, and might have been of some importance, if the main object of the inquiry had been to appreciate the political character of Cleisthenes; but since this is here a point merely incidental, and subordinate to the question as to the nature of the Athenian political associations, and the conditions under which they were formed, such a distinction with regard to the purposes for which they were employed is either totally irrelevant, or it introduces an entirely new element into our notion of them, and one which renders it the more difficult to understand how there could have been any thing in them peculiar to the state of society at Athens or in Greece, or characteristic of Athenian or Greek modes of thinking. We must however hasten on to the period of Themistocles, that we may

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see this new qualification more fully explained, and may be better able to judge how far it modifies the author's original proposition.

He gives (p. 21.) a good account of the contrast between the policy of Themistocles and Aristides, and shows that, notwithstanding the wide divergency of their views, each might be supported by partizans who sincerely believed that they were promoting the true interests of the commonwealth. Then, after some reflections on the career of Themistocles, he proceeds to explain the causes which compelled this highly popular statesman to resort to the aid of private associates.

As, in the absolute democracy, the people insisted on being in its collective capacity the all-controlling power, it recognised the superior intelligence of Themistocles, or rather let him have his own way, only so long as the emergencies of the times rendered him indispensably necessary. It is true he, as well as Aristides and Pericles, did no more than carry the real will of the people into execution; but the people, feeling that, though the will was its own, the discerning and executing of this will was the act of the great individual who conducted its affairs, regarded him with jealousy and mistrust. On this account it became necessary — and for the fuller elucidation of this statement we are referred to the account which is to be given of the administration of Pericles — for the great men to keep their proceedings concealed from the people, and as far as possible to exert a secret influence on its determinations. For this end they saw themselves constrained to form hetæries, which however were not, like those which have been previously considered — such as the oligarchical faction of Isagoras — designed to counteract either the subsisting government, or the prevailing sentiments of the people, but on the contrary to preserve and promote them. It is true Solon, Pisistratus, and Cleisthenes had not stood in need of any political hetæries, properly so called; but then it was through the measures of those statesmen that the people had gained the consciousness of its absolute power in comparison with individuals, and the will to make it respected.

Thus then it might seem as if all that had gone before had been merely introductory, and that the history which in the title-page professes to begin with Cylon's conspiracy, did not really open before that stage in the development of the Athenian democracy which followed the battle of Marathon. This however may be regarded as a mere question of arrangement, on which the author may claim an unlimited discretion. But this is not the case with several other questions which naturally occur to the reader, but which the author seems not to have anticipated, and which he has certainly neglected to answer. One question is, how the account here given of these political associations is connected or agrees

with that contained in the earlier part of the work? Here the phenomenon is described as arising out of the envy and mistrust with which eminent individuals were regarded by the people under the absolute democracy. Before we had been informed that it had its origin in the Greek mode of thinking with regard to the simple obedience due from the individual to the state. But it seems manifest that these are not different descriptions of the same thing, but descriptions of things essentially differing from one another. In the first place this democratical envy and distrust are not features peculiar to Greek society; and in the next place they are quite independent of any mode of thinking, or set of opinions on the relative rights of a community and its individual members. The feeling is one which belongs to human nature in all ages and countries; nor were the circumstances under which it showed itself at Athens peculiar to Greek history. All kinds of pre-eminence are apt to excite envy among those who owe all their importance and dignity to the body to which they belong. And in a society which has been agitated by frequent revolutions, they will be viewed with uneasiness, as suggesting the hope, and supplying the means, of illegal aggrandisement, or violent usurpation of unconstitutional authority. Such feelings may exist in the narrowest oligarchy, or in the bosom of an absolute monarch toward his minister. They imply no moral judgement whatever, as to the limits within which the political action of the individual ought to be confined. Another question is, how this democratical jealousy of individual influence proves the deficiency alleged to have existed in the organisation of the state, of means of exerting it. This jealousy cannot itself constitute such a deficiency, and seems more likely to be excited, in the first instance, by the exercise of a legitimate influence, when there seems to be reason for suspecting it of a tendency to exceed its constitutional bounds. Again it may be asked, since it is admitted that Cleisthenes may have found occasion to employ a hetæry, though he was not driven to this expedient by democratical jealousy, by what criterion is it possible to determine that this was the motive in the case of Themistocles, or in any other? — And, once more, how can such a supposition be reconciled with the most notorious facts in the history of Themistocles himself? So little does he appear to have resorted to secret courses with a view to shelter himself from the envy and mistrust of the people, that he is represented as having provoked their jealousy by the indiscreet language in which he asserted his claims on their gratitude.

There remains then, it would seem, but very slender likelihood that we shall ever be able to detect any thing peculiar or notable in the character of these associations; for it is clear that we could not expect to find it in the aristocratical or oligarchical factions

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and cabals, which from their nature can afford no test of the author's theory. But as he has referred to the administration of Pericles, as a period which will throw a stronger light upon it, it would be hardly doing him justice, if we refused to follow him a few steps farther, which will bring us to the epoch when, according to Droysen's above cited remark, hetæries of an entirely new kind began to make their appearance at Athens.

On the character and policy of Pericles Büttner enters into a comparatively long discussion, comprising, no doubt, much that is true and worthy of remark in itself, though it is mostly difficult to perceive its bearing on the subject of his history. For our present purpose it will be sufficient to confine our attention to a few points, which seem most closely connected with his theory, and which alone can be thought to lend it any support. The question is, how far and in what way the position of Pericles placed him under the necessity of employing private connections and secret agency for political purposes. As to the general character of his administration there can be little room for dispute. What has been said of Cleisthenes applies still more forcibly to him. He espoused the popular cause, if not without motives of personal ambition or antagonism to Cimon, at least incomparably more from a deep conviction of its being inseparably bound up with the strength and prosperity of the state. He, still more than Cleisthenes, and in a higher sense, was in advance of his generation. For his transcendant natural abilities had been cultivated by philosophical studies. In him the spirit of his age attained to the clearest consciousness of its own principles and tendencies, its aims and means. As the result of his deliberate judgement — which perhaps would not have been altered if he had distinctly foreseen its ulterior consequences — he gave the impulse which determined the complete development of the Athenian democracy, and raised Athens to the summit of her greatness.

Now with regard to Pericles, we are not left in doubt, as we were with regard to Cleisthenes, whether he was at the head of a political hetæry; for we have ample assurance that such was the fact, and that he made great use of his private partizans. The only question is, what were the precise circumstances in his position, which rendered their aid indispensable to him? According to Büttner, he was in two respects obliged to shroud himself from public observation. He was obliged to make a secret of the studies by which he acquired his political wisdom, and to conceal the hand with which he guided the helm, though in a course most agreeable to the popular wishes. On the first point Büttner observes: *Pericles was forced to acquire a deeper insight into political matters than was possessed by his fellow-citizens, that he might be able to conduct the affairs of the state. But as by striving after such*

knowledge he would have excited envy and, above all, fear, he concealed his study of philosophy and of political science from the eyes of the multitude. And then he proceeds to adduce some authorities in support of this assertion. This is perhaps the first instance in which he has offered any thing that looks like direct evidence in behalf of his theory, though this I believe will prove quite inadequate to the object proposed. Indeed it would be somewhat strange if it should appear that Pericles had been afraid of letting it be known that he was engaged in the cultivation of political philosophy, and yet took no pains to conceal the science he had acquired. It would have been more to the point to have shown that he was used on public occasions to dissemble his superior sagacity, and to bring down his eloquence and reasoning as near as possible to the level of the multitude. But the specimens given by Thucydides, as well as all we learn of his oratory from other sources, are quite at variance with such a supposition. We must therefore examine Büttner's authorities. He first cites Plutarch (Nic. 23.) in proof of the opinion which prevailed at Athens in the age of Pericles as to the irreligious tendency of the physical philosophy; and then he adds that political science was regarded as an instrument of ambition. For the truth of this last assertion he appeals to the testimony of Plato in the Protagoras (c. VIII. p. 316. D.) where he says that the sages of old, fearing the envy and odium which they might incur by their wisdom, concealed it, and cultivated it only under the pretext of mystical and oracular revelations and musical arts; and among those who had made the profession of music a cover for their real pursuits, he names Pythoclides, whom he elsewhere (Alc. I. 30.) describes as a teacher of Pericles, a testimony which is confirmed by Plutarch's statement (Per. 4. and Ar. 1.) that Damon who likewise instructed Pericles in political philosophy, endeavoured to shelter himself under the like profession, but was at last detected and ostracised, as a man of dangerous projects, and inclined to the establishment of tyranny.

But no such inference as this can be safely drawn from the passage in the Protagoras, not only because it is not Plato himself, but Protagoras, who is there supposed to be speaking, but because the whole tone and purport are such as to raise a great doubt how far it was meant to be taken in earnest. Protagoras has been asked by Socrates, whether he will speak with Hippocrates in private or in the presence of others, and he commends the prudence of this inquiry, observing that a foreigner like himself, coming into a great city, and attracting young men of the best quality to prefer his society to that of all others, has certainly great need of circumspection, as he exposes himself to no little envy, ill-will, and secret hostility. Indeed he believes the sophistical art, which he afterwards explains to be that by which men are qualified for the

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management both of private and public affairs, to be one of high antiquity; only its ancient masters, fearing to incur odium if they professed it openly, cloaked it under a variety of other names: some exhibiting it in the form of poetry, as Homer, Hesiod, and Simonides, others under that of mysteries and oracles, as Orpheus and Musæus; some again under that of gymnastics, as Iccus and Herodicus; others under that of music, as Agathocles, who, he says, was a great sophist, and Pythoclides, and many others. As it is impossible that the whole of this enumeration could be meant seriously, it seems arbitrary to select some examples as of a more historical character than the rest. And Protagoras is made to add, that these attempts at concealment were all fruitless, and imposed on none but the credulous multitude; and therefore he himself had renounced all manner of disguise, and openly professed his art, and in the experience of a long life had found no cause to repent of his boldness.

If this passage had stood alone, it seems impossible that any one could have gathered from it, that the study of political philosophy, or, as Büttner says, political wisdom, was regarded at Athens as an instrument of ambitious views. Büttner however seems to have thought that his interpretation of the passage was sufficiently confirmed by the example of Damon, as reported by Plutarch; and on this the question must ultimately turn. But unfortunately we know far too little of Damon and his history, to warrant our accepting it as an illustration of our author's proposition. All that can be admitted as sufficiently attested about him is that he professed the art or science of *music*, which in its largest sense might comprise every branch of intellectual culture, and in the Pythagorean system was intimately connected with the highest physical and political speculations; that he incurred a suspicion of harbouring designs hostile to the constitution of Athens; and that he was on this account expelled by the ostracism. But it does not follow that the study of the principles of government was, of itself, and as tending to make a man politically wiser than his neighbours, accounted an indication of a dangerous ambition; only it may be conceived that, while the study was yet new and rarely cultivated, its nature and objects might be grossly misunderstood, and might easily afford a pretext for calumnious charges. Büttner's argument would require us to suppose that the more correctly they were apprehended, the more obnoxious they must have become. This would imply that the boast of Pericles (Thuc. II. 40. *φιλοσοφοῦμεν ἄνευ μαλακίας*) not only was groundless, but could not have been uttered.

The other point which remains to be considered is, how it happened, that notwithstanding the popularity and decidedly democratical tendency of the policy of Pericles, he found it expedient, if

not necessary, to make large use of the secret services of his private partizans. According to Büttner (p. 24.) this was necessary because the people would not tolerate superior intelligence and ability, even when exerted in their own cause; they did not like to be guided by an individual, even though to the accomplishment of their own will; and this was represented at the outset (p. 5.) as a result of the sentiments which prevailed at all times in Greece, with regard to the legitimate relation between the individual and the state, as one of simple obedience, with the utmost possible abnegation of will and judgement, and which prevented him from finding adequate means of exerting a legitimate influence in the organisation of the state. We have been led to look for the clearest illustration of this proposition in the case of Pericles. But now that we have come to the point, all that our author is able to produce in support of his assertion is Plutarch's statement, that Pericles, in order to avoid the invidious appearance of engrossing the entire administration of the commonwealth, judiciously distributed the various departments of public business among his confidential friends, and reserved his own personal intervention for great occasions. It is needless to cite the instances by which Plutarch (Præc. Reip. Ger. 15.) confirms and illustrates his general statement. It is only to be regretted that Büttner should have thought it superfluous to point out how this very simple and natural precaution, which common prudence would dictate to every statesman in a free state, lends the slightest colour to a theory of such singular and mysterious pretensions as that which he has attempted to establish. The position of Pericles was one which exposed him to constant danger of a blow like that which fell on his friend Damon; and we know what pains were taken by his adversaries to infuse suspicions of him into the public mind. The greater his real power, the more reason he had to avoid any unnecessary exhibition of it. But not because the Greeks were unwilling, any more than any other people on the face of the earth, to be guided to their good; but because the Athenians, notwithstanding their general confidence in the integrity and patriotism of their great minister, were not entirely proof against occasional misgivings, that he might be tempted to abuse his ascendency over them so as to threaten their freedom.

For Cleon there was manifestly no such danger; as nobody could have foreseen the ostracism of Hyperbolus. We can very easily believe the anecdote recorded by Plutarch (Præc. Reip. Ger. 13.), that when he commenced demagogue, he renounced his connection with his early friends. He wanted no coadjutors for watching the turn of the popular humour, and shaping his own course in compliance with it. They would only have been so many troublesome claimants of a share in the spoil. If, as

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Plutarch supposes, they were men of probity and honour, the connection must speedily have dissolved itself; though it appears from a fragment of a comic poet preserved in the same passage, that he was surrounded by flatterers, and parasites, who fawned upon him as he did on the people. It is melancholy to find Droysen (u. s.), representing this man as a rough but honest counsellor, who did not shrink from telling the Athenians unpalatable truths, and attempting to palliate his proposal of the massacre at Mitylene, on the ground that any thing short of this atrocious cruelty was a half measure, and an unstatesmanlike weakness. Büttner appreciates Cleon's character more justly, but has been misled by his theory into the strange refinement of comparing him with Solon (p. 52.), considering both as mere organs of the popular will, only with the difference, that in Solon's time the popular will was directed by an enlightened view of its true interests; in Cleon's, by its passions and caprices.

Here I may close these remarks, as the remainder of Büttner's work presents no new argument or illustration applying to this subject. To those who are acquainted with the work, I believe, no apology will be necessary for this examination of its contents. To others it may perhaps appear that too much space has been devoted to a criticism which seems to have led to a merely negative result. But I would hope that it may not have been useless so far to consider the grounds of a theory, which, though applied by Büttner to a very narrow and obscure subject, has exercised a much wider influence, and tends, as I conceive, to place several of the most important epochs and characters of Greek history in a perplexing and fallacious light.

APPENDIX II.

ON THE BEGINNING OF XENOPHON'S HELLENICS.

It was not until this volume had been sent to the press that I saw Dr. Peter's *Commentatio Critica de Xenophontis Hellenicis*, where an entirely different view is taken of the transactions related at the opening of Xenophon's history from that which I have presented to my readers. Dr. Peter, it must be observed, considers the first two book of the Hellenics as a distinct work, designed simply to complete that of Thucydides. Nevertheless he supposes that Xenophon did not take up the thread of the narrative where it was dropt by his predecessor, but that he inserted at the beginning

of his continuation an account of some occurrences which Thucydides had already described. And he does not seem to be conscious that there is in this supposition any difficulty needing explanation. It is true, he also supposes that the first five chapters of the first book have undergone much alteration from the transcribers. But he does not appear to believe that there has been an interpolation of matter which the transcribers did not find in their author's text; rather that they curtailed and mutilated it. It is therefore by no means evident why Xenophon should have related the two engagements which are described in I. 1. 7. if, as Peter thinks, they are the same with the sea-fights of Eretria and Cynossema, which are more fully narrated by Thucydides VIII. 95. 104, 105. It cannot, I think, be denied that there is an apparent inconsistency between such a repetition and the design which Peter himself attributes to the work. And though this is not a difficulty which raises an insurmountable objection to his hypothesis, it is at least one which ought to be taken into account, and which may be admitted to counterbalance some of those which he has pointed out in the common view of the subject which he rejects.

The argument for the identity of the action mentioned in the first section of the Hellenics with the battle of Eretria related by Thucydides VIII. 95. is the most plausible. In the very few particulars stated in Xenophon's narrative there is the closest agreement with that of Thucydides. The commanders on both sides are the same in each; in each the engagement takes place immediately on the arrival of Thymochares (*εὐθὺς ναυμαχεῖν ἠναγκάζοντο*, Thuc.; *καὶ εὐθὺς ἐναυμάχησαν*, Xen.); in each the Athenians are defeated. Only Xenophon's *αὖθις* remains unexplained; and Peter is obliged to erase it as an interpolation of the transcriber, who—with the advantage of Xenophon's unmutilated text before him,—still did not perceive that his author was here only speaking of the battle described by Thucydides, and therefore inserted the adverb to remind the reader of what he supposed to be the previous engagement. But Peter also conceives that those who deny the identity of the two occurrences are bound to explain how Thymochares and Hegesandridas had contrived—after the losses each had sustained—to muster the forces which they commanded on the later occasion. Now as we do not know what was the amount of these forces on either side, it is evident that with regard to Thymochares there is no difficulty in this point. For after the battle of Eretria—where he lost 22 out of 36—he had still 14 galleys left, and after the enemy's squadron had been withdrawn from Eubœa he might have received a reinforcement from Athens. Then as to Hegesandridas, it is merely on the strength of a very questionable inference that Peter asserts

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that he lost his whole fleet in the storm off Athos. Thucydides indeed says that Mindarus, after his defeat, sent Hippocrates and Epicles to bring away the ships from Eubœa. And Diodorus (XIII. 41.) relates that Epicles, on his arrival there, collected the ships, which amounted to fifty, and forthwith set out on his return (ἀθροίσας τὰς ναῦς οὔσας πεντήκοντα). That fifty was really the number which he took away, which were all lost in the storm, is proved by the inscription cited by Diodorus, beginning, Οἵδ' ἀπὸ πεντήκοντα νεῶν θάνατον προφυγόντες. But it is equally clear that fifty was not the whole amount of the ships which remained to Hegesandridas after the battle of Eretria. For his own squadron consisted of 42, and he made 22 prizes. So that after he had parted with the fifty which Epicles carried away he would still have 14 left: exactly the number which remained to Thymochares. And I think it can hardly be denied that this looks like something more than an accidental coincidence, and that it was probably for the very purpose of preserving this equality with the enemy's force in this quarter, that no more than 50 galleys were sent to the aid of Mindarus.

Still if the question was only as to the action described in § 1 of the Hellenics, there would perhaps hardly be sufficient ground for distinguishing it from the battle of Eretria. But it is manifest that our conclusion on this point must depend on the view we take of the operations next related by Xenophon, which, Peter maintains, belong to the battle of Cynossema. For if this were otherwise, if they belong to a period not comprised in the narrative of Thucydides, it would be hardly credible that the subject of the preceding section should be an occurrence described by him, at some distance from the close of his history. And Peter himself acknowledges that the evidence of identity in this case is not so satisfactory as in the former, and contents himself with proposing a series of arguments on each side of the question, which he leaves to the judgement of his readers. But he has not, I think, done full justice to those which make against his hypothesis, and has laid more than due stress on some of those which he adduces to support it. One objection to which it seems to me liable, he has passed over without any notice. He has not attempted to explain how it happened, nor whether the cause rested with Xenophon or his transcriber, that of two important engagements, both related by Thucydides, one should be despatched in the fewest possible words, while the other is treated as fully in proportion as any in Xenophon's history. The arguments which he brings forward in support of his opinion are six in number. 1. The identity of the commanders and of the scene of action, and the similarity of the event in the two battles. As to this, it cannot be denied that these are circumstances which afford reasonable

ground for a suspicion that the two narratives may relate to the same transaction. And, it may be added, that this suspicion is strengthened by the recurrence of the parallel: the likelihood that Xenophon is treating of the same occurrences with Thucydides becomes greater, when we find the agreement continuing through two consecutive engagements. But this appears to me the only argument among the six which has any material weight. The two next are founded on the slowness which must be attributed to the movements of Tissaphernes and Alcibiades, if the events which in Xenophon's narrative precede their arrival in the Hellespont are conceived to be subsequent to the beginning of the satrap's journey, with which Thucydides breaks off. For Thucydides leaves Alcibiades at Samos (VIII. 108.); and Plutarch (Alc. 27.) says that when he heard that Mindarus was making for the Hellespont, he hastened to join his forces to those of the Athenians in that quarter. But, in the first place, the force of this argument (both as to Tissaphernes and Alcibiades) rests entirely on the words ἀρχομένου χειμῶνος in the present text of the Hellenics I. 1, 2.,—words, which Peter, who supposes the battle of Cynossema to have been fought in July, is consequently compelled to reject as an interpolation. For if, as he proposes (p. 19.), these words are expunged or transferred to some other place, there remains nothing to determine the length of the interval between the close of Thucydides and the beginning of the Hellenics. But further; it seems clear that Plutarch's statement, on which Peter relies, cannot without violence be reconciled with that of Thucydides as to the movements of Alcibiades, and that the narrative of Thucydides is utterly inconsistent with Peter's hypothesis. Plutarch, apparently, supposes that Mindarus was on his way to the Hellespont about the same time that Alcibiades was cruizing near the coasts of Cos and Cnidus, where he received the first intelligence of the Spartan admiral's movements, and forthwith shaped his course in the same direction. Thucydides, having related the battle of Cynossema, and the subsequent operations of the Athenians at Cyzicus, and of the Peloponnesians at Elæus, proceeds: "*Now about this same time Alcibiades returned with* 13 *galleys from Caunus and Phaselis to Samos:*" apparently therefore after the battle. He then, with a reinforcement of nine galleys, proceeded to the coast of Caria, and, after having settled matters at Halicarnassus and at Cos, returned to Samos, where Thucydides leaves him without any intimation of his ulterior proceedings or designs. And this second return to Samos, the historian informs us, took place πρὸς τὸ μετόπωρον ἤδη. And yet Peter believes that Alcibiades arrived in the Hellespont in time to take a part in the defeat of Mindarus off Cynossema, and urges, as his fourth argument, that Plutarch knows only of one battle fought near

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Abydus, as soon as the hostile fleets reached the Hellespont, in which Alcibiades unexpectedly intervened. The fifth argument I do not quite understand. If, says our author, the Athenians gained two victories within a short time, it does not appear what benefit they reaped from either. For all that is related by Xenophon § 8. as to the mission of Thrasyllus to Athens, with the exception of the name of Thrasyllus, is likewise stated by Thucydides VIII. 106. Whatever may be the point of this argument, it turns on an erroneous assertion. Xenophon says that Thrasyllus was sent to Athens to announce the victory, and to ask for a supply of troops and ships. Thucydides only says that the conquerors sent a trireme to Athens with the news of the victory. He does not speak of any application for a reinforcement, which Peter can only infer from the historian's remark that the Athenians, on receiving the intelligence, conceived hopes that they might still recover their superiority if they prosecuted their affairs with vigour, *ἐνόμισαν σφίσιν ἔτι δυνατὰ εἶναι τὰ πράγματα, ἢν προθύμως ἀντιλαμβάνωνται, περιγενέσθαι.* Finally, Peter observes that the flight of the Athenians to Cardia, related by Xenophon I. 1. 11., was probably occasioned by the great reduction in their numbers which took place after the battle, when they were obliged to send detachments in various directions to levy contributions, so that they were left with no more than forty galleys, while Mindarus could still bring sixty against them. As to this indeed there can be little doubt. But when Peter proceeds to argue that this flight to Cardia appears to be the same movement which Thucydides describes VIII. 107., where it is said that on the fourth day after their victory the Athenians, having refitted their galleys in haste, sailed to reduce Cyzicus, which had revolted from them, and succeeded in that object — it seems sufficient to refer the reader to the two narratives, and to let him judge for himself, whether it is possible to suppose that they describe the same occurrence. If so, Thucydides had omitted to notice the battle of Cyzicus, though he related its results: the recovery of the town, and the levying of contributions from it.

Such being the strongest part of Dr. Peter's case, it seems hardly necessary to discuss that which he himself considers as its weaker side: the objections to which he admits his hypothesis to be open. He feels the difficulty of supposing that Thucydides, in his account of the battle of Cynossema, omitted occurrences so important as the arrival of Dorieus and of Alcibiades, which determined, the one the beginning, the other the end of the battle, though he conceives that the difficulty as to Dorieus is partly removed by the observation, that Thucydides had not noticed his mission to Rhodes, which we learn from Diodorus XIII. 38. But our author does not seem to be aware that the objection as to Alcibiades is not merely that Thucydides has omitted to mention his

part in the battle, but that his arrival in the Hellespont before it was over is, as we have seen, utterly inconsistent with the subsequent narrative of Thucydides.

Another objection of little inferior weight — that the battle of Cynossema is plainly distinguished by Diodorus from that which Xenophon describes (I. 1. § 2—7.) — Dr. Peter meets with an assertion, which does not appear to me to be at all borne out by his authorities. He says that the later battle in Diodorus (XIII. 45, 46.), which ought to have resembled that described by Xenophon, is the same as the one we find in Thucydides, while the earlier one (Diod. XIII. 39, 40.), is so destitute of all special character, that it evidently has flowed from the invention of Diodorus. It seems a sufficient refutation of this argument to observe, that Diodorus, in his description of the second battle, notices both the arrival of Dorieus, as the occasion of the battle, and the sudden appearance of Alcibiades, as having decided its issue.

Dr. Peter also contends that his hypothesis is necessary to allow time for the transactions which follow Xenophon's second battle in the course of the same Olympic year. But, as has been already intimated, the chronological difficulty arising out of the words ἀρχομένου χειμῶνος in Xenophon's present text, cannot be admitted as an argument on behalf of a hypothesis which itself rejects them. And supposing them out of the way, we should not be at a loss to find a fit season for all that Xenophon here relates.

APPENDIX III.

ON THE DECREE OF CANNONUS.

THE modern authors who have mentioned the decree of Cannonus, seem all to have agreed in the supposition, that one of its main objects was, in cases where there were several defendants charged with the offence described in it, to give each the benefit of a separate trial. Schneider, in his note on the Hellenics, I. 7. 21, endeavours to accommodate the allusion in Aristoph. Eccles. 1089, to this supposed purport of the decree. Yet it seems clear that this was not the poet's meaning, and that the young man is only comparing his plight to that of a culprit, who, under the decree of Cannonus, was placed at the bar held by a person on each side. In this sense the Greek scholiast, though his words are corrupted, clearly understood the passage. He says: *ψήφισμά γε γράφει κατεχόμενον ἀμφοτέρωθεν ἀπολονεῖσθαι τὸν κατ' εἰσαγγελίαν ἀποκρινόμενον.*

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And it does not appear that Hesychius meant anything else, though he uses the plural number in the words quoted by Schneider: Καννώνου ψήφισμα· εἰσήνεγκε γὰρ οὗτος ψήφισμα ὥστε διειλημμένους τοὺς κρινομένους ἑκατέρωθεν ἀπολογεῖσθαι. From the language of Hesychius Schneider collects that the word ἑκατέρωθεν belongs to the decree of Cannonus; but the κατεχόμενον of the scholiast he supposes to have arisen from a misapprehension of the poet's meaning, and therefore rejects the opinion of Morus, who, on the authority of the scholiast, concluded that in the decree alluded to by Aristophanes, there was a provision, that the defendant should be guarded on each side while he pleaded his cause, but on this very account, and because the scholiast calls the process an εἰσαγγελία, thought that this must be a different decree from the one mentioned by Xenophon. Hudtwalcker (*Die Diæt.* p. 94. note) agrees with Schneider as to the meaning of Aristophanes, and thinks that the Scholiast misunderstood it, but nevertheless believes that the clause, κατεχόμενον ἀμφοτέρωθεν ἀπολογεῖσθαι, was really contained in the decree of Cannonus, though it is not the part to which Aristophanes alluded. He compares the proceedings in the case of Callixenus, and the others who deceived the people in the affair of the generals, described by Xenophon Hell. I. 7. 39., where it is said that, in consequence of the decree which directed them ἐγγυητὰς καταστῆσαι, they were kept in custody by their sureties: ἐδέθησαν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐγγυησαμένων. In like manner, under the decree of Cannonus, it is probable that the defendant was either to be thrown into prison, and brought up to trial in chains, or, if he found bail, to be attended by his sureties at the hearing.

Schneider's notion that διαλελημμένον in the passage of Aristophanes is to be understood in a middle sense, seems to me to destroy all the humour, and indeed all the meaning of the comparison. For then it is not the embarrassed youth, but his two tormentors, who are compared to the defendants under the decree of Cannonus; while for the speaker himself there would be no point of comparison at all. It is not however on this allusion, but on Xenophon's description, that I rest my belief, that the decree of Cannonus made no provision for the case of a plurality of defendants. The general purpose of the decree, as it is described by Euryptolemus, is well explained by Platner (*Der Process und die Klagen bei den Attikern*, p. 376.), though he has likewise adopted the common opinion as to the clause in question. It was an extremely rigorous decree (ἰσχυρόρατον), designed to deprive the delinquent of all means of evading justice. Its peculiarity as to the process preceding conviction consisted in three points. First, the offence was described in language so comprehensive as to include every possible case of treason: ἐάν τις τὸν δῆμον ἀδικῇ. He was to be tried before the assembled people, ἐν τῷ δήμῳ. And he was to be kept in close custody till the trial was over, δεδεμένον ἀποδύειν,

Considering the ordinary temper of the Athenian tribunals, we can hardly doubt that a clause for separating the cases of several defendants would have been considered as favourable to them; and accordingly Wachsmuth (i. 2. p. 205. note 178.), who adopts the common opinion as to the distinguishing feature of the decree, (*das Psephisma des Kannonos von Sonderung der Sachen mehrerer Angeklagten*) supposes it to have been passed under the polity which followed the overthrow of the Four Hundred. A clause of such a tendency would clearly not have been in harmony with the general spirit of the measure, and we are therefore obliged to view it with the more suspicion. One point at least is evident: that this clause was not the distinguishing feature of the decree; for Euryptolemus supposes that the generals would no less have the benefit of a separate hearing for each, if they were prosecuted under the other law which he mentions, against sacrilege and a certain class of treasonable offences. But I go further, and observe, that such a clause would have been superfluous, as it only prescribed that which the law previously required. For otherwise the proposition of Callixenus would not have been contrary to law; as I presume that no one will contend that the *νόμος* mentioned § 14, 15. 27. is either the decree of Cannonus, or the other law against sacrilege, and treason. This seems proof sufficient that no such clause existed; and the common opinion seems to have arisen solely out of the two words *δίχα ἕκαστον*, § 37., which have been erroneously referred to the decree of Cannonus, though they may just as easily be taken to express a distinct part of the proposition of Euryptolemus.

APPENDIX IV.

ON THE INTERVAL BETWEEN THE SURRENDER OF ATHENS AND THE APPOINTMENT OF THE THIRTY.

If we had no account but that which Xenophon has given of the transactions of this period, we should be led to suppose that the Thirty entered into office within a few days after the surrender of the city. Having related how the terms brought by Theramenes were accepted by the assembly of the people, Xenophon proceeds: *After these things Lysander sailed into Piræus, and the exiles returned, and they set about pulling down the walls to the sound of the flute with great eagerness, regarding that day as the beginning of freedom to Greece.* The next event which he records as having occurred at Athens, is the creation of the Thirty; and he after-

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wards says (II. 3. 11.) *The Thirty were chosen, as soon as the Long Walls and those of Piræus were rased* (ἠρέθησαν ἐπεὶ τάχιστα τὰ μακρὰ τείχη καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ καθηρέθη): words which Peter (Comm. Crit. p. 48.) finds it so difficult to reconcile with his own hypothesis, that he proposes to expunge them along with the next following δέ. It is clear however from Lysias (Eratosth. § 71.) and Plutarch Lys. 14, 15., that the interval which elapsed between the surrender and the creation of the Thirty was at least long enough for Lysander's voyage to Samos, and his return to Athens, and that it included the term allowed by the treaty for the dismantling of the fortifications. But for that work a fortnight might perhaps have been considered sufficient; and less time was required for Lysander's movements. The question is whether there are any facts which compel us to suppose that the interval was much longer than this. Sievers speaks waveringly on this point. In one note (269.) he says: *At least one month, if not two, intervened; so that the destruction of the walls and the establishment of the tyranny, which nearly coincides with it, would fall about the end of April, or of May. Perhaps indeed the interval was still longer. For Xenophon* (II. 3. 3 & 4.) *makes Lysander's departure for Samos* (*immediately after the appointment of the Thirty*) *coincide with an eclipse which happened on the third of September.* But in a subsequent note (292.) he seems to attach little value to the argument from the eclipse, and thinks it enough to allow a month's interval between the two events, and to assign the end of April for the beginning of the tyranny of the Thirty. But, independently of the eclipse, he offers no reasons for any of these opinions.

Scheibe also (p. 161.) lays no stress on any of the chronological statements in the two sections (II. 2. 24. and II. 3. 1.), thinking it doubtful whether they proceed from Xenophon himself. But he conceives that we have elsewhere a note of time which proves that the appointment of the Thirty must have been separated by an interval of several months from the surrender of the city. The government of the Thirty lasted eight months (Xen. II. 4. 21.) But if these eight months are reckoned from the spring, when the surrender took place, for instance from April, they would expire in the next winter; whereas a fact incidentally related by Xenophon implies, as Scheibe thinks (adopting an argument of Peter's, Comm. Crit. p. 47.), that it was much later in the year, in the fine season, when there was already ripe fruit in the country, before the reign of the Thirty came to an end. This they infer from the words in which Xenophon describes the excursions made by the party of Thrasybulus from Piræus, in which, beside forage and fuel, they are said to have collected fruit: προνομὰς ποιούμενοι καὶ λαμβάνοντες ξύλα καὶ ὀπώραν ἐκάθενδον πάλιν ἐν Πειραιεῖ. (II. 4. 25.) It is

true that the words πρὶν ἡμέρας δέκα γενέσθαι appear to connect the beginning of these excursions very closely with the end of the eight months. But it also seems evident that Xenophon is here describing operations which were continued from time to time as long as the civil war lasted, and therefore might introduce a circumstance which properly belonged only to the latter part of the period, which ended in Boedromion. And in fact it is very difficult to believe that the movements of Thrasybulus, from the occupation of Phyle to that of Piræus, as described by Xenophon, (II. 4. § 2—10.) took up several months. After the discomfiture of the troops of the Thirty who attempted to storm the place, and the abandonment of the blockade occasioned by the great fall of snow, the number of his adherents seems to have increased rapidly. It must have been very shortly afterwards that he found himself at the head of 700 men, and surprised the enemy's camp. After this disaster the Thirty felt themselves to be in danger (οὐκέτι νομίζοντες ἀσφαλῆ σφισι τὰ πράγματα II. 4. 8.), and endeavoured to secure themselves by the massacre of the Eleusinians and Salaminians. In a few days after, when his forces amounted to 1000 men, Thrasybulus took possession of Piræus. It is manifest that up to this time, or to the end of the eight months, his progress was most rapid, and never checked by a single reverse; and it is quite incredible that it can have occupied so much time as Scheibe supposes. The eight months must be reckoned back from Gamelion, or at the latest from an early day in Anthesterion, so as to bring us within about a month from the surrender of the city.

And this conclusion appears to be confirmed, if we examine the subject from another point of view, and inquire, as Scheibe proposes (p. 162.) what events occurred between the surrender and the appointment of the Thirty: that is, in other words, what causes there were in operation which tended to lengthen the interval. Those which tended to shorten it are evident enough: it was clearly the interest and the wish both of Lysander and of his Athenian friends to settle the government in the form which suited their purposes with as little delay as possible. What then was there to retard this settlement? Clearly not the operations of Lysander at Samos, which were of very secondary importance. There can be no doubt that he was ready to sail for Athens as soon as his presence was desired by the oligarchical party. The cause of the delay therefore must be sought in the state of affairs at Athens. And there Scheibe thinks it is to be found in the efforts made by the friends of democracy to preserve the old constitution, and thwart the designs of Theramenes and Critias. Lysander, he believes, sailed away to Samos as soon as he had taken possession of the walls and the ships, leaving the Athenians to deliberate on the remodelling of the constitution (he reads

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ἐβούλευσαν, I do not know on what authority, for ἐβούλευσεν, in Plutarch Lys. 15. ὡς παρέλαβε τάς τε ναῦς ἁπάσας πλὴν δώδεκα καὶ τὰ τείχη τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἕκτῃ ἐπὶ δεκάτῃ Μουνυχιῶνος μηνός ... ἐβούλευσεν εὐθὺς καὶ τὴν πολιτείαν μεταστῆσαι — to me the singular number seems to be required by the context). In these deliberations and in the attempts of the democratical party to effect a counter-revolution, several months he conceives were spent, and it was not until about the end of the summer that Lysander was called in to put down all opposition, and establish the government of the Thirty. Accordingly the fifth chapter of Scheibe's work is occupied with the history of these proceedings. But the materials for this history are entirely drawn from the speech of Lysias against Agoratus, which describes the transactions related by me to have taken place immediately before the surrender of Athens. Such is also the epoch to which they are referred by Sievers, who however remarks: *difficile sane est, illa omnia in unum diem cogere.* To me this does not appear very difficult, but at all events incomparably easier than to expand them into matter for the history of several months. The main question however is whether the assembly of which Lysias speaks (Agor. § 32 and 53.), as held in the theatre of Munychia or Piræus, was the same as that in which the terms of the surrender were accepted, or belongs to a later period. Let us consider the occurrences which Lysias describes as preceding and immediately following this assembly.

Theramenes on his return from his last embassy is met by some of the generals and the taxiarchs, among whom were Strombichides and Dionysodorus, who express vehement indignation at the terms of the treaty. *Seeing*, says the orator, *it was a peace only in name, but indeed the subversion of democracy, they declared that they would not permit these things to take place, not that they did not desire peace, but that they wished to bring about one better than this; and they thought they should be able to do so, and they would have effected it, if they had not been destroyed by Agoratus.* Theramenes and his associates, being thus warned of the opposition they might expect, determined, before the assembly should be held concerning the peace (πρὶν τὴν ἐκκλησίαν τὴν περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης γενέσθαι § 17.), to involve these men in a criminal prosecution, so as to deter every one who might be disposed to take the same side in the assembly. To this end they suborn Agoratus to lay a false information against their adversaries. But as they wished that he should appear to give his evidence reluctantly, they induce one Theocritus secretly to inform the Council of Five Hundred that a conspiracy had been formed for the purpose of defeating the intended settlement of affairs (ὅτι συλλέγονταί τινες ἐναντιωσόμενοι τοῖς τότε καθισταμένοις πράγμασι § 21.); that he himself was prevented by oaths which he had taken from divulging

the names of the conspirators, but that he knew of others (Agoratus in particular) who were not so bound. The Council itself, composed of men inclined to oligarchy, immediately passes a decree, and sends some of its members to Piræus, to arrest Agoratus. They find him there in the agora, and attempt to lead him away. But Nicias and Nicomenes, and some other persons, alarmed about the consequences which they saw were likely to ensue (ὁρῶντες τὰ πράγματα οὐχ οἷα βέλτιστα ἐν τῇ πόλει ὄντα § 23.) interpose, resist the arrest, and offer themselves as sureties for him. The councillors are forced to acquiesce, take down their names, and return to the city. Agoratus and his sureties seat themselves at the altar of Artemis in Munychia. They press him to make his escape with them from the torture to which (not being a citizen) he would probably be subjected by the Council, on board two vessels which were in readiness to carry them away. Agoratus however not only declined this, but when a fresh deputation came down from the Council with another decree, he of his own accord quitted the altar, and surrendered himself to them. Having been brought before the Council he made a list of the persons engaged in the alleged conspiracy, including his sureties, the generals and taxiarchs, and some other citizens. The Council pressed him to enlarge this list, and he was induced to make some additions to it. *But when,* Lysias proceeds, *the assembly in the theatre at Munychia came on, so anxious were certain persons that information should be laid against the generals and the taxiarchs before the people (for with regard to the rest that which had been laid in the Council was sufficient,) that they bring the accused officers into the assembly there. So,* he concludes, *Agoratus was the author of all the evils which befel the city: for when those men were arrested and imprisoned, then Lysander sailed into your harbours, and your ships were delivered up to the Lacedæmonians, and the walls were demolished, and the Thirty were appointed to their office.*

It must be observed that Scheibe himself states (p. 47 and 162.) that Lysander took possession of the ships immediately on the surrender of the city, consequently, as it would seem, immediately after this very assembly in Munychia; which, if so, must have been identical with that in which the treaty of surrender was adopted. And this identity is farther confirmed by the previous part of the narrative, in which we were told that the motive which induced Theramenes to get up these false charges against his adversaries, was the notice they had given of their intention to thwart his plans in the assembly which was to be held on the subject of the peace (ἐκκλησίαν τὴν περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης § 17.). He wished to involve them in danger before this assembly should be held, so as to deter every one there who might have been disposed to resist

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his proposals. And the way in which he effected his object was by charging them with conspiracy before the assembly in Munychia, which must therefore be the same with that which was held on the subject of the peace. How then does Scheibe avoid these inferences, and make such seemingly unequivocal marks of identity to disappear? That which is perhaps the most decisive of all he passes over in silence. He does not attempt to reconcile his hypothesis with the passage in which it is said that as soon as the persons charged with the conspiracy had been arrested and thrown into prison, Lysander sailed into the harbour, and the ships were delivered up to the Lacedæmonians. And yet he does quote *the beginning* of this passage, namely the words, *ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι συλληφθέντες ἐδέθησαν, τότε καὶ ὁ Λύσανδρος εἰς τοὺς Λιμένας τοὺς ὑμετέρους εἰσέπλευσε*, and, quietly assuming that this voyage of Lysander was that on which he came to overawe the assembly held to discuss the question of the oligarchical constitution, he treats these words as a proof that this assembly was subsequent to the one held in the theatre at Munychia; but he takes no notice of the words next following, *καὶ αἱ νῆες αἱ ὑμέτεραι Λακεδαιμονίοις παρεδόθησαν*, which so clearly show that this entrance of Lysander into the Athenian harbours was that which he made first, to take possession of the ships and the walls. Here however we must suppose that, absorbed by his hypothesis, he did not observe how it was affected by the words which he has omitted, and which, if he had but once copied them, must, one would think, have forced him to abandon it. The other indication of identity between the assembly held in Munychia and that in which the treaty was accepted — the passage in which Theramenes and his party are said to have planned the false accusation in order to put their opponents in jeopardy before the assembly on the question of the peace should be held, *πρὶν τὴν ἐκκλησίαν τὴν περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης γενέσθαι* — this he gets rid of by a merely arbitrary, and most violent assumption. He says we may understand by this *ἐκκλησία ἡ περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης* that which is elsewhere described as *ἡ περὶ τῆς πολιτείας*. But the only semblance of a warrant that he can assign for the supposition of such a misnomer is, that as the object of Theramenes and his friends with regard to the assembly *περὶ εἰρήνης* was *ἵνα μηδεὶς ἐκεῖ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ὑμετέρου πλήθους ἀντιλέγοι*, so in the oration against Eratosthenes it is said (§ 72.) of the same party, *περὶ τῆς πολιτείας τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ἐποίουν, ἵνα μήτε ῥήτωρ αὐτοῖς ἐναντιοῖτο μήτε ἀπειλοῖτο*. If this argument was worth anything, it would prove that the assembly on the peace was really identical with that on the constitution, since it is certain that on each of these occasions Theramenes and the oligarchs wished to silence the opposition which they had to encounter; but if it is admitted that in each instance they had a similar object, it was to be ex-

pected that this object should be described in both passages by similar expressions.

Scheibe does not seem to me much more successful in his attempts to prove that the assembly in Munychia could not have been that which was held before the surrender, though here he has the advantage of one real difficulty, which however his own hypothesis does not remove any more than that against which he alleges it as an objection. It is true we do not know why the assembly on the peace (*ἡ περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης*) should have been held in Munychia. We should no doubt have expected that it would have been held in the Pnyx. But we cannot infer from our ignorance that there might not have been a sufficient motive for the selection of the place. Scheibe himself admits that there *was* an assembly held at Munychia. Yet he is totally unable to explain why that assembly was not held in the ordinary place. It might perhaps also be asked — though Scheibe has not done so — how it happened, if this was the same assembly as that on the peace, that Lysias describes it in two different ways: first as *ἡ περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης* (§ 17.) and afterwards twice (§ 32 and 55.) as *ἡ Μουνυχίασιν ἐν θεάτρῳ*. The cause appears to have been, that in the first passage the orator is led by his subject to notice the business on which the assembly was called, whereas in the two other passages this was foreign to his purpose, and it was sufficient to designate the assembly he meant by the place of meeting. According to Scheibe's hypothesis we not only do not know why the last mentioned assembly was held in Munychia rather than in the Pnyx, but we do not know why it was held at all; and Lysias would have described it twice by the place of meeting, without having once intimated on what business it met. This omission indeed does not strike the reader in Scheibe's narrative; for he states (p. 53.) that the assembly was called for the purpose of bringing the charges laid against the generals and taxiarchs before the people. But this is nothing more than a conjecture of his own, which is not in the slightest degree confirmed by the text of Lysias. On the contrary, it seems to be most clearly implied in the orator's language, that this assembly had been called for some other business, and that the criminal charges were only incidentally brought before it. For otherwise, instead of saying: *when the assembly met in Munychia* (*ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἡ ἐκκλησία Μουνυχίασιν ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ ἐγίγνετο*), *some persons were so very anxious that the information against the generals and taxiarchs should be laid before the people also* (*for with regard to the rest, the information laid in the Council was sufficient,*) *that they bring them forward there too before the people* (*οὕτω σφόδρα τινὲς ἐπεμελοῦντο, ὅπως καὶ ἐν τῷ δήμῳ περὶ τῶν στρατηγῶν καὶ τῶν ταξιαρχῶν μήνυσις γένοιτο· (περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπέχρη ἐν τῇ βουλῇ μήνυσις ἡ γιγενημένη) ὥστε καὶ ἐκεῖ παράγουσιν εἰς τὸν δῆμον* — in-

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stead of this it would have been natural and almost unavoidable for him to say: *so anxious were some persons to bring these charges before the people, that they procured an assembly to be held in Munychia for that purpose.*

These remarks will in part already have disposed of another argument, which Scheibe grounds on *the circumstance that in each of the two passages* (Lys. Agorat. § 32 and 55.) *in which the assembly in Munychia is mentioned, it is only said that the μήνυσις took place there, while on the other hand where the assembly on the peace is distinctly spoken of, nothing is said about the information against the generals and taxiarchs. It would certainly have been stated either by Xenophon or by Lysias, that the assembly on the peace was held there.* But Lysias in fact does as much; for his narrative very plainly intimates, that the assembly which he first describes as that on the peace, is the same as that which he afterwards mentions as held at Munychia. It is even now inexplicable on any other supposition; and to his contemporaries it would have sounded strange, if he had not given them credit for remembering, when he mentioned the assembly on the peace, that it was held in Munychia, or when he spoke of the assembly in Munychia, that it was held to discuss the peace. But as to Xenophon, whoever looks at this part of his Greek history, and observes how he hurries over the transactions of this epoch, as if he was treading on live coals, will not be surprised that he should not have noted a circumstance which he might consider (perhaps with good reason) as far less important than many others which he also thought proper to omit. But in fact, according to the actual form of his narrative, he could hardly have introduced it; for he has not expressly mentioned the assembly itself. He only alludes to it by a very brief notice of the debate. *On the morrow* (after the return of Theramenes) *the ambassadors made their report of the terms on which the Lacedæmonians would make peace* (τῇ δὲ ὑστεραίᾳ ἀπήγγελλον οἱ πρέσβεις, ἐφ' οἷς οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ποιοῖντο τὴν εἰρήνην). He uses no expression to which he could have annexed the mention of the place.

Weak as these arguments of Scheibe's appear, they are more solid than that to which he attributes the highest degree of cogency, but which rests on an assumption which cannot even claim the value of a probable conjecture. Lysias (c. Agorat. § 15.) says that the generals and taxiarchs and those of their party who had an interview with Theramenes after his return, declared that they would not permit the terms he brought, to be accepted (οὐκ ἔφασαν ἐπιτρέψαι ταῦτα γενέσθαι). *Now this*, Scheibe calmly observes, *can only have passed in the first assembly held on the peace;* and he then proceeds most logically to infer that the assembly next mentioned (ἡ περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης, § 17.) must have been a later one,

namely that which is elsewhere, and properly, described as ἡ περὶ τῆς πολιτείας. It is unnecessary to expose the utter futility of the assertion, that the announcement of a determination to oppose the acceptance of the treaty could only have been made in the assembly in which the treaty was discussed, even if it did not involve the further violence by which the words ἡ περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης are made equivalent to ἡ περὶ τῆς πολιτείας. On the contrary, the words οὐκ ἔφασαν κ. τ. λ. may far more rationally be referred to the same occasion as the ἠγανάκτουν σφόδρα (§ 13.) that is, to the interview with Theramenes, when those who felt this vehement indignation probably did not conceal their sentiments.

It only remains then to consider whether the difficulty — felt, as we have seen, by Sievers, though he did not regard it as insurmountable — of conceiving the transactions related by Lysias (c. Agor. § 13—32.) to have taken place in the interval between the return of Theramenes and the assembly held on the following day, is such as to force us to adopt Scheibe's hypothesis. Scheibe observes that Theramenes could not have prepared the charges against his adversaries before the assembly which was held the day after his return, on account of his absence from Athens. But this assertion is questionable in more respects than one It is not clear that he needed a longer time than the interval between his return and the meeting of the assembly for the plot which Lysias describes; and it is not impossible that he might have concerted it with his confederates before his return to Athens. For he certainly anticipated the opposition he should meet with, and might have laid a plan for overpowering it, which he carried into execution immediately on his arrival. But this supposition is not necessary. The conception of the plan, to employ one of his creatures to trump up a charge of conspiracy against the men who threatened to be troublesome in the assembly which was to be held the next day, was not one which required any long premeditation; nor was much time needed for the preliminary arrangements with Theocritus and Agoratus: and everything else belonging to the execution of the plan might very easily have been transacted during one sitting of the Council; nor does Lysias give the slightest hint that the Council sate oftener on this business. Let the amplest time be allowed for the following occurrences: Theocritus makes his disclosure to the Council; a decree is passed to arrest Agoratus; some of the councillors are sent down to Pirœus; after a short altercation they return to Athens, and are sent back with a fresh decree; Agoratus surrenders himself, and having been brought before the Council makes out a list of the conspirators; all might have been over in seven or eight hours.

There is indeed another difficulty, according to Scheibe's view of these proceedings; but it is a difficulty of his own making, not

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one which arises out of the facts as they are related by Lysias. Scheibe assumes that the information laid by Agoratus against the adversaries of Theramenes was not false: that there was a real, democratical conspiracy, which he and Theocritus knew of and betrayed. Now if this was the case, it certainly would be very difficult to believe that Theramenes, on the very day of his return to Athens had discovered or suspected that such a conspiracy existed, and that Theocritus and Agoratus were privy to it, and had found means to induce them to reveal it. But when we inquire for the evidence of this conspiracy, we find none but Scheibe's bare assertion of the fact. If indeed this assertion could gain any weight by the frequency with which it is repeated, and by the author's seeming unconsciousness that any thing else is needed to establish its truth, it might pass for an argument. Scheibe asserts in the introduction (p. 11.) that *the faction of the moderate democrats and the wealthy aristocrats to whom Nicias, Nicomenes, Aristophanes of Cholleidæ, and perhaps also Eucrates belonged, were combined in a conspiracy against the oligarchs which was betrayed by Agoratus:* and he refers to the fifth chapter of his history for further particulars, and, one might suppose, for proofs. Accordingly the fifth chapter is headed: *Conspiracy against the oligarchs, and treachery of Agoratus.* In the beginning of this chapter the assertion is repeated, with the additional statement, that *already before the return of Theramenes the oligarchs had been making strenuous efforts to discover and frustrate the plot.* But no attempt is made to prove its existence; it would seem that Scheibe was not aware that there was room for doubt on the subject. Nevertheless his only authority is Lysias, who speaks of no plot, except that which was laid by Theramenes to ruin his opponents, and represents Theocritus and Agoratus as his tools, and their accusation as utterly false. According to him the accused were indeed resolutely opposed to the measures of the oligarchy; but they made no secret of their hostility, and relied upon their legitimate influence with the people for the means of effectual resistance to the threatened revolution. Here therefore it is not so difficult to refute Scheibe — for a simple contradiction is sufficient to overthrow an unsupported assertion — as to understand how he was led to take a view of the facts so directly contrary to that which Lysias intended to convey. And I can only suppose that it was suggested to him by the obscurity which certainly envelops one part of the transaction in the orator's narrative. Scheibe seems to have concluded that the anxiety manifested by Nicias, Nicomenes, and the other democrats, when Agoratus was threatened with arrest, could only proceed from their consciousness of his having been their accomplice in some secret designs. But this is only one conjecture among many which might be formed to

explain the mystery. For instance, it might be imagined that the democrats had received some private intimation of the object for which Agoratus was to be arrested. In that case the leading men of the party, without being conscious of any plot, would know that the blow was aimed against them. They were no doubt bound together by a close union of political sentiments, which might naturally enough be styled a conspiracy by their enemies, but ought not, without some better evidence, to be now described by such a name; Bremi, in his Introduction to the Oration against Agoratus (*Bibliotheca Græca*, p. 93) judiciously observes, *Equidem minime negaverim viros fortes patriæque amantes, qui ægre ferebant patriam et per externos et per internos hostes libertate esse privatam conjunctis viribus, quam conspirationem vocare solent potentes vel potius impotentes, studuisse ut tyrannidem a republicâ depellerent. Hoc significat etiam hæc ipsa oratio, imprimis ea quæ narrantur a* § 23 (the scene in Piræus). *Non tamen videtur historicâ auctoritate constitui posse, quatenus ista consociatio progressa fuerit.* Scheibe would have done better, if he had exercised the like caution.

I have thus, I believe, examined every argument he has adduced, and, if I am not mistaken, have shown that there is no force in any of them; that his chronological arrangement of the period in question is entirely inadmissible; and that the interval between the surrender of Athens and the appointment of the Thirty, was probably very little longer than the term prescribed by the treaty for the demolition of the fortifications; which is of course the nearest approximation to an exact measure that the nature of the evidence in this case permits. Scheibe himself, in conformity with the language of Diodorus and Plutarch (p. 55.), supposes the prescribed term not to have exceeded a few days; and the way in which he speaks of it in this passage is remarkable, and suggests some questions for which his hypothesis does not supply a satisfactory answer. *In the autumn of* 404, *Lysander*, —in compliance with the request of the Athenian oligarchs,— *departed from Samos and sailed into Piræus. As the Athenians had allowed the term of a few days* (*von einigen Tagen*), *prescribed to them by the conquerors for pulling down their walls, to elapse, Lysander assembled all the female flute-players of his fleet, and many besides from the city, and caused the ships to be burnt, and the walls to be demolished to the sound of their music, while the allies* (and the exiles, Xen. II. 2. 23.) *crowned with chaplets sang hymns of triumph, as believing that the day of freedom had now dawned upon Greece.* But, according to Scheibe's reckoning, the Athenians had allowed, not only a few days, but several months to elapse, without having executed one of the most important articles of the treaty. And we are led to inquire, how this is to be explained. Even if the Athenians could have persuaded them-

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selves, either that this article would not be enforced, or that they should be able effectually to resist the fulfilment of it, how was it that the Lacedæmonian government remained so long passive, and nourished these hopes by its seeming acquiescence? That it should not have been anxious to urge the execution of the treaty within the prescribed term, is quite intelligible; but that, when it had once gained the advantage of being able to charge the Athenians with a breach of the capitulation, it should have suffered months, during which the Peloponnesian troops were detained from their harvest and their homes, to pass without exacting the performance of so capital an article—for after all Lysander only came upon a summons from Athens—is surely very hard to believe. And if, to escape from this difficulty, we should suppose that the demolition was begun in due time, but not completed—which is perhaps the easiest mode of reconciling Diodorus (XIV. 3.) with Xenophon and Plutarch (Lys. 15.)—then a fresh difficulty arises out of the great length of the interval on Scheibe's hypothesis; for, however slowly the work of destruction might have proceeded, it would probably, if once begun, have been finished before the autumn. The festive pomp with which Lysander set about it, and the language both of Xenophon and Plutarch about *that day being the beginning of freedom for Greece*, certainly rather favour the supposition, that not a stone had been previously moved. But Plutarch, still more plainly than Diodorus, represents the destruction of the walls as having followed very close on the end of the term prescribed by the treaty.

If the words Πυθοδώρου ἐν Ἀθήναις ἄρχοντος ὃν Ἀθηναῖοι, ὅτι ἐν ὀλιγαρχίᾳ ἠρέθη, οὐκ ὀνομάζουσιν, ἀλλ' ἀναρχίαν τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν καλοῦσιν (Hell. II. 3. 1.) are Xenophon's, they would prove that the oligarchy was established before Pythodorus came into office; and at any rate they express the judgement of one who had studied the chronology of the period. Sievers indeed (p. 96.) believes that the anarchy was not the year of Pythodorus, but the interregnum between June 403, when, in the ordinary course of things, the election of new archons should have taken place, and September, when, on the restoration of democracy, Euclides was created. This is probable enough, but does not weaken the argument from the actual text of Xenophon.

Another indication pointing to the same result is afforded by Andocides (De Myst. § 80. Bekk.) where the leading events of the whole period from the surrender to the downfall of the Thirty, are enumerated as follows: ἐπεὶ δ' αἱ σπονδαὶ πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους ἐγένοντο, καὶ τὰ τείχη καθείλετε, καὶ τοὺς φεύγοντας κατεδέξασθε, καὶ κατέστησαν οἱ τριάκοντα, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα Φυλή τε κατελήφθη Μουνυχίαν τε κατέλαβον. According to Scheibe's hypothesis the first of these events, the σπονδαὶ, was separated from those next mentioned

by at least as long an interval as that which elapsed between the appointment of the Thirty and the occupation of Phyle, which the orator could not help marking by his μετὰ ταῦτα.

Lachmann (*Gesch. Griech.* p. 17) gets rid of the difficulty which has occupied us, with an almost enviable facility. He supposes that in the assembly on the day after the return of Theramenes, Theramenes only made a report on his embassy, but that nothing was decided until by means of the plot of Agoratus the leaders of the democratical party had been put out of the way. Then a second assembly was held, in which the treaty of peace was accepted. Shortly after the arrest of the democrats, Theramenes sent for Lysander from Samos, and on his arrival the walls were demolished, and the Thirty appointed. This narrative runs smoothly enough; but if we inquire for the authority on which it rests, we only find a note, in which Lachmann refers to Lys. c. Agorat. p. 453 f. and calmly observes—*Xenophon makes the conclusion of the treaty take place on the day after the return of Theramenes, contrary to the more exact statements of Lysias.* But there is no contradiction between Xenophon and Lysias, and no hint in Lysias of any assembly held after the return of Theramenes, prior to that in which the terms of peace were accepted.

APPENDIX V.

ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SPARTAN CONSTITUTION.

SINCE the publication of the First Volume of this History, in which (Appendix I.) several works relating to the Spartan constitution were mentioned, another has appeared in Germany which may be classed with the more valuable on the subject. Its title is: *Die Spartanische Staats-verfassung in ihrer Entwickelung und ihrem Verfalle von Dr. Karl Heinrich Lachmann. Breslau.* 1836. Though it was published early in the year, it came into my hands too late to be noticed in the preceding pages. But several readers may be interested in an account of the author's views on some of the more difficult and important questions which have been already discussed in the course of this work.

The foundation of his theory is laid in an Introduction on the origin of the Greek religions, and on the early history of the Ionians, whom he conceives to have been closely allied to the Minyans, and of the Achæans, including an inquiry into the legends of the Pelopids, and of the Trojan war. The main object of these

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preliminary investigations is to ascertain the state of Laconia before the Dorian invasion. And the result to which he conducts the reader is, that the population was at that time composed of Pelasgians (Leleges), Minyans, and Achæans. Rejecting the story of the Minyan colony from Lemnos, as a fiction invented to connect two independent facts, he considers the Minyans as the people which preceded the Achæans in the possession of Laconia, where they had reduced the aboriginal Pelasgians to bondage. The Achæans on the other hand he conceives to have been settled there but a few generations before the arrival of the Dorians, and in comparatively small numbers. They were never masters of the whole land, in the same sense as the Dorians became so, but only exercised a kind of *hegemony* over the Minyan cities. Their seat of government was Amyclæ, which at an earlier epoch had sent out a Minyan colony to Sparta. This state of things rendered it easy for the Dorians, notwithstanding their numerical weakness, to dislodge the Achæans, who were almost entirely expelled. The conquerors occupied Sparta (the πόλις properly so called, in contradistinction to the four κῶμαι) and were supported by the tribute which they received from the *helots*, the cultivators of the ἕλος, or level tract on the banks of the Eurotas from Sparta down to the sea, who for some time were permitted to enjoy their personal freedom and the possession and property of their lands subject to this charge, and may therefore be compared with the Attica γεωμόροι before Solon. With regard to the other Laconian cities, the Dorians merely stept into the place which had been previously occupied by the Achæans.

Lachmann's view of the development of the Spartan constitution mainly depends on his conception of the manner in which the Spartan tribes were formed, and gradually united together. The original Dorian nation, according to him, consisted only of the Hylleans. These, in their wanderings north of Olympus, associated themselves with a portion of the Macedonian or Macednian people, who formed the second tribe, the Dymanes. The third tribe, the Pamphylians, was composed of the adventurers who accompanied the conquerors on their expedition into Peloponnesus. The Dorian and the Attic Tetrapolis are both considered as vestiges of the period when there were but two tribes, as the Asiatic Hexapolis is supposed to have represented the three. But these tribes were at first very imperfectly united to each other, and were distinguished by a great disparity of political rights. The two elder tribes were governed each by its own king and senate, and it was only after the conquest that the king of the Dymanes was admitted to a complete equality of rank and power with the king of the Hylleans, and that the legend arose which represented both the royal houses as springing from the Heracleid Aristodemus.

But the *prytanis* of the third tribe strove in vain to raise himself to a level with the other two; its unsucessful efforts are indicated by the story of the regent Theras, the head of the Ægeids (who belonged to this tribe), and of the Minyans, who were banished from Laconia because they aspired to the royal dignity. The distance by which it was separated from the Hylleans and the Dymanes is marked by the tradition reported by Isocrates: that the Spartan Dorians amounted to no more than 2000 (1000 families for each tribe). Like the others, however, it had its *gerusia*, which deliberated apart on its particular interests.

The weakness of the invaders rendered it necessary, very soon after their settlement at Sparta, to confer a limited franchise on a commonalty composed of the natives, who were gathered round them in the four boroughs, or suburbs, Pitana, Mesoa, Cynosura, and Limna, to which Lachmann conceives the name of Lacedæmon was properly applied. The name of Spartans belonged originally and properly to the Dorians of the Old Town (the ὅμοιοι); but they were included in the appellation of Lacedæmonians, which was the official description of the whole people. With the aid of this commonalty the Spartans reduced the rest of the helots to servitude, and deprived them of their property in the land which they tilled, and established their own dominion in the rest of Laconia. But the newly enfranchised commoners (νεοδαμώδεις) were not all immediately provided with landed property, and therefore could not for a long time exercise their political rights, which required that their subsistence should be independent of all industrious occupations. Their wants were supplied by the conquest of Messenia, and were the real motive of the Messenian wars. But in the mean while they took an active part in the contests of the Spartan tribes, and thus contributed to aggravate the disorders of that period of discord and anarchy which was at length terminated by the legislation of Lycurgus. The object of his institutions was to unite the two orders—the Lacedæmonian commonalty and the Spartan Peers—more closely together, and to abolish the distinctions by which the peers of the three tribes were separated from one another. For this purpose he formed one common senate out of the three bodies which had before deliberated apart—though the tradition preserved by Hermippus in Plutarch (Lyc. 5.) that Lycurgus communicated his plans to *twenty* persons, leads Lachmann to the conclusion, that the senates of the two elder tribes had previously been assembled together for public consultations—and made the kings, who had before presided each over the senate of his own tribe, members of the common one. The origin of the ephoralty, which was peculiar to Sparta and her colonies, belongs to the period before Lycurgus. The name ephor is connected, not with the verb ὁράω, but with ἐφορία, which is explained in Bekker's Anecd. (p. 204.)

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as equivalent to ἀγορὰ, ἡ σύνοδος ἡ πρὸς τοῖς ὅροις γινομένη τῶν ἀστυγειτόνων, οὗ οἱ ὅμοροι ὁμοῦ συνιόντες περὶ τῶν κοινῶν ἐβουλεύοντο, as in Rome the forum lay between the two most ancient settlements on the Palatine and the Capitol. In Sparta there were five such ἐφορίαι, which were the places where civil justice was administered. This was one of the royal functions; but when the kings ceased to be considered merely as chiefs each of a tribe, and belonged equally to the whole Lacedæmonian people, they appointed five magistrates—hence called ephors—as their substitutes in this part of their office, only perhaps reserving the more important causes and appeals in all causes for their own cognizance. Lycurgus united the ephors in one college, transferred the right of appointment to the people, and made all the electors eligible, while the senate remained open only to the Peers. Lachmann totally rejects the story of the partition of land made by Lycurgus, which he thinks may not improbably have arisen out of the endeavour of Agis and Cleomenes to represent their revolutionary changes as a restoration of the Lycurgean institutions.

The conquest of Messenia, as it afforded the means of assigning a piece of land for every freeman, raised the number of the active citizens (the δαμώδεις) who shared the Spartan education, and had a place at the public tables, to 9000 families. So that the commoners, who were equally distributed among the three tribes, forming twenty houses out of the thirty in each *obe*, doubled the number of the nobles. To guard against the effects of this preponderance in the numbers of the inferior order, the nobles introduced a measure which so limited the powers of the popular assembly as to reduce its deliberative capacity to a mere shadow. It was only permitted to listen and assent to the proposals of the senate, which was not even bound to obtain this sanction for its decrees. These proceedings having thus sunk into an empty form, must be supposed soon to have fallen into disuse; and the election of magistrates became the only kind of business for which the assembly met. That the nobles were able to carry such a measure, and as it seems without a struggle, is to be ascribed partly to their own hereditary ascendency, partly to the influence of the victorious and popular king Polydorus, to whom so many citizens were indebted for the estates which enabled them to exercise their dormant franchise, and partly to the compensation which the lower order received in the growing power of the ephors, who began to be considered as its representatives. From these premises our author deduces a new and important proposition: that the ἐκκλησία of Sparta mentioned by Thucydides and other historians, is not the assembly of the people, but only that of the magistrates, the senate, the ephors, and others who, he supposes, may have amounted in all to about seventy persons; for (with

Tittmann) he interprets Xenophon's ὡς τεσσαράκοντα (Hell. III. 3. 5.), not as the whole sum, but as the remaining part, and considers this enumeration as the description of an ἐκκλησία, which was the same body as the ἐκκλητοὶ, the τέλη ἄρχοντες, or ἀρχαὶ, who are sometimes named in its stead. The μικρὰ ἐκκλησία mentioned by Xenophon (Hell. III. 3. 8.), was composed of the senate and ephors only. As the power of the ephors depended upon this aristocratical assembly, it was constantly exercised in support of the aristocratical interests, even when a majority of the college was taken from the lower order. Thus the ephoralty, notwithstanding its democratical origin, became the firmest pillar of the aristocratical institutions.

This short abstract is of course not designed to put the reader in complete possession of the author's views, much less to give any notion of his proofs and illustrations, which must be sought for in the work itself. The reader however may expect to be informed how far this new view of the subject has modified that which has been taken in this history. And the following observations are chiefly intended to gratify this curiosity:

Lachmann's account of the institutions of Lycurgus, though in itself not improbable nor inconsistent with historical analogy, especially with that of Roman history, which apparently suggested it, as is most distinctly shown by Schoemann, *De Ecclesiis Lacedæmoniorum*, pp. 10, 11., seems to assume too many propositions which rest on very slight or ambiguous evidence, and to reject too much of the opinion commonly received among the ancients as to the nature of the changes effected by the Spartan lawgiver. The traces to which he refers, of those conflicts which he supposes to have taken place among the three tribes, are too faint to satisfy us of their existence; and the testimony of Isocrates, as to the number of the Dorian invaders, is the less to be relied on, as it omits the third tribe. Yet this is the main foundation of the hypothesis about the rise of the Lacedæmonian commonalty, which would be unnecessary, if the force of the original settlers is raised but a little higher. Whatever were the means which enabled them to overpower the Achæans on their first arrival, might have sufficed for the gradual subjugation of the whole country, without any communication of the franchise. The mode of this communication also raises some difficulties for which we find no explanation provided. It would seem as if the same principle which led the Dorians to form, first their Macedonian allies, and then the adventurers who joined them in their expedition against Peloponnesus, into a distinct tribe, should have prevented them

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from admitting the Lacedæmonians into any of the three. But it is especially improbable that these new citizens should have been equally distributed among tribes so jealous of each other, and differing so widely in rank. And again, if with respect to the Lacedæmonian commonalty the three tribes were considered as all on one level, then we should not have expected that the unendowed, and therefore imperfectly enfranchised citizens, who could have had no prospect of such a provision as after the conquest of Messenia enabled them to exercise their privileges, should have been immediately incorporated with the noble tribes precisely in the same way as the rest. The Peers, according to Lachmann's view, were not an oligarchical, but an aristocratical body. The account which has been given in this volume of Cinadon's plot, rests upon the other hypothesis. Lachmann is obliged to suppose that no real change had taken place in the relations of the Spartans to the lower orders, with whom they were the object of such violent hatred, but only that there was at Sparta a secret, democratical, revolutionary party, which the sight of Athenian liberty had made discontented with its inferior position. This is a conjecture, which, under the circumstances in which Sparta and Athens had been standing toward each other, appears less probable than the explanation proposed in this volume. The intercourse with Athens, such as it was, to which Lachmann attributes these great effects, was confined to Spartans of the highest rank. On the other hand, I do not think the passages which he cites from Isocrates and Plato, sufficient ground for rejecting the tradition that the legislation of Lycurgus was connected with some changes in the distribution of landed property. As to that of Isocrates (Panath. p. 287. and Leg. III. p. 684.), little is gained for Lachmann's argument, if this be denied. For the eulogist of Sparta in the Panathenaicus not only asserts that no one could produce an instance of a γῆς ἀναδασμὸς at Sparta, but claims for it an exemption from the civil discord (στάσις) which had afflicted all other Greek cities: and this assertion, if referred to the period before Lycurgus, so directly contradicts the concurrent testimony of antiquity which Lachmann himself adopts, that it would deprive the others of all title to credit. I must reserve the consideration of Mr. Grote's far weightier argument on the same side of the question for a future opportunity.

Still less am I satisfied with Lachmann's view of the Spartan ἐκκλησία. He observes that the name given to the assembly of the people in the rhetra of Lycurgus is ἀπέλλα, that Herodotus calls it ἀλία, which was the ordinary Dorian term, and that at Syracuse a select meeting of the principal men was called ἐσκλητύς (ἐσκλητυς, ἡ τῶν ἐξόχων συνάθροισις, ἐν Συρακούσαις. Hesych.). But this does not seem quite sufficient to render it probable that the term ἐκκλησία should have been applied at Sparta to the assem-

bly of the magistrates, still less that it should have been used in this sense by Thucydides and Xenophon, without any qualification to apprise their readers of the wide difference between it and the ἐκκλησία with which they were familiar. Lachmann produces a number of instances from these historians, in which the Spartan ἐκκλησία is represented as deliberating and discussing various questions of state policy: a privilege expressly taken away from it by the rhetra of Polydorus. He however seems to admit that all these descriptions may be referred to the τέλη ἄρχοντες, who according to the common notion were in fact the only speakers in every assembly; but he conceives that this supposition is in itself too improbable to be admitted. He thinks that the commonalty could not have been so often present at such consultations, without gradually enlarging its pretensions; and that such a state of things would have been inconsistent with the rise and the peculiar character of the ephors. Even the Athenian council, he observes, did not deliberate in the presence of the people.

Beginning with this last remark, I would observe on the other side, that the deliberations of the Athenian council were public; and, if Lachmann's conjecture be right, that the Spartans pointed out by Cinadon in the market-place constituted an ἐκκλησία, the case would seem to have been the same at Sparta; for there were 4000 persons of inferior rank present there at the same time. One strong objection to his hypothesis arises out of the very passages of Aristotle which he cites to prove the narrow limits within which the powers of the Spartan assembly were confined. Aristotle mentions as one of the points in which the constitutions of Crete and of Sparta resembled each other, that in Crete all the citizens were admitted to the assembly, but it had no power except that of ratifying the previous resolutions of the senate and the cosmi. (Ἐκκλησίας μετέχουσι πάντες· κυρία δ' οὐδενός ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ἢ συνεπιψηφίσαι τὰ δόξαντα τοῖς γέρουσι καὶ τοῖς κόσμοις. Pol. II. 7. 4.) It seems clear from this that Aristotle knew of no ἐκκλησία, either in Crete or at Sparta, except an assembly of all the citizens; and, if it could be doubted whether he considered the Spartan ἐκκλησία as similar to the Cretan, this doubt would be removed by the comparison which he draws in the next chapter between them both and that of Carthage, which differed from them in the larger powers exercised by the people. It seems impossible that Aristotle could have expressed himself in this manner if he had known that ἐκκλησία at Sparta signified a privy council of about seventy persons. — Again, Lachmann considers the term κρίνειν which Thucydides uses (I. 87.) in speaking of the Spartan ἐκκλησία (κρίνουσι γὰρ βοῇ, καὶ οὐ ψήφῳ), as inapplicable to the popular assembly; but he overlooks what appears to me a much more forcible objection, arising from this passage, to his own opinion: the

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extreme improbability that the council of magistrates should have expressed their determinations in this noisy way, rather than by a silent vote. [So I find Schoemann l. c. p. 17. observing of the mode of suffrage by acclamation: *quæ ratio, in multitudinis cœtu non mira, in magistratuum haud sane admodum numeroso consessu parum credibilis videtur.*] — The language of Xenophon in the passage where he mentions the μικρὰ ἐκκλησία, instead of implying, as Lachmann thinks, that it consisted of the ephors and the senate, seems to prove that it included a greater number of persons, and therefore, most probably, at least all those whom he supposes to have been members of the regular ἐκκλησία. The ephors, he says, were alarmed; καὶ οὐδὲ τὴν μικρὰν καλουμένην ἐκκλησίαν ξυλλέξαντες, ἀλλὰ ξυλλεγόμενοι τῶν γερόντων ἄλλος ἄλλοθεν, ἐβουλεύσαντο. Hell. III. 3. 8. I hardly see how this can mean any thing else, than that, although the senate was privately assembled by the ephors, the μικρὰ ἐκκλησία was not convened. It was therefore a larger body.

That the Spartan assembly, such as I suppose the ἐκκλησία to have been, should have remained down to the latest times as completely under the control of the magistrates as in the heroic age, is certainly a remarkable fact, but in itself by no means incredible; and the power of the ephors, instead of being inconsistent with it, seems to afford the most natural explanation of it, both according to Lachmann's view of the origin and character of their office, and according to that which was proposed in the first volume. Between these views indeed, it will be seen, there is very little difference: both are opposed nearly in the same manner to those of Mueller and Wachsmuth. Mueller's notion that the ephoralty was *the movable element, the principle of change in the Spartan constitution* (Dorians III. 7. 1. 7.) seems to contradict the whole course of its history, in which it appears steadily opposed to all revolutionary attempts, and the main stay of the oligarchical or aristocratical government. On the other hand, Wachsmuth's inference from this fact, that the ephors were chosen from the privileged class, seems to me totally inconsistent with the language of Aristotle, Pol. II. 6. 14. Wachsmuth takes the δῆμος mentioned by Aristotle in that passage for the Peers. But I do not see how Aristotle could have said of this privileged class: ἡσυχάζει γὰρ ὁ δῆμος διὰ τὸ μετέχειν τῆς μεγίστης ἀρχῆς. The senate, though filled from the worthiest, belonged to *this* δῆμος no less than the ephoralty; and ἡσυχάζει does not exclude secret feelings of discontent, but only the outward manifestation of them; so that this statement would not be at variance with the history of Cinadon's plot, though the δῆμος included the ὑπομείονες. The word is used in the same sense as by Thucydides I. 143., where Pericles says of the discontented allies of Athens: οὐ γὰρ ἡσυχάσουσι μὴ ἱκανῶν ἡμῶν ὄντων ἐπ' αὐτοὺς στρατεύειν· and in Pausanias III. 10. 1. the

Corinthians *τότε μὲν τῷ Ἀγησιλάου δείματι ἡσύχαζον*. So the equivalent phrases *ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν*, *ἡσυχίαν ἔχειν*. In Xen. Hell. IV. 8. 22. Ecdicus, finding himself unable to cope with the democratical Rhodians, *ἡσυχίαν ἦγεν ἐν τῇ Κνίδῳ*. In Lysias Eratosth. p. 127. the patriots in the Athenian assembly, overawed by Lysander, *οἱ μὲν αὐτοῦ μένοντες ἡσυχίαν εἶχον*.

As in the Appendix II. to Vol. I. I ventured to offer some conjectures on the organisation of the Spartan army, I will take this opportunity of mentioning Lachmann's opinion on this subject. He sets out from the statement of Herodotus I. 65. (mentioned Vol. I. p. 523.) and infers from it with Mueller, that the army was organised according to the divisions of the tribes; but he observes, that the syssitia, of which Herodotus speaks, cannot have been the greater—which were no way connected with the lochi or the pentecostyes—but the smaller, of fifteen men each, which must therefore, he thinks, have been originally, as well as the triacades, subdivisions of the tribes. In the same way he conceives the six moras to have corresponded to the three tribes, according to that bipartition of which, as we have seen, he finds other examples in the Dorian and the Attic tetrapolis, and in the Asiatic hexapolis. The six Spartan moras he supposes to have formed the *cadres* of the army, in which the contingents of the provincial towns were incorporated; and he thinks it probable that it was only when they were thus filled up, that they bore the name of *mora*. When, as at Mantinea, the army was composed of citizens only, the Spartan mora, being considered only as a part of the corps, properly so called, was termed a *lochus*; and when the whole Spartan force was brought into the field, four of the ordiary lochi were thrown into one. But when only a part of it was called out, the smaller lochi were retained as subdivisions of the mora; and hence he would account for the various statements as to the strength of the mora, which fluctuate between three and nine hundred men. [In a later work (*Geschichte Griechenlands von dem Ende des Peloponnesischen Krieges bis zu dem Regierungsantritte Alexanders des Grossen*), Lachmann has endeavoured to repel the objections of C. F. Hermann and Schoemann to his theory. (Beilage 5. p. 452. ad fin.) Those which I had proposed appear to him, so far as his arguments are not equally applicable to them, to have been stated too briefly to admit of refutation. But I am afraid that if I should try to expand them, I might not render them the more perspicuous.]

APPENDIX VI.

ON THE CONSTITUTION OF ATHENS UNDER THE THIRTY.

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LACHMANN has endeavoured, in the work above noticed, to determine the constitution of the provincial towns of Laconia, and conceives that it is illustrated by the measures which Lysander adopted in the cities subjected to the Spartan dominion after the Peloponnesian war. As Laconia, according to Ephorus, was divided into six provinces (five beside that which included Sparta itself), he thinks that the division of Messenia into five provinces was also made by the Spartans after the conquest. There were thus ten provinces, beside the tract occupied by the sovereign people. Now the Scholiast of Pindar Ol. VI. 154, says (in a passage which has very much the appearance of being mutilated, or otherwise corrupted) that there were twenty harmosts of the Lacedæmonians. This would give two for each of the provinces, corresponding to the Spartan kings. But again we read of a hundred provincial towns, which, as one of those named among them (Æthea) was in Messenia, must have answered to the ten provinces; so that the district subject to each harmost included five towns. If, as Lachmann thinks clear, Messenia was comprehended in the 30,000 parcels mentioned by Plutarch (Lyc. 8.), there would be 300 to each town, and this may therefore be considered as the number of the families which possessed landed property in each township, and formed a provincial nobility. From them were elected the Councils of Ten, which, according to the analogy of Lysander's institutions, Lachmann supposes to have governed the towns under the harmosts. But the decarchy was only introduced in the towns which had been subject to another state, as the provincial towns to Sparta. The constitution of an imperial city, like Athens, was regulated on the model of Sparta itself, as nearly as the difference of circumstances would permit. Hence a Council of Thirty was established there in imitation of the Spartan senate, while Piræus, as a distinct provincial town, was ruled by a decarchy. Even for the Three Thousand, Lachmann finds a parallel in the Spartan institutions. It was, as we have seen, according to him the number of the families contained in the three tribes before the admission of the commonalty.

Ingenious as these combinations are, I doubt whether with regard to Athens they do not place the state of the case in a false point of view. That in the Athenian oligarchical party there was a

predilection, or at least an affectation of respect, for the Spartan institutions, cannot be denied. It is sufficiently indicated by the name of ephors, which was assumed by Critias and his four colleagues before the surrender of the city. Among the remaining fragments of the poetry of Critias is part of an elegy in which he celebrates the superiority of the Spartan convivial usages over those of the other Greeks. He had paid particular attention to the institutions of the Greek states, many of which he had described in a poetical work, which, it seems, bore the same title as Aristotle's on the same subject. It would therefore be possible that he might be better acquainted than even Lysander himself with the Spartan constitutional antiquities; for among them must be numbered the original complement of the three Spartan tribes. But the question is, how far it was the design, either of Lysander, or of the Athenian oligarchs, to assimilate the new constitution of Athens to that of Sparta. That it was the number of the Spartan senate that suggested the Council of Thirty, is indeed highly probable, if not absolutely certain; but this fact seems to be of very little importance, unless it was part of a plan such as Lachmann attributes to Lysander and his partisans, of *ordering every thing strictly upon the Spartan model.* But of this assertion we find no proof; and something very different seems to be implied in the language of Xenophon where he speaks of the institution of the Thirty. He would lead us to suppose, that it was avowedly only a temporary measure, preliminary to a new constitution, which was to be framed by Critias and his colleagues, not however upon the Spartan but upon the ancient Attic model; and indeed it would appear as if Lachmann had entirely overlooked that, beside the Thirty, a larger council and other magistrates were actually appointed, for whom there was no pattern to be found at Sparta. Such professions especially became Critias, who descended in a collateral line from Solon. But as Lysander probably aimed at nothing beyond the establishment of a very narrow oligarchy, so Critias perhaps never intended to make any further changes, as long as the councils and the other magistrates were subservient to his will. As to the reasons which induced him to fix upon the number 3000, for that of the citizens who were to enjoy the new franchise, it does not seem necessary to resort to Lachmann's hypothesis for an explanation. That number was naturally suggested by its proportion to the number of the supreme council, when the question was, whether the forms of the preceding oligarchy should in this respect be retained or altered. But it seems clear from Xenophon's account that the institution of the Three Thousand was merely an after-thought, which had not entered into the original plan, either of Critias, or of Lysander, and would never have been conceived but for the opposition of Theramenes, and

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the danger which threatened the tyrants both from within and without.

Sievers, in his excellent little work on Xenophon's Hellenics, which has thrown more light than any other I have met with on the period included in the first two books, expresses an opinion which I think much too favourable of the character and motives of Critias. This however is a point with which we have here nothing to do. But the language in which he speaks of the designs of Critias seems to me hardly consistent with itself. He says, (p. 50.), Critias, juvenili quodam et generoso ardore flagrans, *antiquum tempus*, ut ita dicam, *reducere* conatus est. Sed hoc in consilio exsequendo — id haud facile quisquam negaret — nihil pensi nihil sancti habuit, dummodo ad id quod vellet perveniret. Then follows an attempt to excuse him, and to distinguish the atrocities of his government from those of the French Reign of Terror; and then he proceeds — Critias autem, solum patriæ remedium paucorum vel unius dominationem esse ratus, quum tyrannidem Athenis constituere studeret, non videbat suam de optima republica doctrinam neque tempori neque loco convenire. The first professions of Critias and his party are indeed well described by the *antiquum tempus reducere;* his real designs, by the *tyrannidem constituere;* but I do not perceive any other connection between the *tyrannis* and the *antiquum tempus.*

I ought perhaps to have noticed a conjecture of Sievers with regard to the number of the Council under the Thirty, of which he says (p. 47.)—*Puto senatum illum non ut antea ex quingentis constitisse, sed multo minorem ejus fuisse numerum.* He does not however pretend to determine what the number was. If we suppose it to have been Three Hundred, this would correspond to the Thirty and the Three Thousand, and would agree with a conjecture which I threw out, Vol. II. p. 47., as to the constitution of the Council before Solon.

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ON THE TRIAL OF SOCRATES.

UNTIL of late years the prevailing, almost universal opinion among men of letters had been, that if any ethical question could arise on the Trial of Socrates, it was only whether his judges were more justly chargeable with flagrant injustice, or with gross credulity.

It was a great step beyond the circle of traditional declamation, when it was shown that we might retain all the reverence which had been so long inspired by the name of Socrates, and yet might acquit his countrymen who condemned him, of atrocious guilt, without thinking very meanly of their understandings. Even according to the accounts transmitted to us by his disciples and admirers, causes were assigned which might prevent the great mass of his contemporaries from forming so correct an estimate of his character, as we can do at this day. But this observation had not long been made public, before it suggested another view of the subject, less favourable to the reputation of Socrates, though still not inconsistent with a high respect for the qualities of his mind and heart. It was contended that, notwithstanding his virtues, abilities, and good intentions, he was probably a dangerous and mischievous person, who, by his injudicious endeavours to uphold religion and morality, really contributed to undermine them; so that the better the Athenians are supposed to have understood the tendency of his habits and pursuits, the more they must have been disposed to concur with his prosecutors.

At this point the inquiry appears to have stopt among ourselves, and this last view of the subject has been adopted as perfectly satisfactory, by no less an authority than Schlosser (I. 2. p. 144.). But it was not of a nature to gain an extensive or permanent ascendency in Germany; and it seems to have been there very widely superseded by one, perhaps more attractive in itself, and recommended by a more celebrated name. From the summit of his philosophy Hegel had looked down with serene impartiality on this question, and had resolved to set it at rest by a decision equally honourable to the Athenians and to Socrates. Socrates was rightly accused, and justly condemned; and yet he was not only an innocent and admirably virtuous man, but an eminent benefactor of mankind. This it is that renders his fate truly tragical. It was not merely a mournful occurrence — a good man perishing by the death of a criminal—it was the result of a necessary collision between two antagonist principles, each of which had an equal right to maintain itself against the other. Hegel's discussion on this subject, which is contained in his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, in the posthumous edition of his Works (Vol. XIV. p. 42—122), has been much admired, even out of his own school: as by Droysen (Aristoph. III. p. 7. note), who speaks of it as if it left little more to be said. Of the ability shown by the author no specimen, of course, is meant to be given in these pages; but it may not be uninteresting to the English reader, to see by what considerations this renowned master of logic and metaphysics has been led to the paradoxical result just stated, and at the same time how far it is confirmed by historical evidence.

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As Hegel's main business with Socrates in those Lectures, was to assign the place which properly belonged to him in the history of Greek philosophy, he has first to determine the relation in which he stood to the Sophists; and this is the point on which all his conclusions principally depend. To illustrate and establish this fundamental position is the chief object with which, after an able portraiture of the personal character of the man, he proceeds to exhibit the leading features of his philosophical method; and the concluding observations on the Trial of Socrates are likewise brought into connection with the same starting-point. Our present inquiry, on the other hand, is chiefly concerned with the Trial, and is designed to discover how far his philosophical character was, either in reason or in fact, connected with his condemnation.

Hegel, while he admits that Socrates was constantly at war with the Sophists, maintains that he and they stood on a common ground, and were in fact alike opposed to the ancient principle of simple faith, of instinctive, unreflecting, unreasoning obedience and conformity to law, custom, and tradition, which had always been regarded as the only firm basis of social order in every Greek state. This was the great contrast which marked this period as a momentous stage in the development of the human mind; in comparison with this, the difference between Socrates and the Sophists was immaterial. They had taught, with Protagoras, that the human mind was the measure of all truth; that is, according to the interpretation which, as a class, they put upon the doctrine, the judgement of each individual, however modified by his intellectual and moral peculiarities, which might perhaps deprive it of all claims to the assent or respect of others, was still for that individual the rightful supreme arbiter of every question, religious, moral, and political, that could be brought under its cognizance. Now this, as Hegel asserts, was just the principle of Socrates, only with one qualification, which amounted to nothing more than this: Socrates, instead of admitting such a right of private judgement, or, in other words, setting up a rule of action which varied with every man's passions and prejudices, and therefore was liable to continual changes even in the same individual, conceived that there was a law of conduct, independent of the agent's personal inclinations, which any man might discover, in a measure sufficient in most cases for his practical guidance, and which all men, in proportion as their intellectual faculties were more diligently exercised, and their judgements were less warped by their particular interests and affections, would be more ready to own it was good for them to obey. Whether any such law exists, or is discoverable by human reason, is not the question. The question is, whether Hegel is right in his estimate of the difference between Socrates and the Sophists, supposing it to be such as has been just described, and in

what sense it may be said that he stood on the same ground with them. Hegel observes that the opposition of Socrates and Plato to the Sophists was not that of adherents of the ancient faith to a new school—not in the spirit in which Anaxagoras and Protagoras were condemned, in the interest of Greek religion, manners, and ancient usage. On the contrary, reflection and an appeal in the last resort to the consciousness (purified and enlightened, in the one case, blind and turbid in the other,) of the individual, was common to them and the Sophists. The principle of Socrates is that man has to find out the truths of practical morality by his own thinking powers. But the language of simple faith and conformity to established usage is that which Sophocles puts into the mouth of Antigone: (454) "*The eternal laws of the gods are here, and no one knows whence they came.*"

Now it must be admitted that there was an affinity between Socrates and the Sophists to this extent: that he and they alike addressed themselves to the reasoning faculties of their hearers, and aimed at producing a certain conviction or persuasion in their minds, by an intellectual process; neither he nor they laid claim to the authority of a lawgiver or an oracle, and required implicit faith, or passive submission to their dogmas or precepts. Socrates fought the Sophists with their own weapons, not with those which Anytus wielded against him. But if in this respect it may be allowable to say that they stood on a common ground, totally distinct from that of law and prescription, it is no less evident, that in another sense the relation in which Socrates stood to antiquity, to established order, to law and tradition, was not that of the Sophists, but diametrically opposite to theirs. To institutions which tended to put a wholesome restraint on the selfish appetites and passions of the citizens, and to regulate their conduct with a view to the public good—to such institutions Socrates was an ally, the Sophists were enemies, in fact, if not avowedly. If therefore Socrates, of his own mere motion, without any urgent occasion, had stept forward to add the strength of reason to the authority of the laws, however he might have been open to censure for undertaking a superfluous task, it would surely be an abuse of language to say that he came into collision with that authority, and, though with a laudable aim, provoked the tragical destiny by which he perished, and that the Athenians, even with a full knowledge of his character and purposes, were justified in condemning him as a representative of the sophistical principle. But the paradox becomes more extravagant, when we consider that Socrates was morally forced into the position which he occupied, and that the common ground on which he stood with the Sophists was no other than a field of battle, where he posted himself on the side of law and justice, to repel their attacks. If the Athenians, with a know-

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ledge of these facts, had condemned Socrates on the ground assigned by Hegel, it would certainly have been no easy matter to vindicate them from the charge either of odious ingratitude or of pitiable folly.

But this is not all. Hegel's notion of the principle of simple faith, and unreflecting obedience, with which he supposes the philosophy of Socrates to have come into collision, appears to me, if not wholly false, at least so vague and exaggerated, as to be quite inapplicable to this or any other question; and if Hegel could have been induced to qualify it so as to to make it more consistent with the truth, he would probably have found it useless for his argument. It is true that at Athens—as every where else in the world—in the time of Socrates—as at all times—with the bulk of the people, motives not derived from reflection, and operating instinctively, reverence and fear of the laws, religious awe, usage, and authority, supplied the place of rational moral principles; and experience has shown that when those motives lose their force, the most logical system of morality will, with the great mass of mankind, be a very ineffectual substitute for them. But they are motives endued with a considerable share of vitality and tenacity, and they are in little danger of being impaired by an attempt—whether successful or unsuccessful—to show that they are, as to the practical result, in unconscious accordance with the conclusions of a sound philosophy. It seems certain at least that at Athens the principle of implicit obedience was not of so delicate a texture. If it subsisted until it was assailed by Socrates, it had stood a long series of much harder trials. It was not Socrates, nor the Sophists, who first opened a discussion on questions of right and wrong, with reference not only to the conduct of individuals and of states, but to the merits or demerits of the laws themselves. Such questions had been freely agitated in the hearing of all Athens ever since there had been public assemblies and popular tribunals. The laws were so far from being the objects of passive, unreflecting obedience, that they were continually, from time to time, called to account, and obliged to defend themselves, and when the defence proved unsatisfactory, as had often been the case, were subject to repeal or alteration. Solon, without pretending to follow any other light but that of his own reason, had introduced most important and extensive changes into them, and he had provided legal means of effecting farther reformations, whenever the people should be convinced that they were desirable. Many years before his death, Socrates had presided in an assembly in which an appeal to the law was drowned by a general exclamation: *that it was strange if the people were not allowed to do as they would.* Socrates alone refused to put the illegal question. *He, for his part*—this is Xenophon's statement—*said that he would only*

act according to the law. Hegel wishes us to believe that the same people who on this occasion threatened him with death for his resistance to their arbitrary will, afterwards actually condemned him, on the ground that the majesty of the law was in their eyes a thing too sacred to be touched by philosophical argument, even for the purpose of supporting it when it seemed to totter.

I might also observe that Hegel throughout tacitly assumes that the range of subjects to which Socrates directed his inquiries was the same as that which had been previously occupied by the authority of law and usage; so that whenever he mooted an ethical question, he virtually denied the validity or sufficiency of the previous decision. But this assumption, though essential to Hegel's view, is wide of the truth. Neither law nor public opinion did in fact cover the whole of the field over which Socrates pursued his investigation, but left a very large space for the exercise of private judgement on a vast variety of debatable topics, affecting all the relations of public and private life; and these appear to have been precisely the subjects to which the attention of Socrates was most frequently turned.

Thus then, generally considered, Hegel's theory, though unjust toward Socrates, altogether fails to exculpate the Athenians, or to assign a rational motive for their conduct. It supposes them to have laid an extravagant stress on a superficial resemblance, while they wilfully neglected a broad and essential distinction. It represents them as seized with a sudden dread of a principle, which, under various forms, had been for many generations the soul of their institutions, the condition of their greatness; and then as, in their blind jealousy, confounding friends and foes, and striking at the man whose efforts had been exerted in defence of the interests which they imagined to be in danger. Still it may easily be conceived that, though Hegel's general description of the relation in which Socrates stood to the Sophists is liable to these objections, the mode in which he carried on the contest with them, may have been such as not only to lend a plausible colour to misrepresentation, but to be justly chargeable with a tendency similar to that of their teaching. And Hegel enters into many details on the philosophy, and more particularly on the philosophical method and manner of Socrates, with a view to show that this was really the case. Many of his observations on this head are just enough, though they are less original in proportion as they contain less of paradox, and bring the question back to the footing on which it had been placed by others, who had thought it sufficient to point out how Socrates might easily have been misunderstood by his contemporaries. I must not omit to own that, though these Lectures are probably a specimen of Hegel's most popular and perspicuous style, there are passages, in this portion of them, in which I have not been able

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to divine his meaning; though, to judge from the context, the obscurity does not appear to arise from the abstruseness of the ideas. A French writer, who has taken great pains to enable his countrymen to appreciate the merits of the Hegelian philosophy (Ott. *Hegel et la Philosophie Allemande*), observes on these Lectures (p. 497.), *C'est ici surtout que notre auteur fait usage de ces artifices de langage qui lui sont familiers, et qui ont pour résultat de changer complétement le sens d'une pensée en l'exprimant d'une certaine façon.* Whoever has only followed this writer in his exposure of the jugglery with words which is the main arm employed by Hegel in his series of assaults on the human understanding—the title perhaps that might most properly be inscribed on his works—will know that this is saying a great deal. But, happily, enough is intelligible to leave no doubt as to the general train of the reasoning, so far at least as it bears on our present subject.

It cannot be disputed, that the philosophy of Socrates presented two aspects, one positive, the other negative, and that on the negative side it must have seemed to come very close to the doctrine of the sophistical school, as Pascal often argues so much like Bayle, that Victor Cousin suspected him of a universal scepticism, from which he could only find refuge in a voluntary abnegation of his reason. The question as to Socrates is, which of these qualities is predominant, so as to stamp the character of the whole.

Now it cannot be denied that to a superficial observation the tendency of a conversation with Socrates might often appear to be purely negative. This was the impression which would be most naturally produced by the irony of Socrates, as to which Hegel found it necessary to enter into an explanation, which would not have been required for any but German readers, to guard them against confounding the Socratic irony with one of a totally different nature, which has made a great figure in the philosophical and esthetical literature of Germany. That which Socrates employed was, as he observes, no more than a mode of behaviour. It might perhaps be considered as only a peculiar form of Attic urbanity; though it was no doubt the most appropriate that could have been selected for the purpose. Socrates expressly disclaimed the possession of superior knowledge and the functions of a teacher. At the outset he placed himself no higher than on a level with his interlocutor, and professed to be taking part in an inquiry interesting to both, without being able to foresee the issue. At the utmost he was only qualified, by his larger experience, to lend some help by guiding the investigation in a right direction, so as to prevent it from being utterly fruitless. But still he himself was only seeking, and whatever might be discovered had been

elicited by their joint researches out of the mind of his fellow-inquirer. Often the irony was carried farther, and Socrates assumed the tone of a learner who came for instruction to the person whom he was about to convict of utter ignorance on the subject of their discourse. But in almost every case the progress of the inquiry in its earlier stage must have exhibited a negative character. It tended to detect some error, to bring to light some difficulty or ambiguity which the other speaker had not at first perceived, to convince him that the view of the matter with which he had hitherto been satisfied was either totally wrong, or at least very imperfect or confused. But further, there can be little doubt that in a great many instances the final result of the whole discussion was negative: that the conversation terminated in a confession of ignorance and perplexity on both sides. *This perplexity*, Hegel observes (p. 69), *has the effect of leading to reflexion; and this is the object of Socrates. This merely negative side is the main thing. Perplexity is the beginning and the first product of philosophy. It is necessary that every thing should be subjected to doubt, and all suppositions given up, in order that they may be recovered as the result of the philosophical process (als durch der Begriff Erzeugtes)*. Only it must be observed, that we could never know as to a conversation of this kind, however faithfully it might be reported, that it was really the end of the discussion between the parties, and that Socrates did not intend to take up the thread he had dropt on some fresh occasion.

Hegel however does not deny that the philosophy of Socrates had a positive side in respect to which he was opposed to the Sophists. Their general proposition, *that man is the measure of all things*, was indeed adopted by Socrates, but with a limitation which guarded it against abuse, and rendered it capable of serving as the foundation of a system of moral philosophy. The Sophists, Hegel observes, ought not to be condemned because they did not themselves so limit their proposition. Every invention has its own time; and the honour of this happened to be reserved for Socrates. The nature of this important limitation Hegel only hints at, very briefly and rather obscurely; but it deserves to be more distinctly stated. The sophistical dogma, in its generality, lent itself to the interpretation, which seems to have been commonly put upon it in the school from which it proceeded: that no individual has any surer criterion of truth than his own judgement, however formed; and again, that no individual can propose to himself any better end than his own interest, according to any view which he may happen to take of it. Socrates also might have said, *Man is the measure of all things;* but man as a rational being—capable of distinguishing truth from error, and of giving an intelligent preference to that good which most properly belongs to

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his nature over every other end. It is the difference between a confused, distorted image of things, and one received through an untroubled medium, and with a rightly adjusted instrument: between one which did not, and one which did answer to the reality. Such an instrument Socrates presented in his dialectic art, which however required a certain state of the moral atmosphere for the due performance of its functions.

But, though willing to allow Socrates this degree of superiority over the Sophists, Hegel is led by the progress of his inquiry to a very unfavourable estimate of the immediate, practical and positive value of the Socratic philosophy. In the first place the principle of Socrates, *that man*—in the sense just explained—*is the measure of all things*, is still directly opposed to that which had hitherto prevailed in Greece—the principle of unconscious morality, of habitual, unreflecting conformity to old rules and ways. Not that this novelty was a fault in Socrates; it was his merit, and his glory; it was an important stage in the development of the human mind; and in Socrates the spirit of his age first became fully conscious of its own tendency; but, as the representative of a new epoch, he came into an unavoidable conflict with the spirit of the past, which, without any fault of the Athenians, proved fatal to him. Relatively to the previous state of things, his principle was a dangerous innovation, a corruption of the simple faith and practice of antiquity. It established the supremacy of reason and reflection over laws and usages which had hitherto claimed absolute unhesitating submission. Socrates felt that the old authority no longer sufficed: that the time had come when, as Hegel expresses it, every man must provide himself with his own principles of morality; and he endeavoured to awaken in others the consciousness of this want, and to put them in the way of supplying it. And this Hegel supposes to have been the meaning of the Platonic doctrine, that *virtue cannot be learnt*, that is, it cannot be received passively from without, but, so far as it implies knowledge and conviction, must be drawn by every man for himself out of his own intelligence. Whether Socrates taught that doctrine in this sense, may be doubtful. But we are informed by Aristotle that one of his tenets was, that *all the virtues are sciences* (Eth. Nic. VI. 13. φρονήσεις—ἐπιστήμας εἶναι πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς). Aristotle objects to this description, that it omits two essential elements in the nature of virtue; namely, the feeling (πάθος) and the habit (ἦθος). Socrates would have been in the right if he had said that there could be no virtue without knowledge, or intelligent consciousness. Hegel applauds this criticism, and observes that what Socrates overlooked in his definition of virtue, was the very thing which had begun to disappear in society, that is, the moral disposition, the will to realize that

which was seen to be true and good. One may however be permitted, without questioning the authority of Aristotle, to doubt whether Socrates was really guilty of so strange an oversight; and whether in his view the knowledge he spoke of did not imply a corresponding bent of the will: whether he did not conceive that such a good could not be clearly perceived without exciting an earnest desire for it, and so impelling to action. Socrates might be completely mistaken in this opinion, which is unhappily at variance with the largest observation of human nature; but it was an error into which he might easily be led by his own experience.

But, if on closer inspection the theory of Socrates might have been vindicated from this censure, it can hardly be denied that his notion of Good, or the moral End, was so indeterminate or undeveloped, as to be of little practical use. It appears indeed that he inculcated obedience to the laws both by example and precept, as in the dialogue with Hippias (Mem IV. 4.); but we do not find that he attempted to deduce the obligation to this obedience from his philosophical theory of Good; and therefore Hegel considers such a defence of the laws as an abandonment of his principle, which would have required that the enactments of law should first have been tried by the test of reason. But perhaps it rather indicates that Hegel's view of the principle he attributes to Socrates is exaggerated and erroneous. There can be no real inconsistency — as Hegel himself seems to admit, p. 92. — between a rational morality and submission to the laws. And we do not know whether Socrates distinctly saw and pointed out the connection between these two things, or simply abstained from interfering with the legitimate province of law. But at least it would seem that if his dialectics were in this respect faulty, his inconsistency, in proportion as it detracted from his merit as a philosopher, should have exempted him from prosecution as a dangerous innovator. Hegel however contends that Socrates exhibited the negative side of his philosophy when, as in the conversation with Euthydemus reported by Xenophon (Mem. IV. 2.), he showed that many general rules of conduct which to an ordinary person at first sight might appear of the most unquestionable certainty, were not absolutely and invariably right, but admitted and required many exceptions or modifications, according to the circumstances in which they are applied. Thus Euthydemus, after he has laid it down that it is a manifest breach of justice to lie, cheat, steal, or enthral by force, is brought to acknowledge that there may be occasions in which all these acts are allowable and just: as when they are performed toward a public enemy in time of war, or toward a friend, to save him from harm. Whether the casuistry ascribed to Socrates in this instance was good or bad, is of course

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immaterial; but to talk of such a very simple remark as a specimen of the Negative in his philosophy, seems to me a piece of wretched trifling, which would have shocked the common sense even of an Athenian court of justice, if it had been suggested as a charge against Socrates; for everybody would have known that the merits of half the causes brought before the tribunals depended on such distinctions. Hegel himself was fully aware—as appears in a subsequent page (90.)—that the process of discrimination through which Socrates conducted Euthydemus was one which every Athenian, however deficient in intellectual culture, was continually performing for himself, only unconsciously. The same man, he observes, who knew that he was commanded to do no murder, would not have scrupled to kill his enemy in the field of battle, but would never have thought of treating a private adversary, however odious to him, in like manner. But Hegel imagines that if this man's attention had been drawn, as that of Euthydemus by Socrates, to these variations of the general rule, the effect would have been to unsettle all his notions of right and wrong. I can only repeat that to me this seems a most arbitrary and improbable supposition; but as it can be no more refuted than proved, it must be left to the reader's judgement. And it would be to as little purpose to dispute with Hegel about his opinion that the negative character of the Socratic philosophy is faithfully and justly represented by Aristophanes in the Clouds. Even the measurement of the flea's leap, though not historically true, was, as Hegel thinks, a fair illustration of one side of that philosophy; for it was meant to ridicule the searching minuteness of the philosopher's investigations, and proves how correctly the poet had seized their character. And after a short sketch of the plot of the play, he proceeds to observe (p. 89.) that Aristophanes cannot be said to have done injustice to Socrates, though he may have pressed the method which he attacks into its extreme consequences with an excess of bitterness. "But Aristophanes is not unjust; indeed one cannot but admire the penetration with which he discerned the negative side of the dialectic method of Socrates, and exhibited it (in his own way) with so sure a pencil. For in the method of Socrates the decision is always referred to the *subject*, the conscience of the individual; but where that is bad, the history of Strepsiades must be repeated." The simple answer to this naked assertion is, that if this had been the case there could have been no such difference as that which Hegel himself had indicated between the sense in which the proposition, *man is the measure of all things*, was understood by Socrates, and that in which it was understood by the Sophists. Everybody before Hegel had seen that to them—according to that view which Hegel himself takes of them — the satire of the Clouds was fairly applicable; and all that Hegel has done to earn the

credit of originality in this respect is first to contrast them with Socrates, and then to slip Socrates into their place. Considering the solemnity of the process, and the irrelevancy and injustice of the pretended result, one might be tempted to say that this stroke of Hegelian legerdemain was not inaptly foreshadowed in the feat, by which Socrates in the play, having sprinkled the table with fine dust, and bent a spit into a pair of compasses — filched a cloak from the palæstra.

The amount of good or harm which Socrates did in his generation can manifestly be no more than matter of very uncertain conjecture to us; and the question is complicated by the difficulty of distinguishing between the effect of his teaching and that of his character. My belief is that both the good and the harm have been greatly exaggerated. It has been thought that such a method as his must have tended to unsettle the practical convictions, more especially of uneducated persons; and it may be asked whether he was not at least guilty of a culpable imprudence when he awakened doubts in their minds on matters such as those which were the subjects of his ordinary discourse. So Schlosser (I. 3. p. 144.) observes: *it seems to be not without reason that Critias in Xenophon* (Mem. I. 2. 37.) *tells Socrates, that the cobblers and tailors would do better to keep to their work than engage in a talk about morality, which could never lead them to any fixed ultimate principle, and must confuse their natural feelings.* And then, after having quoted the passage more literally in a note, he adds a remark: that he must not be understood to deny that there was much in what Socrates says in the context that is excellent and useful; only he thinks that it could never *in that form* keep men's passions under, an end for which mere morality, particularly in a southern climate, is too feeble an instrument. The reader who consults the original passage of Xenophon will be very much at a loss to understand what the sayings of Socrates are on which Schlosser bestows this praise; but he will see that Schlosser has totally mistaken the meaning of the words of Critias which he quotes. It is quite plain, as Ruhnken had observed, that Critias is not speaking of the conversations held by Socrates with various classes of artizans, but of the illustrations which he was fond of borrowing from their callings in his reasoning with others. But the justice of the remark might be questioned, even if the passage had been correctly interpreted. For it may be doubted whether it is justified by the difference which really existed at Athens, between the higher and lower classes of citizens, in education and intellectual culture. The great schools of moral and political instruction, the assemblies, the courts of justice, the theatres, were open to all, and frequented by all alike. The dialectic subtilties of Socrates were probably disagreeable to those who were either

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unable to follow them, or took no interest in the subject; and such persons were no doubt to be found in every class. But there is no reason to think that any Athenian was more disqualified for such inquiries, or more liable to receive injury from them, than others, on account of his station. On the other hand, the society of Socrates could rarely produce a beneficial effect on the character of any but those who sought it from a love of truth and of goodness; not on a Critias or an Alcibiades; and the number of those who were attracted to him by better motives may have been small. But whatever influence he exerted was probably in every case more or less, morally as well as intellectually, wholesome. But we must return to Hegel.

One of the most singular parts of his disquisition is the view he gives of what he calls the *Genius* of Socrates. He attaches the highest importance to this mysterious phenomenon, as characteristic of the relation in which Socrates stood to his age. It was not, according to his view, an effect of an accidental, constitutional peculiarity of the individual Socrates, but was intimately connected with his philosophical principles, by which the decision of all practical questions was submitted to private judgement. "The *Genius* was the peculiar form in which this private judgement appeared in Socrates himself. It was that which, in his own case, supplied the defect of a positive, real element in his system, but which at the same time most strikingly indicated the contrast between the spirit of this system, and that which until then had prevailed in Grecian society." "The Greek," Hegel repeats (p. 96.), "had never been used to determine his actions by a process of reflexion; *still less was there then in existence the thing we call conscience.* Its place was supplied—as we have already heard—by habitual conformity to law and usage. For the path of duty was so accurately marked, as seldom to leave room for hesitation. And even in the cases which were not expressly determined by the legitimate authority, neither individuals, nor even the state itself, had ever presumed to decide for themselves on rational grounds. *The general or even the people* — these are Hegel's words literally rendered—*did not take upon themselves to decide what was best for the state; and so neither did the individual in his private concerns.* They sought the guidance of the gods by consulting an oracle, or by some mode of divination. And with Socrates, as we are distinctly informed by Xenophon, his genius supplied the place of an oracle."

It can hardly be necessary to point out to the reader, that these statements about the Greek divination are mere empty paradoxes. A Greek general or statesman did not the less actively exert his faculties in military or political affairs, he did not the less confidently make up his mind on the measures to be adopted, because,

en the event was uncertain, he wished to learn whether the
ls were favourable to his plan. It was not as a substitute for
ethought and deliberation, that oracles or sacrifices were ordi-
rily resorted to; though a supposed discovery of the will of the
ls might suspend or even prevent the execution of a design.
hen the aspect of the entrails was adverse, it was not inferred
ıt the plan of the campaign was ill concerted; only a fresh
ment, which no human sagacity could have detected, was intro-
ced into the calculation. Hegel's remark is perfectly useless
his purpose, unless it applies to the Greek divination in general;
ereas it is only true with regard to that very small number of
es, in which oracles or soothsayers were consulted for *advice.*
ıd after all, the occasions, either public or private, on which the
of divination was called in at all, were infinitely rare, in com-
ison with those on which men followed the suggestions of their
n judgement. We do not find for instance that in the debate on
massacre of the Mitylenæans, or the Melians, it was proposed
suspend the execution until the pleasure of the gods had been
ertained. The assembly, in such cases, decided for itself on
arguments which it heard, according to the prevailing notion
right and wrong. Nor does it appear that private persons
upled to exercise their own discretion, and to let themselves be
rerned by the view they took of their own interest in their pecu-
ıry contracts, their matrimonial alliances, and other transactions
st deeply affecting their welfare. Sacrifices for the purpose of
ination — which were unknown to the Homeric age, and perhaps
not come into use before the sixth century B. C. (see Boettiger,
en z. Kunstmythologie, I. p. 76.)—were always confined by
ge to a few extraordinary occasions. Hegel makes the excep-
n the rule, and builds his theory on its supposed universality.
But what was the thing which Hegel—more conveniently for
own hypothesis than consistently with the proper meaning of
Greek word, which signifies nothing more than *the supernatural*
n (see Schneider's note on Xenophon, Mem. I. 1. 2.)—chooses
call the *Genius* of Socrates? Its general import he states to be
s: *that man has now begun to decide according to his own*
cernment (*er enthaelt das, dass jetzt der Mensch nach seiner*
nsicht aus sich entscheidet). Considering the importance of the
sition which is thus assigned to it, one might suppose that it
gulated all the actions of Socrates. But we know, and Hegel
mits, that its operation was limited to a much narrower compass.
fore he explains what it was, he thinks it necessary to warn his
arers against two erroneous views of its nature. It must not,
says, be conceived as a kind of guardian spirit or angel, nor
ain as the conscience. Nobody probably would have been in
ch danger of forming the first of these notions about it, unless

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it had been suggested by the ill-chosen word with which Hegel has described it; but whether it would be equally improper to consider it as connected with the conscience, remains to be seen when we have heard Hegel's own explanation, which, as far as I can understand it, is this. Socrates was led by a psychological process, which however is not clearly traced, to contemplate the decisions of his own mind, on practical questions, as objects distinct from himself. "The Genius is not Socrates himself; not his opinion, or conviction, but something unconscious: Socrates is impelled. At the same time the oracle is not anything external: it is *his* oracle. It has the form of knowledge combined with the absence of consciousness." Lest this should seem hard to understand, it is illustrated by the example of persons under the influence of mesmerism. But this is not a mere illustration; for a few pages after (p. 99.) Hegel distinctly expresses his opinion, that the state in which Socrates received the intimations of his Genius, was one approaching to somnambulism, or, as he farther explains it, a duplicity of consciousness (*Gedoppelheit des Bewusstseins*), a view which he thinks is confirmed by the description of his long musings in the camp before Potidæa, which appear to have been something like a magnetic trance. This state in Socrates is not to be considered as a morbid one; far from it; it was the form which the Socratic principle of reflexion and self-decision, at its first appearance, could not fail to assume. This, he concludes, is the central point of the great revolution effected by the principle of Socrates, that the witness of the individual mind has taken the place of the oracle, and that the *subject* has undertaken to decide for himself.

Whether these analogies throw any light on the origin and nature of the phenomenon in question may be left to the reader's judgement; at all events it would not be a more fanciful and arbitrary conjecture, if any one should think it possible, that Socrates might be led to strong convictions by processes of association which passed so rapidly as to escape his observation and recollection, and to leave the final result as a simple impression on his mind. But the futility of Hegel's attempt to connect this inward sign with the principle of the Socratic philosophy, will perhaps be sufficiently proved by two considerations. In the first place, the sign was perfectly consistent with all the branches of the ordinary divination; and as we find that Socrates sometimes was guided by it in the advice he gave to his friends, though he encouraged them to inquire by the ordinary methods after the will of the gods, so we have no reason to doubt that he complied with established usage, wherever it prescribed the use of divinatory experiments, or attention to certain outward signs. The other objection, which seems still more decisive, and which could hardly have escaped Hegel's

attention, if it had not been absorbed by his theory, is: that the cases in which Socrates is related to have been thus inwardly warned, were not cases in which it was usual, even for a pious Greek, either to consult an oracle, or to seek divine direction in any other way.

This discussion on the so-called *Genius* of Socrates is, as will be seen, not a mere episode, but is designed by Hegel to serve as an introduction to the consideration of the Trial of Socrates, on which, it was evident, the proof of his assertion, that the Athenians had done Socrates no wrong, must mainly depend. If his attempt to identify the position taken by Socrates with that on which the Sophists had stood, had been as successful as it has appeared to be unsatisfactory, still it would not follow that Socrates was justly condemned, unless this was the very ground of the charge brought against him. Hegel indeed assures us that such was really the case; that the prosecutors of Socrates, when they accused him of rejecting the gods acknowledged by the state, and of introducing new deities in their room and of misleading the young, viewed him as the man who had awakened the consciousness, that what had hitherto been held as absolutely true, was only so in a relative and qualified sense. (The original may be so paraphrased; it will not bear a literal translation: *Sie fassten den Sokrates als den Menschen auf, der das Nichtabsolutseyn des Anundfürsichgeltenden zum Bewusstseyn brachte.*) But as the preceding inquiry has not been calculated to inspire us with unlimited confidence in Hegel's judgement on historical questions, we must see what is the evidence by which the charges actually brought against Socrates were in his judgement established. Unfortunately Hegel seems to have been unable to keep these two very different things distinct. He is so possessed with his own view of the case, that he is constantly confounding the charge which he himself brings against Socrates, and could have suggested to his accusers, with that which Anytus and Melitus, in their ignorance of this History of philosophy, actually brought. So when Socrates was charged with corrupting the young, this meant, according to Hegel, that he had unsettled their convictions by teaching them to think and decide for themselves. But if this had been the meaning of the prosecutors, it seems likely that they would have intimated it in some way or other, so as to draw some kind of reply from Xenophon. Again, the charge of innovation in religion turned, according to Hegel, on two points: in part, he says, it rested on the same ground as the other; namely this, that Socrates had led men to perceive the error of the common opinion with regard to things deemed agreeable to the gods—a charge not only different from the real one, but irreconcilable with it, inasmuch as it would have admitted that Socrates acknowledged the existence of the gods, which he was said to have denied.

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The other point to which this article of the accusation referred, was the Genius; and we do indeed learn from Xenophon, that this was what afforded the principal pretext for it. But still not according to Hegel's fanciful notion, that Socrates had thereby asserted a principle which superseded the established system of oracles and divination. It is evident from Xenophon's answer that this was not the point of the charge, and had never occurred to any of the prosecutors.

To Hegel, who comes to the discussion of the Trial after having prejudged Socrates on grounds supplied by his own invention, it is of course a matter of very subordinate moment how the prosecutors made out their case, as if it had failed altogether the condemnation of Socrates would still have been necessary and just, as a result of the collision into which he had come with the spirit of his nation and the old established order of things. But one who with myself regards this supposition as no better than an unjustifiable sacrifice of historical truth to a philosophical speculation, will desire to weigh the actual charges by themselves, and to separate them as much as possible from the make-weights which Hegel in the interest of his theory has thrown into the scale. And first as to the charge of introducing new deities in the place of the state-gods, Hegel himself admits at the outset that Socrates did not represent his *Genius* as a god (p. 100.). He might have added that Socrates did not in any way personify it, and therefore that the terms which Hegel constantly uses to describe it, *Genius and Dæmon*, are not only improper in themselves, but tend to create a groundless prejudice in the reader's mind. Socrates only pretended to a *sign* which he described by an epithet, which the Greeks applied to every thing extraordinary and inexplicable. And the question is, whether the laying claim to such a sign was a fact sufficient, according to the religious notions of the Athenians, to support the charge. Xenophon contends that far from supporting, it refuted the charge; inasmuch as it was perfectly consistent with the received principle on which all divination rested—that the gods were used to reveal their will to men—and consequently implied a belief in the existence of the gods. Hegel will not admit this apology, because the sign was something peculiar to Socrates, and did not belong to the ordinary kind of divination. And he seems to think that he has found a strong argument for this opinion in the (probably spurious) *Apology* (§ 14.), where it is said that when Socrates urged this plea in his own behalf, a murmur arose among the jurors, some of whom disbelieved the story, while others felt envy at the privilege which he professed to enjoy. But if we might depend on this statement, it would seem clear that those who envied Socrates on this account must have considered the thing as credible and consistent with their previous religious

notions. The others might regard him as an impostor, but could have no ground for treating him as an atheist. Nor can Hegel put such a construction upon the fact, without the help of an assertion, which only proves that he had overlooked some of the most familiar features in the history of Greek superstition. He says that whether the judges believed Socrates or not, they could not be expected to tolerate such a claim to a peculiar revelation. *Among the Greeks such revelations were restricted to certain modes of transmission. There were, as it were, official oracles (not subjective), the Pythian priestess, the sacred oak, &c. Such a phenomenon, when it appears in an individual who is only a common citizen, is regarded as incredible, not legitimate; and the δαίμων of Socrates was a different mode of revelation from that which was held valid in the Greek religion.* There would perhaps be something a little specious in this objection if it were true that the only modes in which the gods were believed by the Greeks to reveal their will were such as Hegel mentions. But it is notorious that, beside the regular, publicly authorised expounders of the divine will, there were many private pretenders to prophetical gifts, who practised upon popular credulity; and though they might be despised as vulgar cheats by more enlightened persons, nobody thought that their pretensions to a special revelation made them liable to a charge of atheism. Lest however this proof of the impiety of Socrates should not be thought sufficiently cogent, and should appear at the utmost to raise no more than a presumption of an almost imperceptible deviation from the line of the most rigid orthodoxy in matters of divination, Hegel adds another, which is indeed worthy to crown such a pile of sophistry. He has contrived to extract it from the celebrated answer of the oracle, by which Socrates was declared to be the wisest of the Greeks. Anytus and Melitus either did not think of it, or did not venture to produce it; but that is no reason why they should not have the benefit of it now, to bolster up their charge, which turns out to be much better founded than they themselves suspected. Hegel would have furnished them with the following irresistible argumentation (p. 107.): "In the Delphic oracle Apollo presided as the god of knowledge: his supreme commandment was, *Know thyself.* This commandment Socrates fulfilled: he made the γνῶθι σαυτόν the motto of the Greeks. He is the hero who in the stead of the Delphic god set up the principle: That man has the knowledge of truth in himself, and must look into himself. The declaration of the prophetess announced a great revolution: that man's own consciousness, the consciousness which each man has of the thinking faculty common to the race, had been substituted for the oracle." The conclusion therefore must recal the too liberal admission made at the outset, that Socrates did not represent his *Genius* as

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a god. *This inward assurance is certainly a new and different god, not the god hitherto acknowledged by the Athenians, and so the charge against Socrates is quite correct.*

Such is the sum of Hegel's arguments in support of the first article of the indictment; and they have at least this value: that they show what the strength of the case is, according to his view of its merits; that this is all that this celebrated logician has been able to adduce in behalf of his position; that, in his judgement, without these sophisms and perversions of fact the condemnation of Socrates could not be defended.

The examination of the second branch of the accusation, which charged Socrates with corrupting the young, reduces itself to a much narrower compass. Melitus said that he knew some persons whom Socrates had persuaded to obey him more than their parents. *This point of the charge*, Hegel observes, *referred chiefly to Anytus; and as this was confirmed by evidence, the fact was certainly proved: the evidence was sufficient.* But what was this fact? The reader will hardly believe that the fact which, in the judgement of this renowned logician, sufficed to sustain this charge, was simply this: that Socrates had told Anytus, who had himself filled some of the highest employments in the state, that he ought not to bring up his son, whom Socrates considered as a youth of promising abilities, to his business of a tanner. Hegel however, to do him justice, seems to have felt that this might not strike an ordinary reader as a fact very relevant to the charge; and he therefore endeavours to supply the deficiency by a conjecture. In the Apology, which bears the name of Xenophon (and which Hegel appeals to throughout as if it was a piece of unquestionable genuineness), it is related that after the trial Socrates, in conversation with his friends, speaking of the son of Anytus, had prophesied that he would not continue in that servile occupation to which he had been destined by his father, and that for want of due guidance he would become addicted to some disgraceful vice, and would go to a great length in depravity. This prediction, the Apology says, was accomplished; for the young man became a confirmed drunkard and entirely lost himself. And on this anecdote Hegel builds the conjecture, that Socrates, by the opinion he had expressed to Anytus and by his own intercourse with the young man, had rendered him dissatisfied with his calling, and so caused him to seek relief from uneasy thoughts in the pernicious indulgence which brought him to his ruin. It is not however with the conjecture that I have any fault to find, but with the conclusion which Hegel draws from it. *One cannot then*, he proceeds, *regard this charge either as groundless, but on the contrary as completely established. The court therefore found by its verdict that this charge was proved; this is not unjust.* When we remember that the fact on

which this inference rests is itself avowedly matter of mere conjecture, and that, even if the conjecture was well grounded, it would not follow that the slightest blame attached to Socrates for the unhappy result, one cannot repress a feeling stronger than surprise, to find a German philosopher in the nineteenth century lending the sanction of his authority to a perversion of the first principles of equity, as gross perhaps as any that could have been found in the records of the Athenian sycophants or the Roman delators. With regard to the general accusation, that Socrates had induced some of his followers to obey him rather than their parents, it is not difficult to understand how he may very often have afforded a pretext for this charge. Many of his hearers must have conceived a higher esteem and reverence for him than they could feel for their parents, and must have been conscious that they learnt more from his conversation and example, that from what they were used to hear and see at home. The wiser and the more virtuous he was, the more he must have produced such an effect on many of the young men who frequented his society. This is in substance the explanation given of the alleged fact in passages of the ancients to which Hegel himself refers (p. 109.) without disputing their authority. Nor does he attempt to offer one tittle of evidence to show that the charge had any other foundation. But calmly assuming that Socrates had unduly intermeddled with domestic relations, and had wilfully degraded parental authority, and severed the bonds of love and reverence which united children with their parents, he proceeds to point out, almost with a touch of pathos, how injurious to the best interests of society, as well as destructive of domestic happiness, such an interference must be.

Having shown, in so satisfactory a manner, that each head of the indictment had been fully borne out, he condescends to notice another question: whether the offences imputed to Socrates were a fit subject for judicial proceedings; and for this question he finds an answer not unworthy of the genius of an Eymeric or a Torquemada. He bids us consider how essential religion was at Athens to the very being of the state: that there, still more than in modern societies, the relation of parent and child was the groundwork of all morality. The inference is plain. A man who, like Socrates, had laid claim to a special mode of revelation, and had gained credit with the young as wiser and better than their parents, could not but be regarded as a foe to the religion and morals of his countrymen. *Can we be surprised*, he triumphantly asks, *that Socrates was found guilty? We might say, it was inevitable?* (at least with Hegel to sum up). Tennemann, who, in his short-sighted simplicity, had observed, that *though the heads of the indictment contained the most palpable untruths, Socrates was condemned to death, because he would not condescend to the vulgar*

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arts which were commonly employed to corrupt the judgement of the court—is thrust aside with the remark: *All this is a mistake. He was found guilty, but not sentenced to death.* But it is not at all clear that Tennemann—who was certainly not inferior to Hegel in learning, and immeasurably superior to him in the faculty of expressing his ideas—committed any mistake in that assertion. It would be at least as unfair to infer from his silence, that he did not know that Socrates in the first instance was simply found guilty, as to infer from Hegel's words, that *he* was not aware Socrates was afterwards condemned to death. But Hegel's comment on the proceedings subsequent to the conviction of Socrates, is highly characteristic and remarkable. Hegel is so far from sympathising with Tennemann's admiration for the greatness of soul with which Socrates disdained to resort to the common artifices for propitiating his judges, that he considers the prisoner's conduct after the verdict as an aggravation of his offence. His refusal to acknowledge himself guilty was, in Hegel's opinion, inconsistent with his professions of submission to the laws. *The first proof of this submission would have been, since the Athenians had found him guilty, to respect their judgement, and to confess himself guilty* (p. 114.). One hardly trusts one's eyes when one meets with such a sentiment in the pages of a philosopher. But so it is. According to Hegel, this act of falsehood and hypocrisy would not only have been no blemish in the character of Socrates, but was a duty, the breach of which justly exposed him to public indignation. *As he refused to fix the penalty for himself, and so to acknowledge the judicial power of the people, his fate was death* (p. 115.). The conduct of Socrates is contrasted by Hegel with that of Antigone, whom Sophocles makes to say, when she is led away to execution (925, 926.): *If these things are right in the eyes of the gods, when I have suffered, I shall own myself in fault.* Hegel has misunderstood the passage, as he might have learnt from Hermann's note. But the following words in the speech of Antigone ought at least to have led him to perceive that she did not mean to acknowledge Creon's sentence to be conclusive against her. For she proceeds to say: *but if these men are in the wrong, may they suffer no more ills than they unjustly inflict on me.*

ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν οὖν τάδ' ἐστὶν ἐν θεοῖς καλά,
παθόντες ἂν ξυγγνοῖμεν ἡμαρτηκότες·
εἰ δ' οἵδ' ἁμαρτάνουσι, μὴ πλείω κακὰ
πάθοιεν ἢ καὶ δρῶσιν ἐκδίκως ἐμέ.

The moral tact indicated by these observations is worthily supported by the acquaintance which Hegel displays in another remark with the principles of English jurisprudence. In England, he observes, the prisoner is asked by what laws he will be tried,

and answers: *By the laws of his country;* thus, according to Hegel, binding himself to acknowledge the truth of the verdict, if he should be found guilty.

The death of Socrates then is represented by Hegel himself, not as the effect of his principle — for though that was condemned his life might have been spared — but of his refractory spirit which disdained to do homage to the majesty of the people. Yet Hegel tries to show that this last act of the drama was a necessary result of the collision between the new principle and the spirit of the Greek nation. *The fate of Socrates,* he says, *is truly tragical* (p. 119.). And what renders it so, in Hegel's view, is that the Athenians themselves shared the offence which Socrates had committed. They repented of having condemned him, and punished his accusers with death and banishment (a very questionable fact); thus, as Hegel thinks, not only *recognising the individual greatness of Socrates, but still more acknowledging that this principle, pernicious and hostile to them as it was — the introduction of new gods and disrespect to parents — had crept into their own spirit, and that in Socrates they only condemned themselves. They repented of their just sentence on Socrates; so seemingly implying that they wished it had not been passed. But their regret does not prove it ought not to have been passed.* And with a few more reflexions on the destiny of the principle, the curtain drops on this Hegelian tragedy.

It is indeed a very melancholy and pitiable exhibition: a sad tissue of miserable sophistry, a series of outrages against historical truth, right feeling, and the first principles of justice and common sense. Yet Hegel cannot be reproached with a bias against Socrates, of whom he always speaks with the highest respect. On the contrary, the very motive which induced him to throw himself into these forced attitudes, these violent and unsightly moral and intellectual contortions, was evidently his anxiety to preserve a philosophical equilibrium between Socrates and the Athenians, and to contemplate the event with the calm impartiality of a tragic chorus.

To what extent these opinions on the Trial of Socrates have been adopted in Germany beyond the limits of Hegel's school, within which few, I suppose, would venture to disavow them, I have few means of judging. The paradox I have been combating has been echoed by Roetscher in his work on Aristophanes (*Aristophanes und sein Zeitalter*) and by another of Hegel's scholars, v. Henning, in his *Principien der Ethik,* which however has not fallen in my way. On the other side stands a really learned, clear-headed and impartial thinker, my honoured friend Professor Brandis, who devoted an elaborate article in the Rhein. Mus. II. p. 85. (*Ueber die angebliche Subjectivität der Socratischen Lehre*)

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to the refutation of Roetscher's fallacies. And I am glad to observe that they are rightly appreciated by some other German scholars. I cannot resist the temptation to transcribe a few sentences from Fritsche (*De Socrate veterum Comicorum Dissertatio* (p. 101.). *Aliam viam ingressos esse video optimos duumviros, Henningsium atque Roetscherum, quorum uterque est ab Hegelio. Hi omnes, et præceptor et discipuli, sæpe alias ita disputant, ut nihil admodum se mente complexos esse homines vulgo querantur, ego autem sine ullo stomacho, ut potius cum quadam etiam voluptate ne me quidem percipere istud, quidquid est sapientiæ, potuisse animadvertam: hic vero illi raro fortunæ beneficio apertissime id disputant, quod non modo ego, sed quivis intelligat, etiam indoctus. Docent igitur Socratem in Nubibus plane talem induci qualis fuerit reapse: adjiciunt justas eum Comico pœnas dedisse, ideo quod Socratis eadem causa fuerit, quæ Sophistarum: Socratem pariter atque sophistas contemto ipsius veritatis studio causas rerum justo altius repetere solitum, inutilia quæque rimari, ac pleraque temere opinari, quemadmodum solent homines argutuli: postremo concludunt sic, Athenienses jure suo de Socrate supplicium sumsisse: quasi vero nostri philosophi propter errores quosdam suos, quos ipsi Hegeliani plurimos committunt, morte multandi sint.* It would indeed have been not uninteresting to have seen how Hegel would have defended himself against a similar charge, which might certainly have been brought against him with a much greater appearance of truth and justice than it was against the adversary of the Sophists.

It is painful to see so able a writer as Droysen speaking of Hegel's disquisition on this subject in a tone of admiration. But it is consoling to find that at bottom his own opinion is widely different on the main question. He says, indeed (Aristophanes, *Die Wolken*, p. 10.): *That the philosophy of Socrates, if it is to be so called, grew out of the same soil with the Sophistical school, and was even like it in its essential tendencies, is a fact no longer to be denied.* Nor, as far as I know, was it ever disputed that they belonged to the same intellectual movement. The only question has been and is, whether the points which Socrates had in common with the Sophists, or those in which he differed from them, best deserved to be termed *essential.* And on this question I should be content to appeal to Droysen himself, who proceeds to observe: *but the distinction between Socrates and the Sophists was this, that he strove to give a new and firmer stay to the mind, which had been detached from every outward basis of authority, by insisting on the idea of the Good, and to withdraw the richly developed rational faculty from outward and selfish aims, and carry it back into itself, to the consciousness of what was right and worthy of pursuit. This was an immense and ever memorable step in ad-*

vance: that freedom which, in the democracy and the progress of enlightenment, had turned itself against all established traditional order, henceforward found its true ground in the individual consciousness (in der Subjectivität) and its true measure in the sense of Right, and the craving after Good.

This is indeed just the reason why it seems to me both a gross error and a flagrant injustice to confound Socrates—the man who strove to establish certain principles of moral conduct by which men might be surely guided to what was right and good — with teachers who, like the Sophists, only endeavoured to furnish every man with grounds or pretexts for following his own inclinations, and sacrificing all law and right to his selfish instincts. And the remark which Droysen subjoins, on the political influence of Socrates, does not at all affect the reality and importance of this contrast.

Notwithstanding the protests which have been made here and there, and in Germany itself, against the idolatry of Hegel, his reputation may be allowed to justify the attention with which I have examined his opinion on this question. It would be the less advisable to enter into like details on any of the later works which have treated on the same subject, as Hegel's may be considered as the common armoury from which most of the writers have borrowed their principal weapons. Yet I must briefly notice one, which has excited a good deal of interest and of controversy in Germany, not so much by the novelty or importance of its contents, as by the connection into which the author has dragged the subject with the political theories of the day, and which is indicated by its title: *Die Athener und Sokrates, Die Gesetzlichen und der Revolutionär:* which may be rendered: *The Athenians and Socrates, the Men of the laws and the Man of the Revolution;* by Dr. Peter Wilhelm Forchhammer. Dr. Forchhammer by his previous writings had earned the somewhat ambiguous reputation of an eloquent and impassioned antiquary, who would argue a disputed point in the constitutional history of Athens with as much energy and pathos, as an ordinary pleader might display in a question of life or death. It is therefore not surprising that he should have discussed the case of Socrates in the tone, if not the temper, of a determined advocate and a warm partisan. His essay, as is observed by a critic in Zimmermann's *Zeitschrift für alterthumswissenschaft*, 1840, p. 535., is in fact a party pamphlet, in which the character of Socrates is estimated by its conformity with the principles of the author's political school. The feeling of disgust and indignation at its want of candour and sobriety, which that critic expresses (p. 542.), has probably been shared by most readers beyond the circle of the author's private acquaintance. Droysen (Aristoph. *Wolken*, p. 7.), though no doubt dissenting

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widely from most of his conclusions, notices it with the indulgence becoming a friend and colleague. But I cannot assent even to the very qualified praise he bestows on it for the *art* with which the argument is conducted. So far indeed as *art* is opposed to earnestness, reality, and truth, and is allied with sophistry and disingenuousness, the term may be properly applied to Forchhammer's reasoning or declamation; but I can perceive little ingenuity or skill in it. He himself seems to be conscious (p. 90.) that it was not likely to produce a very favourable impression on ordinary readers. It may however serve to raise some questions of general interest, which were not so directly suggested by Hegel's view of the subject.

Dr. Forchhammer arrives at the conclusion (p. 74.) *that no more legal judgement was ever pronounced, nor by a more legal tribunal, than that by which Socrates was first of all declared guilty of the offence of unbelief in the gods of the state, and of corrupting the young, and thereupon was condemned to death.* It will be worth while to consider the verdict and the sentence with special reference to this *legality* on which Dr. Forchhammer so strongly insists, and for this purpose to follow his division of the indictment into the two heads of *unbelief* and *corruption of the young*, under which he ranges all his arguments. To warrant his conclusion it was of course incumbent on him to show with regard to each of these heads, that Socrates was convicted of a breach of the Athenian law, upon evidence which would have satisfied every enlightened and conscientious tribunal, and that he was legally condemned to death.

Now there can be no doubt that the first part of the indictment, rightly understood, and with due allowance for inaccuracy of expression, describes something which was an offence against the laws of Athens. But Dr. Forchhammer has not made such allowance, and seems not to understand the point on which the question of legality turns. He begins with asking (after quoting the words of the indictment: *Socrates does not believe in the gods of Athens*): *Was this accusation true?* And he afterwards (p. 11.) concludes: *If then Socrates did not believe in the gods of the state, he was guilty.* But Socrates might have been an unbeliever, and yet not have been guilty of a breach of any Athenian law. For we must presume, until we have some proof to the contrary, which Dr. Forchhammer does not attempt to offer, that the laws of Athens resembled most human laws of civilised states in this respect, that they did not affect to regulate the inward consciousness, but the outward deportment of the citizens: that they did not prescribe what was to be believed or felt, but what was to be done or said. They guarded the religion of the state with penalties against impiety. And no doubt those penalties might

be incurred, not only by irreverent behaviour toward the gods, but by a denial of their existence, and a substitution of other objects of worship. And assuredly the meaning of the indictment was not simply that Socrates did not believe in the gods, but that he had manifested his unbelief by act or speech. But it does not appear that the accuser was able to bring any evidence that could ground a reasonable presumption of the fact. And Dr. Forchhammer does not attempt to supply the deficiency. If he was aware of the real question, he has evaded it. But I do not suspect him of such a trick. It is evidently in honest ignorance that he fails ever to come to the point. In fact he admits that Socrates practised an outward conformity to the state religion (p. 6.), but taxes him with hypocrisy on that account (p. 9.), and asks, why he did not openly avow his unbelief, and go to the assembly to propose a change in the laws which prescribed uniformity of religious profession (p. 11.). Dr. Forchhammer apparently had not observed that however these questions might affect the moral character of Socrates, they do not concern his legal liability, and are quite foreign to the inquiry which is the subject of the pamphlet. But how do we know that Socrates was insincere in his conformity? Dr. Forchhammer in the first place appeals to common notoriety or general belief. *The very thing*, he observes, *for which we are used to extol Socrates is, that he had raised himself above the polytheistical conceptions of his age.* And he proceeds to show, with great unction, that, however meritorious this might be in itself, it could not appear so in the eyes of a devout Athenian. Then he cites the oath taken by the young Athenians in the temple of Aglauros, in which they bound themselves to honour all that their forefathers had held sacred (τὰ ἱερὰ τὰ πάτρια τιμήσω), and called on seven deities by name to witness their vow; and again he asks, whether any one will maintain that Socrates had kept this oath in the sense in which the state exacted it. Farther on he supposes that if Melitus had challenged Socrates to raise his hand toward the gods in whom he believed, and to answer, Yes, or No: whether he believed, as the law prescribed, in the gods acknowledged by the state, the force of truth must have constrained Socrates to answer in the negative. But all these are plainly mere rhetorical variations of the same illegitimate assumption, and do not corroborate it in the slightest degree. One assertion indeed Dr. Forchhammer makes, which, as it is more specific, may at first sight be taken for an argument. But it is an assertion which not only requires proof, but is in direct contradiction to the best evidence we have on the subject. He asserts (p. 6.) that the conversation of Socrates tended to undermine the religious convictions of the Athenian youth. Now if by this is meant that Socrates was in the habit of suggesting doubts to his hearers on articles of

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popular belief, the allegation would certainly be pertinent to the question, and if established would go far to sustain the charge. But in this sense the assertion is clearly groundless; for we have direct and authentic testimony that Socrates studiously avoided such topics. (See the passage of the Phædrus in the note, p. 269. and the remarks in the text.) On the other hand, if the meaning is only that the conversation of Socrates tended to foster habits of intellectual activity in his hearers, which were unfavourable to their acquiescence in the religious belief of the vulgar, this may be admitted, but will not at all serve Dr. Forchhammer's purpose. For no Athenian law—except the edict by which the Thirty endeavoured to silence Socrates—forbade such exercises of the thinking faculty, as none was framed to guard against such a danger; and Melitus, even if he had perceived it, would probably not have thought it prudent to insinuate to his audience, that in proportion as the understandings of the young were better cultivated, they would be more disposed to reject the established creed.

Dr. Forchhammer does not fail to urge the inward monitor of Socrates as something inconsistent with the religion of the state; and unfortunately he does not scruple to use language about it which he must have known to be gross exaggeration; for he speaks of it (p. 7.) as a *new divine Being for which, according to the doctrine of Socrates, the Athenians were to exchange their old gods.* I have already remarked that we have no reason to think there was anything in this inward voice at variance with the tenets of the popular Greek theology; and I will only add, with reference to our present inquiry, that if there was such a degree of novelty and peculiarity in this mode of divine communication, there was certainly no distinct provision against it in the then existing Athenian laws, and it could only be by a more or less violent and arbitrary construction—such for instance as Hegel puts upon it—that it could be brought within the scope of any of them.

Even then if Dr. Forchhammer had been entitled to assume that the discrepancy which he supposes to have existed between the religious sentiments of Socrates and the worship of the state was a matter of general notoriety, or one on which all well-informed persons are agreed, still it would not follow that at the time of the trial there was any proof which should have satisfied a court of justice, that the prisoner had committed an offence against the laws. And it should be remembered that the laws of every Greek state necessarily, from the nature of the case, allowed a very great latitude of religious opinion; because there was no authentic standard of religious truth. There was no canon, no book, by which a doctrine could be tried; no living authority to which appeal could be made for the decision of religious controversies. Beyond the bare fact of the existence of the beings who were

objects of public worship, there was hardly a circumstance in their history which had not been related in many different ways; and there was no form of the legend which had more or less claim to be received than another. So that if Socrates rejected every version of the fable which appeared to him to have an immoral tendency, he was only exercising a right which could not be legally disputed, and was taking no greater liberty than had been used by many others without any scandal, as for instance by Pindar with the story of Pelops. (Ol. I. 59. ἀντία προτέρων.)

But in fact that agreement as to the religious views of Socrates, on which Dr. Forchhammer lays so much stress, is neither so general as he represents it, nor entitled to much deference. For if its ground is examined, I believe it will be found to rest on the difficulty which most persons in modern times have experienced in reconciling the pure and lofty ideas which Socrates appears to have formed of the Divine nature, with a belief in the doctrines or fables of the Greek polytheism. But that difficulty—a natural consequence of the change which has taken place in our point of view—though it sufficiently explains the origin of the common opinion, does not materially strengthen its authority. And Dr. Forchhammer knew, or ought to have known, that this opinion is rejected by a writer whose judgement on such a point far outweighs not only his own, but all that could be adduced on the other side. Ritter (*Gesch. der Philosophie*, II. p. 38.) observes that the peculiarity of Socrates cannot be conceived in its proper light, unless it be recognised that the moving principle of his life lay mainly in his old-fashioned sense of religion (*in seiner alterthuemlichen Religiositaet.*) It will be in vain, he says (p. 40.) for any one to think of vindicating Socrates from the reproach of superstition. And in this superstition we are to distinguish, according to Ritter, between that which was derived from the opinions which prevailed among his countrymen, and that which was the result of his own personal experience. If we may trust Ritter, Socrates had no need to apply to the assembly for an enlargement of the liberty of conscience, and was not even under any temptation to violate the laws which were enacted for the security of the national religion. So much then for the legality of the conviction under the first head of the indictment. Let us now consider the second.

In this, Socrates was charged with *corrupting the young*. And according to Dr. Forchhammer this was the substance of the whole indictment. For, as we have seen, the only material charge which he brings against Socrates under the first head is, that his teaching tended to undermine the religious faith of his disciples. Under the second head however the political principles of Socrates were the main gist of the accusation, and the prosecutor sought to

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substantiate it by five distinct allegations, which Dr. Forchhammer —after an historical introduction designed to vindicate the Athenian democracy, and to expose the misdeeds of Alcibiades, Critias, Theramenes, and Xenophon—examines separately, and endeavours to illustrate, supply, confirm, and aggravate, so as to establish the prisoner's guilt. Here it will be sufficient briefly to enumerate them. I. Socrates had spoken of the mode of appointing the Archons and other magistrates by lot as foolish (*μωρὸν*—not as Dr. Forchhammer disingenuously mistranslates the expression, *a proceeding of madmen*). II. Two of the men who had brought the greatest evils on Athens, Critias and Alcibiades, were among the disciples of Socrates. III. Socrates persuaded his disciples that he could make them wiser than their parents, and that it was allowable for a son even to use violence with an imbecile father. IV. Socrates taught that the man who possessed the ability and the will to make others wiser and better, was better entitled to their confidence and regard than the nearest relative and the most affectionate friend. V. Socrates was used to quote passages of the most mischievous political tendency from the most celebrated poets, and in particular one from the Iliad (II. 188, foll.), breathing the most anti-democratical spirit, and sanctioning the oppression and misusage of the common people.

It would be an affront to the understanding of an English reader, if I were to set about convincing him that none of these are matters fit to be brought into a court of justice: that even if they might suffice to raise reasonable suspicion that the person to whom they were brought home was disaffected to the existing order of things, and might justify the government under which he lived in viewing him with distrust, they could never, in a rightly constituted commonwealth, become the subject of a criminal prosecution. But this is not the point with which we are immediately concerned. The question which Dr. Forchhammer's pamphlet brings under discussion is, whether Socrates was legally convicted on this evidence. We must therefore inquire what law he was alleged to have broken? A law—as the indictment implies—which forbade the corrupting of the young. But if there was such a law at Athens, we must suppose one of two things: either that the law had some specific meaning which was well understood: that it referred to a certain mode of corrupting the young; or, that it was purposely framed in the most general terms, in order to leave the amplest room for the discretion of the courts in applying it to the cases brought before them. If the law had a specific, definite object, which was well understood, though not distinctly expressed; then we may be sure that it was not pointed against such offences as those of which Socrates was accused, but rather against the crime of debauching the morals of the young, and

seducing them into vicious habits such as they might be most frequently led to form by the example or persuasion of their elders. And if so, it could have been only by a violent and arbitrary interpretation that it was applied to the case of Socrates. In other words, the conviction under this head of the indictment was clearly illegal. But it was no less so if the law was purposely framed in the most comprehensive terms, with a view to leave the courts at liberty to exercise their judgement on the circumstances of every case which could come within that description; as, for instance, one in which unsound religious or political doctrines had been taught to the young. A decision under such a law would not be the less arbitrary, or the more subject to any legal rule, because it was the very aim of the law to release the courts from such subjection, and to invest them with arbitrary power.

Dr. Forchhammer is so little aware of the real question on which his conclusion depends, that he fancies he has gained something for his argument, if he has made it appear that the Athenian institutions were faultless; that Socrates spoke of them in disparaging terms; that he made no secret of his preference for a different form of government; that he would not have scrupled, if an occasion had presented itself, to use violence in order to effect a change in the constitution; and that many of his friends were in a conspiracy to overthrow it. Yet, questionable as some of these propositions are, if they were all admitted they would avail nothing to prove the legality of the verdict against Socrates. Dr. Forchhammer indeed observes (p. 57.) that *it would to be sure be a fine thing if a state could attain to such a degree of independence in its external and internal relations as to be able, without apprehension of danger, to permit free discussion of the principle of its constitution. But what state*, he asks, *has ever permitted that?* — What? not even in private conversation? not even in a philosophical treatise or lecture? one might rather ask, what state has ever forbidden it? And the answer would show that it was not any of those in which liberty has most flourished under the shade of the laws. Greek writers certainly do not seem ever to have thought it necessary to accommodate their political theories to the institutions under which they lived.

But there remains still another point to be considered. Dr. Forchhammer maintains the strict legality not only of the verdict, but of the sentence. And we must inquire how the case stands as to this. The Athenian law, as it is interpreted by Dr. Forchhammer and others, in those cases in which it did not itself fix the penalty of an offence — and to this number that of Socrates belonged — compelled the court to choose between that which was proposed by the prosecutor, and that which, after conviction, might be tendered by the defendant. Dr. Forchhammer calls this a very wise law

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(p. 64.); though its inevitable operation would appear to be, that the punishment adjudged would always either exceed or fall short of the offender's deserts. It was however clearly the intention of the law, that the judges should endeavour to approximate as nearly as they could to the adequate measure of punishment: that they should select that which appeared to them to diverge least either way from the right mean. Of any maxim by which they were held bound to incline to the side of mercy, and above all not to award capital punishment when they did not believe it to be due to the gravity of the offence, though the alternative might be too lenient — of this we have perhaps no right to speak. But Socrates was found guilty only by a majority of three votes; and of the 281 jurors who found this verdict, Dr. Forchhammer himself thinks it certain (f. 65.) that there were few who meant that he should suffer death, and who would not gladly have voted for as light a punishment as could be deemed commensurate with the offence. Socrates however by his refusal to propose one at all approaching to this, *forced his judges*, according to Dr. Forchhammer, to adopt the prosecutor's estimate of his desert. Now undoubtedly with regard to the 281, this might be a sufficient explanation and defence of their conduct; and however we might suspect that they voted under the influence of a different motive, we could not prove that they did not reluctantly take that course which law and justice seemed to them to prescribe. But whereas there had been only a majority of three for the conviction, there was a majority of eighty for the capital sentence. That is to say, seventy-seven of those who had just before pronounced Socrates innocent, now voted for putting him to death. What is the plain unavoidable inference from this fact? Surely it is that they, and the rest who voted with them, were not compelled by their sense of justice, but provoked by the defendant's behaviour and language after the verdict. Let it be admitted that this behaviour was not at all noble and praiseworthy, but in the highest degree offensive and blamable; let us even suppose that in itself it was worthy of death. Still it would be clear that Socrates was tried for one offence, and was condemned to death for another. His punishment therefore might be deserved, but it could not be legal.

Thus then from every point of view we are brought to a conclusion directly opposite to Dr. Forchhammer's, and we must say: *That there never was a case in which murder was more clearly committed under the forms of legal procedure than in the trial of Socrates.* Judicial murders more atrocious in their circumstances may have been perpetrated by the Roman Senate under the emperors, by the Holy Office, and by the Revolutionary Tribunal under the Reign of Terror. But it is only in their proceedings that a parallel

can readily be found to that which Dr. Forchhammer applauds. Their most infamous acts might be in other respects more detestable, but could not be more illegal than this. And we may add that it could be only such tribunals that could listen without disgust and indignation to the arguments by which he has attempted to defend it. For the Athenians indeed much may be pleaded in extenuation or excuse: their old prejudices, their recent sufferings, the final provocation. But none of these pleas can benefit him. It is not the reputation of Socrates that has been damaged by his pamphlet, but his own; and in points of more importance than a literary oversight. Dr. Forchhammer, as I have already noticed, betrays some misgiving as to the impression his work was likely to produce on most of his readers; and at the close (p. 91.) he expresses a good-natured regret, that literary antagonists so rarely find opportunity to form a personal acquaintance with each other, which might correct misunderstandings, and soften their mutual prejudices. Every one who is capable of forming a judgement on the subject of Dr. Forchhammer's pamphlet, may well hope and believe that the man is incomparably better than his book. I can easily imagine that his convivial qualities, to which he delicately alludes, (ibid.) may make amends for his want of intellectual sobriety. But still there is one uncomfortable reflection suggested by the exhibition he has here made of himself to the public. Here is a German scholar, of some note in the literary world; of unquestionable learning and showy talents; one of a class which has exercised and is likely more and more to exert a powerful influence on the political destinies of his country, living in a period of great political excitement and in the midst of a general expectation of organic changes in the national institutions; and he betrays such gross ignorance of the first principles of law, justice, and rational freedom, as proves that he is not only incompetent to have a voice on any great political question, but that he would be utterly unqualified to serve on a common jury.

The intimate connection between the subject of this Appendix and the Clouds of Aristophanes will perhaps be deemed a sufficient excuse for subjoining a brief notice of two views of the comedy, which are almost equally opposed to one another and to that which has been taken of it in this volume. Droysen, in whose writings it is impossible not to perceive a disposition to look at every thing Athenian in the most unfavourable light, will not allow Aristophanes credit for the slightest degree of earnestness or of patriotic or moral feeling. He was the heartless representative of an unprincipled age, with no higher aim than popular applause, and always ready to pander to the corrupt taste of his contemporaries, and to sacrifice whatever was most sacred and venerable—whether things or persons—to his selfish object. It is

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therefore lost labour to try to reconcile his credit for honesty or good intentions with the misrepresentations in the Clouds. The poet did not fling his satire about carelessly or at random, nor was he labouring under any misconception as to the real character of Socrates, but knowingly and wilfully distorted it by a perfidious caricature, which preserved just sufficient likeness to the original to prevent it from being mistaken for any one else. (p. 12.) Neither this nor any other work of Aristophanes, or of the Old Comedy in general, will bear to be tried by any moral standard. The only merit and value of that drama consist in the incomparable perfection of art with which it is endowed. (p. 14.)

Attempts, we know, have been made among ourselves by means of a similar abstraction to vindicate or palliate the grossness and the absence of all moral principles which are admitted on all hands to prevail in our own Comedy of the period next following the Restoration. It would lead us too far away from our present subject, if I were to enter into a discussion on the question, whether that perfection of art which Droysen attributes to the Old Comedy is really consistent with that utter moral depravity which he finds in it. But this comparison suggests one remark which may be worth submitting to the reader's judgement. Whether a comic poet has a right to claim an exemption from the rules of ordinary morality, and to require that no other measure shall be applied to his writings than one either of mere art, or of a conventional and arbitrary code of ethics,—this is a question which may admit of a doubt. But as to the character and tendency of the comic drama of the Restoration, if it is subjected to a moral standard, there cannot be two opinions. If the comic poets of that age were in earnest about anything, it was, as has been ably shown by Mr. Macaulay, in their love and admiration for vice, their contempt and aversion for every kind of moral restraint. It is the very nakedness of their profligacy which has been confounded by some of their apologists with the innocence of paradise. How far it may be extenuated by the general reaction on the forced austerity of the preceding period, is another matter. But if Droysen is right in his estimate of Aristophanes, that poet has created an extraordinary illusion, by which many, and those not the least intelligent among his readers, have been led to believe that he was animated by a very deep, and in the main a right moral feeling: an illusion so strong that it has not been dispelled even by Droysen's exposure. On the contrary it appears (p. 12.) that he has been warmly assailed for the opinion he has expressed on this point, and I am not aware that he has made any converts to it.

But to return to our play. Highly as Droysen admires the poetical art of Aristophanes, he agrees with Hermann that the Clouds is not one of his best pieces. And this judgement he seems to

rest chiefly on three defects which he has observed in the construction of the plot, by which, as he thinks, the poet has violated the rules of art, and the proper character of the Old Comedy, to which he has most successfully adhered in all his other works. In them the action closes with the full triumph of the absurdity which it is the business of the play to exhibit in a ludicrous light. In the Clouds the folly of Strepsiades is checked and corrected, and Socrates—though, as Droysen justly observes, Strepsiades had forced himself and his son upon the master, and therefore should have turned his anger not against him, but against himself—suffers an almost tragical punishment. Again, toward the end of the play the Chorus drops its original character, and, in a tone of severity quite foreign to its mask, represents itself as luring men who are bent on wickedness into evil, that they may learn to fear the gods. (1408.)

ἀεί ποιοῦμεν ταῦθ' ἑκάστοθ', ὅταν τινα
γνῶμεν πονηρῶν ὄντ' ἐραστὴν πραγμάτων,
ἕως ἂν αὐτὸν ἐμβάλωμεν ἐς κακὸν,
ὅπως ἂν εἰδῇ τοὺς θεοὺς δεδοικέναι.

A third point in which Droysen has detected an incongruity, is the dispute between the advocates of the just and the unjust cause. Strepsiades had heard (113.) that the school was furnished with a plea for each side of every question, the right and the wrong; and that of these two the unrighteous plea is enabled to gain the cause.

εἶναι παρ' αὐτοῖς φασὶν ἄμφω τὼ λόγω·
τὸν κρείττον', ὅστις ἐστί, καὶ τὸν ἥττονα·
τούτοιν τὸν ἕτερον τοῖν λόγοιν, τὸν ἥττονα,
νικᾶν λέγοντά φασι τἀδικώτερα.

Since then both the pleas belong to the teaching apparatus of the school—so Droysen argues—both must be stamped with the immoral character of the modern learning. But instead of this, when the two pleas are brought forward personified in two antagonists, that which had been described by Strepsiades as the stronger turns out to be an advocate of right, a champion of the good old times, a personification of the principles which we should have least expected to find in the school; and when at last he is overcome by the arts of his adversary, he takes refuge in the midst of the public, though according to his own description it was the quarter in which he could least look for any sympathy with his sentiments.

I must own that this last exception to the structure of the play appears to me hypercritical and futile. Strepsiades had heard

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that the school could produce two opposite pleas, the one just, and therefore naturally and in itself the stronger, the other unjust; and that it could make the unjust, that which was in itself the weaker, triumph. His object was at first to induce his son to learn the unjust plea, and the art of succeeding with it, in order to defraud his creditors. He uses the terms *just* and *unjust* in their ordinary acceptation. If therefore the two pleas were to appear personified on the stage, one of the orators must have been the advocate of justice in the common sense of the word, and not according to any new-fangled subtilty of the school. Then if it be necessary to explain how a champion of the good old times could issue from such a training-place, it seems easy enough to suppose that a scholar who, like Carneades, could argue equally well in behalf of justice and against it, on this occasion undertook the just cause. But I do not think many readers would feel the need of any explanation, even after the supposed difficulty had been pointed out to them. As to the close of the scene, in which the just pleader abandons his post, and goes over to the spectators (ἐξαντομολῶ πρὸς ὑμᾶς, 1088.) it seems to me a natural consequence of his admission that he was defeated, as well as an exquisite stroke of humour.

But, however this may be, it is rather surprising that Droysen should not have observed, that his three remarks on the plot, more particularly the first two, point to a conclusion very different from any which he intended to be drawn from them, and far more important than the question as to the merit of the play. For the result of the whole is, that Aristophanes here has a little forgotten himself, and in the catastrophe, and the language of the chorus, has sacrificed the rules of art, and the consistency of his drama, to some other object. And this object is evidently that of exciting the indignation of the audience against Socrates. The poet cannot control his own so far as to let off the arch-sophist with no severer penalty than the most complete exhibition of his extravagant perverseness. And when Droysen assumes that the pleader for justice and the old morality is so much in earnest, that he ought not to have been represented as belonging to the school of Socrates, or as mingling with the reprobate multitude—what is this but an involuntary admission that the poet has treated the subject too seriously, and has sacrificed the interests of art to those of morality and religion? Indeed it seems hardly possible to read the play without perceiving that the author is aiming at something more than provoking a laugh at the expense of Socrates: that he is himself under the influence of a strong hostile feeling toward the object of his ridicule; and as we have no reason to suppose that this was a feeling of personal animosity, we can only attribute it to a sincere conviction that he was holding up a mischievous sophist to public contempt and abhorrence.

A very different view of the subject is proposed by Fritzsche in the above-cited dissertation (which forms part of his *Quæstiones Aristophaneæ*, Tom. I.), where he endeavours to save the credit both of Socrates and Aristophanes; but by an extremely complicated hypothesis, which nevertheless answers its purpose but imperfectly. The author himself however believes (p. 103.) that there is nothing recondite, or strained, or over-refined about it, nor anything that might not readily occur to a common reader, or at least, when pointed out, would not be sure of gaining general assent. As to this, some judgement may be formed from a simple report of its leading features, though it would not be fair absolutely to reject it without weighing the author's arguments as they are stated by himself (p. 99—195). He conceives that the difference between the first edition of the Clouds, that which was exhibited, and the second, that which we now read, was much greater than has been commonly supposed. In the former play, Aristophanes levelled his attack chiefly at some of the disciples of Socrates who were the most notorious for their sedulous cultivation of the new sophistical learning, and for the arts of chicanery to which they applied it, and by which they had become the plague and terror of the quiet and honest citizens and strangers, more particularly Alcibiades, Chærephon, Critias, and Theramenes. That this constituted the main argument of the piece, Fritzsche collects from the allusion in the Parabasis of the Wasps 1037—1043. In this play the poet treated Socrates himself very gently, and only ridiculed the excess to which he was thought to have carried his physical speculations, and the dialectic subtilty with which he made the worse appear the better reason, and taught others to do so. The chief ground for this opinion is afforded by the allusions to the play in the Apology, c. 23 and 10. The words καὶ θεοὺς μὴ νομίζειν in the last of these passages are *aliunde petita*, and Fritzsche will not admit that the rest of the description answers to anything we find in the play now extant, which he thinks touches too slightly on the physical investigations of Socrates, as well as on his dialectical sophistry. Whereas in the first Clouds the poet, as he believes, had dwelt upon these matters with such an elaborate parade of erudition, as to weary the audience, which was unable to follow him into such refinements; and to this cause the failure of the piece was principally owing. In support of this surmise Fritzsche lays a strong emphasis on some expressions which occur in the Parabasis of the extant Clouds (510—516.) and of the Wasps (1044—1048.).

All this however is but preliminary to the solution of the problem, which is to explain the form in which the play has come down to us. For this purpose Fritzsche assumes that Aristophanes was deeply mortified by the defeat he had suffered in a

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work on which he had spent so much pains (ἡ παρεσχέ μοι ἔργον πλεῖστον, Clouds 515.), and which he valued above all his former comedies, ἡγούμενος ταύτην σοφώτατ' ἔχειν τῶν ἐμῶν κωμωδιῶν, 514); and this is indeed a very natural supposition. But to this Fritzsche is obliged to add that, partly in consequence of this event, and partly through some other unknown causes, Aristophanes became violently exasperated against Socrates, and, to gratify his resentment, attacked him four or five years after with a number of calumnious imputations, in the extant comedy, which however was not only never brought on the stage, but never finished; for just before the last stroke had been put to it, a reconciliation was effected between the poet and the philosopher, or else the former became sensible in time of the wrong he was doing to an innocent man. Yet neither his conscience nor the reconciliation, withheld him from shewing the work to his friends, by whom it was copied, and brought into general circulation (p. 108.), though his own high estimation of it never induced him to complete it.

That after the production of the Clouds Aristophanes was not on terms of bitter enmity with Socrates, appears probable from several indications which have been pointed out by Fritzsche (p. 194, foll.), beside the famous scene in the Platonic Banquet. But how far this fact, if admitted, will go to sustain his hypothesis, and what the character of Aristophanes gains by this account of his motives, are points which may be left to the reader's judgement. The repentance of the Comic Poet, and his reconciliation with the injured philosopher, also, as I learn from Dr. Forchhammer, form the groundwork of a play of Oehlenschläger, which appeared about the same time with Fritzsche's Dissertation, and, as a work of imagination, is probably far superior to it.

APPENDIX VIII.

ON LYSANDER'S REVOLUTIONARY PROJECTS.


THE account which Plutarch gives, on the authority of Ephorus (ἀνδρὸς ἱστορικοῦ καὶ φιλοσόφου, Lys. 25.) of the mode in which Lysander meant to bring about the revolution which he meditated at Sparta, is chiefly remarkable as it shows the degree of credulity which he attributed to his countrymen. There was, it seems, somewhere on the coast of the Euxine a young impostor named Silenus, who gave himself out as the son of Apollo. Lysander had prevailed on this youth to lend himself to his designs, and hoped first to gain the sanction of the Delphic oracle for the im-

postor's pretensions, and then to use his authority to confirm a forged prophecy which was to be brought to light at Sparta, to the effect that the state would be more prosperous, if the kings were elected from the worthiest citizens. Plutarch conceives that Lysander did not fall upon the thought of this machinery in aid of his revolutionary plans, until they had been so far matured, that he had procured a speech to be written for him by Cleon of Halicarnassus, with which he intended to recommend the measure. He was then struck with the difficulty of the enterprise, and bethought himself of playing upon the superstition and credulity of the Spartans. All was ready for the execution of his project, when one of his associates became frightened, and withdrew; and his own untimely death soon after put an end to it. Nor was it discovered until the speech was found in his house, which however Agesilaus was induced to suppress by the advice of the ephor Lacratidas.


I cannot agree with Manso (*Sparta*, III. 2. p. 47.), that the circumstantial details with which the ancients relate Lysander's project, place the fact beyond doubt; if its credibility rested on no other ground, I should not have been inclined to censure the temerity with which it has been rejected by a modern author, though the reason which he assigns for his incredulity — Xenophon's silence — would not be the less absurd; for the same motives which induced the Spartan government to hush up the affair, would certainly have led Xenophon carefully to avoid all allusions to it. My conviction of the truth of the main fact is grounded chiefly on its perfect congruence with the character, and the position of Lysander, and with several well attested events in his history. The motives which urged Pausanias and Cinadon to a similar enterprise were all combined in Lysander. The ancients indeed do not agree in their accounts of his motives, and consequently differ as to the epoch when he first formed the design. But these discrepancies may be easily reconciled. The authors followed by Nepos ascribed it to his resentment against the ephors who abolished his decarchies; Plutarch, to his quarrel with Agesilaus. Both motives may have conspired to fix his resolution. It was not only, or for the first time, in the abolition of the decarchies that he had been thwarted by the ephors. It appears from Plutarch (Lys. 19, 20.) that still earlier after his triumph at Ægospotami, he had experienced some personal humiliation from them, which must then have been peculiarly irritating to him, from its contrast with the extravagant flattery which he had received abroad, especially in the Ionian cities.

Nevertheless, here again it is only the general fact that we can accept as probable; for it seems impossible to reconcile Plutarch's details with Xenophon's narrative. Plutarch says that Pharnabazus sent envoys to Sparta with complaints against Lysander, on account of damage done to his territory, and that the ephors put his friend










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